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ABSTRACT 
 
INTERPRETING MATERIAL COOPERATION AS A FUNCTION OF MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT TO GUIDE MINISTRY FORMATION 
 
 
 
By 
Steven Joseph Squires 
May 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, Ph.D. 
 While not exactly back room political bargaining, the traditional use of 
cooperation has been by moral theologians attempting to define the level of cooperation 
for a particular situation.  This chosen definition, in turn, may help focus the range of 
appropriate actions in response to the situation‘s circumstances.  In this customary usage, 
an organization‘s associates (employees) may assist the implementation of relevant 
responses to a cooperation analysis, whether the issue is clinical or organizational in 
nature.  They have not been integral to the decision-making process – until now.   
Cooperation has been the proverbial candle under the bushel (Matthew 5:15).  
This paper proposes the involvement of organizations‘ associates not only for decision-
making and discernment, but for their own moral development.  The foundation of this 
thesis is not only that organizations are moral agents, but also that organizations are 
 v 
reflective of the moral development of their associates when they exercise their agency.  
Using this model, this theory advances a use of the principle of cooperation by 
interpreting cooperation as a function of moral development for advancing associates.    
Advancement, in this case, means that, optimally, the process will expose participants to 
individuals in various stages of moral development, challenge them in appropriate ways, 
and enhance their moral development as characterized by Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol 
Gilligan.  Even if participants do not advance in their moral development, the model 
proposed here will form participants in moral decision-making within the Catholic moral 
tradition.  To a lesser degree, it is also a useful ministry discernment tool if appointed to 
discriminate responses to some of the individual and organizational issues (topics) 
mentioned above. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
 
I. Foundational Assumptions: Individual and Group Concepts as Context for the 
Principle of Cooperation 
 
This dissertation includes a breadth of scholarly disciplines.  Ethics, theology, and human 
development (psychology) are primary to developing this proposed application of the 
Roman Catholic moral principle of cooperation.  To a lesser degree, other significant 
subjects are philosophy, education, and anthropology.  As a result of this span, the task of 
this first chapter is to set a sufficient foundation for subsequent chapters. 
 The chapter begins with a description of cultures in order to properly situate the 
context for most uses of the principle of cooperation, a notion that the final chapter will 
challenge.  Defining communitarianism and the common good provides the basis for 
fleshing-out the philosophical and theological milieu of Catholic culture.  Detail 
accompanies the relationship of individual and society because this is the basis for 
understanding the principle of cooperation as a social principle.  Significant care and 
attention go to this section‘s development for this reason as well as the reader‘s 
understanding of the foundational philosophical and theological assumptions about 
individual-societal relationships behind cooperation. 
 At this point, the chapter‘s attention modifies to introduce why this is a relevant 
and timely dissertation, especially for Catholic health care given its tribulations.  The 
reality is that Catholic health care is facing a number of challenges in contemporary U.S. 
culture.  These trials are daunting, many of them having to do with maintaining integrity 
while acting as agents serving in the Spirit of the Gospel and carrying forward the healing 
ministry of Jesus Christ.  It may seem outrageously optimistic to suggest that one 
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principle in the Catholic tradition serves as an inherent social principle and, furthermore, 
is well suited to address the constant bombardment of tests to personal or organizational 
integrity.  Adversity notwithstanding, this is exactly the claim. 
 The progression of this thesis has a focus both on the challenges to Catholic 
health care systems in the U.S. as well as the particular mechanisms to resolve them.  
There are three preeminent trials for Catholic health care: diminishing numbers of women 
religious, organizations‘ failure to fully develop their associates, and incomplete 
appreciation about the individual-societal relationships, culpability, and accountability.  
A principal test is the rapid decrease in numbers of women religious who founded most 
of the U.S. Catholic health care systems.  This presents difficulties for maintaining the 
identity and culture of organizations, which have distinct manners of thinking and 
behaving, with individuals who are unfamiliar with organizational identity and culture 
(and with little or no guidance from members of the founding congregations).  Another 
tribulation generally pertains to how organizations fail to let their associates grow in their 
own development.  People, particularly but not exclusively those in Catholic health care, 
integrate their and the organization‘s values into decision-making.  Values based 
decision-making, ethically integrated decision-making, and integrating mission and 
values into discernments are focal topics in the literature.  Navigating disagreements 
about mission-, values-, and ethics-based decisions is not a prominent literature topic.  An 
omission such as this is both glaring and awkward because people do not develop without 
challenges to the status quo.  This barrier is noteworthy even if it is hidden or 
subconscious.   Full appreciation of the relationship between person, organization, and 
society – as well as a method for discussing the culpability of persons and organizations 
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with an evil, injustice, or malfeasance – is the final ordeal.  The remainder of this chapter 
defines the principle of cooperation as an inherently social principle; explains how it is 
complementary to some of the difficulties facing individuals and organizations because 
of its nature; and entertains why its suggested new uses, such as group discernment for 
non-traditional issues, bring cooperation back to its original purpose. 
IA. Anthropology for the Traditional Use of Cooperation: An Illustration of Self vs. Other 
All are agents of culture.  Patterns of human behavior (i.e. beliefs, values, 
attitudes, norms, knowledge, religion, order and hierarchies, etc.) – that people are 
capable of learning and transmitting from generation to another – describe how people 
embody culture.  It is possible for large numbers of people, a large group or society, to 
have similar behavior patterns.  A dominant culture is a group of persons where the 
majority in the group, or the persons in power within the group, has similar or shared 
patterns of behavior.  A group that shares various behavior patterns with the dominant 
group whilst having its own distinct behavior patterns (from the dominant culture) is a 
subculture.  Occasionally, subcultures‘ behaviors involve rejecting the dominant group, 
establishing the group as countercultural.
1
 
The character and type of relationship or interaction between the dominant 
culture, subcultures, and countercultures depends on where and when one looks as well 
as the scope (range, boundaries) for such an investigation.  For instance, a contemporary 
Caucasian European, Roman Catholic lady from the Basque area may likely find herself 
in the current dominant European culture.  Still – with willing suspension of disbelief – 
she would find herself in a subculture, or counterculture, nearly anywhere in the 1800s 
within the United States.  Shakespeare‘s writings are replete with characters that are not 
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part of the dominant culture: He contrasts Shylock and other Jewish characters in The 
Merchant of Venice
2
 and the noble Moor Othello in Othello
3
 to the prevailing Venetian 
culture. 
With a counterculture, one may infer a dissonance or disconnect between the 
subculture choosing to part with the dominant culture.  This does not imply a total 
synergy between a dominant culture and subcultures.  Differences are, in fact, what 
differentiate subcultures from a dominant culture.  Occasionally, these distinctions have 
been pronounced – enough so that they form a palpable wedge between the cultures.  The 
wedge, in some cases, pierces so profoundly that a tension develops between the cultures.  
A counterculture arises when cultural tensions advance into outright rejection of the 
dominant culture by the subculture.  Examples of a well-known counterculture are the 
hip-radical movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s that was effectively two 
subgroups, the hippies and the radicals.
4
 
At the outset, the reader may assume that this dissertation hones its scope to two 
relevant cultures, each with contextually specific subcultures discussed below.  The two 
cultures are, after all, the two typically discussed in issues of applying the principle of 
cooperation, which is the Catholic moral principle at the core of this dissertation.  These 
cultures are relevant to this milieu; still there is broader appeal beyond the two groups.  
The conclusion explains the expansive applicability of the model detailed here. 
First, one culture is the Roman Catholic culture, generally, with its beliefs, values, 
attitudes, mores and norms, knowledge, religious identity, hierarchies, artifacts and 
possessions.  The Roman Catholic culture is wide-ranging.  There are about 
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1,146,656,000 persons (17.3%) who identify themselves as Roman Catholic worldwide 
(world population of approximately 6,617, 097,000).
5
   
Narrowing the focus slightly, this dissertation studies predominantly the Roman 
Catholic Church in the United States (U.S.).  One in four persons in the U.S. are Catholic, 
meaning that about 25% of the adult (>18 years-old) U.S. population self-identifies as 
Catholic.  The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life corroborates their findings with 
General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the 
University of Chicago starting in 1972 about the dynamic changes that have and will 
occur with the numbers of Catholics in the U.S.: The 25% of Catholics in the U.S. has 
held steady in recent decades.  Although the number is static, assuming little change in 
the influences of this percentage is wrong.  Of the Pew Forum U.S. survey respondents, 
about one-third of those self-identified as raised Catholic are not currently Catholic, 
meaning that 10% of Americans are former Catholics.  This American attrition is offset 
somewhat by the people who convert to Catholicism (2.6%) but also the large number of 
Catholic immigrants to the U.S.  For instance, one of every three adult Catholics in the 
U.S. is Latino, which ―may account for an even larger share of U.S. Catholics in the 
future.‖6   
Catholics are a subculture within the U.S., where the Protestant culture still 
predominates.  Framing U.S. cultures as Christian and non-Christian, Christian culture 
prevails, with Catholicism as a part of the dominant culture.  Catholicism differs in many 
significant ways from Protestantism and, as such, it is easy to frame it as distinct from 
Protestantism using the former distinction rather than the latter. 
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Almost any organization could apply this cooperation model, as discussed later.  
Still, the traditional use of cooperation has occurred largely within Catholic health care 
organizations and systems.  Associates or employees in Catholic health care may be 
another relevant Catholic subculture according to conventional uses.  In the U.S., there 
are about 62 Catholic health care systems, 615 Catholic acute care organizations, and 
1,400 Catholic long-term care organizations (nursing homes), surgical centers, and clinics 
present in all 50 states.  These Catholic health care organizations treat one of six people 
(15.5%) hospitalized in the U.S., accounting for 20% of all admissions in 20 states, and 
provide work for over one million people, with 598,934 full-time equivalent employees 
(FTEs) in Catholic acute care organizations.
7
  Not all associates working in Catholic 
health care are Catholic themselves.  Irrespective of their personal faith traditions 
(gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socio-economic status), associates of Catholic 
health care organizations abide by the tenets of the Catholic Church as articulated by a 
variety of sources. 
Second, the other extensive culture is society.  This includes secular society 
counting other-than-Catholic persons.  Not every group categorically adheres to the 
principles and goals of the Catholic faith.  In a world of about seven billion people, less 
than 20% belong to the first cultural group (Catholics). 
The expression that the former group, the Catholic Church and those who embody 
its values, ascribes to the latter group, society, is the common good.  The common good 
is ―the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their 
individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.‖8  The 
Catholic social encyclical Rerum novarum refers to the definition and purpose of the 
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common good.
9
  Stated differently, Catholics understand the common good as the most 
basic, foundational condition for a good society, which all members of the diverse human 
community share.
10
  Foundational to the common good are at least two concepts.  The 
first is the respect for the human dignity of each person, which is the responsibility of 
everyone.
11
  The principle of solidarity encapsulates the second.  Solidarity is the 
recognition that everyone in the world depends on each other; people are interdependent 
and ―keepers [of their] brothers and sisters.‖12  The demands of the human community 
surpass all individuals‘ differences (i.e. ethnicity, nationality, socioeconomic status, 
gender, age, and sexual preference).
13
  It is through the model of Jesus and his agapaic 
love (a.k.a. non-erotic, sexually-disinterested love, similar to friendship or social 
charity
14
) that persons respect the needs of the others by ordering their goods and works 
toward the common good, rather than the wants of particular individuals. 
A question surfacing when comparing and contrasting these cultures is about the 
appropriateness of assuming that the relevant subcultures of society for this dissertation 
are the U.S. culture and local sub communities (cities, districts, states, regions) if U.S. 
Catholics and Catholic health care are relevant subsets of Catholicism worldwide.  Yes, 
this assumption is appropriate and correct.  Still, the issue about the relation between 
Catholics and Catholic subcultures with society for the common good is complex. 
The common good is a declarative statement about justice, similar to the idea of a 
socially just society.  As a justice concept, there are different ways that one may measure 
the ‗achievement‘ of a just society (i.e. each person achieves his or her due based on 
merit or achievement, freely agreed social contract, the maximization of happiness and 
minimization of pain, community consensus or concurrence about priorities, expanding 
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or making the most of individual liberties or working agreements, or through the absolute 
equity of each individual).  Additionally, each one of these, as well as other, 
measurements implies a different method or mode to work towards the fulfillment of a 
just society. 
Historically, the Catholic Church has witnessed similar considerations – that is, 
different modes of working towards, achieving, and defining universal goods and justice 
– with the common good.  Charlie Curran summarizes some of the developments 
associated with the common good in his book Catholic Social Teaching 1981 - Present: 
A Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis:  First, Catholic social teaching has 
moved from a denunciation of concepts perceived as individualistic such as liberty, 
participation, and equity to their emphasis in current teaching.  Second, contemporary 
Church teaching acknowledges a distinction between the temporal common good and the 
spiritual common good, which is not the case in earlier teaching.  Third, the scope of the 
common good has become worldwide in current Catholic social teaching as opposed to 
previous emphases on specific societies and nation-states.
15
 
IB. Philosophical Milieu for Typical Uses of the Principle of Cooperation 
One may correctly assume that Catholic concept of societal common good, 
meaning the rapport and affiliation between Catholics (and those embodying Catholic 
ideals and ministering within the Catholic tradition) and society-at-large, is not only 
enmeshed but presupposes certain ethics and justice theories.  In other words, achieving 
the common good benefits Catholics and other-than-Catholics alike.  Boundaries between 
Catholics and other-than-Catholic society are porous and nebulous.  Chapter two 
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discusses the perimeters and flux between Catholic and societal ideals in much more 
detail. 
The most basic supposition of Catholic ethics and justice theories is that they have 
their basis in empirical metaethical absolutist theory.  Metaethical absolutism generally 
means that ethical judgments ―have meaning and can be verified.‖16  There can be many 
sources of reality including supernatural or divine revelation, rationality, intuition (moral 
sensibility), or reality in this case.  Thus, the verification of meaning for empirical 
metaethical absolutist theory is through the study of reality.  Objects of study may 
include the individual and society through modes of study that use reason and experience.  
Examples within the Catholic tradition include scripture and the magisterium, both of 
which affirm independently validated and discerned facts of human experience.  It is 
from this ‗starting position‘ that many other ethics and justice frameworks have their 
grounding, such as the natural law.
17
 
An ethics or justice theory presupposed by empirical metaethical absolutism is 
communitarianism.  Mark Kuczewski, a bioethicist and self-disclosed and public 
communitarian, describes communitarianism: 
Communitarianism is a neo-Aristotelian philosophy that focuses 
on the common good [emphasis added] and is concerned with the 
relationship between the good person or good citizen and the good 
of the community or society.  As would be expected, it has much 
in common with other neo-Aristotelian approaches, such as 
casuistry and virtue ethics.  Communitarianism is both a critique of 
the dominant Western ideology of liberal individualism and an 
orientation to ethical problem solving.
18
 
 
Communitarians believe that elements of collective understanding have been lost and 
warrant discovery or rediscovery.  The process of rediscovering is not an easy one, but 
according to some, it is the only germane salve for the wound of a fractured society.  One 
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may have difficulty labeling all communitarians.  Nevertheless, many communitarians 
are skeptical of deontological ethics and liberal democratic theory and practices.  
Differences between communitarians evidence themselves in the nuances of the critical 
assessments of liberal theory.
19
  Individuals need to interact together in society in order to 
discover a core or common morality shared by individuals bound through common 
culture(s).   
Justice for the communitarian is dependent on history, tradition, solidarity, and 
relation of individuals to the community and vice-versa.  Community needs and goods 
take priority before individual needs and goods.  For some communitarians, the basis for 
true societal consensus and justice is a core or common morality resulting in ―a shared 
vision of the good life or shared hierarchy of goods.‖20  ‗The proof is in the pudding,‘ 
meaning that members of society would not debate the constitutive elements of the 
shared vision or hierarchy of goods if they rediscovered their common morality.  Given 
the divisiveness within contemporary American society – ranging from issues counting 
pro-life or pro-choice ideologies in the abortion debate, and access to reasonable 
healthcare as a right or healthcare as a commodity in American politics – a shared vision 
and hierarchy of goods is far from reality.  Hence, it is tricky to argue that persons share a 
core or common morality.  The pudding is not there.  For other communitarians, there are 
easier ways of reconstituting the common morality of sub communities, and then society-
at-large. 
 Kuczewski believes that the communitarian movement started in the early 1980s 
with works that emphasized the topics of responsibility and community.  Examples of 
acknowledged early communitarian works include Alasdair MacIntyre‘s After Virtue 
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(1981) and Michael Sandel‘s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).21  The 
communitarian philosophical review of liberalism in the 1980s gave rise to even more 
communitarian approaches in the 1990s.
22
 
 Social psychology and the relationship of the self to others is a metaphor for 
communitarianism and the relationship between Catholicism and society.  One of the 
fundamental concepts for each person is a sense of self.  Still, people realize quickly in 
their infancy that they are social creatures and rely on others, while their conscious 
awareness about their environment expands.
23
  Environment and others influence 
persons‘ behavior and conception of self.  These influences are so significant that a 
branch of psychology, called social psychology, is the systematic study of the thoughts, 
influences, and relationships of others to self.  As a capstone for this point and metaphor, 
the chapter on social psychology in an introductory psychology textbook begins with a 
quote from Herman Melville: ―‗We cannot live for ourselves alone, for our lives are 
connected by a thousand invisible threads.‘‖24 
IC. Theological Milieu for Typical Uses of the Principle of Cooperation 
 Readers and participants in the model detailed in this dissertation who are 
Catholic, work for Catholic systems, or otherwise commit to Catholic ideals and 
foundations may identify with the foundations of Catholicism directly.  Many can speak 
in the first-person about their knowledge and experiences related to Catholicism and its 
ministry, ideals, and interaction with society; Catholicism is self for those in this group.  
Similar to the skin, which is the barrier demarcating self from environment and others, 
one can identify those who claim to uphold the Catholic faith including one‘s own self.  
Environment may be a part of self, defined in a Catholic context.  For instance, entering 
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any door to walk inside a Catholic health care organization, such as an acute care 
hospital, may serve as a reminder about self or, at least, the Catholic faith and its 
interdependent function with society.  An associate (employee) of a Catholic hospital 
ministry may think, The people within these walls are the living legacy of the founding 
Sisters, and as one of these people, I am an exemplar, who is to live the mission and 
ministry of the Sisters and the Catholic Church both inside and outside of these walls.   
Catholic social encyclicals consistently emphasize the collective and social nature 
of human beings, which is the foundation of Catholicism and strikingly similar to, if not, 
communitarianism in its origin.
25
  Towing the line between capitalism without welfare 
and socialism, Pope Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum, 1891) defines the proper role of the State 
as serving the common good of its people, calls for strengthening entire commonwealth 
by achieving its Christian end, condones distributive justice because the goal of society is 
to make people better, asks citizens to contribute to the common good and rulers to 
protect the community and common good.
26
  Pope John XXIII states that persons are 
innately social and, as such, live in community and further each other, thereby creating an 
ordered society in the (1963) encyclical Peace on Earth (Pacem in Terris).
27
  In addition 
to Rerum novarum (mentioned above), Pope Paul VI‘s (1967) On the Development of 
Peoples (Populorum progressio) enunciates, again, that it is social connection that binds 
all persons together.  It is the responsibility of all people to advance society‘s 
development.  The reality of being human with societal solidarity corresponds with the 
reality of obligation to all members of society.
28
  Pope John Paul II, in (1987) On Social 
Concern (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis), comments:  
The obligation to commit oneself to the development of peoples is 
not just an individual duty, and still less an individualistic one, as if 
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it were possible to achieve this development through the isolated 
efforts of each individual. It is an imperative, which obliges each 
and every man and woman, as well as societies and nations.
29
 
 
He reaffirms the teachings of Rerum novarum in (1991) The Hundredth Year (Centesimus 
annus) by reiterating and insisting that human goods, including work (that is also 
communal in nature) and facets of private property ownership, are for everyone.  
Everyone should distribute accordingly with this end in mind.
30
   
Pope Benedict XVI, quotes the Leviticus 19:18 (―You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself‖) as constructing an obligation to share love with others, which is reflective of 
God‘s love for all, in his encyclical (2005) God Is Love (Deus Caritas Est).31  Pope 
Benedict XVI echoes his own message in Deus Caritas Est with (2009) Charity in Truth 
(Caritas In Veritate):   
Another important consideration is the common good. To love 
someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps 
to secure it. Besides the good of the individual, there is a good that 
is linked to living in society: the common good. It is the good of 
―all of us‖, made up of individuals, families and intermediate 
groups who together constitute society. It is a good that is sought 
not for its own sake, but for the people who belong to the social 
community and who can only really and effectively pursue their 
good within it. To desire the common good and strive towards it is 
a requirement of justice and charity. To take a stand for the 
common good is on the one hand to be solicitous for, and on the 
other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of institutions that give 
structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and 
culturally, making it the pólis, or ―city‖. The more we strive to 
secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of our 
neighbours, the more effectively we love them. Every Christian is 
called to practise this charity, in a manner corresponding to his 
vocation and according to the degree of influence he wields in the 
pólis.
32
 
 
 14 
As stated above, agapaic love is the sisterly or brotherly love modeled by Jesus.  Charity 
is imbedded in agapaic love.  Loving others with charity means that one treats them justly 
because justice is indivisible from charity.  Justice and charity have an inextricable link.
33
 
ID. Interactions and Boundaries between Individuals and Communities (Society) 
 Personal success and leadership consultant and author Linda Galindo uses 
foundational social psychology in her book The 85% Solution.  The environment and 
others influence people.  The extent that society and environment modifies behavior, 
including how behavior modifies, is up to the individual as a result of her conscious, 
subconscious, or unconscious choice.  People tend to be happier or more successful the 
more that they take responsibility for their own actions, rather than blame challenges on 
the environment or society.
34
 
 Galindo‘s observations are particularly relevant to the communitarian and 
Catholic contexts.  Some people may find it all too easy to ‗opt out‘ of communal 
decision-making for several reasons.  In response, on one hand, apathy and disinterest do 
not dissolve the inherent bonds between the person – or small group – and the rest of the 
community (society).  For instance, consider the petulant teenager who considers other 
family members square and not cool.  No amount of denial about family attachments or 
wishing for disownment will resolve the inherent union of person with family.  The same 
holds true for Catholics who wish to totally cloister themselves from other-than-Catholic 
society or, at bare minimum, from other individuals who are not Catholic.  Functioning in 
contemporary civilization, with only a few exceptions, necessitates a baseline of 
interactions with others, whether it is for food, education, or work to secure basic 
necessities.  Additionally, and discussed in greater detail in chapter two, there is a Gospel 
 15 
message that yields a paradoxical relationship: the Church lives in the world to spread her 
message throughout, whilst still retaining qualities that make her distinctive for Catholics 
and Christians. 
 Denial is a similar quality to apathy and disinterest for these purposes.  Like 
apathy and disinterest, denying the connections between self and other – or Catholic-
minded and other-than-Catholic-minded – does not absolve intrinsic correlations 
between.  The ending of the documentary film Food, Inc. unequivocally draws out this 
connection.  Movie viewers discover the unethical practices in the food industry, 
including the inhumane treatment of animals, may wish to conduct ‗business as usual.‘  
For many of us, the norm includes eating foods of convenience (despite inhumane, 
unsanitary harvest and slaughter practices of unhealthy foods to begin with) that we 
purchase cheaply (despite the fact that most food is the most inexpensive it has ever been 
in history).  While pontificating on the abhorrence of such practices, some will do things 
like stop for fast food on the way home from a late night at work.  Thoughts (intent), 
articulations (communication), and behavior (action) are incongruent in this case, similar 
to previous examples.  One of the narrators, Michael Pollan or Eric Schlosser – Schlosser 
authored the bestseller book called Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All American 
Meal that serves as one of the inspirations for the movie – nicely summarizes the idea 
that denial can contribute to inequitable or unethical practices.  He suggests that there are 
things persons can do to ensure congruence between thoughts and actions.  They can buy 
organic, local crops and, if we choose not to be vegetarian, meat from humanely raised, 
free-range animals.  Like it or not, everyone affects food industry practices with their 
vote.  Everyone cast their vote on this issue at least three times a day.
35
 
 16 
 These examples serve not just as exemplars of community decision-making and 
its relation to the individual; they provide for other meanings (understandings) of 
communitarianism, including methods or processes in addition to structures or 
compositions.  From Kuczewski‘s description, the reader may rightly understand that 
individual rights and welfare are inherently tied with the rights and welfare of others (the 
community).  Ideally, there is a balance between individual and community good, which 
is difficult in practice (discussed later).  In situations of competition or conflict, 
communitarians understand that the community may take priority over the individual.  
Communitarianism also is process, describing forms of communal deliberation using 
specific means to advance mutual group decisions and norms.
36
  Scholars have proposed 
several different methods for communal consideration,
37
 so one does not need to lock 
communitarianism into one particular method. (It is beyond the scope to detail all the 
various communitarian deliberative mechanisms beyond a cursory sketch.  Mark 
Kuczewski masterfully summarizes the ―whole tradition‖ method of reconstructing moral 
concepts within the specific tradition(s) that will truly understand them, as advanced by 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas.  Moreover, Kuczewski discusses the 
framework called liberal communitarianism, typified by a public deliberative process 
with participants from various moral traditions.  This means that communal consensus 
defines and structures this ―whole tradition‖ method, which reflects the minimal shared 
understandings and respects the rights of all its individual participants, as advanced by 
Ezekiel Emanuel.)
38
   
 Individuals – especially in societies that value individualism such as the U.S. – 
may feel highly uncomfortable with community as the locus of decision-making as well 
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as the idea that community needs and good may trump individuals‘ needs and goods.  
Communitarianism is not totalitarianism.
39
  (Gerald Gutek typifies totalitarianism as ―a 
system, headed by a single person or party, that seeks complete or total control over all 
aspects of life – social, cultural, economic, and educational.  It uses the agencies such as 
courts, schools, the media, churches, youth organizations, and art to carry out the policies 
of the leader or party…[the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini are examples of totalitarian 
establishments].‖)  Beauchamp specifies that in communitarianism, groups are given 
preference in decision-making and priority (moral preference of values, duties, goals, or 
consequences) with decisions over individuals, but this does not mean that the 
community decides everything.  Individuals have liberty to determine their own 
priorities, which communitarians acknowledge and may include a conscious or 
unconscious refutation of communal priorities.  Ethics is an enterprise that is both 
descriptive, determining what is, as well as prescriptive, establishing what ought to be; in 
communitarianism, the community prescribes or determines what ought to be.
 
 It may 
deem a person who disregards the communal norms as either inconsequential or immoral, 
especially if the person‘s values are different from the community‘s values.  Some draw a 
more decisive line between the individual and community.  Those persons accept that 
individuals‘ autonomous actions are contrary to the larger groups (i.e. sub communities, 
communities, society) that exist to guide decision-making.
40
 
 A profound tension exists between balancing individual freedoms (liberties) with 
community needs.  Stated differently, the strain itself is about where to ‗draw the line‘ 
between respecting the autonomous choice of individuals and the justice for the 
 18 
community.  This stress is one that communitarians and other scholars, both secular and 
religious, are aware of its existence. 
 Jonathan Moreno, a secular philosopher, describes individual-societal tensions as 
they relate to this thesis of consensus: 
Consensus…is reached in a social context.  To understand 
consensus processes fully requires the study of subjects proper to 
fields such as communications and small group theory.  The study 
of consensus also comports with the recent growth of philosophical 
interest in the idea of community.  Those who strive to find a 
middle ground between individualism and socialism often call 
themselves communitarians, emphasizing the importance of 
common interests and responsibilities as a basis for novel means to 
manage seemingly recalcitrant societal problems.  I do not claim 
expertise in this philosophy, but the study of consensus is surely an 
important feature of communitarianism.
41
 
 
Not all philosophers understand individual-societal relationships in the same way.  John 
Gray introduces the concept of modus vivendi, which refers to working relationships 
between people and society.  Individuals do not have inherent, immutable rights.  They 
have ―enforceable conventions,‖ and it is in the best interest of government or society to 
recognize, respect, and protect these conventions.
42
  The individual-societal tension is 
evident, albeit in a different form than Moreno‘s.  Think of modus vivendi individual-
societal affiliation as a pendulum that tries to stay at its lowest point.  This point is the 
place where there is a balance between individuals and society.  Raising the pendulum up 
on one side creates potential energy that tries to turn into kinetic energy so the pendulum 
will go back to its center.  The metaphor continues that the pendulum going up on one 
side is similar to a government or society that does not respect the conventions of the 
individual.  The transfer of potential energy into kinetic represents the changing of 
societal regimes in order to readjust the individual-societal arrangement. 
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 Church documents also reflect the paradoxical nature between individual freedom 
and advancement of the common good.  A passage in Pope Leo XIII‘s Of New Things 
(Rerum Novarum) quotes Thomas Aquinas with reference to personal property and 
possessions.  It is lawful and possibly necessary, according to Aquinas, to have personal 
property and possessions.  However, the end or purpose of ownership is not only for the 
self.  Persons should consider possessions as common to all, taking only what they need 
and giving the excess to others.  Doing this should provide everyone with necessities 
without surplus.
43
   
Pope Paul VI‘s (1965) Joy and Hope (Gaudium et spes) specifies that individual 
freedom is a prerequisite to seeking good.  On one hand, some use their individual 
liberties to act selfishly either due to internal motivations or yielding to external pressures 
by pursuing those things that benefit themselves (the individual).  Actions such as these 
may, in fact, ignore or disadvantage the community.  These behaviors are the result of 
social tensions between the social, economic, and political spheres on one level.  In a 
more basic way, individual conceit, greed, and egoism cause disequilibria on the societal 
level.  On the other hand, others either consciously or unconsciously realize that 
individuals are reliant on one another.  This reliance grows and persons become more 
interdependent as the world develops through technological and intellectual innovations.  
Full respect for individual dignity includes comprehending how secular laws and society 
promote a vision of Christian revelation that encourages the complete communion of 
human persons.  The counterweight or ‗equal and opposite reaction‘ to the duty of 
individuals to society is the obligation of society to provide basic necessities such as 
food, clothing, and shelter as well as fundamental rights such as liberty, education, 
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employment, existence in good repute, respect, suitable information, to act in accord with 
one‘s conscience, to defend privacy, and religious freedom. The tie or mediating factor 
between the individual and society is the interdependence needed for the development of 
both.  An insoluble connection exists between individual and community flourishing.  
After all, the purpose of social institutions is for the person who is, in turn, totally reliant 
on social institutions for his or her prosperity.
44
 
 Pope John Paul II cites the biblical passage about Cain and Abel (Genesis 4:9) 
and being ―our brother‘s keeper‖ as the foundation for similar comments about the 
paradoxical dependency of individuals to society and vice-versa.  God grants freedom 
and this freedom is innately communal and relational.  A person can abuse his or her 
liberties: 
…The roots of the contradiction between the solemn affirmation of 
human rights and their tragic denial in practice lies in a notion of 
freedom which exalts the isolated individual in an absolute way, 
and gives no place to solidarity, to openness to others and service 
of them… [W]hen freedom is made absolute in an individualistic 
way, it is emptied of its original content, and its very meaning and 
dignity are contradicted. 
 
There is an even more profound aspect which needs to be 
emphasized: freedom negates and destroys itself, and becomes a 
factor leading to the destruction of others, when it no longer 
recognizes and respects its essential link with the truth. When 
freedom, out of a desire to emancipate itself from all forms of 
tradition and authority, shuts out even the most obvious evidence 
of an objective and universal truth, which is the foundation of 
personal and social life, then the person ends up by no longer 
taking as the sole and indisputable point of reference for his own 
choices the truth about good and evil, but only his subjective and 
changeable opinion or, indeed, his selfish interest and whim.
45
 
 
Evangelium vitae continues with the explanation about why the use of freedom in this 
way is a distortion of communal life.  Absolute autonomy – in the form of positive liberty 
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(a state of existence structured towards allowing people to act in whatever ways they 
wish) – intrinsically results in impinging the autonomy – in the form of negative liberty 
(a state of being totally free from force, coercion, or harm) – of others.  Society becomes 
merely a collection of individuals without any shared ties.  Practices do not advance the 
common good; their design is for the progression of each person individually, in order to 
further the agendas of individuals.
46
 
 The anthropological, philosophical, and theological stage has been set, positioning 
the background for more specific problems facing health care generally and Catholic 
health care specifically.  A philosophical theory, communitarianism, and its theological 
embodiment, fidelity to the common good, create an undividable link between 
individuals and their society with community at the core of moral decision-making.  
There is tension involving boundaries, or where to draw the line around individual 
autonomy and community justice for the benefit of others.  Whereas the tension is 
applied and tangible (e.g., the accumulation of personal possessions and wealth versus 
appropriately tithing for the maximum benefit of the community), it will remain 
predominantly theoretical for our purposes.  Its service was groundwork for the latter 
portion of the chapter, which investigates some of the tangible challenges facing Catholic 
health care organizations. 
 
II. Pivotal Times for Catholic Health Care: Challenges as Straws Piling on a 
Camel’s Back 
 
 Roman Catholic health care is facing challenging if not perilous times.  Certain 
needs, like decreasing acute care patient volumes and reimbursement for services, are 
universal challenges in U.S. health care and, as such, not unique to Catholic health care.  
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Other facets of these difficult times are unique to the identity and mission of Catholic 
health care.  Catholic identity and mission are venerable and essential, albeit that their 
existence places additional demands on the ministry of Catholic health care.  This 
dissertation addresses the distinctive nature and demands of Catholic health care before 
extrapolating insights to other organizations in the final chapter.  
 Two broad categories suffice as the starting position for describing the precise 
characteristics of the summons for Catholic health care.  First, one group relates to the 
role of Catholic health care organizations with society, meaning external influences of 
organizations, which is critical.  Perhaps the external pressures are the best known 
because they are the most visible to the people working outside of Catholic health care.  
The progression of the line of reasoning will be chronological because some external 
challenges have opposed Catholic health care since its advent in the U.S. 
IIA. Historical Tests for Health Care and Catholic Health Care 
Almost by definition, Catholic organizations reflect the story of courage and 
optimism in the face of adversity, down to their placement or locale.  Catholic 
organizations are often in geographic areas with high concentrations of indigent and 
neglected people where Catholicism is not the primary religion.
47
  Their geographic 
placement is deliberative, because the prophetic mission of such organizations 
corresponds with service to those who are poor or neglected.
48
  The first Catholic 
infirmary – established in Baltimore by the University of Maryland physicians in 1823 – 
is an example, which had the mission of delivering ―‗piety, charity, and usefulness…for 
the sick, aged, infirmed,‘‖ … ―‗poor, prisoners and others.‘‖49  (A notable distinction 
from the Christopher Kauffman is that the Ursuline sisters opened a state facility in New 
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Orleans around 1627.  This was considered an almshouse and not a hospital or 
infirmary.)
50
 
Placement of Catholic hospitals has been strategic since the advent of Catholic 
health care in the U.S.  The central consideration and barrier in hospital placement is how 
to best meet the needs of communities.  Approaches or tactics reflect the dichotomies 
between self and other as well as honoring integrity, Catholic integrity in this case, while 
serving in the larger community, which was and is pluralistic. 
Exemplifying this was Bishop of New York, John Hughes, who established St. 
Vincent‘s in New York during the mid-1800s.  According to Bishop Hughes, two reasons 
existed for the existence and strategic placement of Catholic hospitals.
51
  (For people 
such as Hughes and Kenrick, their intentions were reflected in the second item – Catholic 
institutions should be bastions of Roman Catholicism.  The mainline Protestantism 
prevalent in society was a clear and present danger for the few Catholic organizations at 
the time.  Their ideology suggested a fear that the new American, Protestant society 
would ‗water down‘ the mother sauce of Roman Catholicism into a mushy, melting pot, 
resulting in a diluted roux of American Catholicism.  Hospitals were only one facet of 
their desire to establish multiple institutions, including schools, infirmaries, hospitals, 
churches, and other outreach missions.)
52
  Primarily, they should attract people in need 
from any denomination or faith tradition together with their spiritual advisors.  Catholics 
at the time knew of instances, now documented, when priests were not allowed access to 
Catholic patients in Protestant hospitals and wards.  Catholic hospitals‘ staff members 
were to be open and accepting, serving as exemplars and virtuous role models for 
pluralistic communities.  Fulfilling this need had profound results.  Proselytism of 
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patients and advocates was somewhat successful and certainly commendable according to 
Bishop Hughes.  Subsequent to this, Catholic hospitals also served a role for Catholics in 
the local communities.  Bishop Hughes was candid about his perspective that Catholic 
hospitals provided Catholics safe havens or sanctuaries from the predominant Protestant 
culture.  Protestants, according to Hughes, were known for their religious prejudice, 
paternalism, and (ironically) proselytism.
53
 
Demand for the Church‘s healing mission grew.  Tom Nairn comments on the 
relationship between external need (demand) and the Church‘s response (supply): 
[In the 18th and 19th centuries,] more and more religious 
communities of women were founded to carry out particular 
apostolic activities. Caring for the sick once again became a 
communal vocation. When these religious communities came 
to the United States, hospitals were among the institutions that 
they founded.
54
 
 
Many of these communities devoted themselves to either education or health care.  In 
1949, approximately five of 16 communities of women religious in the U.S. were actively 
engaged in health care.  About 75 Catholic hospitals existed by 1875, and nearly 400 
existed by the turn of the century (1900).  With the mission of caring for sick poor and 
underserved, the challenge for communities of women religious became the rapid 
expansion of the country and increases in this population.
55
 
 For years, women religious, including congregations of sisters, met the rapid 
growth of U.S. society.  Women were involved prominently in most aspects of Church 
ministry.  They were the infrastructure of the parish, and in many ways, the most visible 
parts of parish ministry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Many more 
women entered convents when compared to their brothers in seminaries and monasteries.  
Triple the number of women religious existed for every priest by 1965.
56
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The demand (need) for deliberately placed (location) health care services 
continues, but the intricate expansion (―evolution‖ was not used because it suggests 
sophistication that the modern U.S. health care system lacks) of health care delivery 
placed new demands on Catholic hospitals and health care systems.  There were several 
reasons for the rapid changes in health care delivery.  First, shifts in the focus of health 
care itself began, from managing symptoms of large groups in epidemics in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, to surviving acute events and trauma in the mid-1900s, to chronic 
disease management in the late 1900s, which continues today.  Second, the rapid 
expansion of technology – that was minimal in the early 1900s but had unparalleled 
growth in the mid-1900s and late 1900s – transformed the way acute care organizations 
delivered care.  Hospitals focused not just on caring and symptom management.  The 
science of medicine changed them to places for cure – they were byproducts of the new 
emphasis on scientific methods, research and inquiry, and identification using 
laboratories.
57
  New technology, equipment (X-rays in the late 1800s and the 
electrocardiogram and electroencephalogram in the early 1900s
58
) and medications (e.g. 
penicillin, sulfonamides, and vaccines in the mid-1900s
59
), procedures (e.g. antiseptic 
surgery in the late 1800s
60
), and techniques required superior skills and backgrounds 
from medical professionals.  To compete, acute care organizations needed a greater 
breadth of professionals than ever before.
61
   
Hand-in-hand with other changes, the social organization of health care in the 
U.S. itself changed from virtually nothing in the early 1900s to our current system of 
infinite, unwieldy intricacy.  Rudimentary efforts to provide medical services at a 
discount (for the volume) was the employment of physicians directly by industries (i.e. 
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railroads, lumbar, textile, and mining), lodges, and fraternal orders in the early 1900s, 
followed by the establishment of the first private physicians‘ group practices.  Rather 
than industries employing physicians directly, industries instituted contractual 
relationship with hospital associations, especially within the states of Washington and 
Oregon and Texas, in the 1930s and 1940s.
62
  Just prior to this time was ―the birth of the 
Blues‖ (the now-mammoth Blue Cross and Blue Shield), which began in Dallas in 1929 
when several hospitals including Baylor University Hospital and Methodist Hospital 
contracted with school teachers and others groups to provide up to a few weeks of 
hospital care for $6-9 per person.
63
   
Employer and hospital cooperative insurance expanded as well as other new fee-
for-service indemnity health insurance arrangements after World War II.  These 
eventually included the dawn of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the 1970s 
and preferred provider organizations in the 1980s.  Patchwork efforts by the U.S. Federal 
Government have extensively altered provisions of care for the public, purchasers, 
payers, providers, and brokers as well as created public assistance or welfare medicine 
programs.  Examples include the Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 founding 
Medicaid, instituting Medicare in 1965 after the precursor Title XVIII of the Social 
Security Act in 1957, the 1973 HMO Act allowing for economic incentives to start 
federally qualified HMOs, and the creation of Medicare diagnosis related groups (DRGs) 
with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TERFA) in 1982.
64
  Rapid changes 
continued from the mid-1990s until the present day.  Philip Keane identifies the major 
trends of the transformation, which consist of ―the burgeoning growth of managed 
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care…[and] a government policy of piecemeal changes in health care coupled with 
substantial reductions in the rate of government spending on health care.‖65 
All of the described changes had profound impact on the expectations of hospitals 
and other acute care facilities, beginning with the need for sterile surgical suites after 
popular use of antiseptics.  Space for both surgical services and recovery (post-op) was at 
a premium, and hospitals needed to expand in order to provide a continuity of care.  The 
addition of dedicated technical laborers (e.g. medical technicians and specialists) and 
necessary support functions in the physical facilities (e.g. hotels, food services and 
cafeterias, and laboratories) required new financial resources.  To a lesser extent, an 
‗answer‘ to this strain was the systematic, business-model management of hospitals, 
signifying a transition from informal, trustee management to formal, bureaucratic 
management that still exists in the present day.  To a greater extent, income arrived 
through the requirement of greater payment for services by patients, which catalyzed at 
least two other events.  Hospitals benefited by having additional space available for more 
paying patients.  Another way to encourage hospital patriotism or allegiance was to 
increase the number of staff appointments and affiliated physicians who brought their 
own patient clientele.  The expansion of hospitals was so rapid that it outpaced the 
graduation rate and numbers of physicians; demand for physicians increased as well as 
the competitiveness between hospitals.  Lastly, technological progress, financial 
incentives to control costs, and decreasing inpatient volumes produced most of the 
present difficulties for hospitals – the need to integrate delivery across the continuum of 
care, expand services (i.e. provide more outpatient and ambulatory services), leverage the 
economies of their size and scale, and provide local access to highly specialized 
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services.
66
  The outcome of all the influences was a chain reaction that continues 
presently and accounts for the modern-day challenges of hospitals. 
Perhaps the most visible and striking symptom of contemporary hospital 
tribulations is in the creation of hospital systems and the merging of hospitals and 
systems.
67
  James Tubbs reports on a 2002 study by Bazzoli and colleagues that listed the 
top three reasons for hospital mergers in 1983-1986 and 1989-1996 (the top three reasons 
were the same in both time periods): to consolidate services, for operational economies, 
and to strengthen the organizations‘ financial stability.68  Hospitals characteristically 
consolidated (and continue to consolidate) services in two ways – horizontally or 
vertically.  Horizontal integration is when facilities and services at the same point or 
stage in the continuum of patient care join that streamlines services, eliminates excess 
and waste, and leverages economies of scale (useful for purchasing).  Examples are 
several hospitals coming together to form a health care system.  Vertical integration 
describes situations when a single organization organizes or commences several, often 
sequential, stages in patients‘ continuum of care.  Examples are the assimilation of 
physicians‘ practices, rehabilitation clinics and centers, acute care facilities, long-term 
care, and geriatric services.
69
  The type of management provided by multi-hospital health 
care systems varies, with some having a loose, holding system management and others 
having a tight, corporate operational management and supervision.
70
 
Consolidation of hospitals and services began in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting 
from the variables mentioned above, and rapidly picked-up pace in the mid-1990s with 
relevant current examples.
71
  Before these time periods, there were few mergers and 
consolidations. Only five examples of consolidations existed in 1961.  About fifty per 
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year occurred in the early 1970s.  There were between 176 and 245 multi-hospital 
systems in 1980 (depending on the survey used), accounting for about 30 percent of 
hospital beds in the U.S.
72
  According to Tubbs, citing data about hospital mergers and 
acquisitions from Irving Levin Associates: 
The trend peaked in the period 1994-1997…with 163 deals 
completed in 1996 and a record 197 deals in 1997.  During that 
period the number of hospitals belonging to health networks or 
systems also increased significantly, from 56.2 percent in 1994 
to 70.9 percent in 1998.  By the beginning of the new century, 
the frequency of deals had declined somewhat, to 86 in 2000 
and 83 in 2001, yet these numbers remain much higher than 
pre-1990 levels.
73
 
 
While the number of mergers and acquisitions steadily decreased from the 1990s until 
2003, the trend of mergers has crept back up from 2003 to 2008 with the number of 
hospitals within the deals between 149 and 249 for three of the years in this period.
74
  In 
other words, the era of hospital and health care system mergers and consolidations has 
hardly tapered off, and evidence subsists of mergers between bigger hospital and health 
care systems. 
IIB. Contemporary Challenges for Catholic Health Care 
 Catholic health care is not immune from the external stresses mentioned here.  In 
fact, Catholic organizations are just as susceptible to pressure from the outside as other-
than-Catholic institutions.  Recent challenges to health care mentioned above, including 
the requisite to curtail expenditures, create new dilemmas for Catholic organizations with 
missions of providing care for, especially, the poor and underserved, based off of the 
fundamental commitment that health care is an essential, human right.
75
  New structural 
and operating arrangements such as mergers and collaborations with other organizations 
are ways to continue operations and, sometimes, to ensure survival.  Not surprisingly, the 
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numbers of mergers, affiliations, and joint ventures between non-Catholic and the 
nation‘s largest private health care provider, the health care facilities of the Catholic 
Church, continue to be higher than pre-1990s levels.
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 The other set of issues also have to do with Catholic health care carrying out her 
mission.  Contrary to the former group, this consortium of dilemmas has to do with 
internal struggles and the availability of resources to fulfill the mission of Catholic health 
care.  Internal predicaments mentioned below may be distinctive to Catholic health care, 
whereas the external quandaries indicated above are considerable but not exclusive to 
Catholic organizations. 
 It is safe to presume that there will always be people available to continue the 
healing ministry of Jesus, as told through the Gospel stories.  Equally as reasonable is the 
supposition that the constituency or characteristics of people who carry out the Gospel 
ministries of healing have not and will not remain the same.  As implied in the chapter‘s 
beginning, culture is not stagnant but is always shifting.  Dynamics of Catholic health 
care are in such transition that one may wonder if previous shifts were mere tremors 
before ‗the big one,‘ meaning the record setting, off-the-Richter-scale earthquake of 
movement within Catholic organizations currently. 
 Congregations of men and women religious founded most of the Catholic health 
care systems in the United States.
77
  Sisters especially were actively involved, not only in 
mission and governance, but in administration and operations.  Until the mid- to late 20
th
 
Century, nuns were so represented in day-to-day caregiving (i.e. clinical care, spiritual 
care, food services, and housekeeping) that patients thought of them symbolically, as 
God‘s earthy presence rather than as people.78  Women religious acknowledged, 
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accepted, and fostered their angelic persona.  Christopher Kauffman quotes Mother Mary 
Xavier Clark, a Sister of Charity, who wrote the following in a manual for sister nurses: 
On the modesty; prudence and religious spirit which should 
always adorn a person consecrated to God The eyes of a sister 
should never rest upon any man‘s face; she should merely give 
the look that charity demands of her, and see… if the patient 
looks better or worse and that will suffice. A patient should be 
able to say, when a Sister leaves his bedside, ‗That Sister is 
more like an angel than a human being: — The very sight of 
her makes me think of God and love him.‘79 
 
This was congruent with the memory and personal experience of elders in the Squires 
family (including the extended family, the Grasleys and the Downings).  Generations of 
the Squires family, dating back to the 1800s, lived in southeastern Michigan where the 
Saint Joseph Mercy Hospital in Ann Arbor has served community residents.  It has been 
there for all stages of life; family members have been born, ill, and have died within the 
hospital and under the auspices of its extended care services.  Loyal Grassley, a Squires 
family member, wrote a poem titled ―Angels in Our Midst‖ remembering a bout of illness 
requiring hospitalization and thinking of his nurses, some of who were nuns.  (Loyal 
Grassley was this author‘s great grandfather and paternal grandmother‘s, Laura May 
Squires, father.  He wrote the poem after an experience at Saint Joseph Mercy Saline, 
which part of the Saint Joseph Mercy Health System.)  Ransom Squires recalled when 
nuns sat with patients, one per room, throughout the course of their illness, even if they 
did not have any pressing needs.  Their visibility and presence to patients was what 
differentiated Catholic health care from others.  (Ransom Squires was this author‘s 
paternal grandfather who was a farmer all of his life.  He died in 2008 while receiving 
care from Saint Joseph Mercy Health System home hospice after being treated for cancer 
at Saint Joseph Mercy Hospital in Ann Arbor.) 
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Men and women in Catholic health care ministry were the Jacks-and-Jills-of-all-
trades.  The same brothers and sisters often tended to many now-separate functions while 
a patient was in the hospital; they were the orderlies, nurses, housekeepers, spiritual 
caregivers, food service workers, and administrators (trustees).  Because of the loose 
structure of hospitals, organizations had more institutional self-determinism, and its 
employees (associates) had additional leeway when compared with present day 
counterparts.
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 A couple reasons exist for the change in this now-dated milieu, typified by less 
involvement from women religious in the day-to-day operations and administration of 
hospitals.  First, discoveries and advances in science and technology led to medical care 
in hospitals, laboratories, and schools being more formal, systematic, and specialized, as 
noted above.
81
  These improvements had recognizable side effects.  Professional 
colleagues joined the likes of the scholarly profession of medicine with the establishment 
of formal academic programs and skills training.  For example, Paul Starr traces the 
professionalization of nursing in the U.S. to the founding of three training schools in New 
York, New Haven, and Boston in 1873.
82
  More laypersons
83
 slowly entered hospitals and 
health care systems as qualifications became more specific.  Just as gradually, the 
predominant concern of Catholic health care became the encroachment of secularization.  
Nuns and brothers accommodated the change by becoming professionalized while still 
maintaining their individual subcultures, both Catholic and to their religious congregation 
or order.  Women and men religious were less diversified but had more specialized 
knowledge and skills than their 1800s counterparts.
84
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 Second, Catholic health care was affected by a decline the number of women 
choosing religious life as their calling, which was symptomatic and indicative of a larger 
multinational trend.  Congregations of women religious have been a part of the Catholic 
Church almost since the beginnings of Christianity; despite their early establishments, 
they face a current crisis.
85
  There were 181,421 U.S. nuns in 1965.  This number of 
women dropped to 153,645 by 1970 when, along with declines in women taking vows, 
4,337 women left their orders and congregations.  There were 92,107 nuns in 1995, 
roughly half the amount in 30 years prior, 68,000 in 2006, and only 59,000 in 2009.
86
  
The decline in the amount of nuns was 54 percent between 1945 and 2000 (from 122,159 
to 79,876).
87
   
The statistics validate the experiences and observations of associates (employees) 
in the Trinity Health Home Office (corporate office) who have witnessed the 
diminishment in the number of sisters in all areas of the Trinity Health Home Office.  
Within the last five years, women religious have gone from at least half-a-dozen full-time 
associates to one full-time and one part-time associate.  Trinity Health is not the only 
health system to experience the reality that as smaller numbers of women go into 
religious life, fewer women religious enter the health care setting.
88
 
 The founders of Catholic health care systems bring many notable qualities to the 
table that laypersons generally have less familiarity with.  Such features were and are 
innate to persons religious.  They are also attributes that help make Catholic health care 
unique and meaningful to patients.  Nuns, brothers, and priests owe, in part, these 
attributes to their specialized training, which involves their vocation and formation. 
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 The journey begins with vocation, which depicts when men and women who have 
an ―inner conversion experience of the transforming power of divine grace…[followed 
by] a public commitment to a calling…which took the form of disciplines and productive 
work.‖89 Those persons, who profess themselves within the Catholic Church, although 
vocation may be a secular term as well, commit to a life that has both individual and 
societal import.
90
  Some religious orders are geared towards the contemplative life, but 
others are active.  Although orders and congregations began being specialized in the 
1930s, there were elements of their enculturation or formation that remain.  Women and 
men religious have unique cultural ideologies of values, beliefs, ideas, theology, symbols, 
and ecclesiology.  They have social order, which incorporates various role relationships 
(hierarchies within, between, and outside the orders or congregations).  Each group has 
its own social resources, such as education, training, professionalization, and physical 
(‗bricks-and-mortar‘) facilities.91  
A detailed description of formation is in chapter five of this thesis.  At a glance, 
formation is inculcation or indoctrination into a way of being.  Forming religious 
candidates has the goal of initiating the person to religious life and generating awareness 
of distinctive characteristics within the Church, seeking to support candidates and persons 
religious through recognizing and appreciating their call to Christ through words of the 
Spirit, by means of spiritual, apostolic, doctrinal, and practical components.
92
  Formation 
catalyzes candidates to realize and then incorporate and expand their religious identity so 
that the person will be pertinent, helpful, and authentic in their witness and participation 
with God and the works of the Spirit.
93
  Both before and after the Second Vatican 
Council (Vatican II), formation of men and women religious has been a priority of the 
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Catholic Church.  Evangelical counsels produced a series of recommendations for 
superiors, provincials, and formation directors, which include precise and universal 
directives for the formation of candidates into religious life (e.g. how to practice chastity, 
poverty, and obedience).
94
 
Congregations of women have distinguishing attributes common to all, which is 
similar to many communities of men: They live simply and are celibate.  The community, 
rather than the individual, makes decisions.  Inasmuch as it is the predominant 
characteristic of some communities, all communities deliberately dedicate time to 
thoughtful prayer and contemplation.  In addition, communities work to address the needs 
of others, especially the poor, disenfranchised, and underserved.  (The charter of religious 
communities, even the cloistered ones, to have a service component ‗in the world‘ was a 
byproduct of the 20
th
 Century Church and the Second Vatican Council.)
95
 
In addition to universal directives, each religious congregation or order has its 
own charism or distinctiveness that permeates religious orders and communities, giving 
them a unique disposition.
96
  The following examples use the two predominant founding 
congregations of Trinity Health in its 2000 establishment: Sisters of the Holy Cross 
embody the characteristics of their founder, Fr. Basil Moreau, with the core values of 
compassion, faith, prayer, and community for the ends of serving as prophetic witnesses 
to transform and bring hope to a fragmented world, supporting right relationships in 
diverse communities, promoting ecological sustainability, advocating for systemic 
change with poor, underserved, impoverished, and excluded persons through political, 
economic, and social mechanisms.
97
  The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas exhibit their 
charism by serving in education, health care, and other ministries in order to advance the 
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further the well-being (that may be social, political, economic, or spiritual) of God‘s 
people, address concerns, care for the poor and women, create a spirit of hospitality, and 
address Christ‘s mission through mercy, justice, and collaboration by working alongside 
others.
98,  
There are other examples of charisms including the Dominican Sisters of St. 
Cecelia, who define their congregation as both contemplative – by dedicating times and 
places to silence, living in community and cloistered (at times), wearing a habit, regular 
prayer and devotions, choral recitations, and living simply in poverty – and active – 
mainly through teaching, education, and religious formation.  An additional example is 
the sisters in the Mother Joseph Province of the Sisters of Providence and their 
expression of their charism as ―the manifestation of the mysteries of the Providence of 
God and Our Mother of Sorrows in compassionate love and creative, prophetic solidarity 
with the poor.‖99 
These circumstances beg a question about how organizations prepare themselves 
continue the specific missions of the founding sisters by reflecting and serving within the 
distinctive charisms of the founding congregations, even though the numbers of sisters 
are shrinking.  It is commonplace now to have predominantly laypersons in the 
administration and operations of hospital systems.  Laypersons can and do answer 
callings to serve in business and corporate culture, including hospitals and health care 
systems.
100
  Still, they do not have the training and backgrounds, the formation, of 
religious sisters.   
Additional considerations and demands on an organization‘s internal resources 
include its ability to maturely discern or reflect on issues that are important to the 
 37 
organization.  Discernment and decision-making are processes that, at least in Catholic 
health care, include mechanisms to encourage the integration of an organization‘s 
mission, vision, values, and behaviors with the relevant issue.  During discernments or 
decision-making, associates project their own development, values, and mores into their 
choices.  Organizations are reflective of their constituent parts; therefore, it benefits an 
organization for its associates to make good decisions, which presumably embody the 
culture of its religious founders.  The decrease in nuns, brothers, and priests and increase 
in laypersons within hospitals and systems begs other inquiries related to moral and 
values based discernment and decision-making:  One may speculate about lay associates‘ 
awareness of the charisms, values, and priorities of the religious congregations or orders 
that founded the hospital or health system (often partially articulated in mission, core 
value, integrity, and behavior statements).  Given awareness of these characteristics, one 
wonders about their application and implementation in organizational decisions and 
discernments.  Another reasonable query also pertains to decisions and discernments, 
namely if they are reflective of the priorities, charisms, and values of the founding 
congregations or orders. 
The broad answer to many of the internal and external challenges in Catholic 
health care is the development and formation of lay associates in health care systems.  
Obviously, the lives and careers of most professionals do not permit them to take vows to 
religious orders or congregations for similar knowledge and training to the organization‘s 
founders.  This is not only impractical; it is unreasonable to suggest for reasons that 
involve family, lifestyle, commitments, finances, and time.  Consequently, health care 
formation programs have structures that are conducive for participants to acquire 
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knowledge and skills using modes that are much more accessible for working 
professionals. 
All these features act together with each other much like a pressure cooker.  
External and internal demands rise like heat from a burner.  A high temperature causes 
the pressure to increase in the sealed vessel, or the cooker, which represents the 
organization.  The fare inside the cooker is akin to the internal and external stakeholders 
of the organization, meaning those people within and outside of the organization who are 
impacted by its decisions.  The pressure needs to be just right to cook the food.  Too little 
is usually not the problem – the meal needs to cook longer.  Too much pressure not only 
ruins the meal, but it can be disaster in the form of an explosive cooker ejecting its 
contents with such force that it damages everything around it.  Continuing the metaphor, 
excessive strain on an organization, including its associates and communities they serve, 
can spell disaster in the form of collateral damage.  What an organization needs is a 
release valve. 
This dissertation describes a new, novel, and innovative use of the principle of 
cooperation as this valve, more specifically, by interpreting the principle of cooperation 
as a function of moral development.  Moral development of participants with the model is 
not guaranteed.  Even if participants do not develop, the model is an instrument for 
ministry discernment and ministry formation.  Material cooperation is a principle of 
Catholic moral theology; and as such, moral theologians are the primary users, applying 
it to a specific range of issues confronting Catholic organizations.  This proposal 
theorizes that the principle lends itself to a broader interpretation, use, and application, 
mainly for moral development, and to a lesser degree, ministry formation and ministry 
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discernment.  It is precisely material cooperation‘s complexity that lends itself to these 
purposes.  When used in this way, (completing the metaphor) the principle is not only a 
release valve on the pressure cooker, it is akin to loosening the lid or opening the vessel 
so that the pressure is right all the time. 
IIC. The Ideal Release Valve: Cooperation as a Social Principle 
 A natural, next question is about what makes cooperation the appropriate release 
valve?  The characteristics that make cooperation unique and distinct from other 
principles in Catholic teaching are answers to this question.  This section addresses the 
distinguishing attributes of cooperation, which make it best for development and 
formation. 
Many principles reveal inherent concern with the integrity of decisions.  For 
example, the principle of subsidiarity pertains to persons making decisions at the most 
appropriate level and forum.  In other words, leaders should not trump decision-making 
or sequester decisional authority.  Decisions should belong to those people most affected 
by the results of that decision, thus ensuring a measure of integrity in the process of 
decision-making.
101
  Cooperation, as well, intrinsically concentrates on decisional 
veracity.  
In contrast to other principles, including subsidiarity, we know that people, other-
than-Catholics in many cases, do things that those in the Catholic tradition do not fully 
agree with.  An option is for persons to indiscriminately participate in the questioned 
activity.  Another is total removal and isolation from set questionable activity.  Tensions 
exist between these two, arguably, diametrically opposed choices.  Christians live in 
society, which is one they may not totally agree with, and they must question where to 
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‗draw the line‘ between loosening the veil to let down their hair and building up their 
cloisters even higher.  Stated differently, it is responsibility of those upholding Catholic 
norms to consider where the line is, based upon the characteristics of a situation.  In some 
cases, this means sticking to Catholic norms and principles at the expense of participating 
in community.  In others, it means recognizing that continuing in the spirit of the ministry 
of Jesus, articulated in the Gospels, means that Catholics and Christians inevitably get 
their hands dirty.  Cooperation inherently expresses this particular tension in ways that 
other principles, such as subsidiarity, does not. 
Various different agencies, some explicit and others implicit, accompany different 
Catholic moral principles.  This statement merits further attention.  A significant number 
of Catholic moral principles address only one agent, which is the person acting or 
refraining from a moral decision, one behavior, which may be an action or omission by 
the same or another agent, and predominantly one stakeholder, meaning that the import 
of the action or omission is principally one person.  These principles are individual in 
character.  For instance, a hospital ethics consultant attends to a case where an 88-year-
old man and father of two, ‗Lou,‘ with decisional capacity in multiple organ system 
failure looks to frame his treatment options.  The intervention that is foremost in his mind 
is his dialysis, but he would also like to consider his rapidly escalating hospital bills left 
for his family.  This case is similar to others where the moral agent is also the primary 
stakeholder.  The ethicist or clinician structures the conversation using the principle of 
proportionate and disproportionate means, articulated by Directives 56 and 57 in the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs) and the 
ordinary and extraordinary means distinction in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
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Faith‘s (CDF‘s) Declaration on Euthanasia.102  Lou is the agent making the decision, 
will authorize one behavior (or interconnected series of behaviors), and will bear the 
import of his decision.  The context of the principle is individual. 
Likewise, the clinicians and ethicist working with Katherine‘s, a 51-year-old 
patient and mother of three, request for framing options, including double mastectomy, 
responding to her aggressive but still local cancer may know about the principle of 
totality and integrity.  They mention the approach with the best outcomes and least bodily 
harm.  Katherine ultimately makes the decision, approves a behavior that may also be a 
series of behaviors, and is the person most affected by the decision.  Similar to 
proportionate and disproportionate means considerations, the principles of totality and 
integrity – describing the duty to preserve the body and spirit in total form unless there is 
a proportionate benefit to the harm or side effects
103
 – are individual in their situation. 
Other principles may seem social in character, but are more individual than not.  
For example, double effect reasoning (DER) or the principle of double effect (PDE) 
describes an action or omission that has two foreseen effects, one intended and the other 
not.  An action is licit or ―permissible if and only if‖ it meets a series of, typically, four 
conditions (discussed later).
104
  The action or omission under consideration is the result of 
one agent, can impact another person, and a third person could authorize the choice.  It is 
understandable why DER may seem social or communal.  Still, it is not because DER 
only refers to the agent and that person’s choice, including intent and circumstances, 
despite its appearance.  DER is largely a single-agency principle. 
The principle of cooperation joins the likes of other principles and theories, such 
as common good and the closely related distributive justice, which are social or 
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communal.  The common good and its necessary components of respect for persons, 
social welfare, and peace and security apply to a choice or series of choices.
105
  It reminds 
the agent and decider that choices have greater import and impact than ‗just‘ the 
individual.  Distributive justice is another consideration interconnected with the common 
good.  This is the justice due to individuals from a community or society, which may 
depend on individual needs (wishes) and contributions, communal or societal resources, 
and the organization of distribution mechanisms.
106
  It is equitable allocation for 
individuals and groups that incorporates benefit, burden, macroallocation, and 
microallocation factors.
107
  Common good and distributive justice relate such that 
―society ought to structure itself so that individuals are able to participate in it and ought 
to distribute its goods and resources in ways that are equitable (which is not the same as 
equal).‖108  Using Kantian terminology, the common good is the end that depends on 
needs, resources, and order (organization) while distributive justice describes any number 
of means to that end.  In other words, distributive justice describes various routes for 
achieving the teleological goals of the common good.  (Teleology is the ethics theory of 
orienting ones decisions and behavior to a final cause or goal.  Aquinas linked the 
concept of finality with ―the good‖ because agents position themselves to achieve 
both.)
109
  An individual or group may make the decision, approve a behavior or series of 
behaviors, and the decision impacts multiple stakeholders who may or may not be the 
person(s) making the decision.  Applying common good and distributive justice 
considerations to a situation has a much more communal- or group-orientation than the 
principle of proportionate and disproportionate means, the principles of totality and 
integrity, and DER.   
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A unique factor regarding the principle of cooperation when compared with other 
communal principles and theories is that it is inherently a multiple-agency principle.  
There are two people or groups with moral instrumentality – the agent is the one 
responsible for the sin, injustice, or malfeasance in question (that cooperators or others 
are assessing) while the cooperator is the one with some type of connection (relationship) 
with the agent.  There are two behaviors (acts or omissions) – the behavior of the agent 
and the behavior of the cooperator.  The cooperator clarifies the naturalistic fallacy.  (The 
origin of the naturalistic fallacy is the philosopher G.E. Moore, who observed that people 
often justify moral conclusions as ‗good‘ because they are linked to happiness, 
development, evolution, or survivability.  In contemporary philosophy, it is also known 
as the ―is-ought‖ distinction or problem because it describes situations where people infer 
what ought to be from what is.)
110
  This person questions, What should our level of 
participation be with something we do not agree with, irrespective of the current 
situation?  Should what is also be what ought to be?  The cooperator implements his or 
her agency by either forming or continuing a relationship with the agent or distancing or 
ending the relationship.  Cooperation refers to multiple agents and their choices and, as 
such, is a multi-agency principle. 
Previously discussed and other Catholic moral principles and theories have 
multiple agents focused on a decision, which may or may not involve a series of 
behaviors towards a desired end, outcome, or duty.  (That is, one could describe social 
principles as being deontological, teleological, or consequential.)  For instance, the 
common good and distributive justice may apply to numerous people – there can be many 
stakeholders.  Likewise, multiple persons can make and authorize a decision with 
 44 
common good and distributive justice considerations that affects the stakeholders.  The 
common good remains unfulfilled.  Nonetheless, it has received well-deserved attention, 
enough to surmise that what is does not comport with what ought to be.  The decision-at-
hand is a vehicle – who, what, when, why, and how – for achieving the desired state or 
goods.  For instance, the principle of stewardship, a chief concern for Catholic health 
care, implores its users to take responsibility for God‘s creations, as humans were 
entrusted with ―limited dominion‖ over the environment and animals.111  Human and 
other animal life as well as the environment deserves careful consideration when human 
activities impact them.
112
  Similar to the common good, the principle of stewardship may 
entail multiple agents making choices that affect multiple stakeholders.  The focus in the 
application of the principles is the decision itself, and how the decision bears on the, as 
yet, unachieved goal, consequence, or duty.  
In contrast to these other principles, the principle of cooperation intrinsically is 
about relationships with an achieved goal, consequence, or duty.  The endpoint of 
applying cooperation has been determined – it is the evil, injustice, or malfeasance 
committed by the moral agent.  Perpetration of the ‗sin‘ either has or continues to occur.  
(Persons will not agree to the weight and categorization of any particular action as sin, 
injustice, or malfeasance.  For these purposes, the Catholic Church weighs and 
categorizes sin even though we may personally disagree.)  For example, a small, regional, 
Catholic health care system regards a partnership with a Protestant hospital within the 
same region that continues to perform elective sterilizations.  Due diligence catalyzes the 
request from the Catholic system that the Protestant hospital cease and desist its elective 
sterilization program.  The Protestant hospital does not agree.  In this case, the evils 
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defined by the Catholic Church continue, and the cooperator questions: What must be the 
nature of relationship, if at all, to the Protestant hospital for the Catholic system to 
maintain its integrity while working with this system doing evil according to the Catholic 
Church?  The agent (the Protestant hospital in this case) can agree to stop committing the 
evil.  As a result, the need to use the principle of cooperation may not exist, as it is 
generally about the relationship with someone committing evil.  It is cooperation, 
however, that may catalyze appreciation for the need to maintain apposite distance from 
another‘s moral evil, which results in a cease and desist request to the other moral agent.  
Even in this scenario, the impact of cooperation on new relationships is evident.  The 
cooperator proclaims to the agent: Continuing to behave in this way may impact our 
plans for continuing or developing our affiliation.  
The import of cooperation in the ministry of Catholic health care is significant 
already.  The entirety of Part Six in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services (ERDs) uses cooperation as a framework for the formation of new 
partnerships with Catholic health care.  Cooperation‘s impact becomes even more 
significant as a multi-agency principle for fostering organizational virtue for a couple 
reasons.  As inferred from the example above and detailed later, organizations are moral 
agents; they have moral agency.  Organizations must determine the best option between 
competing or conflicting choices in order exercise their agency with integrity.  This is the 
work of both organizational ethics and cooperation, when used in this context.  The 
‗other,‘ meaning the agent(s) under scrutiny for questionable decisions, may be secular 
(non-religious) organizations and society.  It may also be the organization itself.  In other 
words, organizational integrity concerns how organizations respond to internal dilemmas 
 46 
and decisions with questionable morality.  Virtuous organizations have moral integrity 
because they have both internal and external focus.  From a psychological and 
developmental standpoint, moral organizations have both customer-focused agency, 
focused on product and societal impact, as well as self-discerning or self-reflective 
capacity, with a focus on ethical process.  Incidentally, the last description is also one 
commonly captured in the definition of organizational ethics.
113
  Cooperation enjoys 
unique standing as a multi-agency, social principle oriented to relationships and good for 
analyzing choices both internal and external to the organization that the agent does not 
agree with. 
It is worth mentioning some examples of what multi-agency dilemmas in 
organizational ethics within Catholic health care systems look like.  This first of two 
examples involves a dilemma faced by many health care systems, while not referencing 
any actual, existing system in particular: The human resources department in hypothetical 
Agape Health recently made a controversial decision regarding employee benefits.  In 
short, Agape Health approved an initiative for every associate to purchase a minimal 
level of health care and life insurance benefits.  This requirement did not exist previously.  
They are considering broadening this to other benefits such as dental and vision.  Income 
and position within the organization do not make a difference.  Associates in human 
resources justify their decision on the grounds that many within the organization with 
lower incomes do not buy insurance, even though these people need it the same or more 
than others.  They argue that support is found within Catholic social teaching, which 
states that everyone has ―the right to life, rest, medical care, … [and] security in the event 
of sickness.‖114 
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The second example occurs before commentary about the first, as the discussion 
of each has similar elements and follows this example.  Alike to the first, it references an 
oft-encountered situation, without referring to any existent health system in particular.  
The disputed situation, in contrast to the first situation, occurs outside the organization: A 
regional, Catholic system, St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH), signed a letter of 
intent (LOI) to form a partnership with a small, accountable health network, St. 
Bernardine of Siena Wellness System (SBW), originally Catholic, sold to a Protestant 
denomination, which sold it again.  A secular company operates SBW now, which is 
locally reputable and gaining national attention, mainly for its high reported patient 
satisfaction scores and efficient coordination of care.  SBW includes two acute care 
facilities and a number of point-of-care, multi-specialty clinics with state-of-the-art 
technology for diagnostics, wellness (fitness), and coordination of care (e.g., electronic 
appointment scheduling and video and IM capabilities with physicians, nutritionists, 
therapists, wellness coaches, and other professionals).  The LOI, signed after the due 
diligence processes of both organizations, specifies that they will slowly increase their 
operational integration over two years.  This process recently started.   
Some of the associates from SFH notice what they describe as troubling processes 
at SBW despite the unproblematic due diligence.  First, more questions now exist about 
the technological capabilities of SBW.  In short, access to care is great for those who 
have computers with internet connections.  Customer service is poor for persons using the 
telephone.  This issue is one of socio-economic justice: people who are more affluent 
receive better service.  Second, SBW is beginning a preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) program.  PGD describes ―techniques involving both genetic diagnostic 
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technology and assisted reproductive technology (ART) to gain genetic information about 
a newly conceived embryo prior to the establishment of uterine pregnancy,‖115  The 
developing PGD program did not appear in the due diligence process and most ART is 
problematic and prohibited by Catholic teaching.  Third, SBW has not stopped its 
involvement with the selective reduction (e.g., multifetal pregnancy reduction is the 
abortion of one or more fetuses to increase chances for normal gestation, development, 
and viability for the remaining fetuses).
116
  Due diligence provisions from SFH demanded 
the program‘s abolition prior to the integration of the organizations, because of Church 
prohibitions of affiliations with organizations that terminate pregnancies.  Fourth, there is 
evidence of patient ‗cherry-picking‘ and ‗dumping,‘ practices designed, in this case, to 
retain patients who are healthier and give better satisfaction scores, despite the moral 
repugnance and illegality of such practices.  One could assess any of these practices 
individually using the principle of cooperation.  Another concern is that SBW and SFH 
associates witnessed SBW administrators commenting, ―We are too far along now to 
make such changes,‖ ―This deal needs to go through,‖ and ―We can sweep this under the 
carpet and revisit when there is less scrutiny.‖  The overarching concern is now about the 
cultural fit of SBW with SFH. 
In the first example, the problem is that other elements are missed with a narrow 
focus on Catholic social teaching, which has many facets.  For instance, one component 
may be the living wage and the inability of people with low incomes to pay bills for basic 
needs along with health care for family.  The central question is about if there other ways 
to provide health care for the working poor and underserved without creating additional 
problems, such as loss of income.  The second example involves the issue of cultural fit 
 49 
between a Catholic system, which fosters respect for all people in words and actions, and 
a system that seems to be deceptive or negligent in many areas.  In both cases, the social 
effects of using this multi-agency principle to assess the situations are evident, albeit with 
multiple agents within the same organization in the former example and multiple agents 
in different organizations in the latter.   
IID. Future Hindsight – A Solution Becomes a Problem: Lessons Learned from Casuistry 
 
The model of cooperation proposed here would be effective for moral 
development and ministry formation of associates in addition to the application of 
cooperation as issue discernment.  Chapter two discusses some of the emblematic 
functions of cooperation; it is a staple for mergers and acquisitions.  As this thesis 
demonstrates, its contemporary use and relevancy to the similar types of situations is 
ominous. 
Lord Byron and Lord Halifax both comment that the past is the best predictor of 
the future.
117
  Søren Kierkegaard is attributed with the quote, ―Life can only be 
understood backwards, but it must be lived forward.‖118  The wisdom of these sayings has 
relevance for these purposes.  Account for and learn from the past while bearing in mind 
that future situations in the experience of living life forward may not share the same 
characteristics of the past.  Analyzing the present and adapting for the future requires a 
measure of creativity when applying lessons from the past. 
Such is the case with applying the learning from the historical context of 
cooperation and casuistry, which is a method of argumentation predominantly driven by 
making analogies between case features.
119
  Casuistry was the method of choice for the 
Catholic Church for ritual and ecclesiastical discipline that began early in this history of 
 50 
Christianity.  Penitential books, canon law, and confessional books all exhibited casuistic 
reasoning.  The period began with extrapolating natural law theory within the sources 
mentioned above to account for the variations of everyday life and situations.  Decisions 
were highly dependent on reasoning, conscience, prudence, and circumstances.
120
   
Casuistry exploded in use, reliance, and popularity during the Middle Ages.  
During this time, various theologians developed their own practical confession books, 
meant to provide those taking confessions with guidelines for discussion and resolution in 
parishioner confessions.  For instance, John of Fribourg made his own collection called 
Summa Confessorum (c. 1280), a Franciscan composed Summa Atestana (c. 1317), the 
Franciscan Angelo Carletti wrote Summa Angelica (c. 1480), the Dominican Sylvester 
Mazzolini of Priero compiled Summa Summarum (c. 1516), and the Dominican Thomas 
de Vio Cajetan penned Summula Peccatorum (c.1523).  The Summas were highly 
intricate, encyclopedic in scope, (eventually) rarely relied on conscience or discernment, 
applied maxims to circumstances, and directly repeated other Summas.
121
 
The downfall of casuistry was the byproduct of any number of dynamics.  The 
abuse referenced in the title of the book The Abuse of Casuistry was the result of 
confessors who could astutely shape casuistic reasoning to ―alibi the misdeeds of their 
patrons,‖ which discredited the method.122  Additional abuses in application include 
confessors who would categorize the confession and penance before hearing all the 
relevant detail from the patron.  In other words, a full understanding of the sin is 
necessary if intent, circumstances, and context matter.
123
  Problems existed in the writing 
of the guides.  Casuistry gradually loosed the tether to its natural law, which is the belief 
that God or nature is responsible for creating persons‘ ends or goals.124  Authors began to 
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repeat each other and texts became increasingly subject to individual interpretation, as a 
consequence of misunderstanding, imprecise translation, and undue liberties creating new 
examples.
125
  The rampant application of casuistry failed for other reasons such as ―hard 
to find paradigm cases, weak maxims, and obedience to rules rather than moral value.‖126 
It was in this milieu, after the high period of casuistry, that Alphonsus Liguori, 
who was the originator of cooperation, commented on moral theology.  One word sums 
up the difference in Liguori‘s moral theology – moderation.  This meant navigating the 
tumultuous waters between a rigorist view, where adherers searched for a coherent moral 
system from the Gospels, and a lax view, where they ―were content with plucking the 
most liberal opinions from the most recent authors if only they had the slightest shadow 
of probability.‖127  Unlike others, he was not ready to throw the enterprise of casuistry 
into the fire, but strict casuistry was similar to strict legalism, a practice where a person 
resorts to a rule for everything without intentional discernment, which Liguori abhorred.  
Application of principles, cases, and discernment require moderation from 
knowledgeable persons with well-guided consciences.
128
  
Similar to the casuists during the high period, Liguori was interested in providing 
practical and useful help to those priests listening to confessions.  Liguori comments: 
The office of the confessor is the greatest – it concerns eternal 
salvation – and the most difficult.  The most difficult because it 
requires knowledge of all the sciences, all work, all the 
professions; because it touches upon every kind of problem; 
because it presupposes knowledge of a huge number of positive 
laws and sacred canons that have to be rightly interpreted and, 
finally, because there remains the had work of applying all of this 
to the diversity of cases for which circumstances call for different 
solutions.
129
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What is now the principle of cooperation is the ideal example of Ligouri‘s even-keeled 
approach, which originally served as guidance for those taking confessions.  Persons 
employing the principle cannot resort to strict legalism or casuistry; it requires users to 
discern the situation, context (intent, circumstances), applicable Church teaching, and the 
instrumentality, directness, and consequences of cooperating.  Liguori wished to catalyze 
consciences rather than substitute reasoning with a scheme of rules. 
 Hundreds of years after Liguori, contemporary observations about the state of 
casuistry and cooperation reveal a peculiar set of circumstances.  Kuczewski comments, 
―Casuistry…was discredited in philosophical circles for several hundred years but was 
revived by bioethicists in the 1980s…It is currently considered by many to be the 
quintessential method of medical ethics.‖130  As discussed in chapter two, the principle of 
cooperation has been formalized into a scheme or nexus with copious differentiators.  Its 
contemporary application is for more than just confessions, and it is useful for individuals 
and organizations.  Despite the seeming breadth of issues for application, people 
frequently use it for the same types of issues with mergers between Catholic 
organizations and other-than-Catholic organizations performing sterilizations being the 
paradigm case.  In fact, one could make the case that the many applications of 
cooperation are a type of casuistry.  For instance, organizations made widespread use of 
duress for providing services to communities in mergers and joint ventures that would not 
be licit otherwise.  These categorical uses led to a universal rejection of using duress for 
justifying organizations to be in immediate material cooperation with moral evil.
131
 
 One wonders how Liguori would react to this state of affairs.  On the one hand, it 
is conceivable that he would think that contemporary society reduced the application of 
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cooperation to the legalism that he was trying to get away from.  It could be that the 
customary, current use of cooperation is casuistry run amok for Liguori.  This is difficult 
to categorically assume.  On the other hand, Liguori may think that there are there 
methods to broaden the application and use of the principle while being more discerning 
and formative about issues.  This may or may not get closer to Liguori‘s intent and 
purpose.  This dissertation proves that the last approach, cooperation becoming more 
discerning and formative, is possible in the five chapters that follow this. 
IIE. Chapter Summaries 
 Chapter two is the Theological and Ethical Analysis of Material Cooperation.  
The beginning of the chapter connects theology and ethics when addressing material 
cooperation, provides the historical context of cooperation, and establishes an 
understanding of theological ethics as a framework for right action.  The latter part of the 
chapter defines material cooperation within the Catholic tradition of theological ethics, 
places it in relation with other ethical principles within the Catholic theological tradition, 
locates cooperation within the history of theological ethics, categorizes typical individual 
applications of cooperation to issues in Catholic health care, and identifies fundamental 
controversies in the application of cooperation. 
 The focus changes from individual to organizational in chapter three, titled 
Material Cooperation within the Organizational Context of Health Care.  Critical 
backdrop to this chapter is establishing that organizations have moral agency, validated 
historically, which is a function of organizational ethics.  There are pertinent differences 
between individual and organizational applications of the principle of cooperation that 
the chapter addresses along with usual applications of cooperation with organizations.  
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 Chapter four shifts gears from theology to address psychology and development, 
appropriately titled Interpreting the Implementation and Use of Material Cooperation as a 
Function of Moral Development.  It is moral development that serves as the foundation 
for moral agency to identify wrongdoing, and two developmental theories – Kohlberg‘s 
Theory of Moral Development and Gilligan‘s Theory of Woman‘s Moral Development – 
are key to this foundation.  After aligning moral development with discernment and 
organizational agency, the chapter concludes with the understanding that applying 
material cooperation is a function of moral development. 
 Chapter five not only ties together all the previous concepts but it introduces the 
new model of cooperation.  Its heading is Material Cooperation as Model for Ministry 
Formation and Ministry Discernment and it begins by situating the model as a complex 
moral intervention.  Then attention and detail goes to the model itself including its 
structure, roles, and process.    
 The conclusion is chapter six.  The chapter begins with specifications about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the model.  After reflecting on the complexity of 
cooperation, significant attention goes to justifying the utility of this model in other-than-
Catholic settings.  All sorts of organizations have mission statements, behaviors, and 
values that they may or may not pay attention to in action.  In addition, anyone may find 
out that he or she, or an organization, is somehow complicit in a distasteful, immoral 
practice.  Any of these issues can happen in every setting, providing a ripe environment 
for using this model based off of the Catholic principle of cooperation. 
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Chapter Two – Theological and Ethical Analysis of Material 
Cooperation 
 
 
I. Theological Ethics as the Context for Understanding Ethical Practice 
The latter section of the chapter addresses the principle of cooperation as an application 
of theological ethics.  Before this, the initial section establishes theological ethics as the 
context for understanding ethical practice.  Essential to this establishment is bonding 
theology and ethics when addressing cooperation, explaining the historical context for 
addressing cooperation, and then understanding theological ethics, based on the bond and 
historical context between theology and ethics as a framework for right action. 
 The Georgetown University bioethics bibliography defines bioethics ―as the 
systematic study of value questions that arise in health care delivery and biomedicine.‖132  
Bioethics is the crossroads of ethics and the life sciences.  The modern emergence of 
bioethics has had profound impact on other disciplines, such as medicine, biology, the 
social sciences, law (legal), public policy (government), literature, philosophy, and 
religion.
133
 
David Kelly observes at least two important things about the name and origins of 
bioethics.  First, with respect to the name, Van Rensselaer Potter coined ‗bioethics‘ in the 
early 1970‘s, and delegated a broad, ecological meaning to it.134  Bioethics has a more 
expansive meaning today, as it applies ethics to the environmental and animal milieu, 
than health care ethics and medical ethics, which designate value distinctions associated 
human condition of illness and the methods for attending to illness.  Medical ethics and 
health care ethics are the most specific terms for our context and, like Kelly, their use is 
interchangeable. 
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The contemporary emergence of the multidisciplinary bioethics began in the 
1950s and 1960s.  Factors leading to its materialization included the advent and prolific 
use of advanced medical technologies such as dialysis, artificial respirators, intensive 
care units, and organ transplantation.  Other dynamics included social developments and 
reforms such as the civil rights and feminist movements as well as the social welfare 
programs mentioned in the first chapter.
135
 
Kelly, second, notes that Roman Catholicism has been the most influential to the 
contemporary, Western development of medical ethics.  The reason for this is because 
theologians, and Roman Catholic theologians more specifically, have commented on the 
link between morality, religion, and medicine for hundreds of years before the present 
time.  A paradigmatic example of this is Francisco de Vittoria, a Spanish, Dominican 
moral theologian who lived from 1486 to 1546 and made the following comments in his 
Reflection Theologicia: 
One is not held to protect his life as much as he can…[Secondly], I 
say that one is not held to lengthen his life because he is not held to 
use always the most delicate foods, that is, hens and chickens, even 
though he has the ability and the doctors say that if he eats in such 
a manner he will live twenty years more… And even if he knew 
this for certain, he would not be obligated.  Just as one is not held 
to live in the most healthful place, neither must one use the most 
healthful foods.  If one uses food, which men commonly use and in 
quantity, which customarily suffices for the preservation of 
strength, even though one‘s life is shortened considerably, one 
would not sin.  One is not held to employ all the means to conserve 
life but is sufficient to employ the means…intended for this 
purpose and which are congruous… If one had moral certitude that 
drugs would heal and prolong life, then one should take the drugs 
himself or give them to a sick neighbor.  If…not, he would be 
excused from mortal sin. But because a cure can seldom be certain, 
one need not use drugs even though very ill.
136
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Readers may notice at least two concepts prevalent in contemporary Catholic health care 
ethics.  First is the concept of proportionate and disproportionate means discussed in the 
first chapter.  Second, de Vittoria applies this mechanism of weighing burdens and 
benefits to food.  His logic has resurfaced both explicitly and implicitly in the current 
discussions about medically assisted nutrition and hydration (MANH) with people who 
have chronic conditions such as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or locked-in.  
The purpose of the example is not to discuss the issues, but simply to illustrate that 
Catholic theologians have been discussing morality as a matter of moral theology for 
hundreds of years.  Albert Jonsen observes that moral theology emerged as a distinct 
discipline in the 1400s, and it immediately attended to matters of medicine and health as 
illustrated by the example.
137
  This interface of ethics, religion, and medicine (health) 
continues today. 
IA. Introduction: Connecting Theology and Ethics when Addressing Material 
Cooperation 
The relationship between ethics and theology deserves more overt attention.  
Theology itself is the study of God or rational discourse about God.  Theologians in the 
Western tradition do this by thinking about the history of interaction between God and 
humans.  In this way, theology is a reflection on the faith relationship between persons 
and God.  There are various different theologies because there are many different faith 
traditions.
138
  Christian theology, for example, is the methodical contemplation on all 
facets of human life from a Biblical vantage.
139
  Special attention goes to answering 
questions about what it means to be human within this historical context.  There are two 
predominant strands of theology.  One, there is a speculative theology that seeks to know 
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more about the relationship between God and humankind, called dogmatic, doctrinal, 
speculative, or systematic theology.  Two, another strand of theology attends to the 
behavior and lives lived by those who believe in God, called pastoral, practical, or moral 
theology.  It is the second kind of theology, moral theology, which serves as the primary 
point of engaging the tradition.
140
  Moral or pastoral theology is the main way that 
theology engages the doctrinal foundations of Catholic tradition.  That is, theology has an 
investment in the rules or ideas taught to believers as the truth.
141
 
Ethics, too, has branches and divisions much like theology.  Generally, ethics 
involves matters of common and reflective persons,
142
 and it describes the methodical 
and meticulous study of moral norms.
143
  It is normative anthropology.
144
  There are three 
major branches of ethics.  Metaethics is the closest branch of ethics to doctrinal, 
dogmatic, and systematic theology.  It is the branch that examines the significance and 
import of terms, the reasons behind moral reasoning, and focuses on ontology, 
epistemology, and justification.  Descriptive ethics focuses less on what should be the 
norm and more on how it is we view circumstances involving ethics and morals.  In other 
words, it seeks to depict how we think and behave in moral situations. Normative ethics 
applies to what we ought to do by attending to questions in a methodical and attentive 
manner.
145
   
Other closely related terms to ethics deserve explanation.  Ethical theory describes 
the attempt to find a sufficient normative concept to attend to moral problems.
 146
  Ethical 
methodologies are endeavors to provide methodology or means ―for producing a 
normative framework, for using the framework once it has been identified, or for 
navigating the complexities of moral life in the absence of a framework.‖147  The goal of 
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theory is not just academic;
148
 the response must be proper conduct in the form of doing 
good or doing right.
149
  James Walter distinguishes that potential versus actual conduct 
illustrates the difference between the terms morality and ethics – ethics describes the 
normative ought (to act a particular way) while morality depicts the descriptive is (about 
actions).
150
  In effect, it is ethics that attends to the normative justification of actions 
within the tradition. 
IB. Describing the Historical Context for Addressing Material Cooperation 
Previous examples and discussion reveals that theology and ethics relate 
hermeneutically in the Catholic tradition to distinguish right and wrong action.  On one 
hand, this happens within the context of nature through natural law.  Natural law is the 
individual and collective experience of using reason to discover right and wrong within 
God‘s continuingly unfolding creation.151  Ought as well as is are functions of natural 
law, meaning that God is the creator of all things such as the environment and humans 
use these conditions along with their reason to determine what should be.
152
  Richard 
McCormick shares natural law as specified by Thomas Aquinas, namely that there are 
three tiers of natural tendencies and their corresponding good.  First, all beings share a 
propensity to good that is compatible with their common nature.  Other commonalities 
exist, second, with all animals that are taught by nature, i.e. reproduction and care of 
offspring.  All rational creatures, third, have the predilection to rationalize in search of 
knowledge, truth, and quality interactions with others.
153
  Reason helps people determine 
the order designed by God for all creatures that all other conventions measure against; it 
also involves recognition of innate qualities and invention of standards.
154
  It is natural 
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law that is the groundwork for discriminating morality, establishing conduct standards, 
and providing significance for moral conduct.
155
   
On the other hand, the hermeneutic relationship between theology and ethics in 
the Catholic tradition that distinguishes right and wrong action also occurs within the 
grace granted through divine revelation.  In the most basic sense, ―grace is God‘s 
deliverance…a gift from God that we do not deserve; it is not self-righteousness that we 
achieve by our own good works.‖156  Aaron Mackler draws attention to the association 
between grace and original sin, namely that God‘s grace is not something we can live 
without because of the existence and prevalence of sin.
157
  We are aided by supernatural 
grace;
158
 it is our divine forgiveness for when we sin or make judgment errors.  This 
grace generates agapaic love, which binds all people and establishes a basis for human 
conduct because of our love for God and our neighbors.
159
  
 Theological ethics or moral theology is the context for understanding ethical 
practice for our purposes.  The inclusiveness and distinctiveness of moral theology and 
Christian theological ethics is a noteworthy discussion.  A foundational issue in moral 
theology is the existence and characteristics of a distinctly Christian ethic.
160
  It begs the 
question about where to place Christian moral theology on a scale of integration with 
other ethical theories (e.g. secular, humanist ethics).  On this scale, one endpoint 
delineates that moral theology is unique and distinctive from other ethics, and the other 
endpoint indicates Christian theology is universal.  In other words, does a Christian ethic, 
a universal and human ethic,
161
 possess distinctive characteristics?  Perhaps being 
universal and distinctive are not mutually exclusive.  Christian ethics can be global in 
scope while including particular, distinguishing attributes.
162
  The minimal agreement 
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between theologians about being universal yet unique is the basis of Christian ethics in 
scripture and religious teachings, taken from the ministry of Jesus.  Christian ethics 
contain descriptive statements about God‘s connection with humankind as well as the 
actual condition of humankind.
163
  The Gospel provides a context for understanding 
human experience.
 164
  A particular subset of Christian ethics is Catholic moral theology.  
Catholic moral theology discriminates a range of viable options within the framework of 
nature and grace in the Catholic tradition.
165
 
IC. Historical Context for Cooperation and Theological Ethics as Framing Right Action 
 Theological ethics as a path for right action is a difficult one,
166
 possibly due to 
the exemplar of taking the right path, even if not the road less traveled.  The challenge 
and ideal of the Christian ethic is in part or wholly due to the exemplar of Christian ethics 
– Jesus Christ.  Christ is a moral exemplar, and his virtue-based model serves as a guide 
for good and moral behavior, details that have not escaped theologians and other 
scholars.
167
 
 By no means do persons understand Christ, as well as his morality, in the same 
way.  That is, each person has his or her own Christology, meaning an understanding of 
the import of Jesus Christ to the Church.
168
  Some identify most with Jesus as the Son of 
God, a high Christology, which is a characteristic of the Gospel of John.  Using this 
interpretation, Jesus shares God‘s divinity, implements divine authority, and conveys his 
authority unambiguously.
169
  He knows the perfect way to act because he is one with 
God.  This includes being the ideal moral exemplar and teacher while accounting for all 
the various diversity and combinations of people and situations.  Most likely, this is 
Christology that Martin Luther ascribed to when he referred to Christ‘s ethic an 
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impossible one.
170
  Others recognize Jesus mainly as the Son of Man (sic) with a low 
Christology, which occurs in the contexts of ―Jesus‘ activity and teaching during his 
ministry, statements concerning his death and resurrection, and passages dealing with his 
ascension and apocalyptic return.‖171  Jesus, from this perspective, was an enigmatic and 
charismatic prophet and teacher.  Even if not the perfect exemplar, he was skilled 
nonetheless as a teacher of morality.   
Biblical and historical references do not record any examples of Jesus Christ 
delivering a complete, methodical, or common ethical framework.  He taught moral 
lessons in parable format, which is a manner of speaking that has an enlightening and 
moving proverb, allusion, analogy, or image.  Numerous examples exist – all of them are 
Jesus responding ad hoc to situations and questions.  Some of them include the parable of 
the sewer (Matthew 13:24-30) or examples of how to gain eternal life by total submission 
to God using the analogy of the camel and eye of a needle (Mark 10:17-25), the plower 
looking ahead rather than back (Luke 9:62), or cutting off an appendage that hinders 
one‘s moral behavior (Matthew 18:8-9, Mark 9:43-48).172 
  Despite any theological significance, differences based on Christology, Jesus as 
moral teacher, and Jesus as moral exemplar are of little relevance to this discourse.  The 
end is the same whether persons identify with Jesus as God or Jesus as man.  On one 
hand, Christ as God would know the perfect and ideal way to transmit moral lessons to 
people.  The Gospels promote the ideal moral teacher and exemplar – knowing exactly 
how to respond to every different context and situation.  On the other hand, Christ as man 
may not have known the idyllic way to teach, act, and respond.  Nevertheless, he did 
respond in the various parables and sayings, many of them having a moral lesson, 
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counting the divided house (all four Gospels including Mark 3:23-26), mustard seed (all 
four Gospels including Mark 4:30-32), wicked tenants (all four Gospels including Mark 
12:1-11), fig tree (all four Gospels including Mark 13:28-29), two builders (Matthew 
7:24-27; Luke 6:47-49), yeast (Matthew 13:33; Luke 13:20-21), lost sheep (Matthew 
18:12-14; Luke 15:4-7), wedding banquet (Matthew 22:1-14; Luke 14:15-24), talents or 
pounds (Matthew 25:14-30; Luke 19:11-27), the growing seed (Mark 4:26-29), hidden 
treasure (Matthew 13:44), pearl (Matthew 13:45-46), great net (Matthew 13:47-48), 
unforgiving servant (Matthew 18: 23-25), two sons (Matthew 21:28-31), ten bridesmaids 
(Matthew 25:1-13), creditor (Luke 7:41-43), good Samaritan (Luke 10:30-37), 
unexpected guest (Luke 11:5-8), rich fool (Luke 12: 16-21), barren fig tree (Luke 13:6-9), 
lost coin (Luke 15:8-10), prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32), dishonest manager (Luke 16:1-
8), rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), Pharisee and the tax collector (Luke 18:9-14), 
good shepherd (John 10:1-18), and vine and branches (John 15:1-10).
173
  Arguably, the 
worth of Jesus Christ as moral teacher and exemplar is relevant whatever Christology one 
chooses.  The proof is in the pudding.  The significance of his life and teaching is 
manifest in the popularity and widespread use of the Bible today, with the impact and 
weight of his teachings to past and present contexts, and as a subject of attention with 
contemporary theologians and scholars. 
 Following the life of Christ, the Church and its believers have and continue to join 
Christian virtue from its exemplars with basic Christian principles.
174
  L. Gregory Jones 
offers examples of the most prominent virtues in Scripture – ―receptivity, humility, 
truthfulness, courage, charity, and imagination.‖175  Some gospel lessons seem obvious.  
For others, we have to interpret gospel stories in light of our present-day situation. 
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 Applied ethics, secular or religious, is the application of virtue and principles in 
practice with all of their various interpretations.
176
  Ethical practice does not occur in a 
vacuum, meaning that our actions impact others and a just society.  Scholars comment on 
the link between theory and action.  James Tubbs, Jr. defines applied ethics as: 
A term referring to the application of ethical theory, ethical 
reasoning, or ethical perspective to particular areas of human life 
and activity – for example, business ethics, legal ethics, health care 
ethics, or pastoral ethics – or to particular problems, such as the 
moral issue of abortion or of warfare.  The term ―practical ethics‖ 
is often used as a synonym for applied ethics.
177
 
 
James Rachels states that the end or purpose of morality is to direct conduct, using reason 
in order to effectively consider the import of behavior to others.
178
  There are more than 
enough reasons to apply ethical theory, reasoning, and perspectives to particular 
problems.  Thomas Aquinas believed that morality and human acts are synonymous, 
meaning that every act has a moral dimension.
179
  According to David Kelly, pastoral 
medicine was a theological form of applied ethics, designed for physicians and 
theologians to apply moral theology to the practice of medicine.
180
 
 Dr. Martin Luther King taught, ―An individual has not started living until he can 
rise above the narrow confines of his individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of 
all humanity.‖181  Prosaically, Dr. Martin Luther King also used a quote from the 19th 
century abolitionist and Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, ―The moral arc of the 
universe bends at the elbow of justice.‖182  He understood, as others do, that applying 
ethics to practice and situations relates to both individual action as well as social 
justice.
183
  The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) summarizes the 
connection between the moral life of individuals and social communities including the 
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family, the nation, and the international community in a 1976 pastoral letter on the moral 
life: 
While the ultimate and most substantive values inhere in 
individuals, individuality and community are inseparable elements 
of the moral life.  So, for instance, honesty, courage and hope, 
which abide only in individuals, can be fostered by freedom to 
learn, protection from violence, adequate income, and the 
availability of health care.  As followers of Jesus we are called to 
express love of neighbor in deeds which help others realize their 
human potential.  This, too, has consequences for the structures.  
Law and public policy do not substitute for the personal acts by 
which we express love of neighbor; but love of neighbor impels us 
to work for laws, policies, and social structures which foster 
human goods in the lives of all persons.
184
 
 
Underpinning this statement is the concept that, ideally, we behave ethically not just for 
ourselves but also for others.  Like it or not, social, organization, and systemic injustices 
are reflections of weaknesses in individuals‘ morality.  One need not look any further for 
a contemporary example of this link than the 2009 financial collapse in the U.S. and its 
connection with the greed of more than a few individuals in power. 
 Relating this back to Christ‘s example and Christian virtue and practices, ethical 
practice is rational discourse through natural law in the Catholic theological tradition.
185
  
As John T. Noonan notices, Catholic moral teaching is not dormant, but awake and 
active; it changes over time and is prone to misstep.
186
  Thomas Aquinas realized this and 
expected a dynamic tradition.
187
  The evolution of ethics as rational discourse within the 
natural law happens for several reasons.  First, reasoning in light of personal experience 
varied because no two people experience and interpret the same way.
 188
  Second, any 
rational agent can reason, which does not hold a privileged status among Catholics or 
Christians.  It does not matter if the person reasoning has faith or not.
189
  Third, Aquinas 
also recognized that human nature changes over time.
190
  As persons‘ natures change, so 
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do morality and the unfolding of natural law.  Even respectful dissent from Church 
teaching is a part of the contemporary understanding of ethics within the context of 
natural law.
191
 
 
II. Material Cooperation as an Application of Theological Ethics 
IIA. Defining Material Cooperation in the Catholic Tradition of Theological Ethics 
The use of the term ‗cooperation‘ in the Catholic Church and in Catholic moral 
theology differs from other general terms describing partnerships, such as collaboration 
or participation.  Cooperation is association, affiliation, or some other partnership with 
evil; it is assistance in an immoral act by another.  The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
(CCC) expresses cooperation: 
We have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we 
cooperate in them 
 by participating directly and voluntarily in them; 
 by ordering, advising, praising, or approving of them; 
 by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an 
obligation to do so; 
 by protecting evil-doers.192 
 
Cooperation is the choice of an individual or institution to assist an immoral act by an 
agent, usually another individual or institution.
193
  The CCC continues with repercussions 
of sin on others: 
Thus sin makes men accomplices of one another and causes 
concupiscence, violence, and injustice to reign among them.  Sins 
give rise to social situations and institutions that are contrary to the 
divine goodness.  ―Structures of sin‖ are the expression and effect 
of personal sins.  They lead their victims to do evil in their turn.  In 
an analogous sense, they constitute a ―social sin.‖194 
 
The above passage is a reminder that both sin and cooperation in the sins of others may 
lead additional people to into sin.  Cooperation is well suited to structure the relational 
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impact of others‘ sins as described in the first chapter.  This particular multi-agency, 
social principle is perfectly positioned to address the social nature and impact of sin 
illustrated by CCC definition above. 
 Collaboration describes something different in the context of Catholic teaching.  
Whereas the ―evil act is the ultimate referent of the principle of cooperation,‖ this is not 
so for collaboration, which describes a ―deliberate joint…action.‖195  This collaborative 
mutual behavior, presumably through action or omission, is not in reference to a moral 
evil.  Therefore, collaboration is extraneous to this discussion it is not in reference to evil, 
injustice, or malfeasance, which are the focus of this dissertation. 
 Specifications are in order before discussing the divisions of cooperation.  First, a 
cooperator‘s participation may be either positive or negative.  Positive or direct 
cooperation involves a cooperator‘s action that, in some way, assists the principle agent 
in the form of counsel, petitions, incentives, requests, directives, or imperatives; 
conversely, the cooperator ―does nothing to impede [the agent‘s evil]‖ in negative or 
indirect cooperation, which often takes the form of disregarding an occasion to warn 
someone or obstruct their action.
196
  Second, according to Canon Law, cooperation may 
have physical and/or moral form, may precede (pre-) the immorality (injustice) or 
accompany it (peri-), and may be according to an agreement or not in accord with an 
agreement.
197
  Just as there are many ways to sin, there are various ways to assist the sin.  
Manualist theologian Henry Davis remarks that cooperation may be after the evil itself 
(post-) by defending or sheltering the evildoer.
198
  A tangible example of post-evil 
cooperation is the declaration of U.S. President Bush immediately after September 11, 
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2011, when he said that he would consider any country or faction who harbors terrorists 
as sympathizing with them and an enemy of the United States. 
 Cooperation uses a taxonomic scale to assess the level (amount) of participation 
in evil.  Because cooperation is conceptually difficult, the following ―Figure 1: The 
Taxonomy of the Principle of Cooperation‖ should provide visual assistance for 
conceptualizing the principle of cooperation.   
Figure 1: The Taxonomy of the Principle of Cooperation
199
 
 
The initial taxonomic divisions of cooperation are formal and material cooperation.  
Formal cooperation occurs when a cooperator helps an agent in sin while intending the 
sin.
200
  It is participation in sin while espousing the evil intent.
201
  Clarifications of formal 
cooperation are in order.  One is that participation in evil is independent of the attitude or 
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motive of the agent or cooperator,
202
 meaning that the motives (justifications) of intent 
are irrelevant to the definition of formal cooperation.  Another relates to slightly different 
descriptions some commentators use to explain formal cooperation.  Some explain that 
formal cooperation is the cooperator‘s approval of evil.203  Others describe it as consent 
or concurrence to the evil by the cooperator.
204
  If there are subtle distinctions between 
‗intention,‘ ‗approval,‘ and ‗concurrence,‘ they are irrelevant; all of these are the same for 
this discussion.  An additional clarification, related to the former, pertains to the extent 
that one who is cooperating must register disapproval that, by extension, illustrates a 
cooperator‘s different intent from the agent.205  For instance, one may evidence 
displeasure by cooperating with a perfunctory measure, not cooperating, or thwarting the 
agents‘ and others‘ participation while not cooperating. 
 Formal cooperation has two divisions, explicit formal cooperation and implicit 
formation cooperation.  Explicit formal cooperation is when cooperator‘s intention (ex 
fine operantis) is the agent‘s sin.206  The end of the cooperator and the agent are the same; 
the cooperator makes a specific act of the will that directly approves of the agent‘s 
immorality.
207
  A definition of implicit formal cooperation is when the cooperator claims 
no intent or approval because the act (or omission) is not sinful in itself, but the nature 
(object) of the act cannot have any other meaning (ex fine operis).
208
  The Appendix of 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs) describes 
implicit formal cooperation:  
Implicit formal cooperation is attributed when, even though the 
cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer‘s object, no other 
explanation can distinguish the cooperator‘s object from the 
wrongdoer‘s object.209 
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No other explanations for the cooperator‘s action exist other than the wrongdoer‘s object 
itself, because ―the object of the act excludes any other meaning.‖210 
 Material cooperation is different from formal cooperation in at least one important 
way.  This difference is one of intent; Keenan offers, ―The manuals agree‖ that ―material 
cooperation requires that one cannot actually intend the illicit action.‖211  Therefore, the 
absence of evil intent defines material cooperation.
212
  It is cooperation without the 
knowing and willing assent, or approval, of the agent‘s act on the part of the 
cooperator.
213
  The intent could be many things: personal gain, profit, or convenience as 
well as the avoidance of harm, loss, or nuisance
214
 – just not the evil intent of the moral 
agent.  Some commentators differ about the conditions necessary for one to prove that he 
or she does not assent (intend) the evil.  Noldin defines material cooperation as the 
absence of intent and does not address approval.
215
  Kelly believes the cooperators must 
indicate disapproval ―by show[ing] in some way that they do not approve of [the evil]… 
otherwise their unprotesting assistance would imply approval.‖216  Any tension resulting 
from these distinctions alleviates by defining approval as intention, and material 
cooperation as participation in evil without intent or while evidencing disapproval.  After 
setting aside the issue of intent, the focus is on the act itself.  Manualists observe a 
necessary precondition for material cooperation is that the cooperator‘s act is not sinful in 
itself, that is, by the object of the act.
217
 
 Similar to the divisions of formal cooperation, material cooperation has two initial 
subdivisions.  Material cooperation may be either immediate or mediate.  In immediate 
material cooperation, ―the object of the cooperator (nature of the cooperation) is the same 
as the object of the illicit activity‖ but the cooperator does not intend the evil 
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(cooperator‘s intent is apart from the moral agent‘s intent).218  As the moral theologian 
Charles McFadden explains it, immediate material cooperation is participation in an 
immorality, in part.
219
  In this way, the critical component of immediate material 
cooperation is the essentiality, or primacy, of the contribution to the evil act; this is 
because the cooperator directly helps to provide part or all of the conditions necessary for 
it.  Some consider that immediate material cooperation is any willful, intentional 
contribution to the essential circumstances of the agent‘s immoral act while not intending 
the object of the act.
220
  In other words, a cooperator knowingly cooperates but does not 
approve of it.  As can be assumed, mediate material cooperation occurs when the 
cooperator assists the evil act by contributing in a non-essential, or secondary, way.  The 
cooperator‘s act is lesser when compared with the primacy of immediate cooperation, and 
the cooperator does not intend the evil of the primary agent in mediate material 
cooperation like immediate material cooperation.
221
  Other explanations for the ‗degree of 
separation‘ from the act are ―something antecedent or consequent to the evil,‖222 ―a 
preparation to a sinful deed,‖223 ―an action which one would ordinarily have a right to 
do,‖224 or a contributing to the ―nonessential [not indispensable] circumstances before, 
during, or after the act.‖225 
 Further delineations divide the subcategory of mediate material cooperation.  In 
proximate mediate material cooperation, the cooperator‘s help intimately connects with 
the evil of another.  The cooperator‘s help does not closely connect with the agent‘s evil 
in remote mediate material cooperation.
226
  McFadden further elucidates and exemplifies 
the proximate and remote classifications of mediate material cooperation: 
Mediate cooperation is called proximate or remote, according as it 
is more or less intimately connected with the act of the principal 
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agent.  Thus, a nurse who would stand beside a surgeon who was 
performing an immoral operation and hand him all the required 
instruments and material would be rendering proximate assistance.  
In contrast, a nurse who would prepare the patient in a hospital 
room for the forthcoming immoral operation, or the nurse who 
would sterilize and set out the instruments for the operation, would 
be rendering remote assistance [emphasis in the original].
227
 
 
In other words, proximate mediate material cooperation has a more direct causal 
relationship than remote mediate material cooperation.
228
  A description of the 
relationship of proximate and remote cooperation with proportionate reason occurs 
below. 
 Four other concepts have an intimate association with the description and 
application of cooperation to any situation.  First, the gravity of the moral evil is part of 
ascertaining cooperation.  The history of magisterial teaching and pastoral application 
supports that certain moral evils, abortion and euthanasia for instance, are much more 
grave than others, such as direct sterilization and birth control.
229
  When applying 
cooperation, the weightier the moral issue, the more the weight anchors the application of 
cooperation.  It becomes less likely that any sufficient distance exists to make tolerable 
mediate material cooperation with an especially grave evil.  Yet, as one scholar notices 
about the words of John Paul II, ―circumstances can mitigate even to a notable degree 
subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of those who make these choices 
which in themselves are evil.‖230 
 Second, duress has a pronounced association with cooperation.  Thomas Aquinas 
provided a basic definition of duress: one‘s will ―moves towards [an evil], albeit not for 
its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is 
feared.‖231  Duress is significant because it is an important distinction when considering 
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material cooperation and the legitimacy of immediate material cooperation.  A cooperator 
may face a situation where he or she does not share the evil intent of the agent but, 
nevertheless, essentially or secondarily participates in an immorality (injustice) because 
of duress.  In particular situations such as these, ―If the cooperator could avoid it, he or 
she would do so; but, given the fact that duress is present the cooperator does do 
something that helps the principle agents to accomplish evil.‖232  In general, the duress 
involved in any situation is greater when fewer alternatives (options) exist.
233
  Duress can 
take any one of a number of forms: individual or social, corporeal or emotional 
(psychological), fiscal or material, direct or indirect.
234
  Historically, rare exceptions for 
regarding immediate material cooperation as legitimate due to duress have been allowed.  
Prudential judgment must be the basis for such decisions where there are little or no 
options.
235
 
 Third, another concept important for understanding cooperation is scandal.  The 
Holy See defines scandal as the following: 
[Scandal] is an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil.  
The person who gives scandal becomes his neighbor‘s tempter.  He 
damages virtue and integrity; he may even draw his brother into 
spiritual death.  Scandal is a grave offence if by deed or omission 
another is deliberately led into a grave offense… Anyone who uses 
the power at his disposal in such a way that it leads others to do 
wrong becomes guilty of scandal and is responsible for the evil 
that he has directly or indirectly encouraged.
236
 
 
The moral manuals specify that scandal is seduction that causes another to sin, which 
includes offering the occasion to sin for the purpose of sin; it is conduct having the 
appearance of evil, leading a neighbor to the occasion of spiritual ruin.
237
  Scandal is 
relevant to the principle of cooperation.  As summarized by Directive 71 in the ERDs, 
―Cooperation, which in all other respects is morally licit, may need to be refused because 
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of the scandal that might be caused.‖238  Assessing scandal in cooperation is important, 
particularly as it applies to mediate material cooperation.  Even though a cooperator‘s 
action or omission might not be intrinsically evil, leading a third party to think less of the 
Church, its teaching, or its authority is sinful.
239
 
 Proportionality, fourth and lastly, correlates with any application of the principle 
of cooperation.  Proportionate justification factors into material cooperation as a sliding 
scale, and it is especially relevant when determining if mediate material cooperation is 
licit.  Less separation between cooperator and the evil (proximate) requires a more 
serious justification for the cooperation, while more separation between the cooperator 
and the evil (remote) requires a less serious justification for the cooperation.
240
  
Validation for cooperation does not occur without proper proportionate justification.  
IIB. Relating Cooperation with Ethical Principles in the Catholic Theological Tradition 
As discussed in chapter one, cooperation is both related to and distinct from other 
theological concepts and principles.  Three additional principles are worth mentioning, 
both for their similarities to and divergences from cooperation.  The reason for detailing 
these principles now is because they, at first glance, may seem to be similar to 
cooperation in their function, history, or application.  Perhaps it is more important to 
explain how the principles are sufficiently different and, subsequently, less valid for the 
purpose of this dissertation than specifying them only. 
Theologian William May articulates the significance of human actions: 
Human acts are not physical events that come and go, like the 
falling of rain and turning of leaves, nor do they ‗happen‘ to a 
person.  They are, rather, the outward expression of a person‘s 
choices, for at the core of a human act is a free, self-determining 
choice, which as such is something spiritual which abides within 
the person, determining the very being [emphasis in original] of 
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the person.  The Scriptures, particularly the New Testament, are 
very clear about this.  Jesus taught that it was not what enters a 
person that defiles him or her; rather, it is what flows from the 
person, from his or her heart, from the core of his or her being, 
from his or her choice (cf. Matthew 15: 10-20; Mark 7: 14-23).
241
 
 
St. Thomas Aquinas specified that moral acts have moral object, intent, and 
circumstances.  According to the ‗three-font‘ (‗tres fontes‘) or three sources of morality 
principle, the object is an act of the will, formed by conscience, which expresses the 
rational order of good and evil.  It is in reference to the act itself.  Intention, the 
secondary end of the act, has a close connection with the object, and is a part of the 
agent‘s will.  Circumstances are ancillary, or tertiary, elements involved in any moral act, 
and they may alter the goodness of that act.  Neither good circumstances nor intention 
may justify an intrinsically evil act (by its object).
242
  Object, intent, and circumstances 
must have a proper disposition in order for an act to be morally good.
243
 
 It is the dissimilar ways of considering of the object, intention, and circumstances 
that account for the range resulting from the assessment of human acts.  Physicalists, for 
instance, accentuate the corporal dimensions of acts and do not regard other dimensions 
as important, such as the psychological, spiritual, and social.  In contrast, personalists 
believe that all dimensions of an act (i.e. psychological, spiritual, and social as they relate 
to object, intent, circumstances) are significant.  Personalists predominantly focus on the 
interpersonal and human characteristics of an action, including circumstances, as they 
relate to its goodness.
244
 
 The three-font principle also relates to the movement and method dubbed 
proportionalism, also referred to as revisionism or consequentialism.  David Kelly traces 
the origins of proportionalism to an article by Peter Knauer in 1965 where Knauer 
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asserted that doing evil must have a ‗counterbalance,‘ which is good serving as 
proportionate reason for the evil.  Despite proponents‘ arguments to the contrary, Kelly 
argues that proportionalism represents a change from legalism to judicious (i.e., not an 
extreme form of) situationalism or, to phrase this differently, a shift from deontology to 
an ―intrinsic consequentialism.‖245  Proportionalists are critical of physicalists because 
reducing an act to its physical properties does not account for other important factors.  It 
is more likely that a proportionalist will not view an action as ontic or premoral evil; an 
act is wrong when proportionate justification does not accompany it.
246
  ―Thus, just as not 
every killing is murder, not every falsehood a lie, so not every artificial intervention 
preventing (or promoting) contraception is necessarily an unchaste act.‖247   
John Paul II declared proportionalist reasoning as unfaithful to Church teaching in 
his encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993),
248
 which does not repudiate the three-font 
principle.  The denunciation means that one should not use proportionate reason as the 
sole or chief determinate about the acceptability or illicitness of actions.  This relates to 
cooperation because the Church affirms that certain acts are ontic or premoral evils, 
irrespective of circumstances, which can be the focal point of cooperation. 
Many know double effect as the ‗principle of double effect.‘  Daniel Sulmasy 
caveats that people employ the use of the terms ‗doctrine of double effect,‘ such as Quinn 
in 1989,
249
 and ‗rule of double effect,‘ such as Ramsey in 1978.250  Scholars Thomas 
Cavanaugh and Christopher Kaczor expound that this classification as a single ‗principle‘ 
is a recent occurrence, given the extensive history of concepts innate to double effect.
251
  
Scholars and theologians after Aquinas did not remark about one principle alone, but a 
sequence of conditions with more than one effect.
252
  Therefore, according to Cavanaugh, 
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it may not be clear that these criteria are principles.  Cavanaugh employs the use of  
―double effect reasoning‖ (DER) to evade any misinterpretation, a convention that 
Kaczor adopts.
253
 
Questions abound as to the origins and formulators of DER because the current 
formulation of DER does not reflect the pre-conglomerated existence of potentially 
disparate, distinct concepts.  According to Kaczor, some scholars believe that Thomas 
Aquinas was the originator of DER, as traces of the modern concept are in Summa 
Theologiae, either in his attention to killing in self-defense or discussion of the direct and 
indirect voluntary.
254
  Thomas Aquinas was not the originator of DER according to other 
scholars,
255
 despite little evidence of concept‘s components existing before Thomas 
Aquinas.
256
  In either event, DER was contrary to the prevailing Christian teaching of St. 
Augustine that one should not kill another in self-defense, an almost universal 
prohibition, because bodily life is subordinate to eternal life.
257
 
According to Kaczor, Aquinas addressed moral acts having two effects, one that 
is intended and the other apart from the intention, in Summa Theologiae.  He continues 
by quoting Aquinas as he addresses intention, effect, and proportionality: 
Nothing prevents that there be two effects of one act: of which the 
one is in the intention, but the other is outside the intention. 
However moral acts take their species from that which is intended, 
not however from that which is outside the intention, since it is per 
accidens, as is clear from things said before. Therefore, from the 
act of one defending himself a twofold effect is able to follow: one 
the preservation of his own life, the other however the death of the 
aggressor. Therefore an act of this type, from the fact that the 
preservation of one's own life is intended, does not have the 
character of the illicit, since it is natural to anyone to preserve 
himself in his being insofar as he is able.
258
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Little was written about DER for about 200 years after Thomas Aquinas.  Then Cardinal 
Cajetan elucidated his interpretation of Aquinas and DER in the early 1500s, as it applied 
to self-defense.  DER clearly derives its current form within his wording, and other 
implicitly accepted formulations by the end of the 1500s.  It was not until the mid-1600s 
that the Salmanticenses used DER as a general line-of-reasoning, as opposed to always 
being attached to particular cases such as self-defense.
259
  Mangan quotes theologian 
Joannes Gury, where he specifies the four conditions necessary for legitimate, lawful 
action: 
1. The ultimate end of the author must be good, that is, the author 
may not intend the evil effect, because otherwise he [sic] 
would intend something evil and consequently commit sin. 
2. The cause itself of the effects must be good or at least 
indifferent, that is, as an act the cause must not be opposed to 
any law.  The reason is evident.  For, if the cause is evil in 
itself, of itself it makes the action imputable as a fault. 
3. The evil effect must not be the means to the good effect.  The 
reason is that, if the cause directly produces the evil effect and 
procures the good effect only by means of the evil effect, then 
the good is south by willing the evil.  And it is never lawful to 
do evil, no matter how slight, in order that good may come of 
it… Therefore, one may never tell a lie even to save some 
man‘s life.‖ 
4. There must be a proportionately serious reason for actuating 
the cause, so that the author of the action would not be obliged 
by any virtue to omit the action.  For natural equity obliges us 
to avoid evil and prevent harm from coming to our neighbor 
when we can do so without proportionately serious loss to 
ourselves.
260
 
 
Some theologians believe that it was Gury – the French, Jesuit theologian, referenced 
above, who lived in the 1800s – who coalesced some of the principles in DER and, thus, 
was the originator of contemporary DER.
261
 
 Unlike cooperation, which depends on two agents and acts (or omissions), DER 
concerns one agent and one act (or omission) with two foreseen effects.  The connection 
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between DER and cooperation is that cooperation becomes an issue only for those issues 
that do not pass DER.  DER is apparent in each of the following common examples: 
Categorically, informed clinicians and other associates in Catholic health care systems do 
not worry about treating women‘s ectopic pregnancies, taking out women‘s 
hemorrhaging uteri, or removing cancerous portions of women‘s reproductive tracks.  
Any one of these actions may render a woman infertile or sterile.  As discussed later, the 
Church prohibits procedures that render someone infertile.  Still, the purpose of the 
Church teaching are those procedures performed with the intent of inducing sterility.  
Ectopic pregnancies, cancer, or a hemorrhaging body parts are present and serious 
pathologies that, depending on the specifics of the situation, generally pass DER.  Other 
health care procedures employing the use of DER include the separation of conjoined 
twins, terminal sedation, organ donation, and transplantation.
262
  Procedures that do not 
pass DER are ones that may require the use of the principle of cooperation.  In other 
words, cooperation is not needed, even if it could apply, for something that is licit per 
double effect.  Catholic hospitals may perform those procedures covered by DER. 
 The direct/indirect distinction relates closely to double effect.  Thomas Aquinas 
discussed the direct/indirect distinction, but his use of the terms is different from their 
present form.  He distinguished between direct and indirect within a larger discussion of 
voluntariness.
263
  More contemporary issues revitalized the description and discussion of 
the distinction with results that were far from unanimous about its explanation.  For 
some, direct become synonymous with immoral, and evil has justification only with 
indirect means.  Scholarly discourse about abortion in the early 1900s typified this 
description.
264
  Peter Knauer understood the distinction as describing the presence or 
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absence of proportionate reason in his essay on double effect in 1965.
265
  Bruno Schüller 
critiqued the significance of the direct/indirect distinction in 1972 and 1979, arguing that 
its users overemphasized its significance.  According to Schüller, the direct/indirect 
distinction was about the intending will (direct) and the permitting will (indirect) having 
similar temperaments.
266
 
 Richard McCormick and Daniel Maguire both believed that disagreements about 
the definition and use of the direct/indirect distinction were part of the problem.  There 
was no agreed definition about the distinction.  Still those using it interpret that direct is 
illicit and indirect is licit.  This led to what he referred to as absolutism and abuse of the 
distinction.  An illustration of this a person who likens something as morally justifiable 
because its cause is indirect, but the action clearly is not morally justifiable.
267
  Maguire‘s 
theory may hold true to the extent that most commentators do not comment on how they 
use the direct/indirect distinction.  It is unclear if something indirect when it ‗passes‘ 
double effect.  Is, for instance, sterilization direct if the intent of the agent is to cease 
reproductive functioning, or is it direct merely in the absence of a severe and threatening 
pathology?  The answer to this clearly depends on the definition of direct and indirect.  A 
problem is that scholars are not always clear about the use of direct or indirect.
268
 
 In order to reduce complexity, rather than add to it, the indirect/direct distinction 
will be synonymous with double effect for our purposes.  If an action or omission ‗fails‘ 
double effect, using the previous definition of double effect, than it is direct.  It is indirect 
if it passes double effect.  Using this definition, cooperation concerns do not involve 
those things that are indirect.  For example, Catholic health care organizations may not 
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directly sterilize men or women, but procedures may respond to a present and serious 
pathology even if they cause sterility.
269
 
IIC. Locating Material Cooperation within the History of Theological Ethics 
 In contrast to the reasoning and principles mentioned above, the origin of the 
principle of cooperation is, most likely, not Thomas Aquinas.
270
  The framework and 
guidelines that coalesced into the principle of cooperation are the work of Alphonsus de 
Liguori. 
 The previous chapter outlined the context surrounding Liguori but did not detail 
the man along with his life and works as they relate to what is now the principle of 
cooperation.  Alphonsus Maria Liguori was born on September 27, 1696 in the Kingdom 
of Naples, which was under Spanish rule at the time, to a noble family.  His father, Don 
Giuseppe Liguori, was an accomplished naval officer and renowned as a commanding 
officer.  Donna Anna Cavalieri, his mother, dedicated her life to service and the 
education of her eight children, four girls and four boys (three of whom besides 
Alphonsus became priests or nuns), of which Alphonsus was the oldest.  The maternal 
grandfather of Alphonsus was one of the kingdom‘s chief magistrates.271 
 His parents were both devout Catholics, and his interests in and contributions to 
the fair may be due to his pious upbringing.  Alphonsus seemed to appreciate his 
mother‘s discipline and morality.  As a young adult, he learned and practiced the arts, 
became an accomplished musician and fluent in three languages (Latin, Greek, and 
French), and studied civil and cannon laws, mathematics, literature, philosophy, and 
science.  The extensive studying paid off – he became a doctor in 1713 when he was a 
little over sixteen years old and a practicing lawyer shortly thereafter.  By his twentieth 
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year, he had a successful legal practice with a number of clients, some of them famous 
persons.
272
 
 Alphonsus remained interested in leading a virtuous life, which led him to 
maintain a reserved and pious life, join religious retreats with popular theologians, enter 
the service of others such as volunteering at hospitals, and devote himself to prayer.  He 
renounced the legal profession after a particularly prominent and difficult case in his 
early twenties.  His father renounced him after years in solicitude away from the legal 
practice.  This furthered his intent to dedicate himself to God by entering the priesthood 
in 1723, a decision that disappointed his father.  As a priest, he became even more ardent 
with strict spiritual exercises.  In 1726, Alphonsus, now in his late 20s, was ordained.
273
 
 He became as well known as a skilled orator and saver of souls.  Liguori not only 
enjoyed bringing peace to troubled souls, he was quite adept at it.  There were numerous 
occasions of Liguori skillfully responding to those in confession as well as bringing the 
most obstinate and hardened-heart individuals back to the faith and good moral conduct.  
He conducted retreats, went on missions, and founded a retreat center and a religious 
congregation.  Alphonsus was elected rector-major in the 1740s when he began to write 
his many works including Moral Theology, published in 1753.  Liguori declined the 
bishopric one time but did not when he was asked thirty years after he founded his 
congregation.  He accepted the calling well into his seventh decade of life.
274
 
 As an accomplished theological scholar, Liguori had many theological interests, 
with one of the foremost being the instruction, formation, and training of priests.  A 
critical subset of this, for Liguori, had to do with the important practice of priests 
listening to the confessions of parishioners and responding appropriately to the occasions 
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of sin.  The duty of being a spiritual director and hearing confessions was paramount, and 
priests should not take it lightly.
275
  Hearing confessions and responding appropriately – 
as well as being pastoral while also having concern with truth due to those seeking 
eternal salvation – is a difficult job as described by St. Alphonsus Liguori himself: 
The office of confessor is the greatest – it concerns eternal 
salvation – and the most difficult.  The most difficult because it 
requires knowledge of all the sciences, all work, all the 
professions; because it touches upon every kind of problem; 
because it presupposes knowledge of a huge number of positive 
laws and sacred canons that have to be rightly interpreted and, 
finally, because there remains the hard work of applying all of this 
to the diversity of cases for which circumstances call for different 
solutions.
276
 
 
The role is so difficult that, according to Liguori, angels fear to tread on the office 
because, as described by St. Lawrence Justinian, there is nothing more delicate and 
hazardous than the duty of providing to God a description of others‘ lives.277  He took the 
‗office of confessor‘ seriously and expected others in the office to do the same. 
 Chapter one expressed the cultural milieu surrounding Liguori and the pushback 
against casuistry along with Liguori‘s sensible morality.  Alphonsus Liguori comments 
more specifically about the cultural forces mentioned in chapter one: 
Some pride themselves on being scholars and distinguished 
theologians and disdain to read the moralists whom they scornfully 
call casuists.  It is enough, they say, for the confessor to know 
general principles of morality to solve every particular case.  It is 
certainly true that all particular cases are to be solved in light of the 
principles.  But the whole difficulty consists exactly in applying to 
particular cases obscured by complex circumstances the general 
principles appropriate to them.  Reason comes into play in order to 
weigh the pros and cons of each principle.  This is the task 
performed by the moralists.
278
 
 
Liguori‘s morality is sensible because prudence, reason, and wisdom mediate the 
application of more abstract rules, principles, and values to specific situations that include 
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various intentions and circumstances.  For the reasons expressed, Liguori considers moral 
theology one of the most difficult duties persons (presumably both priests and 
laypersons) may enter into for a few reasons.  First, it requires knowledge of several 
disciplines (some mentioned above).  Second, moral theology encompasses a gargantuan 
amount of information due to the first reason.  Third, decisions are dependent on other 
variables such as intent and circumstances.  No two situations may be exactly alike.  The 
principles, concepts, and solutions employed for one case do not necessarily work for 
other cases, even ones that seem similar to the first.  It is this density and complication 
that renders the proper practice of moral theology so difficult.
279
 
 One can find the concept now called the principle of cooperation in his writings.  
Not surprisingly, Alphonsus conceptualized components as ways to guide clergy listening 
to confessions.  Confessors – who intentionally or unintentionally participate in the sins 
being confessed – sin themselves: 
Priests who see insults offered to God and remain silent are called 
by Isaias mute dogs.  But to these mute dogs shall be imputed all 
the sins that they could have but have not prevented. ‗Do not be 
silent,‘ says Alcuin, ‗lest the sins of the people be ascribed to you.‘ 
Some priests abstain from reproving sinners because they do not 
wish to disturb their peace of mind; but, says St. Gregory, for this 
peace that they desire, they shall miserably lose peace with 
God…St. Leo adds: ―The priest who does not withdraw another 
from error proves that he is himself involved in it.‖280 
 
Liguori does not refer to this explicitly as cooperation.  However, formal cooperation 
describes when a cooperator participating in the sin of the agent in such a manner that the 
sin of the cooperator is indistinguishable from the sin of the agent.  In other words, 
Liguori is expressing the modern understanding of formal cooperation. 
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 Evidence exists of the modern-day concept of material cooperation in Liguori‘s 
writings.  Again in the context of confession, Liguori gives the example of the tightrope a 
confessor walks with a person who keeps himself or herself in the company of proximate 
or remote sin: 
The occasion may be remote or proximate. The remote occasion is 
that in which a person rarely sins or in which men, commonly 
speaking, seldom fall. The occasion that is itself proximate is that 
in which men always, or nearly always, fall. The occasion that is 
proximate by accident, or the respective occasion, is that in which 
a particular person frequently sins. This is the correct definition of 
the respective occasion, according to the true and common opinion 
of theologians, in opposition to those who hold that the proximate 
occasion is that in which a person always, or nearly always, yields 
to sin. The occasion of sin is also divided into voluntary and 
necessary. The occasion is voluntary when it can be removed; it is 
necessary when it cannot be avoided without grievous loss or 
grievous scandal to others.
281
 
 
Restating this, persons keeping themselves in the proximate occasion of sin may require a 
‗tough love‘ approach from a confessor when compared to counterparts who are in 
remote proximity to sin.  Proximate occasions of sin typically require more rigor than 
remote occasions, which may include, on the one hand, not absolving the sinner until the 
proximate reasons to sin have been removed.  On the other hand, the confessor may 
absolve a person staying in the presence of proximate sin a couple times but no more if 
the sinner promises to remove the occasions for sinning.  Proximate sins are much more 
difficult to remove than remote ones.
282
   
An example of proximate (mediate material) cooperation Alphonsus gives is a 
parishioner who keeps a concubine in his house.
283
  The supposition from his writing is 
that the concubine is the moral agent who sins.  He does not mention if the parishioner, 
who is the cooperator, has already sinned.  Still, the example infers that by merely aiding 
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a sinner, while not intending the transgressions of the sinner, provides reasonable 
occasion for the cooperator to sin because of the assistance or relationship to the moral 
agent.  Albeit not by name, this situation describes what now is proximate mediate 
material cooperation. 
In the former example, the role of the confessor is to appropriately challenge the 
parishioner, lest he become inappropriately connected with the transgressions by 
ignoring, trivializing, or otherwise condoning the situation.  Again, this is a delicate 
balance for the confessor, as Liguori‘s writings reveal: 
In choosing an opinion, when it is a question of removing a 
penitent from the danger of formal sin, the confessor must often 
follow the most tolerant options, to the degree that Christian 
prudence allows him to do so…If, however, the penitent‘s opinion 
places him in close proximity to the danger of formal sin, then the 
confessor must advise him to follow the stricter opinion.  I say 
advise because if the penitent holds a truly probable opinion and 
wishes to follow it, he cannot be refused absolution, since, by his 
confession which he has already made, he has acquired the right to 
receive absolution…A confessor [realizes that his penitent is 
committing sins the gravity of which he is unaware]; if he foresees 
that his admonition would do no good, must he nevertheless warn 
him?  No.  The confessor can and must leave him in good faith.  Of 
two evils it is necessary to choose the lesser.  When the choice lies 
between material and formal sin, one must at all costs avoid the 
latter, for it alone God punishes because by it alone is He offended.  
But what then of the truth?  Certainly, the confessor cannot deceive 
his penitent if the latter asks him.  But he is not only a teacher, he 
is a physician.  And his faculty to hear confessions is first of all a 
ministry of charity.  Is the truth to be sacrificed then?  In no way.  
He does not choose between truth and charity.  He practices charity 
toward the penitent and towards God [who will not be formally 
offended] without doing injury to the truth.  He does not speak it 
[because it is not good to utter every truth]…A single formal sin is 
more serious than all the material sins together.
284
 
 
Notice that prudence requires the confessor to react differently to various situations.  The 
ideal is the removal of sin or the occasion to sin in totality.  Yet this may not be optimal 
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for any number of reasons.  In these cases, the lesser of two evils is material proximity to 
sin rather than formal, as well as maintaining the parishioner‘s good conscience if he or 
she is unaware of the sin‘s gravity rather than objectively informing the parishioner of the 
sin‘s gravity. 
Church hierarchy and officials grew weary and suspect of (what scholars now 
dub) high casuistry ―because it sometimes became oversubtle and even intellectually 
dishonest‖ around the time of and shortly after Ligouri.285  Therefore, after Ligouri, the 
significant applications of cooperation were by Manualists, who often defined it then 
applied it to health care and cases of assisting in illicit procedures as well as other 
assistance in evil.
286
  The purpose and name of the manuals originated from the desire of 
moral theologians for seminarians to use deductive reasoning, to reason from universal 
principles to individual situations.  Theories, teaching, and principles were codified into 
textbooks or manuals predominantly from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries.
287
  
The following is a survey of some more recent, English moral manuals.  They are 
in chronological order by book edition: Henry Davis defines cooperation, explains the 
taxonomy and malice of cooperation, and provides practical examples of cooperation in 
his 1945 edition of Moral and Pastoral Theology.  His examples include a priest giving a 
consecrated Host to an ―unworthy recipient‖ during Communion (an application Liguori 
would appreciate), associating with immoral books and papers (i.e. printing, writing, 
publishing, selling, advertising, and so on), promoting idolatry (e.g. creating offensive art 
such as provocative statues, making Masonic emblems), selling sinful objects, illicit 
operations (i.e. surgeries such as direct sterilizations), spouses who use contraceptives, 
managers who ask employees to sin, associating with unjust laws and sentences, selling 
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furniture from churches, reading or reciting Anglican prayers, helping in public welfare 
clinics that give information about or distribute contraceptives, and participation in 
Chinese rituals.
288
  Heribert Jone and Urban Adelman applied cooperation, in their 1952 
edition of Moral Theology, to cases of interacting within Protestant churches (e.g. 
attending a service, designing worship space) and with Protestant clergy (e.g. last rites), 
donations for building and maintenance of non-Catholic institutions (e.g. schools, 
orphanages), printed works with controversial content (i.e. authoring, printing, editing, 
proofing, advertising, selling, setting the typeface, and so on for inappropriate books, 
papers, or magazines), immoral shows and dances (i.e. arranging, conducting, financing, 
playing music for, or being security for an inappropriate exhibit or show), employers who 
sin (e.g. preparing a meat dish for an other-than-Catholic employer during a day of 
abstinence), laborers and tradespersons (e.g. sewing a revealing dress), and with a judge 
executing an unjust law through a sentence (e.g. invalid marriage, divorce).
289
  In his 
1963 manuals The Law of Christ, Bernard Häring focuses on avoiding cooperation to 
begin with, as his rules for conduct in cooperation portray: 
First Principle: It is never permitted, directly or indirectly, to 
cooperate in an act which is in itself evil, even though one 
anticipates the very greatest good as a result of the act. 
Second Principle: There is no universal obligation to omit a 
good or indifferent act because of the evil effects which it may also 
have because of the hazard of circumstance or the malice of others.  
But there must be a proportionate reason for performing the action. 
Third Principle: If no relatively higher good is at stake, 
ordinarily love of neighbor, zeal for the kingdom of God, and 
frequently justice itself commanded us to omit actions which will 
have foreseen but unintended evil effects. 
Fourth Principle: The obligation to prevent or avoid the 
unintended evil effects of our actions is all the more urgent, 1) the 
more baneful the effect can be, 2) the more immediately it flows 
from our action, 3) the more the duties of our state of life or of our 
vocation command us to prevent such evil efforts.
290
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Thus, his conceptual understanding of avoiding cooperation to begin with is more fitting 
than his examples, which seem to border on DER (e.g., a male gynecologist becoming 
aroused while examining female patients, killing in self defense, a priest giving the 
consecrated Host to a congregant whom he denied absolution).  Using Häring‘s 
reasoning, we cooperate when we do not have proportionate reason to act or do not try to 
avoid the evil effects of an action with two foreseen effects.
291
  This is Häring‘s way of 
saying that participators‘ cooperate with evil when an act or omission fails DER. 
 Some manuals focused on medicine and its moral practice in particular.  One who 
had many editions of such a manual was Charles McFadden, whose first edition of 
Medical Ethics was in 1945.  In his 1961 edition, he defines cooperation, explains the 
association between cooperation and DER, gives preconditions for using cooperation and 
DER like Häring, and applies it to a series of issues.  Of significance to McFadden is a 
professional‘s (usually a nurse‘s) assistance in a suspect or immoral procedure, which is 
the title of his chapter (―Assistance at Immoral Operations‖) and a subject he nuances 
within.  As McFadden knows, this is not the only form of cooperation within the medical 
setting.  He also addresses mercy killings, referrals for illicit procedures, being ‗ordered‘ 
by a superior to do something immoral, working in an office where a physician 
recommends contraception to patients, sterilization by non-surgical means, and working 
in a public health clinic.
292
  Thomas O‘Donnell, a Jesuit and Georgetown University 
professor, wrote Morals in Medicine in 1956.  After defining cooperation and its 
taxonomy, he suggests that DER is the litmus test for the acceptability of mediate 
material cooperation.  It is less likely that a cooperator‘s action is mediate material 
cooperation if the act does not pass all four elements of DER (the act is not intrinsically 
 96 
evil, the agent intends the good and not the evil, the evil is not the means to the good, and 
proportionate reason exists).  The cooperator‘s act would be formal or material 
cooperation.  If the act passes DER, it could qualify as mediate material cooperation.
293
  
O‘Donnell‘s examples are similar to ones mentioned above, used by other manualists.  
He addresses cooperation in Church Canon law, which is more concerned with what 
kinds of cooperation are punishable by ecclesiastical penalty than what kinds are 
immoral.  Using O‘Donnell‘s interpretation, cooperation can be an act, omission, morally 
necessary or not, according to agreement, or in preparation to the evil act or omission.
294
  
Jesuit Gerald Kelly wrote popular manuals beginning in the late 1940s.  Many of these 
were condensed to make Medico-Moral Problems in 1958.  Kelly only briefly addresses 
cooperation in Medico-Moral Problems’ ―Chapter 38: Cooperation in Illicit Operations,‖ 
where he introduces the principle of cooperation through the example of a nurse assisting 
in an illicit operation.
295
 
 Commentary about cooperation the application of cooperation to situations did 
not end with the manualist tradition.  Far from it, contemporary discussion ensues.  
Developments make obsolete some discussed applications of cooperation in the moral 
manuals (e.g. attending Protestant services, preparing meat during periods of abstinence).  
People find new ways to apply cooperation as a result of new technologies (e.g. Esure, 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, stem cell research), unfolding Church teaching, and 
arguments for its use.   
The influence of cooperation was evident when it was added to Part Six and the 
Appendix of the third edition (1994) of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services (ERDs) and when Part Six and the Appendix were substantively 
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revised in the fourth edition (2001).  At least three reasons contributed to the revisions 
between the third and fourth editions: First, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith (CDF) alleged that Catholic health care organizations were misusing the ERDs for 
agreements, arrangements, and cooperatives with other-than-Catholic organizations.  
Second, the CDF challenged that cooperation distinctions applying to individuals, a topic 
in this chapter, did not apply the same way with organizations, the focus of the next 
chapter.  Organizational agreements had commenced with the assumption that individual 
and organizational distinctions were similar.  Third, the justification of duress was 
inappropriately applied in Catholic organizations.
296
  All three of the above issues 
intricately relate to one another.  Despite the changes between the third and fourth 
editions, Part Six has stayed consistent with subsequent ERDs’ revisions, including the 
most recent fifth edition (2009) of the ERDs.  Discussion of contemporary uses of 
cooperation occurs in the next section. 
IID. Applied Material Cooperation to Issues in Catholic Health Care 
 There are litanies of ways that one can apply cooperation to issues that arise with 
individuals either in Catholic health care or pertaining to Catholic health care.  This will 
not survey all the possible ways someone can apply cooperation, but simply attend to the 
main ones for individuals.  Attention to the topics will include a thorough explanation of 
the topic, the relevance of cooperation, and the variety of different ways to apply 
cooperation.  Literature is replete with the subsequent topics. 
IID1. Assistance in Morally Illicit Procedure(s) (Termination, Direct Sterilization) 
 Catholic health care professionals or those who align with Catholic values, 
including the ERDs, may encounter situations when they must respond to requests to 
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assist a morally illicit procedure.  Morally questionable or objectionable procedures are 
those that go against the conscience of the individual that often accounts for Catholic 
teaching about morally grave procedures.  For instance, Pope John Paul II affirmed in 
Evangelium vitae that direct abortion – meaning deliberate or direct killing of life in utero 
from conception to birth as an end or means – is always morally grave and disordered 
according to the Catholic Church.
297
  Direct sterilization – that is any procedure that 
dispossesses a man or woman of the ability to reproduce intended in itself or as a 
means
298
 – is also illicit even though it has a less severe moral gravity than abortion.299  
In other words, direct sterilizations are for the purpose of contraception either in intent or 
in the absence of other mitigating reasons;
300
 they are intrinsically evil according to the 
Catholic Church.  Some patients wish to end their lives for various reasons, often 
involving chronic, intractable pain associated with a terminal illness.  Concurrently with 
such wishes, patients prefer to die in a humane way, as death with some illnesses is 
undignified, and ask for their physician‘s help in doing so.  Physician assisted suicide 
(PAS) is the practice when physicians provide the means for a patient who is able to 
commit suicide and does so.
301
  According to Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae: 
[PAS describes the cooperation or perpetration] of an injustice 
which can never be excused, even if it is requested.  In a 
remarkably relevant passage Saint Augustine writes that ―it is 
never licit to kill another: even if he should wish it because, 
hanging between life and death, he begs for help in freeing the soul 
struggling against the bonds of the body and longing to be 
released; nor is it licit even when a sick person is no longer able to 
live.‖  Even when not motivated by a selfish refusal to be burdened 
with the life of someone who is suffering, euthanasia must be 
called a false mercy, and indeed a disturbing ―perversion‖ of 
mercy.  True ―compassion‖ leads to sharing another‘s pain; it does 
not kill the person whose suffering we cannot bear.
302
 
 
Per this passage, PAS is impermissible in the Catholic tradition. 
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 Other reasons exist for objecting to something or considering it immoral besides 
the moral norms of the Catholic Church.  In one case, for instance, a surgeon may object 
to a request from a patient for an unreasonable or unsafe procedure.  In another, a nurse 
may consider restraining a pregnant woman for delivery morally repugnant, even after 
knowing of the infant‘s acute, severe distress and the woman‘s seemingly unreasonable 
objections to the Cesarean Section because she does not like surgical pain.  Whereas 
these instances exist and cooperation may assist, they are topics inherent in chapters four 
and five and do not aid the understanding about the application of cooperation to this 
category of issues.  This line of reasoning will concentrate on moral evils according to the 
Catholic Church. 
 Cooperation applies to individual participation in abortion, sterilization, PAS, and 
other moral evils defined by the Church.  Scholars comment on participation in illicit 
medical procedures, such as abortions and sterilizations.
303
  Gerald Kelly, in particular, 
defines an important caveat and applies cooperation to the individual assistance in an 
illicit procedure.  His caveat is that there should not be any illicit procedures in a Catholic 
hospital, so no issues should exist in reference to assisting such procedures in a Catholic 
hospital.  The issue he attends to is Catholic nurses participating in illicit procedure, 
presumably, in a secular hospital or clinic.  In these cases, nurses‘ actions are not the ones 
in question.  Nevertheless, they may assist other clinicians, most likely physicians, in 
procedures running contrary to Catholic teaching.
304
  Kelly is astutely aware that the 
principle of cooperation is apposite for instances such as these. 
 Health care professionals in these situations should register their disapproval.  Not 
doing this is tacit approval of the procedure and formal cooperation.  It is disapproval that 
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exemplifies material cooperation, where the cooperator does not intend the evil of the 
moral agent.  The ideal is that the supervisor excuses the professional wishing to decline 
for reasons of conscience.  Depending on various factors, honoring the professional‘s 
objection would either place the professional in remote, mediate, material cooperation or 
would eliminate cooperation altogether.  This may not happen.  If it does not, the 
professional faces a choice whether to resign from the position or stay.  Factors 
influencing this evaluation (staying or leaving) are the availability of other positions both 
within and outside the organization based on geography and travel, job market, family 
structure and dynamics, and personal or family finances.
305
   
Although not referred to by name, these features have to do with the presence and 
intensity of duress.  Occasions when a professional has options, such as moving to other 
jobs without the same trying conditions, are ones the professional should exercise 
because the duress on that person is low.  Conversely, not everyone will have this option.  
Family, geography, finances, and job markets may create higher degrees of duress and 
limit options.  Professionals in such situations may be in proximate, mediate material 
cooperation, which is licit with proportionate justification, or immediate material 
cooperation, which is typically not licit but may be so under duress.  The ‗distance‘ from 
the procedure also matters along with the essentiality of the cooperator‘s action.  
Examples are a nurse, the cooperator, who operates the suction machine during an 
abortion as opposed to a nurse who takes care of women after the abortion.  The latter is 
not only more distant from the abortion itself; the nurse does not provide anything 
essential or significant to the abortion.  This is not true of the former situation.
306
  Edwin 
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Healy and Charles McFadden interpret that only an extremely grave reason should justify 
the former.
307
 
IID2. Assisting in Suicide(s) 
 PAS may involve a number of health care and other professionals (cooperators) 
who play roles in supporting the patient (agent) in his or her suicide.  Involved 
professionals may be ―a hospital administrator, a nurse, a pharmacist, and possibly even 
an orderly if the orderly must retrieve the lethal dose from the pharmacy.‖308  The 
professionals who may or may not cooperate depend on the means used to facilitate the 
suicide.  Means may be proactive or reactive, and the discussion of both occurs below. 
 In the event of a patient request for medical assistance, there are a series of ways 
that a health care professional could act, with all the ways fitting into the nexus of 
cooperation.  For instance, the patient‘s physician could agree with the patient‘s request 
and write a script for enough controlled substances to provide a lethal dose.  The 
physician may articulate disapproval of PAS but justify it with another belief, such as 
autonomy and individual choice, and write a script for the substance.  The latter incidence 
is implicit formal cooperation while the former is explicit formal cooperation; both 
explicit and implicit formal cooperation are prohibited.  Another scenario is that the 
physician could object to the patient‘s request just to be told by an insurance provider that 
she or he cannot question intent when patients request potentially lethal doses of 
medicines all the time.  Prescribing a dose despite suspect circumstances that a patient 
uses for suicide is immediate material cooperation with duress.  Robert Miech, a person 
commenting on all levels of cooperation with PAS, believes that the loss of livelihood is 
not significant enough to claim duress for legitimate immediate material cooperation in 
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this case.  Miech is equally rigoristic with an example of mediate material cooperation he 
provides – covering a fellow coworker‘s duties while she or he attends to the patient‘s 
suicide request.  Proportionate reason means having no other work available, and this 
type of organizational policy must not give rise to scandal according to Miech.  His 
specific example of proximate, mediate material cooperation is a physician advising 
another to buy stock in a pharmaceutical company that is releasing a new substance that 
one could use or dispense for suicide.  Remote, mediate material cooperation is a 
physician writing a script for a substance that happens to have the same manufacturer that 
produces and markets a substance prescribed for PAS.
309
 
 Philip Boyle and the ethics department at Catholic Health East consider a 
different situation related to cooperating with another‘s suicide: 
Harry is 82-years-old and has Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease (COPD) and has the initial signs of memory loss.  
Admitted to the hospital unconscious after a failed drug overdose 
and attempted suicide, he was placed on a ventilator.  An out-of-
hospital DNR and other advance directives make it clear he does 
not want CPR or other invasive treatments.  His duly appointed 
healthcare agent [a.k.a. durable power of attorney for health care 
(DPOA-HC)] requests that the vent be removed on Harry‘s 
previous statements.  Staff wonders whether they will be 
cooperating in Harry‘s suicide.310 
 
Again, staff members confront a range of options for reacting to this situation that serve 
as models for others facing similar situations.  Health care professionals know that 
removing the ventilator based on this information alone (assuming Harry did not have a 
DNR order or other expressed wishes to forgo invasive treatments) will make them 
complicit in Harry‘s choice to commit suicide.  This is tantamount to formal cooperation.  
The existence of the DNR order and other advance directives to forgo aggressive 
treatments, though, are justifiable reasons to limit interventions.  Ethicists at Catholic 
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Health East point out that the cooperators, the hospital staff in this case, must make it 
clear that they would not cooperate with the agent and that person‘s intent, Harry‘s 
attempted suicide in this case.  The ethics department does not resolve how immediate or 
mediate material cooperation would ‗look,‘ meaning what actions, if any, the staff could 
take to presumably honor advance directives while still depicting that they are not 
intending Harry‘s suicide.311  On one hand, not honoring the patient‘s advance directives 
would likely remove the opportunity to cooperate altogether, but would disrespect 
Harry‘s self-determinism and expressed wishes.  On the other hand, there is conscientious 
objection and referral to a different physician, as long as that physician will be more 
comfortable with the suicidal patient while still preventing the suicide itself.
312
  Such 
referrals from one uncomfortable professional to another would be neither formal nor 
immediate material cooperation.
313
  An ethics consultation and subsequent chart note, 
potentially referencing the use of cooperation in discerning the issue, before tapering 
down or withdrawing invasive interventions would be another way for the staff to 
illustrate their disagreement with the patient. 
 Helen Watt shares a nuance related to the gravity of the moral evil of suicidal 
patients as an application of the principle of cooperation.  In the three font (tres fonts) or 
three sources of morality criteria explained above, acts change according to their object, 
intent, and circumstances.  With this in mind, all suicide attempts or suicidal patients are 
not of the same ilk.  Watt distinguishes a range of suicidal thoughts and actions where 
patients on one side are strongly suicidal and weakly suicidal on the other.  A strongly 
suicidal patient is one who articulates the motive of committing suicide and seems to 
make an unreasonable refusal; the patient justifies his or her decision based on burdens, 
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but others do not perceive the burdens as justifying refusal, even taking into account the 
particular patient‘s context.  A weekly suicidal patient is one who has the primary, week 
or strong, motive of avoiding a procedure based on his or her benefits and burdens 
calculus.  (Presumably, others do not question the patient‘s decision given the situation‘s 
benefits and burdens.)  The intent to die is only a week motivation – an acceptable 
byproduct, or foreseen consequence, of avoiding an intervention or procedure.  A patient 
between these two extremes is one who ―is strongly suicidal, but is, in addition, strongly 
set on avoiding on the procedure itself.‖314 
 Discerning correct action is thorny given the range of intent and circumstances in 
these situations.  A cooperator may think of the following question: Keeping in mind 
Helen Watt‘s distinctions, does a cooperator need a more compelling proportionate 
reason to cooperate with a ‗strongly suicidal‘ patient (in essence, making even proximate, 
mediate material cooperation difficult) than a ‗weekly suicidal‘ patient?  Using this 
reasoning, cooperating with a strongly suicidal patient is more grave than cooperating 
with a weekly suicidal patient.  Another line of reasoning is that assisting a weekly 
suicidal patient is not a cooperation issue at all.  The basis for this idea is that weekly 
suicidal patients ‗pass‘ DER.  Such a claim is not easy to adequately justify because it 
involves a primary intention and a secondary order of the will.  In other words, it is 
possible to intend to decline a procedure based on a weighing of benefits and burdens 
while simultaneously willing a suicide.  It is this complex nature of intention that makes 
at least one criterion in DER difficult to justify.  As the use of DER here is a side issue, 
few reasons subsist to pursue this particular conundrum any further. 
IID3. Allowing, Prescribing, or Distributing Contraceptives (Birth Control, Condoms) 
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 The prescription or distribution of contraceptives such as birth control and 
condoms are other opportunities to apply the principle of cooperation to individuals.  As 
cooperation is always in reference to evil, it is prudent if not crucial to define what evil is 
in reference to artificial contraceptives.  In Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI reaffirms the 
magisterial teaching that there are two purposes of the marital act or sexual intercourse 
between spouses: it is unitive, meaning that it connects husband and wife, and 
procreative, signifying that it is open to the generation of life.
315
  These two functions of 
the act should be inseparable from each other; humans should not tear asunder those 
things willed by God.
316
  Artificial means to separate the unitive and procreative function 
include sterilizations, ‗the pill‘ (birth control pill), condoms, and others.  These are 
‗unlawful means‘ according to Humanae Vitae.317  Lawful means utilize the rhythm 
method, which is when a couple uses the woman‘s cycle by resorting to intercourse 
during infertile times only.
318
  John Paul II reiterated these teachings again in Familiaris 
Consortio.
319
 
 Catholics or those adhering to Catholic teachings may find themselves in a variety 
of situations related to the prescription or distribution of contraception or birth control.  
In secular supermarkets and drug stores, for instance, a clerk may face the choice of 
selling (distributing) contraceptives at a customer‘s request.  Pharmacists specifically and 
regularly deal with requests and scripts to dispense birth control and the morning after 
pill (such as ―Plan B‖).  Catholic health care organizations, similar to their secular 
counterparts, have in-house pharmacies in acute care facilities and primary care and 
gynecological clinics where physicians and pharmacists receive requests for birth control, 
fitted contraceptives (such as diaphragms), and abortifacient substances.  Moral 
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theologians comment on the appropriateness of applying the principle of cooperation, 
which is fitting in these situations.
320
 
 An important caveat is in order before applying cooperation to some 
representative occasions of contraception.  Various examples of conscientious objection 
to the distribution of contraceptive substances and mechanisms involve professionals 
other than the persons prescribing them.  It is the attending, primary care, or specialist 
physician (nurse practitioner or physician‘s assistant), for instance, who prescribes the 
contraceptive that then goes to the in-house (within the clinic, acute care, or other 
facility) or commercial pharmacist to fill.  When the pharmacist fills the script, he or she 
does not know the clinical indications of the patient when doing so.  Instances of 
conscientious objection demonstrate the professional‘s presumption that dispensing the 
substance or mechanism illicitly ties them to a moral evil.  Such a presumption may not 
be accurate, per the use of DER and cooperation. 
 A case may assist understanding of this claim.  Supposing a woman visits her 
gynecologist for abnormal periods, which she describes as being both painful and having 
a heavy flow.  Her gynecologist diagnoses her with primary dysmenorrhea and profuse 
menstruation,
321
 which are of great concern because she is now anemic and is developing 
other severe conditions.
322
  Hormones, an often-effective treatment for such conditions,
323
 
to regulate the menstrual cycle in the form of a specific birth control pill is the 
recommendation of the physician, who writes a script for the patient.   
This is a classic use of DER.  Going through the conditions of DER, this situation 
will result in two foreseen results with the intended effect of diminishing or eliminating 
her heavy, painful periods causing serious illnesses and the unintended effect of 
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contraception: The object of the act, which is swallowing a pill or hormonal regulation, is 
not evil in itself.  Attending to the serious condition is the intent, not the contraception.  
Both effects occur simultaneously, meaning that the evil effect is not the gateway to the 
good effect.  Proportionate reason exists for the pill as treatment, not only because of the 
heavy and painful periods themselves, but also because of the other resulting conditions‘ 
severity such as the anemia.  The case passes DER using this reasoning. 
The patient takes the script to the pharmacy in a local drug store that is part of a 
national retail chain.  She hands it to the pharmacist on duty, who is Catholic and refuses 
to fill the valid script.  The pharmacist is not the treating physician and does not know the 
clinical indications that led to the prescription.  Accepting the application of DER above, 
the pharmacist‘s presumption has its basis in the use of contraception as evil in this case, 
which is not accurate because it passes DER.  No need for using cooperation exists, 
because moral evil is not there. 
One could respond that many of the scripts falling under the pharmacist‘s purview 
are for the purpose of contraception or birth control, which is not permissible in Church 
teaching.  Such responses lack empirical evidence.  Arguments such as this are 
categorical by nature – persons using them make unfounded empirical claims.  
Notwithstanding this categorization, professionals such as pharmacists have the principle 
of cooperation to gauge their complicity. 
A different, hypothetical example portrays the application of cooperation to the 
dispensing of substances and mechanisms.  St. Ignatius Hospital has a dispensary in the 
emergency department (ED), similar to other hospitals, which requires the in-house 
pharmacist to key into the safe cabinet for the relevant pharmaceutical.  A physician in 
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the ED calls the pharmacist to dispense levonorgestrel, commonly known as Plan B, for a 
patient.  The pharmacist refuses by phone, verbalizing her conscientious objection as an 
―obedient‖ Catholic serving within a Catholic hospital.  As is often the case, the in-house 
pharmacist does not know the clinical indications for dispensing this, or any, 
pharmaceutical.  Treating physicians could use medications, including Plan B, in direct or 
indirect ways. 
From one perspective, categorical situations – occurrences when we do not know 
case-based specifics – do not lend themselves well for applying cooperation, which 
depends on knowing specifics like the moral evil, injustice, or malfeasance; from another 
perspective, an agent could try applying cooperation to what little is known in this 
situation.  The pharmacist, or other evaluator, may have difficulty equating her actions 
with formal cooperation.  Any evaluator does not know the intent of the physician 
ordering the substance.  It could be to treat a sexual assault victim, which is licit 
according to the Church teaching expressed in the ERDs.  It might be that the physician 
does not know about such licit and impermissible distinctions within Catholic health care.  
The script was signed out of apathy, not bad or malicious intent.  Circumstances may 
exist where a physician disregards the Church and orders something not permitted by 
Catholic teaching.  The pharmacist may reasonably assume good intent based on the 
continuing education about Catholic teaching for physicians within the hospital.  The 
significance of this statement is that associates in the Catholic hospital reason through 
issues using their knowledge of Catholic teaching, meaning that most requests should be 
licit.  Playing Devil‘s advocate, an objecting pharmacist may assume the opposite, or that 
Catholic teaching prohibits most requests, and apply cooperation categorically.  The 
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pharmacist still does not know the intent of the agent, is unable to articulate the same 
intent, and, therefore, cannot assume explicit formal cooperation.  It would be as equally 
as difficult for another evaluator to allege implicit formal cooperation.  In fact, sufficient 
reason exists to show that the pharmacist does not have the same intent as a physician, 
even assuming a physician ordered the substance for use in a direct and illicit manner.  
Discerning correct action with Catholic moral teaching on the part of the pharmacist 
exhibits concern for the relationship and respect for Catholic teaching, which does not 
conform to the intent of the agent.  One could allege that the primacy of providing the 
medication for an illicit purpose makes the cooperative act immediate material 
cooperation.  It is unlikely that any one pharmacist‘s contribution is essential, as another 
could easily complete the order in the absence of another. 
James Keenan addresses the example of dealing with the realistic occasion that 
not all persons with HIV or AIDS chose to live a chase life.  In these instances, the 
principle of toleration is not the apposite principle for considering barrier methods of 
contraception known to reduce the spread of HIV through sexual intercourse, but 
cooperation is.  Keenan employs the use of six questions in order to ascertain the 
cooperation level: 
First, what is the object of [the cooperator‘s] activity?  Second, is 
the cooperator‘s cooperation in the agent‘s illicit activity formal or 
merely material?  Third, is the cooperation immediate or simply 
mediate?  Fourth, is the cooperation proximate or simply remote?  
Fifth, does the cooperator have sufficient cause for acting?  Sixth, 
is the cooperator‘s cooperation indispensable?324 
 
He answers all six of his questions when applying cooperation to giving condoms to 
persons with HIV/AIDS to protect others from transmission during sex.   
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His reasoning is as follows: Answering the first question is tricky and Keenan 
spends considerable attention trying to navigate the precise object of the act.  Keenan‘s 
conclusion is that the object of the act is the distribution of accurate information and, on 
another level, ―to give hygienic advice for diminishing the threat to the common good as 
found in an action with two objects, sexual activity and endangerment of the common 
good.‖325  Arguing that this action is implicit formal cooperation does not suffice because 
of the inability to separate the common good apprehension from the illegitimate sexual 
intercourse.  Implicit formal cooperation is for instances that exclude any other meaning, 
and these are not examples of them.  Cooperation is, therefore, material.  The object of 
the cooperator‘s act is the same as the object of the agent‘s act in immediate material 
cooperation.  This is not so because there is a difference between sexual unions and 
educational and health programs, so cooperation must be mediate material.  Keenan 
classifies the cooperation as remote (mediate material), with grave reasons for the 
cooperation, which are restraining a pandemic (HIV/AIDS), preserving life, and 
defending the common good.  Contrary to other writers on this topic, Keenan has ―not 
found any case that better illustrates the ‗dispensability‘ of cooperation than this case.  
Thus, we see that the letter‘s proposals of cooperation in no way assist the person to 
commit the act [emphasis in original].‖326 
Someone contrary to Keenan‘s categorization of the distribution of contraceptives 
for health (HIV/AIDS) reasons is Bernard Häring.  His comments about applying 
cooperation to supplying contraceptives in The Law of Christ precede Keenan‘s analysis 
by decades; still Häring‘s analysis appears remarkably different than Keenan‘s: 
[Pharmacists, druggists, or drugstore clerks who are aware of the 
immorality of contraceptives being sold are] guilty of formal 
 111 
cooperation in every instance of sale…A conscience attuned to the 
divine law steers clear of [evasions] and of the evil deed.  This is 
not to deny that the manager or owner of the store in question 
obviously must be charged with far greater guilt than a mere 
clerk.
327
 
 
Häring‘s application appears different from Keenan‘s because the context or 
circumstances of the response are slightly different.  Keenan‘s comments are in response 
to the specific context of HIV/AIDS and its education, prevention, and impact on the 
common good, as addressed by the NCCB‘s 1987 document The Many Faces of AIDS: A 
Global Response, as well as the follow-up 1989 Called to Compassion and 
Responsibility: A Response to the HIV/AIDS Crisis.
328
  It seems that Häring‘s statement is 
much more general to contraceptives, appearing to be a physicalist in nature even though 
Häring, like Liguori, did not like the legalism that often accompanies physicalism.  
Perhaps Häring would understand the specific situation Keenan comments on in a similar 
way, which seems much more personalist. 
IID4. Allowing, Prescribing, or Distributing Erectile Dysfunction Substances 
 The next category of situations where individuals individually apply the principle 
of cooperation needs additional specification.  Generally, this grouping includes any 
clinician who prescribes or person who distributes erectile dysfunction substances.  
Examples of these include Viagra (Sildenafil), Levitra (Vardenafil), and Cialis 
(Tadalafil).  Unlike other examples, Church teaching does not nuance the conditions 
associated with the justifiable use pharmaceuticals for erectile dysfunction.  The Church 
does not need to comment, as it is the person using the pharmaceutical who determines its 
legitimacy. 
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 A couple possesses the ability to separate the unitive and procreative functions of 
the marital act in any number of ways, despite the Church teaching that they should not 
be split:
329
  The couple is homosexual with a sexual relationship.  A couple is 
heterosexual and having sex where one or both are single (i.e. unmarried), married and 
―cheating‖ (i.e. sex with another who is not the spouse), or married while engaging in 
pleasure other than penile-vaginal intercourse (e.g. oral sex, anal sex).  Any duo may also 
use a barrier or other contraceptive method such as condoms, spermicide, diaphragms, 
and so on.  (For the purposes of discussion, it is better to assume that the use of a 
contraceptive barrier such as a condom is not for health reasons such as HIV/AIDS.  
Cooperation assumes a moral evil, injustice, or malfeasance.  Something is licit that 
passes a Catholic moral principle such as DER, the Church does not address in its 
teaching, is not part of the Church‘s authoritative Magisterium, is a matter of following 
one‘s conscience, or Church teaching establishes as legitimate.  Recent Church teaching 
represents an unfolding line of reasoning with respect to the use of contraceptives such as 
condoms and grave health threats that include the HIV/AIDS crisis.
330
  As such, it is 
easier to assume that one of the intimate partners does not have a grave health risk.) 
 Privacy, confidentiality, and relationships have expected connections to applying 
cooperation to the prescription of erectile dysfunction substances.  The first of these, 
privacy, may cause one to question how these personal and intimate subjects relate to 
physician-patient relationships.  Quite simply, there are at least two ways that patients 
share private information with their physicians.  Doctors‘ offices and clinics typically 
request demographic and personal data at the first patient visit in order to begin a new 
patient chart.  Categories and questions comprise indications about marital status.  In 
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addition, patients always have the option of sharing sensitive, personal information under 
the umbrella of the physician-patient relationship, which relates to the second topic, 
confidentiality.  Consider an admission, for instance, to an urologist from a gentleman 
who admits to having ―two girlfriends‖ who are sexual partners in addition to his wife.  
This information is mostly irrelevant unless the physician knows about a health or safety 
threat to the patient, his wife, and his girlfriends such as HIV/AIDS.  However, it may 
have relevance to a Catholic practitioner, or a clinician working in a clinic or office 
owned, managed, appropriated, or operated by a Catholic health care system.  The third 
topic, the relationship between physician and patient, becomes paramount given the 
disclosure about infidelity and, upon appropriate screening, the patient‘s request for the 
physician to prescribe an erectile dysfunction substance. 
 Cooperation enters the equation at this point.  Writing a script for an erectile 
dysfunction pharmaceutical is, most likely, formal cooperation with clear indications that 
the person is heterosexual and unmarried, cohabitating, cheating on a spouse, or 
homosexual.  Especially given specific requests, the purpose of such controlled 
substances is the restoration of normal sexual functioning for a male.  It would be 
difficult for a physician to justify his or her script for anything else (assuming the patient 
asks or its use is not for a different condition).  The cooperator, the physician, shares the 
same intent as the moral agent, the patient.  Even if the physician denied the intent, 
another could allege that he or she engaged in implicit formal cooperation.  The 
assistance is immediate material cooperation assuming that one could convincingly 
establish a different intent for the cooperator because of the instrumentality of the erectile 
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dysfunction medication.  Upon appropriate testing and diagnosis, men diagnosed with 
primary erectile dysfunction are dependent on medicines to be sexually active. 
Mike Delaney, a general practitioner, comments on another central feature related 
to the last comment above.  A man‘s erectile dysfunction may correlate with another 
illness or disease process.  In other words, the dysfunction is secondary to another 
concern.  Restoring health also restores erectile functioning.  For this reason, Delaney 
proclaims that there is no moral dilemma because, ―The doctor has simply fulfilled his or 
her professional obligation to investigate and treat disease.‖331   
Moral dilemmas do not exist from the perspective of Church teaching, as DER 
applies to the treatment of disease that has two foreseen effects, the alleviation or 
abolition of a disease state as well as the restoration of this component of sexual 
functioning.  The mitigation or eradication of disease is the intended effect.  Restitution 
of the ability to maintain an erection may be an unintended effect given indications that a 
patient indulges in immoral sexual activity according to the Church.  Medications or 
exercises to treat a condition such as heart disease are not evil by their object.  Their 
intent is to allay the condition and to restore, as much as possible, what Norman Daniels 
calls species-typical normal functioning, which ailments hinder; they block not only our 
biological wellness but ―reduce the range of opportunity open to the individual in which 
he [sic] may construct his [sic] ‗plan of life‘ or ‗conception of the good.‘‖332  The evil 
effect is not the way to the good effect.  In fact, quite the opposite is true, if at all.  The 
physician, in all likelihood, does not know if treating heart disease and high blood 
pressure will resolve erectile dysfunction.  If it does, the treatment of the heart and blood 
pressure precedes any resolution of the sexual dysfunction.  Proportionate reason exists 
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for the possible restoration of the patient‘s sexual functioning that he could use for illicit 
purposes.  The proportionate reason is the re-establishment of an even more critical 
condition or disease, such as heart disease and high blood pressure.  Because it passes 
DER, there are no reasons to use cooperation in instances of secondary erectile 
dysfunction. 
Dr. Delaney handles cases of primary erectile dysfunction slightly different – a 
sufficient moral solution avoiding formal cooperation that he reached after many years 
and consulting with experts.  Using the information sources mentioned above, he assumes 
a marriage is valid unless he hears otherwise (as he points out, he is a physician and is not 
in a place to judge a marriage).  He may clarify with a superficial question about marital 
status, and commences by treating the married while forgoing treatment from 
homosexuals (irrespective of marital status), ―cohabitating‖ persons, and the 
unmarried.
333
 
IID5. Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening 
Another area for individual applications of the principle of cooperation in the 
health care setting is prenatal genetic testing.  Prenatal genetic testing or screening 
describes the exercise of diagnostic equipment to establish a genetic account of an 
embryo or fetus before birth.
334
  Methods of prenatal testing or screening include three 
methods, listed in order of most to least frequently used and described according to the 
―Genetic Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing‖ entry in the 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics by Nancy Press and Kiley Ariail: 
1. Amniocentesis – is a technique for removal, via a needle 
puncture of the uterus, of amniotic fluid from the sac, which 
surrounds the fetus during pregnancy…performed in the 
middle of the second trimester of pregnancy.  [The test is 
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invasive, carrying the risk of fetal (and maternal) harm, and 
costly.] 
2. Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) – is a technique for removing 
fetal tissue cells, the chorionic villi, which are precursors of the 
placenta…by a transabdominal or transvaginal 
biopsy…performed safely as early as the tenth week of 
pregnancy.  [The test is invasive, carrying the risk of fetal (and 
maternal) harm, and costly.] 
3. Maternal serum fetal cell recovery – [is a less invasive 
procedure than amniocentesis and CVS for the mother and 
non-invasive for the fetus administered] through a maternal 
blood draw…[where] a small number of fetal cells are 
sloughed off and cross into maternal blood 
circulation…[Difficulties include the difficulty of fetal cell 
identification and isolation, the numeric rarity of fetal cells in 
the maternal serum, and the fetal cell types being suboptimal 
for detection, isolation, and analysis.]
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A test called the maternal serum alpha fetoprotein (MSAFP) is not a genetic test.  It is, 
however, a procedure that detects a substance present in the maternal bloodstream that 
the developing fetus generates.  It was the first screening test offered to all pregnant 
women and detects the risk of particular fetal anomalies such as neural tube defects 
(NTDs), but has a lower sensitivity to accurately detect chromosomal anomalies such as 
Down syndrome.
336
  Scientists have developed probes from the gene responsible for the 
disease (disorder) or molecular markers linked to the disease (disorder) gene.  There is 
common and wide use of these probes in the prenatal testing and screening for 
Huntington disease, cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and hundreds of additional genetic 
diseases (disorders).
337
   
James DuBois lists some of the reasons why parents opt for prenatal genetic 
testing or screening: 
 To enable parents to make an informed decision whether or not 
to continue a pregnancy 
 To diagnose disorders that can be treated or that require special 
management of a pregnancy 
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 To help parents to prepare for the birth of a child with special 
needs 
 To put parents‘ minds at ease 
 To satisfy a physician‘s legal requirement to provide patients 
with information
338
 
 
The difference between prenatal genetic testing and prenatal genetic screening is that 
people with a known genetic risk employ testing to identify genetic disease in their 
progeny.  On the contrary, people who do not have any known genetic conditions or 
disease use screening to detect a higher disposition of a defect or carrier status in their 
children.
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According to Catholic moral teaching, there is nothing inherently evil about 
prenatal genetic testing or screening, as articulated by John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae 
and directive 50 in the ERDs: 
Special attention must be given to evaluating the morality of 
prenatal diagnostic techniques [emphasis in original] which enable 
the early detection of possible anomalies in the unborn child.  In 
view of the complexity of these techniques, an accurate and 
systematic moral judgment is necessary…When they…are meant 
to make possible early therapy or even to favor a serene and 
informed acceptance of the child not yet born, these techniques are 
morally licit.
340
 
 
Prenatal diagnosis is permitted when the procedure does not 
threaten the life or physical integrity of the unborn child or the 
mother and does not subject them to disproportionate risks; when 
the diagnosis can provide information to guide preventive care for 
the mother or pre- or post-natal care for the child; and when the 
parents, or at least the mother, give free and informed consent…341 
 
This begs an answer to questions about what the cooperation issue is, given that this 
statement in the ERDs coincides with DuBois‘ second, third, fourth, and fifth points in 
his list.  The answer is simple.  Directive 50 concludes with a sentence about not 
employing prenatal diagnosis tests or screenings when doing so with the intent of 
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terminating the pregnancy if the child has a significant defect.
342
  DuBois articulates this 
same concept in his first point; obviously the Catholic Church disagrees with this as a 
valid option because abortion is a grave evil.
343
 
 Abortion is the connection that makes the advice pre- and post-testing (screening) 
for the prospective child‘s parents a cooperation issue344 – and such an important one to 
address from a Catholic perspective.  The Church is unambiguous about its condemnation 
of abortion, a perspective that is evident throughout Church teaching since the first 
century.
345
  Moreover, abortion is something that has a particularly high moral gravity, 
meaning that it is a severe mortal sin because of the absolute sanctity of human lives.  
Pope John Paul II warned the faithful that they should cooperate with abortions in any 
way because of the sin‘s gravity and the risk of scandal and corruption.346 
Using cooperation, DuBois suggests that recommending abortion is formal 
cooperation, which is accurate because the cooperator, the counselor, shares the intent of 
the agents, the parents, to terminate a child.  He goes on to state, ―[Genetic counselors in 
Catholic health care]…must refrain from presenting it as merely one among several 
legitimate options [emphasis added].‖347  Explanation about why does not accompany his 
statement, leaving the question open as to the level of cooperation (implicit formal, 
immediate material, or mediate material) and significance with the act of mentioning 
pregnancy termination as one of several options (the mere mention of abortion or the 
absent objection to this in order to clarify it as an unacceptable option, for instance).  
Defining and applying cooperation appropriately, presumably mediate material 
cooperation at most, during genetic counseling is not simple because of the options and 
divergences in experts‘ opinions and advice. 
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This issue deserves closer attention with the qualification that greater awareness 
will not ‗settle‘ the issue, meaning that moral and theological consensus about the 
application of cooperation to genetic counseling does not exist.  The following writings 
represent a range of opinions about the application of cooperation in these instances.  On 
one side, Norman Ford infers the mere mention that abortion is not a service provided in 
religious organizations is acceptable.
348
  While not overtly referring to Catholic 
organizations, his logic is solid that most religious organizations share a common sanctity 
for the value of human life and do not perform direct abortions.  The declaration that the 
Catholic hospital does not recommend or perform abortions to parents consenting to 
genetic screening or testing shows the counselor‘s difference in intent from the parents 
who may intend abortion if the procedures reveal fetal abnormalities.  Such declarative 
statements delineate the counselor‘s response as material, not formal, cooperation.  
Furthermore, information is hardly essential or primary to the evil itself, nor is 
indispensable to the choice, given the prevalence of abortion as a popular societal issue 
and the availability of information from sources such as the Internet.  Informative 
disclosure is at most proximate, mediate material cooperation. 
On the same side, as well, are Michael Panicola and Ron Hamel in their 
commentary about full disclosure about options counting abortion during genetic 
counseling in a Catholic health care organization.  Their reasoning is: 
1. The object of the cooperator‘s activity is the communication of 
factual information to patients about their condition [or the 
condition of the fetus] and the options available to them.  
Arguing that this is promoting or condoning practices 
[prohibited] by the Church…is a hard case to make, especially 
when the information is provided in an objective manner as 
part of the informed consent process and within the context of 
a Catholic moral vision. 
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2. Cooperation is material [emphasis added] because options 
were provided out of a sense of professional obligation, with 
the intent to inform the conscience of the patient and meet the 
legal requirements of informed consent, and within the context 
of a Catholic moral vision. 
3. It is mediate material cooperation [emphasis added], as neither 
the Catholic provider nor the patient would actually be engaged 
in the morally illicit action and full disclosure…in the form of 
stating options about which the patient probably already knows 
and for which the information is obtainable elsewhere, does not 
rise to the level of essential support. 
4. Cooperation is proximate, mediate material [emphasis added] 
because it is very far removed from the patient‘s actually 
undergoing an abortion…in that he or she would still have 
much work to do to get from the stating of the option to the 
actual performance of the morally illicit action. 
5. Proportionate reasons exist to cooperate [emphasis added] for 
several reasons.  There is the moral responsibility to inform the 
conscience of the patient.  Withholding information could 
seriously undermine patient trust in the patient-professional 
relationship.  The need [subsists] to provide moral guidance to 
the patient in a time of great need. 
6. The cooperation would not be indispensable [emphasis added], 
as the patient could pursue one of the prohibited options 
without having been told by the Catholic provider, since the 
information is available elsewhere and is probably already 
known by the patient.
349
 
 
Panicola and Hamel‘s account does not address the need or importance of a perfunctory 
disapproval of abortion from the genetic counselor to the parents.  Presumably, it is not 
needed or important because the requisite info is so causally removed and differently 
intended than abortion itself. 
 On the other side, Germain Grisez and William May represent a different and 
opposite perspective regarding the application of cooperation to genetic counseling.  
William May makes a recommendation for counselors to give a blanket disclaimer, 
presumably with each patient, that they respect the sanctity of human life from 
conception to natural death.  Accordingly, the counselor cannot direct anyone to 
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procedures contrary to Catholic teaching, such as contraception, sterilization, and 
abortion.
350
  One can reasonably infer from May that the only time the counselor 
mentions contraception, sterilization, or abortion is in the disclaimer; the counselor does 
not address abortion as an option in response to troublesome genetic information after the 
procedure and examination of the genes.  May refers to Grisez in his segment on genetic 
counseling within Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life. Grisez is even more 
cautionary than May on this issue in the third volume of his The Way of the Lord Jesus.  
He recommends that Catholic health care professionals (or those upholding Catholic 
teaching), including physicians and genetic counselors, draft a broadly based 
conscientious objection clause with their organizations of employment.  The clauses 
should include not only the provision that they will not do procedures such as 
sterilizations and abortions, but they ―will give no medical advice regarding these matters 
and no information about their availability, and…will not refer patients to others from 
whom they might obtain any service, advice, or information that…[they] would not 
provide personally.‖351  Grisez appears to have more stringent standards than May. 
 A complete cooperation breakdown does not accompany May and Grisez‘s 
application of cooperation to genetic counseling, unlike Ford, Hamel, and Panicola.  It 
should suffice to claim that May implies some form of illicit cooperation (formal or 
immediate material) without the counselor‘s specific disclaimer indicating her or his 
disapproval.  Without the disclaimer, May surmises a reasonable person may infer that 
the counselor intends the evil act (e.g., sterilization, abortion, contraception, etc.).  Grisez 
is even more regimented.  His reasoning is that any mention of procedures by a 
professional, counting direct sterilizations and abortions, is a form of illicit cooperation.   
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Standards recommended by May and Grisez seem too cautionary, even 
counterintuitive, for at least two reasons.  First, imagine the implications if discussion of 
illegitimate acts was, itself, tantamount to recommending the acts.  The works of most 
moral theologians, Catholic health care ethicists, and this dissertation would be formal or 
immediate material cooperation.  Second, even the opinions of May and Grisez could 
lead others into sin.  They are not recommending acts such as direct abortion and 
sterilization.  Still, a reader could read their argument, realize that there are options he or 
she did not know, and exercise options if he or she were in a similar situation.  Someone 
applying cooperation in a manner similar to May and Grisez could summarily render the 
opinion that either commentator was in immediate material cooperation.  Scandal does 
not seem to a significant consideration to either theologian. 
Another situation, as a supplementary note to this issue, validates Grisez‘s 
application as farfetched.  It involves the 1995 German legalization of abortion during the 
first twelve weeks of pregnancy and role of counseling through the Catholic Church.  
Shortly summarizing events after the legalization, the German bishops protested but also 
consented to being part of the abortion boards, which women were required to have a 
certificate from in order to demonstrate they took part in counseling.  The bishops 
reasoned that the Church-state sponsored and operated boards were, in fact, a good way 
to dissuade mothers from abortion.  Pope John Paul II and the Vatican required the 
Church boards to issue a different kind of certificate that the pregnant woman could not 
use to procure an abortion.  Despite doing this, three out of four women were able to use 
the Catholic caveat certificate for abortions.  This became a divisive issue for the German 
bishops and others.  Some believed that complicity with abortion was illustrated by 
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backing away from the boards.  Others thought the previous level of involvement was 
tantamount to giving Catholic, German bishops a ―license to kill.‖352  Recounting this 
situation, Bishop Anthony Fisher recalled that no party alleged formal cooperation with 
the counseling agencies during exchanges amongst involved Catholic Germans and 
between they and the Vatican.  Although it is ―naïve to assume that all [emphasis in the 
original] those involved in such agencies shared the bishops‘ abhorrence of abortion.‖353  
This recollection diverges from Grisez‘s application and justification of cooperation, 
which he would surely describe this situation as formal cooperation. 
As a summary note on this issue, scripts assist genetic counselors by providing 
them with highly regimented procedures as well as answers to frequently asked or 
difficult questions.  Screening – from Table 1of  Nancy Press and Kiley Ariail‘s ―Genetic 
Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing‖ in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 
3
rd
 Edition – includes questions about age, family genetic disorders, a partner‘s ethnicity 
or culture or country of origin, prenatal care.  An algorithm then follows, depending on 
the answers to the questions.  For instance, answering that age is over thirty-five years 
should catalyze a referral for an amniocentesis or CVS.  People of certain ethnicities and 
cultures (e.g., African-American, Ashkenazi Jewish, Mediterranean such as southern 
Italian, and some European American people) are often referred for blood testing.  
Depending on the results, parents may need to go through further testing.
354
  DuBois 
remarks that there is a prevailing model of genetic counseling is ―non-directional,‖ 
meaning that the counselor does not actually recommend any option.
355
  Counselors are 
highly adept at ‗staying on topic,‘ ‗sticking to a script,‘ and answering difficult questions.  
All of these variables provide an advantage to the counselor who wishes to maintain an 
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acceptable distance for licit cooperation…at least using an application of cooperation per 
Panicola and Hamel.  Those adhering to orthodox interpretations of applying cooperation 
may find the counseling role more difficult or regimented. 
IID6. Stem Cells, Research, and Other Uses of Embryos and Aborted Fetuses 
 The category of research and therapies derived with stem cell lines from aborted 
fetuses is expansive because it subsumes various other topics.  It is possible, albeit not 
necessarily ethical, to conduct scientific research on embryos and fetuses in nearly any 
stage of development.  For instance, researchers use embryos before implantation and 
before the fourteenth day of development, embryos before implantation and after the 
fourteenth day of development, implanted fetuses, and aborted fetuses.
356
  Several 
discoveries resulted from research on tissues from embryos and fetuses.  There is also the 
prospect of additional discoveries with the goal being useful information and therapies.  
In some cases, embryonic research is for the identification of genetic disease in embryos, 
called preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), where scientists implant healthy 
embryos and discard diseased ones.
357
  In others, it is the hope of therapies from 
embryonic stem cells.  Embryonic stem cell research began in 1998 at the University of 
Wisconsin and describes the harvesting and use of undifferentiated cells.   
Stem cells can ―propagate indefinitely‖ while being appropriately assisted in the 
laboratory.
358
  Pluripotency refers to the stem cells that have the potential to develop into 
many different tissues and organs.  Totipotency is the earliest cells in an embryo, located 
in the inner embryo called the blastocyst, which can differentiate into any type of bodily 
tissue.  The hope is that influencing (if not manipulating) cells will enable them to grow 
into whatever tissue we see fit for tissue damage and diseases: pancreatic cells to help 
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with diabetes, kidney tissue for those with kidney disease, liver cells for those in liver 
failure, heart tissue for those in heart failure, and neurons for those with Parkinson‘s, 
spinal cord injuries, Alzheimer‘s, and multiple sclerosis for example.359  The potential 
impact of versatile stem cells on even a single health issue mentioned above is amazing.  
For instance, with organ transplantation, there is the hope of considerably ―decreasing the 
annual death rate of nearly 4,000 patients awaiting transplants in the U.S.‖360 
 While anchoring the moral evil is easy, it is much more difficult to categorically 
define cooperation.  The moral evil is research or therapies derived from embryos or 
aborted fetuses.  The level of cooperation depends on the cooperative act, which varies 
according to the particular uses referred to above.  It is outside the scope to discuss every 
use of embryos and fetuses, so only the most discussed issues follow. 
 Vaccine development and production has used cell-lines from fetuses aborted in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Any current research and development for vaccines does not use 
the fetal cells themselves.  They are derivatives from an original line of cells, which 
required some manipulation in order to produce the cell lines.
361
  Examples of vaccines 
with origins and cell-lines from aborted fetuses‘ lung cells are MRC-5 and WI-38, which 
Merck & Co., Inc. used for the rubella vaccine ―Meruvax,‖ Merck & Co., Inc. used for 
the chicken pox vaccine ―Verivax,‖ and SmithKline Beecham used for ―Havrix‖ that 
treats rheumatic fever, scarlet fever, kidney inflammation, and other hepatitis A 
infections.
362
 
 This is a moral issue and cooperation applies.  A few points related to cooperation 
and vaccines are worth noting.  Using stem-cell lines for development of vaccines from 
aborted fetuses is contextually different from using stem-cell lines from aborted fetuses 
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for research.  There is demonstrated benefit with vaccines where the benefit is uncertain 
for research.  Benefit is general or collective, rather than individual, because we do not 
know if inoculating a person will benefit that person.
363
  Another noteworthy 
specification is that some vaccines use other means for deriving future vaccines other 
than the original embryonic material.  Time and replication methods make a difference 
because they add distance to the original act.
364
  There is little risk of scandal because the 
same cell lines grow in culture.  ―There is little incentive to being new human cell lines 
when these are will established and their various scientific properties well understood.‖365 
 Most commentaries on the type of cooperation associated with vaccines derived 
from fetal or embryonic tissue agree that the cooperation is mediate material, if at all, and 
licit.
366
  Commenter Alexander Pruss reinforces this by adding that even the most 
orthodox ethicists consider the use of abortion-derived stem-cell lines licit.  Those who 
use the vaccine clearly do not share in the intent of those who chose the abortion, nor is 
there anything in the use of vaccines that encourages past abortions.
367
  Likewise, ―the 
abortion was not done for the purpose of obtaining the vaccine.‖368 
 In embryonic stem cell research, the process begins with technicians ‗creating‘ a 
blastocyst, which is an embryo in an early stage of development, created through in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) or somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).  Technicians remove the inner 
cell mass.  This, in turn, kills or destroys the embryo.
369
 
 Again, this is a moral issue for the Catholic Church, as it involves the moral evil 
of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and violating the protection of life from 
conception until natural death through the embryo‘s death; cooperation pertains, given 
the moral evils.
370
  Similar to other applications of cooperation, one may become 
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affiliated with embryonic stem cell research in any number of ways.  For instance, the 
scientists doing the research and developing therapies, research sponsors and financiers, 
companies providing the laboratory space, clinicians who administer therapies, and 
legislators involved in creating or altering laws pertaining to stem cell research all have 
some connection, some more direct than others, to embryonic stem cell research. 
 Martin Onwu provides a broad analysis about the use of cooperation given the 
type of act and cooperation as well as a moral caveat to this issue: 
[The] principle does not justify any form of medical research in 
this new field.  For examples, the principle cannot justify 
therapeutic cloning which entails the creation of embryos via 
nuclear transfer method and their subsequent destruction via the 
extraction of stem cells; moreover, the principle of cooperation 
cannot justify the creation of embryos for research.  However, the 
future of potential [embryonic stem cell] therapies, utilizing 
immortalized cell lines created from stem cells extracted from 
human embryos (despite their unavoidable destruction in the 
process) in principle may possibly be justified under the principle 
of cooperation.
371
 
 
Using preserved embryonic stem cells lines for research is parallel to the licit use of 
suspended fetal stem cell lines for vaccines.  Putting it simply if not bluntly, ‗the deed is 
done.‘  It would not make the ―user complicit in the previous destruction of embryos 
insofar as the use of therapies would be distinct from the act of destruction and there 
would appear to be a sufficient distance between the different acts.‖372  As Birgitta 
Mackiewicz comments, ample separation exists between the principal agent(s), who 
destroyed the embryos, and the cooperators, who wish to advance and preserve people‘s 
health.
373
  Cooperation is mediate material because the preserved cell lines do not cause 
the embryos‘ destruction.  Michael Prieur and colleagues paraphrase Peter Cataldo ―that 
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to study and investigate what such stem cells are and can do has no essential relation to 
how they are obtained.‖374 
 An essential qualification subsists.  Cooperation is material only when enough 
time has passed to inherently create sufficient distance between the cooperator and the 
principle agent.  Therefore, it is one thing to use, per Onwu‘s terminology, ‗an 
immortalized cell line‘ initially created from the tissue of embryos or fetuses.375  Scholar 
Gerry Magill offers that it is another to claim clean hands by ordering another agency to 
do the dirty work.  His example is National Institute of Health (NIH) researchers who use 
private companies to remove stem cells from embryonic or fetal tissue.  The NIH can 
allege sufficient distance by using another company for the moral act, but such claims are 
morally insufficient.  Stem cell researchers know better than most that harvesting stem 
cells destroys embryos.  The NIH request is an order to this effect.  Magill describes this 
as formal cooperation.
376
  Indeed, this is a textbook example of the academic distinction 
of implicit formal cooperation, when the cooperator does not claim to have an evil intent, 
but the act of cooperation cannot have any other meaning. 
Those who create, rescind, or alter legislation regarding embryonic stem cells also 
have involvement and moral complicity, presenting another occasion to employ 
cooperation.  (Participation in unjust or immoral legislation is the topic of the next 
section.  Arguably, this topic could belong in either this or the next section.)  Magill also 
uses cooperation to contrast the policy decisions concerning embryonic stem cell research 
of President Clinton and President G.W. Bush.  President Clinton‘s executive order in 
2000 permitted NIH research of embryonic stem cell research as long as NIH researchers 
are not the persons to remove the embryonic stem cells.  Presumably, the purpose of such 
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orders or legislation was to create distance between the research and the embryo 
destruction caused by removal of stem cells.
377
  President Bush opposed President 
Clinton‘s stance a year later.  While President Clinton‘s policy approved ongoing 
harvesting, President Bush‘s policy was to use immortalized embryonic stem cell lines.378  
Using these stem cell lines, as Onwu stated, does not require further destruction of 
embryos.  By doing this, President Bush ―adopted a practical policy ‗without crossing a 
fundamental moral line by providing taxpayer funding that would sanction or encourage 
further destruction of human embryos.‘‖379 
Both leaders sought to create a distance between the destruction of embryos and 
stem cell research; though, President Bush was more successful in this endeavor from the 
perspective of licitly applying the principle of cooperation.  Continuing to harvest 
embryonic stem cells is an example of implicit formal cooperation, as the section below 
details.  As Magill states, ―In the getaway car, the driver wants to ‗work with‘ the loot in 
the bags – similarly, the scientist under President Clinton‘s policy is driving a research 
agenda that wants to ‗work with‘ embryonic stem cells involving the ongoing harvesting 
of these stem cells [emphasis in the original].‖380  Theoretically, President Bush‘s policy 
is mediate material cooperation because it does not intend nor provide anything essential 
for the destruction of embryos, uses immortalized cell lines, and seems to yield 
proportionate benefit.  Some bishops express a reluctance to categorize President Bush‘s 
policy as licit because of the slippery slope argument that the magnitude of embryonic 
stem cell research and therapies will become an impetus to harvest additional stem 
cells.
381
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A noted objector to the use of any fetal- or embryonic-derived stem cell lines, 
which seems to include immortalized cell lines, is a National Catholic Bioethics Center 
(NCBC) ethicist and education director, Tadeusz Pacholczyk.  Anything associated with 
the grave moral evil of fetal or embryonic demise renders collaborators in treatments and 
research complicit in the evil.  Pacholczyk‘s ‗answer‘ is to only collaborate with efforts 
that use adult stem cells, which is not a cooperation issue at all.
382
 
IID7. Involvement in Unjust (Immoral) Legislation or Legislators 
The last individual cooperation issue addressed in this section is involvement, 
mainly through voting, for unjust or immoral legislation.  This also applies to voting for 
legislators with a history of supporting unjust or immoral legislation.  Abortion is the 
most relevant issue involving policy, political candidates, and elected officials.  It is also 
the issue receiving a great deal of publicity because of President Obama‘s health reform 
plan, popularly referred to as ―Obama-care.‖ 
In 2010, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), acting for 
the U.S. bishops, and the Catholic Health Association (CHA), representing Catholic 
health care in the U.S., took opposing sides to this health care reform.
383
  CHA as well as 
many orders of women religious opined the exclusion of any federal money supporting 
abortions in the Affordable Care Act.  The USCCB stated that the new legislation would 
permit federal funding for abortion.
384
  Seemingly, neither group used cooperation in the 
analysis because, according to one side, there was not a connection between the bill and 
the moral evil; a reasonable assumption for the other side is that the gravity of abortion is 
so severe that the supporting the bill was formal cooperation. 
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Abortion is a ‗cut-and-dry‘ moral evil in the Catholic Church, but the issue 
becomes much more complicated considering the ways that a vote or voter influences 
legislation.  In other words, laws are never as simple as ‗yea‘ or ‗nay‘ to the issue itself.  
Laws have nuance, provisions and caveats, as well as history.  Acts may catalyze 
existing, just legislation becoming more strict or less strict.  Acts can influence existing, 
unjust (immoral) laws by adding or loosening restrictions. 
An exchange about voting for unjust legislation(s), apparent with chapters in 
Cooperation, Complicity, & Conscience, typifies the disparity about how to apply 
cooperation.  It is beyond the scope to detail the nuances of the various perspectives.  In 
summary, one set of positions holds that any vote cast for a position other than total 
repeal of a current abortion is unjust and formal cooperation.
385
  Included in this is that 
making an abortion law – whether it is restrictive, moderate, or tolerant – more lenient or 
permissive is inappropriate, as well as voting for candidates with track records of voting 
for such permissive legislation.
386
  Likewise, equally as inappropriate are legislative votes 
to block an even more restrictive amendment or alteration.  All of these are formal 
cooperation.
387
 
Equally valid alternative considerations exist.  One alternative is a caveat to the 
amendments and appropriations mentioned above.  ―A legislator who, having tried and 
failed to exclude abortion funding from a general appropriation bill, then votes for the bill 
only to bring about the good things it will fund.‖388  Rather than formal cooperation, this 
is mediate material cooperation according to Bishop Anthony Fisher.
389
  Perhaps it is licit 
cooperation because the legislator openly demonstrated her or his disapproval with the 
appropriations before discussion ceased.  Bishop Fisher interprets Evangelium Vitae as 
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promoting proposed legislation that would limit the harm done by a previously existing 
bad law.
390
  Another perspective is that many reasons exist for voting for something other 
than total repeal of an unjust, unethical law – and the reasons are not necessarily formal, 
illicit cooperation.  It would be only mediate material cooperation and licit to vote for a 
bill or amendment if an imperfect law (one permitting abortion totally or in certain 
circumstances) already exists, if no other sufficient bill exists to restrict even more, if the 
bill sets more limits that current law, and if it does not abolish future possibilities for 
additional limitations.
391
 
IIE. Identifying Fundamental Controversies when Applying the Principle of Cooperation  
 There are a few observations about cooperation worth noting.  Implicit formal 
cooperation is a frequent topic of discussion and debates among Catholic moralists.  
Conversations in academic publications center around implicit formal cooperation as both 
an academic distinction and formal cooperation ‗trump card.‘  As discussed previously in 
the chapter, implicit formal cooperation is when the cooperator claims that he or she does 
not intend (will, act) to cooperate, but no other reasons support such statements.  Third 
parties who witness the cooperation often cite implicit formal cooperation when there is 
no other reason for the cooperator‘s intent except for willing (assenting, intending) the 
same evil as the evildoer.   
Accepting this, the difficulty is that anything can become formal cooperation if 
the third party evaluates a cooperative arrangement as such.  All cooperation is subjective 
and dependent on the person evaluating the level of cooperation; formal cooperation is 
perhaps a more transparent component for the subjectivism of those persons who apply 
cooperation.  The foundation for this claim is the introduction of another distinct moral 
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agent, an evaluator, in addition to the previous representatives.  Examples below in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 and depict how two possible arrangements may look before and 
after another evaluative moral agent: 
Figure 2: Implicit Formal Cooperation Structures
392
 
 
Preexisting Arrangements 
(i.e. before the addition of an additional agent) 
 
 
Original Arrangement A – 
 
1) Agent (i.e. the one or group 
directly associating with the evil, 
injustice, or malfeasance) 
2) Cooperator (i.e. the one or group 
somehow participating in the sin 
of the agent) 
 
Original Arrangement B – 
 
1) Agent 
2) Cooperator 
3) Primary Evaluator (i.e. the person 
or persons assessing cooperation 
levels, whom may cooperate, 
too) 
 
New Arrangements 
(i.e. after the addition of another agent) 
 
 
Revised Arrangement A – 
 
1) Agent 
2) Cooperator 
+ Primary evaluator (additional 
agent) 
 
 
Revised Arrangement B – 
 
1) Agent 
2) Cooperator 
3) Primary evaluator 
+ Secondary evaluator (additional 
agent) 
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Figure 3: Implicit Formal Cooperation Structures
393
 
 
In any instance of implicit formation cooperation, including those mentioned above, there 
is someone else evaluating the actions of the connection between the agent and 
cooperator.  The cooperation in arrangement A either did not include an evaluator, or the 
cooperator also served as the first evaluator.  Arrangement B already included one 
evaluator and appends another.  Again, the secondary evaluator deems the actions of the 
cooperator to be in formal cooperation with the agent in every case.  An evaluation of the 
cooperation level contradicts the assessment of the cooperator or evaluator in some cases.  
In others, explicit evaluation does not exist, so the evaluator disagrees with the statements 
of the cooperator, who does not claim any intent to cooperate; however, as explained 
above, the evaluator can find no other reason for the actions of the cooperator. 
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 Examples of implicit formal cooperation are helpful.  In Figure 1, Michael 
Panicola uses the example of a how various forms of providing a ladder for a thief to 
break into a house and steal have different forms of complicity.  Holding the ladder to 
steady it as the burglar breaks into the home and steals possessions is formal cooperation, 
while making the ladder that a thief eventually uses for theft is a remote type of mediate 
material cooperation.  His example of implicit formal cooperation is when someone 
directs a crook to a house and a ladder whilst claiming not to want the theft to occur.
394
  
Suppose another moral agent, one who would evaluate the level of cooperation, was 
included in this scenario.  The first evaluator assesses the act and intent of the cooperator, 
and determines that the cooperator neither intended nor condoned the robbery.  In other 
words, the cooperation is some form of material cooperation.  A second evaluator 
labeling this implicit formal cooperation would be disagreeing inherently with the first 
evaluator, because the cooperator who directs and gives tools, for two reasons.  First, the 
cooperator provides necessary and essential elements for the agent‘s sin (robbing).  
Second, there can be no other reason for the cooperator‘s help, presupposing he or she 
knows the agent is a thug, despite any statements from the cooperator to the contrary. 
 In tribute to Liguori‘s views on the confessor‘s office, the next example of 
implicit formal cooperation uses the connection between a sinning but penitent 
parishioner and the confessor priest.  The situation, in general, is nothing new to either 
party, as it is a perpetual reoccurrence, which Liguori refers to as relapsing sin (those 
who revert back to similar sins after confessing them).
395
  Yet again the parishioner 
confesses to having extramarital sexual intercourse with a prostitute at a local residence, 
identified by many as a brothel.  The priest, feeling defeated from his inability to stop this 
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reoccurring sin, forgoes his previous warnings and suggested repentance.  ―If I know the 
building you are talking about,‖ explains Father who continues, ―it has been shut down 
by the cops just this week.‖  Without any mental reservation, he adds sarcastically, ―You 
obviously haven‘t found the other brothel hideout behind the metal fasteners building to 
the side of the old 4
th
 Street Bridge.‖  The priest may claim that he was only being 
acerbic and flip, and that his cooperation is only material.  Still, such an act is essential, 
bearing little other moral meaning for this recognized, perpetual sinner than intent for the 
evil to continue. 
 An historical controversy in the application of cooperation is around the issue of 
duress.  At least one reason for the seeming difficulty using duress as a mitigating factor 
while applying cooperation to a situation pertains to the arduous task of defining duress.  
Theologians and ethicists comment on the disjunction between the individual and societal 
uses of duress.  Common examples of duress involve instances with perceived threat(s) of 
bodily harm to individuals (emphasis added).
396
  There is disconnect when defining and 
applying duress to an organizational context.  For example, The Congregation for the 
Doctrine of Faith (CDF) as well as Cataldo and Haas reflect that intimidation(s) to an 
individual‘s life do not transfer to the organizational level because nothing mimics the 
gravity of losing one‘s life.397  Scholar Thomas Kopfensteiner recognizes institutional 
forms of duress;
398
 The National Catholic Bioethics Center, like the CDF and others, 
believes there are no institutional forms of duress;
399
 a concern of Peter Cataldo is that 
acknowledging institutional duress led institutions to cooperate when they should not.
400
  
Duress was in the appendix of the 1995 ERDs before its omission in the fourth edition of 
the ERDs in 2001.  Purported misapplications of duress were the subjects of many 
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debates, eventually leading to a change in the ERDs.  Working towards the changes to 
Part Six and the Appendix of the ERDs resulted in tensions between the CDF, CHA, 
national bishops‘ conference, religious congregation leaders, and Catholic health care 
system leaders.
401
 
 Disparities in implicit formal cooperation and duress are the result of several 
different factors.  First, scholars define concepts such as material cooperation, 
proportionality, gravity, scandal, and, of course, implicit formal cooperation and duress 
differently.
402
  Second, a definitional issue also pertains to the fact that someone may not 
perceive a particular association as cooperation.  The affiliation may be some other form 
of complicity, such as toleration.
403
  Third, scholars may define concepts in the same 
way, but could interpret and apply the same understanding to the same situation in totally 
divergent ways.  Finally, and most importantly, how we define, interpret, and apply 
cooperation is representative of ideological and methodological differences.
404
 
An illustration of differences based on ideology, methodology, and the application 
of cooperation is in the writings of Germain Grisez, William May, Richard McCormick, 
and Benedict Ashley and Kevin O‘Rourke (consider Ashley and O‘Rourke as one).  All 
of these theologians comment on applying cooperating with other health care systems 
providing direct sterilization.  Cooperation in and with organizations and groups is the 
chief focus of the next chapter.  Still, this is the issue that all of these theologians 
comment.  Some minute differences subsist in the issues they apply cooperation to, which 
the concluding comments address. 
Germain Grisez presents an opinion that using a third party to oversee functions, 
such as direct sterilization, is formal cooperation.
405
  William E. May believes that 
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Catholics and Catholic hospitals may be in material cooperation with evil acts only under 
expressly particular conditions.  He goes onto specify particularities with direct 
sterilization.  For instance, he does not see any reason to cooperate at all in locations that 
have respectable other-than-Catholic facilities.  Likewise, Catholic hospitals that are sole 
providers for communities may wish to reallocate resources or relocate to an area where 
tension between service in resource scarcity, witness, and Church ‗teaching‘ does not 
exist.  Concurrently, those evaluating such agreements must consider the likelihood of 
scandal, which may be an overriding factor in Catholic sole provider situations.
406
  
In their first edition of Health Care Ethics, Ashley and O‘Rourke recounted that 
the Second Vatican Council changed some of the thinking around cooperation.  
Previously unjustifiable acts now were licit.  A greater emphasis was placed on acting 
according to conscience and respecting others‘ consciences.  ―Thus, we may sometimes 
cooperate with other persons out of respect for their right to act according to their 
conscience, even when we cannot in good conscience ourselves cooperate with their acts 
as such.‖407  Even in the fourth edition of Health Care Ethics, they state, ―[W]e believe 
that exceptional cases may occur in which material cooperation of the Catholic hospital 
would be justified if it is mediate cooperation only.‖408  Without Ashley, O‘Rourke 
responds to other moral theologians such as Grisez who contend that allowing a third 
party to perform direct sterilizations is illicit.  Classifying this as formal cooperation 
―seems to rigorous:‖409 
[T]he Catholic hospital‘s officials could explain their position 
without persuading someone else to perform the proscribed 
procedures. … Would it ever be acceptable for the third party that 
provides the prohibited procedures to do so in the Catholic 
hospital, or in a hospital managed by a Catholic health care 
corporation? … In theory, it is possible, and has indeed been 
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approved in a few situations in which a Catholic corporation has 
been employed to manage a community hospital. … Serious 
reasons would be required for such a ‗partnership‘ to occur.  [It 
may require] a different hospital, … personnel performing 
prohibited procedures would have to be employed and managed by 
a third party, … and the diocesan bishop would have to determine 
that scandal would not arise.
410
 
 
McCormick conceptually recognizes that the principle of cooperation applies to 
working with other health care systems for direct sterilizations.  He hesitates to call such 
arrangements as applications of cooperation for two reasons: First and unlike some 
others, he recognizes that psychological, emotional, social, spiritual, and medically 
indicated reasons are valid; consequently, sterilizations categorized by others as direct are 
actually indirect for McCormick and justified for the overall good of the patient.  Second 
and related to the first, cooperation becomes merely ―a cautious and controlled approval 
in individual instances‖ because few instances exhibit ―less than adequate reasons.‖411  
The implication of McCormick‘s view is that Catholic hospitals should act in accord with 
their consciences, which means acting for the overall good of the patient.  Cooperate with 
others who will act for the holistic good of the patient, with sufficient justification of that 
good, when others restrict options available in the Catholic hospital.
412
 
In summary and explanation of some differences, the above passages provide 
enough information for one to extrapolate the differences between authors based on their 
applications of cooperation.  While Grisez comments on establishing third party 
oversight, it is a reasonable presumption to assume that most third party referrals and 
arrangements for direct sterilization, whether formalized or by practice, are formal 
cooperation for him.  May wants to allow material cooperation only in specific instances, 
most likely for medically indicated reasons before psychological, emotional, social, 
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medically indicated, and spiritual ones (such reasons would qualify sterilizations as direct 
for May).  The specific instances, which May mentions, are so few that he cannot find 
any in regions where there is an other-than-Catholic organization in close proximity.  
Furthermore, he seems so concerned with scandal in instances where the Catholic 
organization is the sole provider that he recommends getting out of the business of being 
sole providers.  Similar to Grisez, this leaves few options or exceptions to categorizing 
most instances as formal cooperation.  Unlike May, Ashley and O‘Rourke seem to 
recognize more occasion to partner with other-than-Catholics, even in standing 
arrangements.  Such agreements, partnerships, or referrals are merely material 
cooperation.  Their caution is to achieve total separation between the entities for sake of 
appearances and possible scandal allegations.  McCormick is less cautious about 
categorizing anything as formal cooperation.  Catholic health care organizations should 
be free to partner or refer whenever needed with other-than-Catholics, especially if the 
Catholic organization will not provide total care of the individual – body, mind, and 
spirit. 
Another way to discuss the above moralists is to place them into a scale based 
upon perceived stringency or flexibility with cooperation.  The basis for this 
determination is the result of constructed assumption and interpretation of this author.  
The scale placement derives from comments May, Ashley and O‘Rourke, and 
McCormick make about specific applications of cooperation.  Not allowing any 
cooperation (no cooperation) is on one end of the scale (see Figure 4 below) and allowing 
every opportunity for cooperation (indiscriminate cooperation) is on the other.  The latter 
position serves society at will, compromising Catholic identity and teachings, while the 
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former upholds Catholic identity and teachings at the expense of keeping hands clean as 
an isolated entity from society.  This is what the scale would look like (endpoints of the 
scale are on top in italics; commentators are on the bottom with extreme positions in 
bold): 
Figure 4: Cooperation Scale with Moral Theologians
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No cooperation                                                                 Indiscriminate cooperation 
 
Grisez                   May          Ashley & O‘Rourke     McCormick                  N/A 
(N/A = None of the Catholic moral theologians adopt a position of arbitrary cooperation.) 
 
III. Conclusion: Interpreting the Ethical Principle of Material Cooperation within 
the Catholic Tradition of Theological Ethics 
  
 In summary, this chapter grounded theological ethics as the context for 
understanding ethical practice.  It then interpreted the ethical principle of material 
cooperation within the Catholic tradition of theological ethics.  A major component of the 
interpretation of cooperation within Catholic theological ethics was describing traditional, 
individual applications of the principle.   
Cooperation is likely to have greater use in the future as Catholic health care 
systems form new partnerships and make new care delivery arrangements.  In fact, at 
least one ethicist views cooperation as the most important issue in Catholic health care in 
years to come.
414
  The next chapter focuses on the fundamental shift from individual to 
organizational use of cooperation in Catholic theological ethics. 
                                               
132 Bibliography of Ethics, ed. LeRoy Walters, Tamar Kahn, and Doris Goldstein, vol. 35, Bibliography of 
Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, 2009), 3. 
133 Daniel Callahan, "Bioethics," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen Post (New York, NY: 
MacMillan Reference, Thomson Gale, 2004), 278. 
134 David Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 9-10. 
 142 
                                                                                                                                            
135 Callahan, "Bioethics," 278-80. 
136 Kevin O'Rourke, "Evolution of Church Teaching on Prolonging Life," Health Progress 69, no. 1 (1988): 
29, Michael Panicola, "Nutrition, Futility, Professional Integrity and Patient Autonomy" (paper 
presented at the 7th Annual Contemporary Catholic Healthcare Ethics Conference, Loyola University 
Medical Center, Maywood, IL, 2008). 
137 Albert Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 35. 
138 Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, 35, Richard McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral 
Theology (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1994), 134. 
139 John Westerhoff III, "A Catechetical Way of Doing Theology," in Religious Education and Theology, 
ed. Norma Thompson (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1982), 218. 
140 Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, 35, McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology, 
134, Westerhoff III, "A Catechetical Way of Doing Theology," 218-20. 
141 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Introduction to Christian Ethics, trans. John Shelley (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1989), 18, 25, 33-44. 
142 Michael Slote, "Ethics: Task of Ethics," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen Post (New York, NY: 
MacMillan Reference, Thomson Gale, 2004), 795. 
143 Darrel Amundson, "History," in Methods in Medical Ethics, ed. Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel Sulmasy 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 126. 
144 Franz Scholz, "Problems on Norms Raised by Ethical Borderline Situations: Beginnings of a Solution in 
Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic 
Tradition, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1979), 158. 
145 Daniel Sulmasy and Jeremy Sugarman, "The Many Methods of Medical Ethics (or, Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird)," in Methods in Medical Ethics, ed. Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel Sulmasy 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 3. 
146 David DeGrazia and Tom Beauchamp, "Philosophy," in Methods in Medical Ethics, ed. Jeremy 
Sugarman and Daniel Sulmasy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 31. 
147 DeGrazia and Beauchamp, "Philosophy," 31. 
148 Richard McCormick makes an academic distinction that there are four different way or levels that one 
can understand ethics as the rightness or wrongness of actions.  References: Richard McCormick, 
"Does Religious Faith Add to Ethical Perception?," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The 
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral 
Theology (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 157-58, McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations 
in Moral Theology, 136-37. 
149 Joseph Fuchs, "The Absoluteness of Moral Terms," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms 
and Catholic Tradition, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology 
(New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 94. 
150 James J. Walter, "Christian Ethics: Distinctive and Specific?" in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The 
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral 
Theology (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 91-94, 98-99. Others believe that morality is about the 
obligations or duties of others. Reference: Don Browning, "Moral Development," in The Blackwell 
Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. William Schweiker (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 
548. 
151 Charles Curran, "Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?" in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The 
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1980), 79, James Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for 
Rapprochement (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 80-94, Kelly, Contemporary 
Catholic Health Care Ethics, 84, Aaron Mackler, Introduction to Jewish and Catholic Bioethics: A 
Comparative Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 27, Glen Stassen and 
David Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2003), 87. 
152 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Fourth ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 1998), 53-
57. 
153 Richard McCormick, The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas since Vatican II 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1989), 212-13.  Also in: John Macquarrie, 
 143 
                                                                                                                                            
"Rethinking Natural Law," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian 
Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 121-45, 
William E. May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor 
Publishing Division, Our Sunday Visitor, Inc., 2000), 55-56. 
154 Tom Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Second ed. (New York, 
NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991), 332, Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Religion and Theology," in Methods in 
Medical Ethics, ed. Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel Sulmasy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2001), 47-49, Ph. Delhaye, "Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality," in Readings in 
Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard 
McCormick (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 253-56, May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of 
Human Life, 57-62, McCormick, The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas since Vatican 
II, 213, Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Nine Theses in Christian Ethics," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 
2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, 
NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 198-204, Walter, "Christian Ethics: Distinctive and Specific?," 95-98, 102-
07. 
155
 Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement, 12, Stassen and 
Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context, 80-98. 
156 Stassen and Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context, 36. 
157 Mackler, Introduction to Jewish and Catholic Bioethics: A Comparative Analysis, 233. 
158 Dionigi Tettamanzi, "Is There a Christian Ethics?," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The 
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1980), 44. 
159 Joseph Ratzinger, "Magisterium of the Church, Faith, Morality," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: 
The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1980), 185. 
160 Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, "Foreword," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The 
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1980), 1. 
161 Curran, "Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?" 63-76, Delhaye, "Questioning the Specificity of 
Christian Morality," 236, James Gustafson, "Can Ethics Be Christian? Some Conclusions," in 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and 
Richard McCormick (New York: NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 147-48, Charles Pinches, Theology and 
Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2002), 6-10. 
162 Bruno Schüller, "The Debate on the Specific Character of a Christian Ethics: Some Remarks," in 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and 
Richard McCormick (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 208-21. 
163 Schüller, "The Debate on the Specific Character of a Christian Ethics: Some Remarks," 208-21. 
164 Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Christian Character, Biblical Community, and Human Values," in Character and 
Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 17, Pinches, Theology and Action: 
After Theory in Christian Ethics, 231-32, Norbert Rigali, "Christ and Morality," in Readings in Moral 
Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick 
(New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980), 113-19. 
165 Curran, "Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?," 73-77, Delhaye, "Questioning the Specificity of 
Christian Morality," 235-62, Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for 
Rapprochement, 61-62, 80-94, 98-126, G. Michael Leffel, "Emotion and Transformation in the 
Relational Spirituality Paradigm: Part 3. A Moral Motive Analysis," Journal of Psychology and 
Theology 35, no. 4 (2007): 306, Macquarrie, "Rethinking Natural Law," 143, Bishop Donal Murray, 
"Cooperation, Complicity and Conscience: The Background to the Debate," in Cooperation, 
Complicity and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 1-11, 
Ratzinger, "Magisterium of the Church, Faith, Morality," 183-86, Walter, "Christian Ethics: 
Distinctive and Specific?," 100-07. 
166 Macquarrie, "Rethinking Natural Law," 142-43, Megan McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and 
Liturgy as Ethical Imperatives (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997; reprint, Second), 7, J.R. Porter, 
 144 
                                                                                                                                            
Jesus Christ: The Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 100-01, 36-39, 48-56, 82-83, Reynolds Price, A Serious Way of Wondering: The Ethics of Jesus 
Imagined (New York, NY: Scribner, 2003), 64-65, 112-14. 
167 Cahill, "Christian Character, Biblical Community, and Human Values," 12-17, Gustafson, "Can Ethics 
Be Christian? Some Conclusions," 148, L. Gregory Jones, "Formed and Transformed by Scripture: 
Character, Community, and Authority in Biblical Formation," in Character and Scripture: Moral 
Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 28-29, May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of 
Human Life, 61-63, McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical Imperatives, 1-
22, Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics, 231-32, Porter, Jesus Christ: The 
Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith, 148-53, Price, A Serious Way of Wondering: The Ethics of Jesus 
Imagined, 9-26, 31, 39, 41, 43, 48-51, 54-59, 112-14, Rigali, "Christ and Morality," 119, Schüller, 
"The Debate on the Specific Character of a Christian Ethics: Some Remarks," 209-112, 214-15, 18-19, 
25. 
168 Porter, Jesus Christ: The Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith, 170. 
169
 Porter, Jesus Christ: The Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith, 166-67. 
170 Daniel Harrington, "The Sermon on the Mount and Christian Virtue Ethics: How Do We Get There? - 
Biblical Perspectives," in Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between New Testament Studies 
and Moral Theology (Landham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2002), 65. 
171 Porter, Jesus Christ: The Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith, 168-69. 
172 Porter, Jesus Christ: The Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith, 136-37, 52-53. 
173 Porter, Jesus Christ: The Jesus of History, the Christ of Faith, 137. 
174 Delhaye, "Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality," 237-39, M. Cathleen Kaveny, "Tax 
Lawyers, Prophets and Pilgrims: A Response to Anthony Fisher," in Cooperation, Complicity and 
Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 78-84, McKenna, Rites of 
Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical Imperatives, 8-13, Ratzinger, "Magisterium of the 
Church, Faith, Morality," 178-83, Schüller, "The Debate on the Specific Character of a Christian 
Ethics: Some Remarks," 209-12, 16-17, 19-21. 
175 Jones, "Formed and Transformed by Scripture: Character, Community, and Authority in Biblical 
Formation," 32. 
176 Kaveny, "Tax Lawyers, Prophets and Pilgrims: A Response to Anthony Fisher," 75, Macquarrie, 
"Rethinking Natural Law," 142-43, McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical 
Imperatives, 14-22, Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics, 106-10, 88-98, 
Rigali, "Christ and Morality," 116-17, Schüller, "The Debate on the Specific Character of a Christian 
Ethics: Some Remarks," 219-21, William Schweiker, "Images of Scripture and Contemporary 
Theological Ethics," in Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2002), 37-40. 
177 James Tubbs, A Handbook of Bioethics Terms (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 
10. 
178 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 14. 
179 Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics, 106. 
180 Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 8. 
181 Canisius College Multicultural Programs, "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK)," Canisius College 
Student Life, http://www.canisius.edu/mlk/, Randolph-Macon College, "Chaplain's Office: Words to 
Inspire You.," Randolph-Macon College, http://www.rmc.edu/Offices/chaplain/inspire.aspx. 
182 "Theodore Parker and the 'Moral Universe'," in All Things Considered, All Things Considered (U.S.A.: 
National Public Radio, 2010). 
183
 Jones, "Formed and Transformed by Scripture: Character, Community, and Authority in Biblical 
Formation," 25-28, McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical Imperatives, 
14-17, Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics, 159, Schweiker, "Images of 
Scripture and Contemporary Theological Ethics," 43-51. 
184 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "To Live in Christ Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral 
Life," in Quest for Justice: A Compendium of Statements of the United States Catholic Bishops on the 
 145 
                                                                                                                                            
Political and Social Order 1966-1980, ed. J. Brian Benestad and Francis Butler (Washington, D.C.: 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops, United States Catholic Conference, 1976, 1981). 
185
 John Boyle, The Sterilization Controversy: A New Crisis for the Catholic Hospital (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1977), 35-39, Anthony Ciorra and James Keating, Moral Formation in the Parish: With 
Your Whole Heart Turn to God (New York, NY: Alba House, 1998), 11-12, 115, Gustafson, 
Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement, 61-62, 80-94, 100-11, 
Macquarrie, "Rethinking Natural Law," 126-43, Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 53-57, 
Schweiker, "Images of Scripture and Contemporary Theological Ethics," 44-52. 
186 John Noonan, Church That Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 1-312. 
187 Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement, 81-82. 
188 Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement, 82. 
189 Boyle, The Sterilization Controversy: A New Crisis for the Catholic Hospital, 38, Ciorra and Keating, 
Moral Formation in the Parish: With Your Whole Heart Turn to God, 115, Curran, "Is There a 
Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?" 79, Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 57. 
190
 Boyle, The Sterilization Controversy: A New Crisis for the Catholic Hospital, 38. 
191 Curran, "Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?" 82-83. 
192 Interdicasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ed., Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, Second (English) ed. (Washington, D.C.: Libreria Editrice Vaticana (United States Catholic 
Conference), 1997, 457, n. 1868. 
193 The Ethicists of the National Catholic Bioethics Center, "Cooperating with Non-Catholic Partners," 
Ethics & Medics 23, no. 11 (1998): 1. 
194 Interdicasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ed., Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, 457 n. 1869. 
195 Peter Cataldo and John Haas, "Institutional Cooperation: The Erds," Health Progress 83, no. 6 (2002): 
printed page 2. 
196 Charles McFadden, Medical Ethics, Fifth ed. (Philadelphia, PA: F.A. Davis Co., 1961), 328, John 
McHugh and Charles Callan, Moral Theology: A Complete Course, ed. Edward Farrell, Two vols., vol. 
One, Moral Theology (New York, NY: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1958). 
197 Thomas O'Donnell, Morals in Medicine (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1956), 123-24. 
198 Henry Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology: Commandments of God, Precepts of the Church, Fourth 
ed., Four vols., vol. Two, Heythrop Series (London, England: Sheed and Ward, 1945; reprint, Second), 
343. 
199 Michael Panicola, "Principle of Cooperation," in Health Care Ethics in the Catholic Tradition 
Presentation, ed. Steven J. Squires from the file "Principle of Cooperation Slide Panicola Revised 
1.ppt" (Saint Louis, MO: Saint Louis University Center for Health Care Ethics (unpublished), 2006). 
200 Henry Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology: Human Acts, Law, Sin, Virtue, Fourth ed., Four vols., vol. 
One, Heythrop Series (London, England: Sheed and Ward, 1945; reprint, Second), 341, Heribert Jone 
and Urban Adelman, Moral Theology, trans. Urban Adelman, 13th German ed. (Westminster, MD: 
The Neuman Press, 1952; reprint, Revised English), 87. 
201 O'Donnell, Morals in Medicine, 45. 
202 Kevin O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," Health Progress 83, no. 6 (2002): printed 
page 2. 
203 Hieronymus Noldin, Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. Two (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1923), 132, O'Rourke, 
"Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 2. 
204 Jone and Adelman, Moral Theology, 87. 
205 Gerald Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems (Saint Louis, MO: The Catholic Hospital Association, 1958), 
333. 
206
 Daniel Pilarczyk, "Ethical and Religious Directives: Development and Revision in a Context of 
Cooperation," in Walk as Children of Light: The Challenge of Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society, ed. 
Edward Furton and Louise Mitchell (Boston, MA: The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 2003), 130. 
207 Peter Cataldo, "Applying the Principle of Cooperation to Collaborative Arrangements," in Walk as 
Children of Light: The Challenge of Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society, ed. Edward Furton and 
Louise Mitchell (Boston, MA: The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 2003), 139, Pilarczyk, "Ethical 
and Religious Directives: Development and Revision in a Context of Cooperation," 130. 
 146 
                                                                                                                                            
208 Pilarczyk, "Ethical and Religious Directives: Development and Revision in a Context of Cooperation," 
130, The National Catholic Bioethics Center, "Avoiding Formal Cooperation in Health Care 
Alliances," in Ethical Principle in Catholic Health Care, ed. Edward Furton and Veronica Dort 
(Boston, MA: The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 1999), 141. 
209 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services, Fifth ed. (Washington, D.C.: USCCB Publishing, 2009). 
210 James Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional 
Principles," International Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1989): 215. 
211 Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional 
Principles," 215. 
212 Cataldo and Haas, "Institutional Cooperation: The Erds," printed page 3, McFadden, Medical Ethics, 
329-30, McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology: A Complete Course. 
213 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 3. 
214 McFadden, Medical Ethics, 330. 
215 Noldin, Summa Theologiae Moralis, 132. 
216
 Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, 333. 
217 Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology: Human Acts, Law, Sin, Virtue, 342, Bernard Häring, The Law of 
Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, vol. One (Westminster, MD: The Neuman Press, 1963), 
293, O'Donnell, Morals in Medicine, 47. 
218 Jone and Adelman, Moral Theology, 87, Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: 
Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles," 216, McFadden, Medical Ethics, 330, O'Donnell, 
Morals in Medicine, 45. 
219 McFadden, Medical Ethics, 330. 
220 Cataldo and Haas, "Institutional Cooperation: The ERDs," printed page 3, The National Catholic 
Bioethics Center, "Avoiding Formal Cooperation in Health Care Alliances," 143. 
221 Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology: Human Acts, Law, Sin, Virtue, 341, Keenan, "Prophylactics, 
Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles," 216, O'Donnell, 
Morals in Medicine, 46. 
222 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 3. 
223 Jone and Adelman, Moral Theology, 87. 
224 McFadden, Medical Ethics, 330. 
225 Cataldo and Haas, "Institutional Cooperation: The ERDs," printed page 4, McHugh and Callan, Moral 
Theology: A Complete Course. 
226 Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology: Human Acts, Law, Sin, Virtue, 341-42. 
227 McFadden, Medical Ethics, 329. 
228 Cataldo, "Applying the Principle of Cooperation to Collaborative Arrangements," 139. 
229 Bishop Anthony Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," in Cooperation, Complicity 
and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 54-55, Luke Gormally, 
"Why Not Dirty Your Hands? Or: On the Supposed Rightness of (Sometimes) Intentionally 
Cooperating in Wrongdoing," in Cooperation, Complicity and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, 
England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 18-26, Orville Griese, Catholic Identity in Health Care: 
Principles and Practice (Braintree, MA: The Pope John Center, 1987), 392, Edwin Healy, Moral 
Guidance, ed. James Meara (Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1960), 52-60, Philip Keane, 
Catholicism & Health-Care Justice: Problems, Potential and Solutions (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 
2002), 134, James Keenan and Thomas Kopfensteiner, "The Principle of Cooperation," Health 
Progress 76, no. 3 (1995): 23-27, May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, 26-27, 170-72, 
McFadden, Medical Ethics, 332-33, Ralph Miech, "Physician Cooperation in Patient Suicide," Ethics 
& Medics 24, no. 7 (1999): 1, Kevin O'Rourke, "An Explanation of the Principle of Cooperation in 
Light of the Dialogue," in Report on a Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation, ed. The 
Catholic Health Association (Saint Louis, MO: The Catholic Health Association, 2007), 21, Paul VI, 
"Humanae Vitae (1968) Nn. 14-18," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 8: Dialogue About Catholic 
Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 
61-62, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, Daniel Westberg, "Good and Evil in Human Acts," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 93-101. 
 147 
                                                                                                                                            
230 John Paul II, The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae) (New York, NY: Times Books - Random House, 
1995), 31, n. 18, O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 4. 
231
 Thomas Aquinas. "Summa Theologica." ed Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (Place 
Published: Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920), 
http://www.op.org/summa/letter/summa.pdf. 
232 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 3. 
233 The Catholic Health Association, "Report on a Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation,"  
(Saint Louis, MO: The Catholic Health Association, 2007), 9. 
234 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 3. 
235 The Catholic Health Association, "Report on a Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation," 
9. 
236 Interdicasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ed., Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, 551, nn. 2284, 87. 
237 Jone and Adelman, Moral Theology, 85, McHugh and Callan, Moral Theology: A Complete Course. 
238 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services. 
239 Benedict Ashley and Kevin O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis, Fourth ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 196, 292. 
240 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 5. 
241 May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, 48. 
242 Interdicasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ed., Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, 433-34, nn.1750-54. 
243 Interdicasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ed., Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, 435, n. 1755. 
244 Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 89. 
245 Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 90. 
246 McCormick, The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas since Vatican II, 134, McCormick, 
Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology, 8-9. 
247 McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology, 9. 
248 John Paul II, "The Splendor of Truth (Veritatis Splendor),"  (1993), 
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0222/_INDEX.HTM, May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of 
Human Life, 83, 113, note n. 48. 
249 Thomas Cavanaugh, "Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States," 
Christian Bioethics 3, no. 2 (1997): 139, note n. 1. 
250 Cavanaugh, "Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States," 139, note n. 1, 
Daniel Sulmasy, "Commentary: Double Effect - Intention Is the Solution, Not the Problem," Journal of 
Law, Medicine, and Ethics 28, no. 1 (2000). 
251 Cavanaugh, "Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States," 139, note n. 1, 
Christopher Kaczor, "Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer," Theological 
Studies 59, no. 2 (1998): 297-98. 
252 Peter Knauer, "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect," in Readings in Moral 
Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick 
(New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 307-08. 
253 Thomas Cavanaugh, "The Unintended/Foreseen Distinction's Ethical Relevance," Philosophical Papers 
25, no. 3 (1996): 179-80, Kaczor, "Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer," 
297-98. 
254 Kaczor, "Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer," 298. 
255 Kaczor, "Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer," 298, note n. 4. 
256
 Joseph Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," Theological Studies 10, no. 
1 (1949): 43. 
257 Mark Aulisio, "Double Effect, Principle or Doctrine Of," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen Post 
(New York, NY: MacMillan Reference, Thomson Gale, 2004), 687. 
258 Kaczor, "Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer," 299. 
259 Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," 52, 56. 
260 Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," 60-61. 
 148 
                                                                                                                                            
261 Kaczor, "Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer," 300, Mangan, "An 
Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," 59-61. 
262
 Aulisio, "Double Effect, Principle or Doctrine Of," 685-88. 
263 Jose Rojas, "St. Thomas on the Direct/Indirect Distinction," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 64, 
no. 4 (1988): 390-92. 
264 Rojas, "St. Thomas on the Direct/Indirect Distinction," 371-72. 
265 Knauer, "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect," 1-39. 
266 Bruno Schüller, "Direct Killing / Indirect Killing," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms 
and Catholic Tradition, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology 
(New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 138-57. 
267 Dan Maguire, Death by Choice (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), 120, Richard McCormick, "Notes 
on Moral Theology: 1984," Theological Studies 46 (1985): 53. 
268 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals (March 13, 1975)," in 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 8: Dialogue About Catholic Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and 
Richard McCormick (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 172-73, Charles Curran, Catholic Moral 
Theology in the United States: A History (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 56, 
John Finnis, "The Consistent Ethics - a Philosophical Critique," in Consistent Ethic of Life, ed. Thomas 
Fuechtmann (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1988), 147-48, Griese, Catholic Identity in Health 
Care: Principles and Practice, 393, John Kenny, "Sterilization," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 8: 
Dialogue About Catholic Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, 
NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 202-05, 08, May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, 176-84, 
Richard McCormick, How Brave a New World?: Dilemmas in Bioethics (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1981), 432-47, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "Statement on 
Tubal Ligation (July 3, 1980)," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 8: Dialogue About Catholic Sexual 
Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 175-76, 
Paul VI, On the Regulation of Birth (Humanae Vitae) (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1968; 
reprint, 1998 - Third in English), Paul VI, "Humanae Vitae (1968) Nn. 14-18," 59-60, Pius XII, 
"Remarks to the Congress of Hematologists (September 12, 1958)," in Readings in Moral Theology 
No. 8: Dialogue About Catholic Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New 
York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 171. 
269 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services, 24, #53. 
270 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," 43. 
271 A Member of the Order of Mercy, The Life of St. Alphonsus Liguori: Bishop, Confessor, and Doctor of 
the Church (New York, NY and West Chester, NY: P. O'Shea, 1882), 3, Théodule Rey-Mermet, Moral 
Choices: The Moral Theology of Saint Alphonsus Liguori, trans. Paul Laverdure, First English ed. 
(Liguori, MO: Liguori Publications, 1998), xiv-xx. 
272 A Member of the Order of Mercy, The Life of St. Alphonsus Liguori: Bishop, Confessor, and Doctor of 
the Church, 4-20. 
273 A Member of the Order of Mercy, The Life of St. Alphonsus Liguori: Bishop, Confessor, and Doctor of 
the Church, 21-64. 
274 A Member of the Order of Mercy, The Life of St. Alphonsus Liguori: Bishop, Confessor, and Doctor of 
the Church, 65-294. 
275 A Member of the Order of Mercy, The Life of St. Alphonsus Liguori: Bishop, Confessor, and Doctor of 
the Church, 252-61. 
276 Rey-Mermet, Moral Choices, 57. 
277 Saint Alphonsus de Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for 
Ecclesiastical Retreats. Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., ed. Eugene Grimm, XVIII vols., vol. XII, 
The Complete Works of Saint Alphonsus De Liguori (New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, 1889), 272. 
278 Rey-Mermet, Moral Choices, 58. 
279 Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for Ecclesiastical Retreats. 
Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., 273. 
280 Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for Ecclesiastical Retreats. 
Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., 180. 
 149 
                                                                                                                                            
281 Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for Ecclesiastical Retreats. 
Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., 281. 
282
 Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for Ecclesiastical Retreats. 
Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., 277-85. 
283 Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for Ecclesiastical Retreats. 
Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., 281. 
284 Rey-Mermet, Moral Choices, 95-96. 
285 James Keenan, "The Histories of Moral Theology and New Testament Ethics - Moral Theological 
Reflections," in Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between New Testament Studies and Moral 
Theology (Landham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2002). 
286 Curran, "Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?," 78, Keenan and Kopfensteiner, "The Principle of 
Cooperation," 23-27. 
287 Keenan, "The Histories of Moral Theology and New Testament Ethics - Moral Theological 
Reflections," 6. 
288 Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology: Human Acts, Law, Sin, Virtue, 341-52. 
289
 Jone and Adelman, Moral Theology, 87-91. 
290 Häring, The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, 293. 
291 Häring, The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, 293. 
292 McFadden, Medical Ethics, 327-42. 
293 O'Donnell, Morals in Medicine, 44-49. 
294 O'Donnell, Morals in Medicine, 121-27. 
295 Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, 332-35. 
296 Pilarczyk, "Ethical and Religious Directives: Development and Revision in a Context of Cooperation," 
126-27. 
297 John Paul II, "The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae),"  (1995), 
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0141/_INDEX.HTM. 
298 Kenny, "Sterilization," 201-02. 
299 John Paul II, "The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae).", John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 103-04, 12, nn. 
58, 62, Paul VI, "Joy and Hope (Gaudium Et Spes)," Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World  (1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. 
300 John Connery, "Tubal Ligation: Good Medicine? Good Morality?," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 
8: Dialogue About Catholic Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings 
in Moral Theology (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 217. 
301 Timothy Quill, "Death and Dignity," in Last Rights: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Debated, ed. 
Michael Ulhmann (Washington, D.C. and Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1998), 
327-28. 
302 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 120-21. 
303 Mike Delaney, "General Medical Practice: The Problem of Cooperation in Evil," in Cooperation, 
Complicity and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 132-35, 
Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 33-38, Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, 332-
34, McFadden, Medical Ethics, 328-37, The Catholic Health Association, "Report on a Theological 
Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation," 26-27. 
304 Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, 232-33. 
305 Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, 233-34, McFadden, Medical Ethics, 329, The Catholic Health 
Association, "Report on a Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation," 26-27. 
306 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 35, O'Rourke, "An Explanation of the Principle 
of Cooperation in Light of the Dialogue," 21, The Catholic Health Association, "Report on a 
Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation," 27. 
307 Healy, Moral Guidance, 48, McFadden, Medical Ethics, 332-36. 
308 Miech, "Physician Cooperation in Patient Suicide," 1. 
309 Miech, "Physician Cooperation in Patient Suicide," 1-4. 
310 Ethics Department of Catholic Health East, "Moral Cooperation: The Case of Attempted Suicide," in e-
Cases in Ethics (Catholic Health East, 2004), 1. 
311 Ethics Department of Catholic Health East, "Moral Cooperation: The Case of Attempted Suicide," 1-2. 
 150 
                                                                                                                                            
312 Helen Watt, "Cooperation Problems in the Care of Suicidal Patients," in Cooperation, Complicity and 
Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 145. 
313
 Watt, "Cooperation Problems in the Care of Suicidal Patients," 145. 
314 Watt, "Cooperation Problems in the Care of Suicidal Patients," 140-41. 
315 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 15, n. 12. 
316 Bernard Häring, "The Inseparability of the Unitive-Procreative Functions of the Marital Act," in 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 8: Dialogue About Catholic Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and 
Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 153, Paul VI, 
Humanae Vitae, 15, n. 12. 
317 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 16-17, n. 14, Paul VI, "Humanae Vitae (1968) Nn. 14-18," 59-60, n. 14. 
318 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 18-19, n. 16, Paul VI, "Humanae Vitae (1968) Nn. 14-18," 60-61, n. 16. 
319 John Paul II, "Familiaris Consortio (1981) Nn. 28-32," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 8: Dialogue 
About Catholic Sexual Teaching, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, Readings in Moral 
Theology (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1993), 66, 68-70, nn. 29, 32. 
320 Delaney, "General Medical Practice: The Problem of Cooperation in Evil," 132, 34-35, Fisher, 
"Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 38-41, Healy, Moral Guidance, 48, Keenan, 
"Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles," 205-
20. 
321 W.B. Saunders Dictionary Staff, Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 28th ed. (Philadelphia, PA: 
W.B. Saunders Company, A Division of Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), 516, 1013. 
322 Better Homes and Gardens, Family Medical Guide, ed. Donald Cooley, Revised ed. (New York, NY: 
Better Homes and Gardens Books, 1978; reprint, Tenth), 430. 
323 Better Homes and Gardens, Family Medical Guide, 431. 
324 Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional 
Principles," 209. 
325 Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional 
Principles," 214. 
326 Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional 
Principles," 209-17. 
327 Bernard Häring, The Law of Christ, vol. Two (Cork: Mercier Press, 1963), 503. 
328 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 38-39. 
329 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, 15, n.12, Paul VI, "Humanae Vitae (1968) Nn. 14-18," 153. 
330 Federico Lombardi, "Vatican Spokesman's Statement on Pope's Remarks About Condoms," Origins 40, 
no. 26 (2010): 401-02. 
331 Delaney, "General Medical Practice: The Problem of Cooperation in Evil," 137. 
332 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care, ed. Daniel Wikler, Studies in Philosophy and Health Policy (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985; reprint, Fifth - 1995), 26-32. 
333 Delaney, "General Medical Practice: The Problem of Cooperation in Evil," 137-38. 
334 Tubbs, A Handbook of Bioethics Terms, 130. 
335 Nancy Press and Kiley Ariail, "Genetic Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing," in 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen Post (New York, NY: MacMillan Reference, Thomson Gale, 
2004), 997-98. 
336 Press and Ariail, "Genetic Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing," 998. 
337 Daniel Hartl and Elizabeth Jones, Genetics: Principles and Analysis, Fourth ed. (Sudbury, MA: Jones 
and Bartlett Publishers, 1998), 388. 
338 James DuBois, "Prenatal Genetic Testing and Wrongful Birth Lawsuits," Health Care Ethics USA 9, no. 
2 (2001): printed page 2. 
339 Norman Ford, "Ethical Aspects of Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis," in Genetics and Ethics: An 
Interdisciplinary Study, ed. Gerard Magill (Saint Louis, MO: Saint Louis University Press, 2004), 198. 
340 John Paul II, "The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae).", John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 114, n.63. 
341 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services, 24, no. 50. 
342 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services, 24, no. 50. 
 151 
                                                                                                                                            
343 United States Catholic Conference, Catechism of the Catholic Church, Second ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
USCC Publishing Services, 1994), 548, n. 2272. 
344
 DuBois, "Prenatal Genetic Testing and Wrongful Birth Lawsuits," printed page 3. 
345 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Declaration on Procured Abortion,"  (1974), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19741118_dec
laration-abortion_en.html, Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, "Foreword," in Readings in Moral 
Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, 
Readings in Moral Theology (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), vii, John Paul II, "The Gospel of 
Life (Evangelium Vitae).", John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 103-15, May, Catholic Bioethics and the 
Gift of Human Life, 39-42, United States Catholic Conference, Catechism of the Catholic Church, 547-
49, nn. 2270-75. 
346 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 49-50, John Paul II, "The Gospel of Life 
(Evangelium Vitae).", John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 103-05, n. 58. 
347 DuBois, "Prenatal Genetic Testing and Wrongful Birth Lawsuits," printed page 3. 
348 Ford, "Ethical Aspects of Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis," 205. 
349
 Michael Panicola and Ron Hamel, "Conscience, Cooperation, and Full Disclosure," Health Progress 87, 
no. 1 (2006): 56-58. 
350 May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, 225. 
351 Germain Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, vol. Three, The Way of the Lord Jesus (Quincy, IL: 
Franciscan Press, 1997), 300. 
352 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 46-47. 
353 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 48. 
354 Press and Ariail, "Genetic Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing," 999. 
355 DuBois, "Prenatal Genetic Testing and Wrongful Birth Lawsuits," printed page 3. 
356 LeRoy Walters, "Fetal Research," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen Post (New York, NY: 
MacMillan Reference, Thomson Gale, 2004), 921. 
357 Press and Ariail, "Genetic Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing," 1002-03. 
358 Michael Prieur et al., "Stem Cell Research in a Catholic Institution: Yes or No?," Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 16, no. 1 (2006): 75. 
359 John Harris, Derek Morgan, and Mary Ford, "Embryo and Fetus: Stem Cell Research and Therapy," in 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Stephen Post (New York, NY: MacMillan Reference, Thomson Gale, 
2004), 722-23, Gerard Magill, "Ethical Implications of Embryonic Stem Cell Research," Health Care 
Ethics USA 8, no. 3 (2000): printed pages 1-2, Prieur et al., "Stem Cell Research in a Catholic 
Institution: Yes or No?," 75. 
360 Magill, "Ethical Implications of Embryonic Stem Cell Research," printed page 1. 
361 Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 256-57, Alexander R. Pruss, "Cooperation with Past 
Evil and Use of Cell-Lines Derived from Aborted Fetuses," in Cooperation, Complicity and 
Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 89. 
362 Edward Furton, "Vaccines Originating in Abortion," Ethics & Medics 24, no. 3 (1999): 3. 
363 Pruss, "Cooperation with Past Evil and Use of Cell-Lines Derived from Aborted Fetuses," 89-90. 
364 Neil Scolding, "Cooperation Problems in Science: Use of Embryonic/Fetal Material," in Cooperation, 
Complicity and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 116. 
365 Furton, "Vaccines Originating in Abortion," 4. 
366 Furton, "Vaccines Originating in Abortion," 3, Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 257, 
Pruss, "Cooperation with Past Evil and Use of Cell-Lines Derived from Aborted Fetuses," 89, Magill, 
"Ethical Implications of Embryonic Stem Cell Research," printed page 2. 
367 Furton, "Vaccines Originating in Abortion," 3. 
368 Prieur et al., "Stem Cell Research in a Catholic Institution: Yes or No?," 89. 
369
 Birgitta Mackiewicz, "Can Catholic Facilities Justify the Use of Embryonic Stem Cell Therapies 
Developed from the Destruction of Human Embryos?" Health Care Ethics USA 14, no. 2 (2006): 
printed page 1. 
370 Mackiewicz, "Can Catholic Facilities Justify the Use of Embryonic Stem Cell Therapies Developed 
from the Destruction of Human Embryos?", Magill, "Ethical Implications of Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research.", Gerard Magill, "Catholic Principles in Government Policy: President Bush on Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research," Health Care Ethics USA 9, no. 3 (2001), Albert Moraczewski, "Technology and 
 152 
                                                                                                                                            
Morals," Ethics & Medics 8, no. 6 (1983): 2, Martin Onwu, "The Relevance of the Principle of 
Cooperation for the Ethical Debate on Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Therapies," Health Care 
Ethics USA 14, no. 1 (2006). 
371 Onwu, "The Relevance of the Principle of Cooperation for the Ethical Debate on Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research and Therapies," printed page 2. 
372 Onwu, "The Relevance of the Principle of Cooperation for the Ethical Debate on Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research and Therapies," printed page 2. 
373 Mackiewicz, "Can Catholic Facilities Justify the Use of Embryonic Stem Cell Therapies Developed 
from the Destruction of Human Embryos?" printed page 1. 
374 Prieur et al., "Stem Cell Research in a Catholic Institution: Yes or No?" 88. 
375 Onwu, "The Relevance of the Principle of Cooperation for the Ethical Debate on Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research and Therapies," printed page 2. 
376 Magill, "Ethical Implications of Embryonic Stem Cell Research," printed page 2. 
377 Magill, "Catholic Principles in Government Policy: President Bush on Embryonic Stem Cell Research," 
printed page 1. 
378
 Magill, "Catholic Principles in Government Policy: President Bush on Embryonic Stem Cell Research," 
printed pages 1-2. 
379 Magill, "Catholic Principles in Government Policy: President Bush on Embryonic Stem Cell Research," 
printed page 1. 
380 Magill, "Catholic Principles in Government Policy: President Bush on Embryonic Stem Cell Research," 
printed page 2. 
381 Magill, "Catholic Principles in Government Policy: President Bush on Embryonic Stem Cell Research," 
printed page 3. 
382 Tadeusz Pacholczyk, "Stem Cell Research, Cloning & Human Embryos,"  (2004), 
http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04C54.pdf. 
383 John Allen, "Bishops' Ties with Health Association Called Strong," National Catholic Reporter, 
February 4, 2011, 15, John Allen, "Minding the Gap between Bishops and Catholic Health Care," 
National Catholic Reporter, June 25, 2010, 1, 8-10, Catholic News Service, "Move Forward after 
Differences on Health Reform, Priest Says," National Catholic Reporter, June 25, 2010, 10. 
384 Nancy O'Brien, "Cardinal George Says Health Care Debate Was 'Wound to Church's Unity'," The 
Michigan Catholic, November 19, 2010, 7, Nancy O'Brien, "Cardinal Backs Bill Fixing Health-
Reform Law on Abortion, Conscience," The Michigan Catholic, May 28, 2010, 7, 22, Michael 
Winters, "High-Risk Health Care and Abortions," National Catholic Reporter, August 6, 2010, 11. 
385 Colin Harte, "Problems of Principle in Voting for Unjust Legislation," in Cooperation, Complicity and 
Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 179-208, Colin Harte, "The 
Opening up of a Discussion: A Response to John Finnis," in Cooperation, Complicity and Conscience, 
ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 246-68. 
386 Finnis, "The Consistent Ethics - a Philosophical Critique," 166-67. 
387 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 48. 
388 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 33. 
389 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 32. 
390 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 49. 
391 John Finnis, "Restricting Legalized Abortion Is Not Intrinsically Unjust," in Cooperation, Complicity 
and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 209-45, John Finnis, 
"'a Vote Decisive For...A More Restrictive Law'," in Cooperation, Complicity and Conscience, ed. 
Helen Watt (London, England: The Linacre Centre, 2005), 269-95. 
392 Steven Squires, "Implicit Formal Cooperation Arrangements 1," in Microsoft Publisher, ed. Implicit 
Formal Cooperation Arrangements 1.jpg (Novi, MI: Trinity Health, 2011). 
393
 Steven Squires, "Implicit Formal Cooperation Arrangements 2," in Microsoft Publisher, ed. Implicit 
Formal Cooperation Arrangements 2.jpg (Novi, MI: Trinity Health, 2011). 
394 Panicola, "Principle of Cooperation." 
395 Liguori, Dignity and Duties of the Priest; or, Selva: A Collection of Material for Ecclesiastical Retreats. 
Rule of Life and Spiritual Rules., 285. 
396 The National Catholic Bioethics Center, "Avoiding Formal Cooperation in Health Care Alliances," 143. 
 153 
                                                                                                                                            
397 Cataldo and Haas, "Institutional Cooperation: The ERDs," printed page 4, Helen Hitchcock, "Bishops 
Clarify Directives for Catholic Hospitals," About Medicine & Morality June 15 (1999), http://www.wf-
f.org/Ethicreldir.html. 
398 Thomas Kopfensteiner, "Responsibility and Cooperation," Health Progress 83, no. 6 (2002): printed 
page 3. 
399 The National Catholic Bioethics Center, "Avoiding Formal Cooperation in Health Care Alliances," 143-
44. 
400 Cataldo, "Applying the Principle of Cooperation to Collaborative Arrangements," 143. 
401 Pilarczyk, "Ethical and Religious Directives: Development and Revision in a Context of Cooperation," 
134. 
402 Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 121, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
"Statement on Tubal Ligation (July 3, 1980)," 175. 
403 Keenan, "Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional 
Principles," 206-08. 
404 Fisher, "Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issues," 56-57, Kaveny, "Tax Lawyers, Prophets and 
Pilgrims: A Response to Anthony Fisher," 73-79, 82-87, Keenan and Kopfensteiner, "The Principle of 
Cooperation," 23-27, Michael Place, "The Journey toward Consensus," in Report on a Theological 
Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation, ed. The Catholic Health Association (Saint Louis, MO: The 
Catholic Health Association, 2007), 16. 
405 Bishop Anthony Fisher, "Is There a Distinctive Role for the Catholic Hospital in a Pluralist Society?" in 
Issues for a Catholic Bioethic, ed. Luke Gormally (London: Linacre Centre, 1999), 204 (printed page 
5), notes 9-10, Germain Grisez, "Difficult Moral Questions: How Far May Catholic Hospitals 
Cooperate with Non-Catholic Providers?" The Linacre Quarterly 62, no. 4 (1995): 67-72. 
406 William E. May, "Sterilization: Catholic Teaching and Catholic Practice," Homiletic and Pastoral 
Review 77 (1977): 15-22. 
407 Benedict Ashley and Kevin O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis, First ed. (St. Louis, 
MO: The Catholic Hospital Association, 1977), 199. 
408 Ashley and O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis. 
409 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed page 5. 
410 O'Rourke, "Catholic Health Care and Sterilization," printed pages 5 and 6. 
411 McCormick, How Brave a New World?: Dilemmas in Bioethics, 274-78. 
412 McCormick, How Brave a New World?: Dilemmas in Bioethics, 274-78. 
413 Steven Squires, "William May, Richard McCormick, and Benedict Ashley and Kevin O‘Rourke 
Responses to Cooperation and Sterilization in Roman Catholic Institutions,"  (St. Louis, MO: Saint 
Louis University, 2006), 22. 
414 Larry Dunklee et al., "Looking Back, Looking Forward: Ethical Challenges for the Ministry," Health 
Care Ethics USA 18, no. 1 (2010): 20-21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 154 
Chapter Three – Material Cooperation within the Organizational 
Context of Health Care 
 
 
Cooperation not only applies to individual contexts such as the ones mentioned in the 
previous chapter.  It applies to institutional or organizational settings.  This section places 
cooperation within the organizational context of health care.  While cooperation is a 
Catholic principle, the implications of this chapter and this dissertation in its entirety go 
beyond the walls of Catholic health care.  Discussions about cooperation within an 
organization apply to health care generally, which includes Catholic health care 
organizations. 
 The groundwork for establishing material cooperation within health care 
organizations is through interpreting the moral agency of organizations.  Achieving the 
examination of organizational moral agency is through defining and describing 
organizational moral agency, clarifying this agency through the lens of theological ethics, 
and establishing this agency as a function of organizational ethics.  Differences in moral 
agency are apparent when individuals and organizations apply the principle of 
cooperation.  This chapter explores many of the relevant differences, such as the greater 
scope of decisions (decisional affect) and possibility for scandal with organizations.  
Much like the previous chapter, this chapter concludes by featuring how health care 
organizations act as moral agents while applying the principle of cooperation.  Issues 
specific to organizational applications of cooperation are at the heart of this final segment 
of the chapter. 
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I. Interpreting Moral Agency within Organizations 
 The previous chapter established the various ways individuals express their 
morality, mainly through applying the principle of cooperation. This chapter considers 
moral agency with organizations, both generally and through the lens of cooperation.  
Beginning this section properly necessitates exploring the concept of moral agency, as 
compared and contrasted between individuals and organization. 
IA. Defining Organizations and Their Moral Agency   
Organizations act as moral agents.
415
  Agency and identity for organizations is 
more than the cumulative agencies and identities of its associates.  As such, organizations 
are distinct as moral actors.
416
  They have behaviors and actions, which may or may not 
be ethical.  Organizations also think, decide, and justify.
417
  Prerequisites to being a moral 
agent, in either an individual and organizational context, are the ability to make 
meaningful promises and fulfill (i.e. carry out, execute) those promises.  The former case 
requires competence or capacity (the distinction between competence and capacity 
applying to individuals does not translate to organizations so uses are interchangeable); 
the latter requires not only resources, but also the ability to ‗make good‘ on promises and 
commitments.
418
 
The relationship between organizational culture, thinking, decisions, actions and 
behaviors, and justification with agency is composite and intricate, as the following 
example illustrates.  Professor Ronald Sims quotes Goodman and Dean from ‗Why 
Productivity Efforts Fail‖ in Organization Development: Theory, Practice, and Research 
with respect to definitions for organizational acts and behaviors.  They are ―‗performed 
by two or more individuals, persist over time, and exist as a part of the daily functioning 
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of the organization.‘‖419  The previous statements about actions and behaviors may seem 
like the organizational agency is the ―mere sum of the individuals within them.‖420  This 
is a façade because of the other factors that influence organizational agency.  Physician 
and philosopher Edmund Pellegrino quotes A.V. Dicey, ―‗Whenever men act in concert 
for a common purpose, they tend to create a body which…differs from the individuals of 
whom it is constituted.‘‖421 
In any situation, actions and behaviors are the visible signs of less-overt culture, 
thoughts, decisions, and justifications.  In some instances, organizational thoughts and 
values, articulated through mission statements and core values, are congruent with 
decisions that are, in turn, harmonious with actions and behaviors.  In others, associates 
ignore mission and value statements in their decisions, actions, and behaviors.
422
  
Referencing the Sims definition above, common and repeated organizational acts and 
behaviors may be chance or unintentional at minimum.  At maximum, they are cultural 
artifacts or decision making that does not reflect preferred or ideal articulation of mission 
and values.  While it is possible for groups to back flawed or repugnant ideals, Pellegrino 
makes the claim that is more likely for moral community to work for good when ideals, 
commitments, values, and behaviors have there foundations in more than just self-
interest.
423
  
Other inherent minutiae with organizational agency and moral communities are 
perceptible.  In some cases, particular individuals within the group or organization speak 
for others within the same group or organization.  This representation includes 
occasionally describing or protecting the morality of other group members.
424
  Dynamics 
within and between communities, described next, are in addition to the characteristics of 
 157 
organizational moral agency mentioned above.  Organizations are competitive and will 
use their agency by trying indirectly to assume a superior position with other 
organizations.  Coercion and misrepresentation also factor into organizational dynamics.  
In this context, coercion is an intentional effort to alter another‘s behavior such that it is 
incongruent with ideals and values.  Misrepresentation is counterfeit influence, which 
depends on the pretense of genuine discourse and relationships with others.  Discourse is 
only the constructed means to the end of generating an artificial trust.  Rhetoric and 
persuasion is a more legitimate dynamic to influence others and is available for use 
within and among organizations.  Another dynamic among groups and organizations is 
appealing to other parties (i.e. third-parties, tertiary agents, outside observers) for 
validation and persuasion.  It is also possible to appeal to internal and external 
stakeholders for future hopes and promises; stakeholders reciprocate with faith in the 
organization that it will improve, steward resources, adapt to changes, and ensure a future 
for the benefit of all.
425
 
With respect to the above details, the author of the ―Organizational Ethics in 
Healthcare‖ entry, Robert Hall, in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, third edition, 
summarizes some of the discussions about organizational agency.  On one side, authors 
question the substantiality of institutional agents, given that they are unlike individuals 
who possess feelings and understandings, purposes and intentions, and scruples.  On the 
other side, organizations possess characteristics of moral agents; they decide, make goals, 
act to achieve goals, are accountable for harm and praised for good, and are responsible 
for the evaluation and assessment of the suitability of those goals and behaviors.  After 
his summary review of discussions, Hall concludes that organizational agency is vaguely 
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different from individual agency.  Still, ―It cannot be doubted that they are responsible 
agents in an ethically meaningful sense.‖426 
Generally, one of the ends of organizational agency is respect and congruence for 
individuals.  Moral communities persuade members and stakeholders to share ethical 
concerns involving the organization (community) in order to considerately and 
thoughtfully resolve them.  They also exhibit consistency between their publicly stated 
and professed ideals and values and the actions and behaviors witnessed by various 
stakeholders (associates or employees, patients, families, community).
427
  So as not to 
confuse the naturalistic fallacy (is/ought distinction), the previous claims sound like 
empirical descriptions of moral communities.  This is not entirely accurate as they are 
normative accounts of what the ideal organization or moral community could be. 
Similar to individuals, communities and organizations change and are never 
stagnant.  They grow and develop through interactions and discussion,
428
 constantly 
assimilating and interpreting new information in light of its ideals and, ideally, its goals.  
Organizations and communities consider ―proposed alternative meanings for various 
behaviors that matter in the group…Discursive action to create community means 
building shared and mutually beneficial interpretations of reality that become the taken-
for-granted basis for valued action.‖429 
Organizational moral agency is, in fact, the model of business ethics.
430
  Magill 
and Prybil stipulate that business ethics attends to value and justice issues, such as 
financial and purchasing practices in management and care delivery, within and among 
organizations.  Corporate ethics is the consideration of value and justice matters with the 
corporate identity and character of hospitals and their congruence with articulations of 
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identity and character, including their policies, procedures, and guidelines.
431
  
Organizations, their agencies, and their influences are considerable.  Scholar Susan Dorr 
Goold considers organizations as the principal actors in contemporary society: 
Organizations expand our abilities in ways that allow common 
people to do uncommon things: a trauma center is able to achieve 
what no individual, no matter how skilled or talented, could hope 
to accomplish.  As dominant actors in health care, organizations 
merit our moral attention for several reasons.  First, they create 
role expectations that have moral content…In addition to creating 
role expectations, organizations as actors respond to social 
conditions… Finally, organizations have a normative structure.  
They set goals and express values and norms in addition to 
creating role expectations.
432
 
 
Multiple theories of business ethics subsist – the integrity, virtue ethics, pragmatist, and 
social contract approaches for instance – similar to assorted, general ethical theories.  All 
approaches recognize organizational moral agency, and some believe that the social 
contract approach has enough substance and malleability to become the prevailing 
approach.
433
 
IB. Clarifying Organizational Moral Agency in Theological Ethics 
 Moral agency of organizations is and has been recognized by scholars of religion 
and the tradition of theology.  Recognition of moral agency within groups is not a new 
development in the Catholic moral tradition.  Manualists have commented on the moral 
agency of groups.  Some representative examples should suffice.  In Jone and Adelman‘s 
Moral Theology (1952), they speak of legal persons, such as the State in instances of 
eminent domain, appropriately acting in the interest of the common good or common 
welfare.  One may also argue that organizational agency is inherent in their discussion of 
eternal law, precepts, and customs and their legislators (e.g. God, pope), promulgators 
(e.g. cardinals, bishops), and subjects (e.g. Catholic faithful).
 434
  In other words, the 
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Catholic Church, many individuals as one, is an organization with agency regarding 
ecclesiastical matters.  Gerald Kelly infers organizational agency when he appeals to the 
authorities of Catholic hospitals to ensure the duties, witness, and virtue and set the tone 
for personnel, patients, and policies.  This is, in fact, one of the first things he discusses 
within Medico-Moral Problems (1958) in his review of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Hospitals, second edition, which is the precursor to the 
contemporary Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, fifth 
edition.
435
  Manualists John Ford and the aforementioned Gerald Kelly discuss the 
relationship between individual and group agency in Contemporary Moral Theology 
(1960).  Specifically, an argument was levied that certain groups (e.g. artists, scientists, 
politicians and statespersons, etc.) and the individuals in them were categorically exempt 
from moral laws.  Ford and Kelly comment on the statements from Pope Pius XII; 
organizations and the individuals within them are not exempt from moral laws.
436
  The 
conclusion is that group (organizational) agency does not absolve the agency of 
individual, representative agents.  Moralist Edwin Healy assumes organizational moral 
agency within Moral Guidance (1960) in his discussion of corporations and unions, as 
these relate to topics such as just wage, living wage, strikes, and benefits.
437
  McFadden 
infers the moral agency of groups of medical professionals in the segment titled ―The 
Value of Ethics to the Profession‖ in Medical Ethics (1961).  A distinction he makes is 
that the character of the medical professional mirrors the culture of its members.
438
 
Papal encyclicals, Catholic social teaching, and Canon law address the moral 
agency of groups and organizations.  In reference to papal encyclicals, evidence of the 
recognition and articulation of group moral agency dates back over one hundred years.  
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Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum (―On Capital and Labor,‖ 1891) – as one may reasonably 
assume from the title – focuses on human work and labor, including the role of 
organizations and associations.  There is an unequivocal acknowledgment of the 
autonomy of associations and organizations, which should allow their members to 
achieve their individual spiritual ends.
439
  In addition, they should work for the good of 
society itself: 
It is clear that [associations] must pay special and chief attention to 
the duties of religion and morality, and that social betterment 
should have this chiefly in view; otherwise they would lose wholly 
their special character.
440
 
 
Specific statements such as these are tacit acknowledgment of organizational agency.  
Pius XI devotes significant attention to the development of workers‘ associations and 
workplaces, wages and contracts, and the morality of institutions (organizations) in 
Quadragesimo Anno (―After Forty Years – On the Reconstruction of the Social Order,‖ 
1931).  Corporations and groups are juridical personalities having the moral authority to 
work for their interests, their associates (employees), and the common good according to 
Pius XI.
441
   
Encyclicals from the ladder half of the 1900s continue to take in hand 
organizations and their moral agency.  Mater et Magistra (―Mother and Teacher – 
Christianity and Social Progress,‖ 1961) by John XXIII speaks to the role of private 
associations, workplaces and organizations, and unions as mediums for social growth – 
for individuals and the common good.
442
  They should use their agency for these 
purposes.  He emphasizes the need to form groups and organizations in order to advance 
human dignity and freedom while fostering responsibility, which individuals could not do 
by themselves, in Pacem in Terris (―Peace on Earth,‖ 1963).443  To state this observation 
 162 
differently, organizational agents can achieve what individual agents cannot.  Within the 
same encyclical, he refers to states and intermediate groups as having juridical status and 
agency that must correspond with the moral order.
444
  Laborem Exercens (―On Human 
Work,‖ 1981) is one platform where John Paul II attends to the role of organizations as 
agents.  For instance, he appeals to organizations to act justly by hiring and creating 
suitable environments for disabled persons.
445
  He directly connects groups and 
organizations, such as agencies and centers, with ethical agency and responsibility, in 
Evangelium Vitae (―The Gospel of Life,‖ 1995).446  Benedict XVI attributes some of the 
financial collapse to the breakdown of businesses that have concentrated more on their 
own self-interests than broad social responsibility and stakeholders other then the 
proprietors in Caritas in Veritate (―Charity in Truth.‖ 2009).447  The agency of some 
organizations lacked evaluative, reflective, self-discerning, self-observing egos; the result 
was a narrowing scope that excluded or ignored the charitable, altruistic dimensions of 
their moral agency. 
With respect to Catholic social teaching, the section on business initiatives and 
business goals in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church affirms the 
following about how organizations should use their agency: 
A businesses‘ objective must be met in economic terms and 
according to economic criteria, but the authentic values that bring 
about the concrete development of the person and society must not 
be neglected …All those involved in a business venture must be 
mindful that the community in which they work represents a good 
for everyone and not a structure that permits the satisfaction of 
someone‘s merely personal interests.448 
 
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) infers, now reconfirmed by the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), that organizations are agents 
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and may act ethically in the ―medical-moral issues‖ and ―prophetic role‖ sections of 
Health and Health Care: A Pastoral Letter of the American Catholic Bishops (1982).
449
  
Similarly, phrases in Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social 
Teaching and the U.S. Economy (1986) validate organizational (corporate) agency: 
Businesses have a right to an institutional framework that does not 
penalize enterprises that act responsibly.  Governments must 
provide regulations and a system of taxation which encourage 
firms to preserve the environment, employ disadvantaged workers, 
and create jobs in depressed areas.
450
 
 
Organizations (agencies, associations) not only have voices and actions, they can use 
their agency for more than just their narrow self-interest – they can be moral by acting for 
the benefit of others.  The U.S. bishops go on, in a later document, to stress that 
―economic choices and institutions must be judged by how they protect or undermine the 
life and dignity of the human person, support the family and serve the common good.‖451   
Arguably in an example of an organization on a macro-level, the U.S. bishops 
maintain that Church teachings support that the State, or government itself, has moral 
agency that it should use for guarding human rights and ensuring justice for all.
452
  In 
fact, in another statement, the U.S. bishops define the relationship between two types of 
group agents – the state and non-state organizations.  No need exists for state intervention 
and imposition into additional areas of life when there is responsible use of non-state 
organizational agency for the common good.
453
  Similar to the concerns about the state, 
the Church has concerns about abuse of multinational corporations and organizations.  
The agency of large groups may turn into a tyranny, which may oppress or subjugate 
others either intentionally or unintentionally.
454
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 Church procedures and canon law address the agency of organizations.  For 
instance, the protocol proposed by The Archdiocese of Philadelphia addresses the role of 
group agency in its suggested procedure for collaborative relationships.  Put simply, some 
factors that merit consideration use organizational agency by: 
a. Helping to implement the church‘s moral and social teaching. 
b. Furthering the health care ministry to the community 
c. Witnessing to a responsible stewardship of limited health care 
resources. 
d. Providing poor and vulnerable persons with a more equitable 
access to basic health care.
455
 
 
Changes to an organizational agent in the form of joint ventures or collaborative 
relationships require a nihil obstat (i.e. ―nothing stands in the way‖ or a Catholic Church 
censor ensuring there is nothing damaging to the faith) from the Secretary for Catholic 
Human Services.
456
  John Boyle provides a summary about the canonical status of 
Catholic hospitals and the Catholic Church in the U.S.: 
The interorganizational relationship of Church and hospital in the 
United States has usually taken the form of Church sponsorship of 
hospitals.  The hospital is usually under the direction of a religious 
community or diocese, which in canon law forms a ―moral 
person‖… The hospital is then usually incorporated separately, but 
with arrangements that give the sponsoring religious group 
decisive control through its control of the corporate membership, 
majority membership on the board of directors, or some other 
similar arrangement.  This the organizational relationship is 
strongly reinforced in the United States by legal and canonical 
arrangements that vest ownership and control of the hospital in the 
religious sponsor who is, in turn, tied by legal and canonical 
arrangements to the hierarchy of Church authority.
457
 
 
The eight-and-a-half year, CHA-sponsored project on shared understandings around the 
principle of cooperation and its applications also discussed the moral agency of groups 
according to canon law: 
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 As understood in canon law, a moral person is a group of 
natural persons who have a particular relationship to one 
another, and because of this relationship, may be conceived of 
as a single entity which does not exist in reality and cannot be 
conceived of apart from the people who comprise it. 
 In church law, a moral person is called a juridic person and has 
been given recognition by proper authority.  The moral person 
has rights and responsibilities recognized by society and civil 
law.  Like natural persons, it must fulfill these rights and 
responsibilities in order to act ethically. 
 The notion of moral agency of institutions is also rooted in the 
church‘s social tradition.  The tradition presupposes an 
understanding of the moral agency of corporate entities such as 
governments.
458
 
 
From the above description, it may seem that group agency is more ethereal, nondescript, 
and therefore less substantive than natural persons‘ (individuals‘) agency.  This inference 
is not entirely correct.  It may take additional time and energy to articulate boundaries 
and scope of organizations, but this does not make them nondescript. 
The canonical and ecclesiastical understanding of the hospital as moral person is 
similar to the understanding of other moral agents, such as professionals and professional 
groups.  As described by moral theologian Philip Keane, the Code of Canon Law 
acknowledges the autonomy and sphere of influence of qualified professionals who are 
knowledgeable in their profession.
459
  Such is the agency with organizations.  They have 
a scope and a sphere of influence whilst simultaneously understanding the overlap of 
other individual agents (e.g. associates or employees, stakeholders) and organizational 
agents (e.g. the Church, state). 
The theological community is not the only one to accept organizational moral 
agency.  The secular community supports this idea.  Regulatory, legal, and compliance 
recognition of organizational agency is prevalent.  Attention to organizational morality is 
a requirement of the regulatory agencies that regulate health care.  For instance, the Joint 
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Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) requires all health 
care organizations to have a method for resolving ethical issues and disputes arising 
within the organization.  Initially, requirements had a clinical focus for organizational 
morality.  However, more recently (1995) this regulatory agency recognized the 
importance of also having an organizational focus, given the prevalence of organizational 
dilemmas and the need to attend to them.
460
  The new mandate included a requirement for 
health care codes of conduct to govern external relationships, marketing, billing, 
admissions, and discharge or transfer.  Other groups enumerated in the expected conduct 
consisted of payers, other health care providers, and educational institutions.
461
 
As previously mentioned, there is secular, legal precedent for the identification of 
organizational agency.  One of the earliest, pivotal, and defining legal cases in bioethics 
is In re Quinlan (355 A.2d 647, N.J. 1976), which the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
opined.  The case details are not important for this discourse.  Yet, the segment of the 
opinion, titled ―IV. The Medical Factor,‖ delivered by Chief Justice Hughes encourages 
the use of institutional ethics committees for inter-institutional dilemmas.  Legal 
professor Jerry Menikoff elaborates, ―While [ethics committees] are now standard in 
modern hospital care, this was a new concept at the time…The court was also ahead of its 
time in concluding that ‗a practice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would 
generally be inappropriate.‘‖462  Statutes and other legislation in the States of Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Arizona mention the helpful role of ethics 
committees in attending to moral dilemmas.
463
  It is a reasonable supposition to suggest 
that such proposals not only exhibit appreciation for organizational agency, they imply 
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trust or conviction that organizations, in certain circumstances, may use their agency to 
attend to internal dilemmas. 
Institutional compliance programs are illustrations of the balance between 
individual agency (persons‘ autonomy) and organizational agency (groups‘ autonomy).  
Categorical examples include anonymous, error-reporting systems for adverse events and 
other mistakes as well as confidential integrity hotlines.  Individual mistakes and adverse 
events may have implications to the organization.  In using the system or hotline, 
individual stakeholders are human moral agents acting for the good of the organization 
and its agency.  Phrased another way, individual agents leave problems that may impact 
the institution for the organization to solve.  It does so with its agency.  The suggestion of 
the President‘s Commission in 1983 suggested the utility of health care ethics programs 
to act, in at least one capacity, as a method of compliance and dispute resolution for 
organizations.
464
 
IC. Clarifying Organizational Moral Agency as a Function of Organizational Ethics 
Organizational moral agency is a function of organizational ethics.  Parts of 
organizational ethics‘ origins are from business ethics, which was discussed above, and it 
is often contrasted with clinical ethics, although any distinction between the clinical and 
organizational ethics is often nebulous.  Providing some definitions of organizational 
ethics, sometimes called institutional ethics,
465
 may be useful and, as defined by religion 
and ethics professor James Tubbs, one such description is that it is moral discernment 
about the determinations and actions of health care organizations and institutions, often 
comprising board, juridic person, executive committees and groups, administrators, and 
other organizational authorities.
466
  Scholar and professor Gerry Magill defines it ―as the 
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integration of values into decision making, policies, and behavior throughout the multi-
disciplinary environment of a health care organization.‖467  Two professionals involved 
with ethics in the Sentara Healthcare define organizational ethics and its goal as crafting 
and framing appropriate options in order to alleviate or abolish organizational ethics 
dilemmas.
468
  Common situations in organization ethics include justice and ethics as they 
connect with safety and workplace conditions, charity and other uncompensated care, 
environmental impacts associated with health care provision, confidentiality of patient 
information, changes to managed care understandings, associate (employee) relations and 
benefits, just wages and living wages, and discriminatory practices.
469
  Other issues, 
depicted ‗from a higher altitude,‘ include clarifying appropriate care broadly and within 
the organization as well as stewarding resources in order to balance multiple stakeholders 
(e.g. associates, providers, payers) and fluctuating dynamics (e.g. access, cost, quality).
470
 
Further approaches to redefine organizational ethics and its functioning have met 
with mixed reviews, both theoretically and practically.  Ethicist and Loyola University 
Chicago professor David Ozar insists that ethics education within the institution should 
be a trademark of organizational ethics, similar to the education function of clinical 
ethics.
471
  Likewise, ethicist Robert Orr suggests that organizational ethics shares 
functional similarities with clinical ethics: 
…John Fletcher, one of the pioneers in clinical ethics, made a 
cogent observation.  He noted that early efforts in clinical ethics 
aimed to make the clinical decision making in medicine more 
transparent, and this met with initial resistance from clinicians.  
More recent efforts in organizational ethics aim to make business 
decision making in medicine more transparent, and it should not be 
surprising that this is meeting with some resistance from hospital 
administrators and boards of trustees.  The following is a story of 
―forced transparency.‖472 
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For Orr, transparency is a mode to honor shared decision-making and to use a Catholic 
moral principle, subsidiarity, in order to achieve a more respectful and unified 
organization.  Another function of organizational ethics has gained traction in the 
literature – organizational ethics as a change agent.  Many health care organizations face 
the need to change with the increasing demands on clinical quality, safety, efficiency, 
equity, and effectiveness – as recommended by reports such as To Err is Human: 
Building a Safer Health System and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health Care 
System for the 21
st
 Century – and organizational ethics processes are positioned to 
facilitate changes.
473
  A number of other ethicists and moral theologians have commented 
on the significance of organizational ethics within health care.
474
 
 Catholic health care systems have an organizational duty beyond the ones 
mentioned above.  Identity as a Catholic organization is a function in addition to making 
decision in light of mission and core values.  Catholic identity has particular 
commitments, requiring promotion and defense of human dignity, action on behalf of 
justice, promotion of the common good, attention to the whole person (i.e. body, mind, 
and spirit), care for poor and vulnerable persons, stewardship of resources, and behaviors 
in communion with the Catholic Church.  Organizational ethics is also useful as a method 
to interpret challenges and conflicts in light of Catholic identity, mission, and core 
values.
475
   
The broad footprint or scope of ethics in health care generally may be, in part, one 
of the attractions to the Next Generation Model of Ethics (also called Next Generation or 
Next Gen) because Next Generation programs attend to both clinical and organizational 
ethics issues.  Next Gen ethics integrates many of the considerations in organizational 
 170 
ethics mentioned above in addition to the core elements of case consultation, education, 
and policy review and development as mentioned in the President Commission‘s report 
on forgoing life-sustaining treatment.
476
  Specifically, many Next Gen ethics programs 
have the foundational characteristics of being strategically proactive (i.e. responsive 
fluctuating dynamics such as access and costs and to an organization‘s quality, safety, 
efficiency, equity, and effectiveness), having measurable outcomes (i.e. transparent about 
its own effectiveness, alleviates or abolishes inequities and dilemmas), staying 
organizationally integrated (i.e. program functions as a change agent, integrates into the 
multi-disciplinary health care setting), and including an orientation to mission and values 
(i.e. ensures congruence between identity, commitments, and behaviors).
477
 
To expand on the link between organizational agency and organizational ethics, 
organizations exercise their moral agency when making organizational decisions that 
impact associates, patients, or the community.  Often, this occurs within the context of 
organizational ethics, or integrated ethics (e.g. Next Gen ethics), deliberations and 
decisions,
478
 which are attempts to ensure that ethical decision-making and morality 
diffuse throughout the entire organization.
479
  Actions and behaviors may be the result of 
organizational agency through organizational ethics or catalysts for organizational ethics 
consideration.  Similar to previous discussions about organizational agency, 
organizational ethics programs may consider an issue, but the decision does not result in 
noticeable action.  Organizational agency still occurs – noticeable in considerations and 
deliberations rather than actions and behaviors. 
Similar to clinical ethics or ethics generally, it can be both descriptive and 
prescriptive.
480
  It is descriptive because ethics observes human behavior, attempting to 
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define what behavior is.  An example of descriptive organizational ethics is 
organizational or system ethics audits to ascertain the ethics of behavior and practices 
with some specificity.
481
  It is prescriptive because it posits or recommends certain 
thoughts, behaviors, and omissions as having more or less value than others; ethics 
defines what should be.  Another organizational ethics example, prescriptive this time, is 
expressing the value behind organizational assumptions, policies, strategy (strategic 
planning), and decisions in terms or recommended behaviors and actions.
482
 
The CHA ―Report on a Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation‖ 
provides a series of theological conclusions.  The conclusions serve as a summary of the 
material covered in this section: 
 Institutions are considered to be moral agents, though analogously.  
They decide and act.  They have an obligation to do good and 
avoid evil.  They are held accountable for their decisions and 
actions, and are praised or blamed for what they do.  The moral 
agency of institutions is recognized in civil and canon law, in 
business, and many other fields. 
 The moral manuals assume institutional moral agency, e.g., the 
armed forces, political parties, quasi-religious sects are identified 
as possible wrongdoers.  If institutions can be wrongdoers, they 
can also be ―cooperators‖ in wrongdoing. 
 The moral agency of institutions is recognized in the church‘s 
social teaching on workforce issues, the responsibilities of 
governments and states, and societies themselves.
483
 
 
Furthermore, organizational ethics is one way to exercise organizational moral agency.  
Organizational ethics as a discipline is both equivalent to and disparate from clinical 
ethics, not unlike individual and institutional applications of the principle of cooperation 
– the emphasis of the next section. 
 
II. Differences in Moral Agency when Individuals and Organizations Apply the 
Principle of Cooperation 
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 The previous section interpreted the moral agency of organizations, including the 
use of that agency in organizational ethics considerations typically impacting associates, 
patients, and the community.  A few of the examples above pointed out the similarities or 
congruency between group (organizational) agency and individual (natural person) 
agency as well as organizational ethics and clinical ethics.  Similarities persist between 
organizational and individual applications of the principle of cooperation. 
 Descriptions, comparisons, and contrasts thus far have explained some of the 
dichotomy between individual agency, group agency, clinical ethics, and organizational 
ethics.  Little attention has gone to similarities and differences between individual 
applications of cooperation and organizational (group) applications of cooperation.  
While some uses are analogous, many are disparate on both a theoretical and practical 
level.  The focus of this next section is on the differences in moral agency between 
individuals and organizations while applying cooperation. 
IIA. Cooperation Used with Organizations as Well as Individuals 
 The following is a simple statement, but one worth making: In addition to 
individual uses, organizations may use the principle of cooperation by applying it to 
appropriate organizational situations.
484
  The task force and theological dialogue on the 
principle of cooperation sponsored by CHA stipulated that there was consensus among 
the participants that cooperation applies to institutions.  Some of the noteworthy 
observations included: 
 As moral agents, institutions encounter evil and cooperate with 
evil.  There seems to be no other available principle to assess 
the morality of their actions than the principle of cooperation. 
 The principle of cooperation in the wrongful acts of another 
applies to moral persons (juridic persons) as well as to 
individual ―physical‖ persons. 
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 The fact that the principle has not been widely applied to 
institutions [and corporate entities] until recently is not a 
sufficient reason for saying it cannot apply.  There is not 
adequate basis for saying that it does not apply. 
 Given the evidence in the tradition, it seems that the burden of 
proof for saying that moral principles, both primary and 
secondary, may not be applied by corporate entities in a way 
analogous to their application by an individual falls on those 
who say it may not.
485
 
 
Cooperation is the relevant principle for organizations by default, despite the clarity that 
initial applications of cooperation were for individuals (natural persons).  The 
contemporary emphasis on organizational applications of cooperation speaks to natural 
law and the ever-unfolding revelation of the eternal law.  Humankind learns more about 
itself and God‘s expectations for persons as moral beings with additional uses of 
cooperation. 
 Differences in moral agency prevail between individual and organizational 
applications of the principle of cooperation.
486
  These differences are significant.
487
  As 
described by the CHA task force on cooperation, ―When one applies the principles 
governing cooperation to instances of institutional cooperation, however, there are certain 
characteristics of institutional cooperation that may affect the outcome of the moral 
assessment in significant ways.‖488  To reemphasize a point from above, just because 
there are noteworthy differences does not mean that the principle applies only to 
individuals.  Peter Cataldo explains that the distinction is indicative of the disparity 
between the various types of moral agency – the principle applies to institutional 
agents.
489
  The remainder of this section details some of the relevant differences in 
agency between individual and organizational applications of the principle of 
cooperation. 
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IIB. Greater Possibility of Scandal with Organizations 
 One stipulation is in order before a discussion of organizational cooperation and 
scandal.  Scandal was defined as leading another into evil in the previous chapter under 
the section titled ―Defining Material Cooperation in the Catholic Tradition of Theological 
Ethics.‖  One should interpret scandal in a ―strict theological sense,‖ which is in accord 
with the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) definition (nn. 2284 and 2287) – the 
exact definition provided in chapter two.
490
 
Regarding the moral issue, a greater possibility of scandal exists with 
organizational cooperation when compared to individual cooperation.  This concern is 
intrinsic to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith‘s (CDF‘s) statement about 
sterilization in Catholic hospitals.  The CDF affirms that the principle of cooperation is 
appropriate when considering referrals or partnerships to institutions that will provide 
direct sterilizations.  However, the Catholic organization must take all possible 
precautions to avoid the scandal and hazards created by misunderstandings.
491
  The CHA 
task force studying cooperation concluded that, ―When the principle of cooperation is 
applied to institutions, scandal is a heightened moral concern with regard to Catholic 
hospitals and Catholic hospital affiliations.‖492 
To some, it may seem trivial to explain why scandal is an increased concern with 
institutions.  It is, nevertheless, a necessary task to reduce any misgivings or 
misunderstandings.  This has to do with the types of agency.   
All individual agents may cooperate with someone or something that generates 
scandal.  Depending on the issue, many individual agents (natural persons) have a narrow 
scope vis-à-vis how many people could (or will) regard an action or behavior as 
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scandalous.  Consider the following hypothetical situation.  Your Aunt Gertrude lives in a 
small, Midwestern U.S. town.  She is Catholic and prides herself on being well informed 
about contemporary Church and social justice issues.  One weekend in 2010, Aunt Gertie 
visited close friends in a larger city, which is within a few hours driving distance of 
Gertie‘s home.  Her friends take her to Mass in the larger city‘s cathedral, where Gertie 
hears about the dispute between the bishops, nuns, and CHA regarding the proposed 
health care act in the homily.  The bishop, who delivers the homily, tells parishioners not 
to support legislators who, in turn, support the health care proposal.  While telling this 
story, Aunt Gertie adds, ―I don‘t care what the bishops said – I was at Berkeley in the 60s 
– and I am not afraid of authorities.  So I wrote my senators in support of the act.  The 
bishops are being ridiculous.  Other legitimate organizations find that none of the federal 
funds will go towards abortions. Don‘t they realize that little, no, or unaffordable health 
care kills people, just like abortions?  In fact, some studies find that inadequate or 
unaffordable health care kills more people than abortions.‖  Without discussing 
conscience and faithful dissent, one would have a legitimate argument that Aunt Gertrude 
was scandalous while informing you and others of her opinion that was in opposition to 
the bishops.  Still, Aunt Gertie‘s scope is small.  She scandalizes her family members and 
a few friends within her small town. 
Gertie‘s example, while not trivial, has much less impact than the scandal from 
institutions.  Whether the locales are urban or rural, community members are aware of 
Catholic organizations and their identity.  Scandal is on a different level with cooperation 
such that laypersons – such as associates (employees) of the Catholic organization and 
community members – are unclear, confused, or led into sin.  Generally, the amount and 
 176 
severity of scandal with organizations greatly outweighs the scandal produced by 
individuals when using a benefits and burdens (i.e. consequential, utilitarian) analysis.  
The effect is more profound for more people with organizational scandal.   
There are exceptions.  Some persons have regional, national, or international 
esteem as public figures, celebrities, or authorities.  By analogy, one could make a 
legitimate argument that scandal certain individuals can create is similar, in amount and 
severity, to organizations.  This is not the case with most people, but deserves additional 
consideration for individuals who are high profile. 
IIC. Organizations’ Actions Affect More than a Few People (Greater Scope) 
Discussion about the differences in agency between individual and organizational 
applications of cooperation with the first issue, scandal, also touches upon the second 
issue, scope.  As mentioned above, organizations‘ actions and behaviors affect more than 
a few people.
493
  Their scope of influence is greater than individuals‘ scope. 
Theologian and ethicist Jan Heller explains this influence as it relates to his 
definition and scope of organizational ethics: 
Broadly (and very briefly) construed, organizational ethics is 
concerned with what elsewhere I have called the three domains of 
ethics: conduct, character, and conditions – and these form the 
perspectives of two types of moral agents: the individual and the 
organization.  That is, organizational ethics is concerned with the 
moral conduct of individuals as they are effected by conditions 
established or affected by the organization; with the moral 
character that inclines these same individuals to choose habitually 
in certain ways; and, with the organizational conditions that 
influence the conduct and characters of these individuals.  Further, 
organizational ethics is concerned with the moral agency of the 
organization itself, for individuals in organizations may act jointly 
as a collective moral agent, and as a bounded whole the 
organization can by help morally (and legally) accountable for 
their actions individually and collectively.
494
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Organizations are not only accountable, as Heller explains, for the individual and 
collective actions of their associates (employees); they are also accountable for the 
repercussions and impact on the wider community. 
 Some community impacts are caustic but may be unconscious or latent to the 
organization and its associates.  The Jesuit Thomas Massaro traces the development and 
future of Catholic social teaching in his book Living Justice, where he examines social 
sin as a developing, prominent area of contemporary teaching.  Social sin addresses the 
way groups of people (e.g. institutions, associations, municipalities, governments, nation-
states) perpetuate injustices and inequities, albeit often inadvertently, through destructive 
behavior patterns.  This has been a topic of Catholic social teaching since the 1970s, and 
it often involves actions and behaviors that individuals unintentionally and subtly 
inculcate (i.e. learn) and then transmit (i.e. perpetuate).  The accumulation of these 
behaviors and actions results in an undeniable, manipulative effect on others in society.  
Examples are institutional and social elitism, sexism, ageism, or racism.  Even though, in 
the words of John Paul II, social sin has its foundations in individual sins and evil choices 
(end paraphrase), corporations could do a better job about identifying their contributions 
to institutional and social sins:
495
   
As the quip goes, when we think about sin, most of us imaging the 
bedroom, not the boardroom.  In other words, most of our 
awareness of sin and practice of sacramental confession remains 
squarely focused on the level of our larger-scale involvements in 
social institutions such as corporations.
496
 
 
Discourse about social sin is an attempt to show that groups have greater scope and 
influence more people. 
IID. Decisions Last Longer for Organizations 
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 Person‘s earthly lives and the decisions made during that time tend to be short in 
duration.  An example of this goes back to Aunt Gertie.  Her decision to write her 
senators in favor of the health care proposal has a defined, time-limited duration.  Any 
repercussions are likely to be temporary, as well, for Aunt Gertie – even if an outcome 
lasts for the rest of her life.  Especially likely, the particular circumstances surrounding 
this issue will not be exactly the same in a few years, meaning that the proposal will be 
passed and enacted into law, or debates will still exist, albeit with different variables that 
change the context.  The relevance this has to Aunt Gertie is that, similar to decision-
making capacity, this decision is relevant for this particular issue at this time for her. 
 Princeton Theological Seminary professor Patrick Miller writes about longevity 
with communities, which applies to organizations and associations: 
The community is one that exists in time and space.  It assumes a 
conventional locale, proximate relationships, place to live, and the 
provisions for life.  But the community [discussed in the chapter] is 
not fixed in a particular time and space.  It may be constituted at 
different times and places.  It is assumed that the community 
created by this formal and given definition of the character of its 
life together is a continuing community [emphasis in original].  The 
assumption of that community is tied to [particular] relationships, 
to successive generations, whose instruction in the moral character 
of the community is a prime concern.
497
 
 
Miller describes two divergent types of communities.  One sort has temporal and physical 
anchors, making them sensitive to time and space.  The other sort has no such temporal 
and physical moorings. 
 Debatably, this is true of organizations and associations as communities.  Some 
are time-dated and organized to be so.  For instance, the creation of task force or ad hoc 
workgroup is for discussing and resolving a particular issue.  Task forces and workgroups 
either have a hard stop (i.e. time limit) for considering an issue, or they dissolve when the 
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issue resolves.  In the discipline of clinical ethics, the Veterans Health Administration‘s 
(VA‘s) Integrated Ethics model, disseminated by the VA‘s National Center for Ethics in 
Health Care, promotes ―ad hoc workgroups convened to address specific topics identified 
by the Integrated Ethics Council.‖498  These workgroups may disband after the six-step 
ISSUES approach to quality improvement as others sustain, disseminate, and continue 
improvements.
499
 
 Other organizations and associations do not have such constraints.  Their 
foundation and operation, in most cases, does not include any thought of ending.  In fact, 
the establishment of an organization, and its respective agency, is to survive as long as 
possible into the foreseeable future.  Numerous examples exist of corporations that 
survive well beyond the lifetimes of their founders – Ford Motor Company (1913 start of 
mass production),
500
 Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Limited (1904 as C.S. Rolls & Co.),
501
 
Macy‘s, Inc. (1929 was the union of Abraham & Straus and Filene‘s to form Federated 
Department Stores, Inc.),
502
 Boeing (1916 as Pacific Aero Products Co.),
503
 and Proctor 
& Gamble (1837).
504
   
 The question remains, despite hints in the descriptions above, as to what group of 
organizations health care, or Catholic health care more specifically, belong.  Without 
question, they are part of the second group that transcend time and place.  Referring to 
Miller‘s distinction, Catholic health care is a community of committed, knowledgeable, 
and skilled persons in health care delivery, all with specific trades, skill sets, or 
backgrounds (i.e. clinicians, finance, admissions, administration, etc.); it has and 
continues to function through successive generations, transcending both time and 
physical locations (refer to the history of Catholic health care in chapter one); and it 
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maintains a commitment to its Catholic identity, organizational mission and core values, 
as well as a continuing prophetic and healing witness of Jesus Christ. 
 Such is the same with the decisions of organizations.  ―Institutional decisions may 
perdure longer than those of individuals.‖505  It appears that the reasoning behind this 
claim is because organizations‘ decisions typically impact more than one individual and, 
in some cases, they involve other organizations resulting in a marked impact on 
stakeholders such as associates and the community.  Bear in mind that an organization‘s 
cooperation may entail situations that are continuing, episodic, or contractual.
506
  Any 
kind of these decisions has the ability to affect groups of people. 
IIE. Less Organizational Capability to Create Moral Distance from Injustices or Evil  
The descriptor ―moral distance‖ portrays how close the cooperator is to the 
primary agent, who is the person committing the sin, injustice, or malfeasance.  An 
example is the bank manager who, under gunpoint, enters the code or combination to the 
safe so thieves can steal gold bullion.  In contrast, the used car salesperson who sold a 
deluxe, high-speed, sports car to the robbers – not knowing their intent nor what they 
would use it for – is in a different position than the bank manager.  The car salesperson 
has more moral distance, being further removed, from the moral evil than the bank 
manager.  In terms of cooperation, the bank manager is in immediate material 
cooperation under duress, which is a mitigating factor; while the used car salesperson is 
in remote, mediate material cooperation.  Per the cooperation matrix, there is more 
culpability in a cooperator‘s behavior if that cooperative agent is closer to or intends the 
wrongdoing. 
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 An individual (natural person) who cooperates often has a certain amount of 
elasticity in the creation of moral distance from the wrongdoing.  Using an oft-cited 
example from the moral manuals,
507
 consider the Catholic nurse whom a superior 
schedules to assist in an illicit procedure.  The nurse typically assists in any number of 
ways such as preparation and handing instruments.  This person has a few options to 
register or display disapproval with the request after communicating dissatisfaction so 
others know why the nurse objects:  He or she may request a schedule change to assist to 
in a licit procedure; refuse to participate under grounds of conscientious objection; 
continue to participate but only in nonessential (i.e. mediate material cooperation) after 
appealing for assistance with the theological analysis; resign and hopefully take a 
comparable, different position.  The presence of duress changes conditions somewhat.
508
  
Even so, the example goes to show the range of options that, typically, are readily and 
rapidly available for individuals, allowing most persons flexibility to move away from 
the evil, injustice, or malfeasance. 
 Institutions do not have the flexibility of individuals in order to move further 
away from the evil, injustice, or malfeasance.
509
  Consider the hypothetical example from 
chapter one with the regional, Catholic system, St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH), 
which signed a letter of intent (LOI) to form a partnership with a small, accountable 
health care network, St. Bernardine of Siena Wellness System (SBW), formerly owned 
by a Protestant denomination and now owned and operated by a secular company.  (The 
story changes somewhat from the previous example to assist this one.)  The period of due 
diligence after LOI signing did not reveal anything unusual from either organization.  
However, after the SFH and SBW integrate, sharing associates and resources, they notice 
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many issues (the ones mentioned in chapter one) – in SBW, people who are more affluent 
receive better service, there is a developing PGD program that was not disclosed in due 
diligence, selective reduction services continue despite wishes from SFH to the contrary, 
and the practice exists of patient ‗cherry-picking‘ and ‗dumping‘ in order to self-select 
healthier patients.  The reaction of the administrators (i.e. ―we are too far along now to 
make such changes‖ and ―this deal needs to go through‖) is indicative of the difficulty 
organizations have in creating moral distance. 
 Changing culture and practices for individuals is similar to driving a speedboat; 
they are light, sleek, and agile, quickly changing to most variances in the water.  Altering 
institutional culture is more like steering a cruise ship or ocean liner; it takes much more 
time to alter course when compared with the speedboat.  The rudder in the cruise liner is 
more sluggish than the speedboat, representing the difficulty involved in transforming 
culture, systemic changes, and even the time needed to amend or resolve previous 
agreements. 
IIF. Greater Responsibility for Organizations to Prevent Irreparable Harms 
 At this point, this section established scandal is an elevated moral concern, scope 
is greater, influence of others is wider, decisions last longer, and there is less flexibility to 
create moral distance exists with organizations.  Part of organizational agency involves 
being accountable for official messages (e.g. press releases, internet, advertising, internal 
policies) and unofficial messages (e.g. postings on social media, publicly available data, 
community benefit ministry, national recognition such as rankings, awards, accolades, 
and scandals).  This means individuals working for the institution transmit organizational 
agency even when not intending to do so.  The result of all these factors is an increasing 
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accountability and conscientiousness for organizations when contrasted with 
individuals.
510
 
 The above claim depends on awareness of some associates (employees) in 
organizations and making others aware.  In an article about whistle-blowing, the author 
comments on other conditions shaping individual and organizational agency: 
…We must recognize that ethics education often proceeds from the 
assumption that individuals make decisions with far more 
information, power and freedom than actually exists.  Individual 
actors are immersed within a web of other demands and 
responsibilities, ranging from the personal to the civic…As 
organizations becomes more complex, powerful and multi-agent, 
the potential for harm to society grows.  This makes necessary a 
sense of responsibility that exceeds the scope of any particular 
organization.
511
 
 
Those in bioethics know well the radical autonomy and self-sufficiency – as well as the 
pervasiveness – of the individual over community in U.S. society.  Even ethics theories 
such as Englehardt‘s libertarianism, which promote the maximization of individual 
liberty through minimal societal or communal interventions, also concede a certain 
amount of tension between respecting persons and accomplishing good, based on moral 
communities.
512
  The passage above not only reflects this tension, but the idea that 
individuals assume liberties in the ‗name‘ of respect for autonomy more so than truly 
exists in a complex, interconnected web of relationships.  A logical inference is that 
organizational agents inherit the tyranny of autonomy and collective apathy of their 
individual agents.  As Susan Dorr Goold explains, organizations are ―the dominant actors 
in health care,‖513 and when taken in tandem with the previous statement, which (to use 
an analogy) is similar to two trains leaving the same station in opposite directions.  On 
one hand, the ‗voice‘ of health care organizations is the prevailing one.  On the other 
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hand, the individual voices may have their bases in an overdeveloped sense of freedom as 
well as a certain amount of apathy. 
 Conceivably the analogy of two trains leaving the same station in opposite 
directions is not as appropriate as two trains heading on a collision course for each other 
after leaving different stations (similar to the old story problem of two stations 240 miles 
apart where train A leaves the west station headed east at 70 m.p.h. and, at the same time, 
train B leaves the east station headed west at 90…).  A number of recent, case-based 
situations seem to support non-empirical claim that the latter analogy is more apposite 
than the former.  Recent scandals including the collapse of Enron may be the product of 
fostering unchecked ambition and breaking rules,
514
 twisting or suspending ethics 
guidelines (e.g. conflict of interest policies),
515
 ignoring and terminating 
whistleblowers,
516
 inattention or disregard on the part of industry watchdogs,
517
 self-
imposed rapid associate attrition (i.e. quickly and automatically terminating the ‗bottom‘ 
or low performing 50% associates in the workforce within a year),
518
 and top executives 
hiring friends into other high-level executive positions.
519
  Societal and organizational 
methods for troubleshooting these situations include encouraging that good-faith 
complaints and worries are brought to the attention of others in the company,
520
 crafting 
new legislation and higher fines for conduct breaches,
521
 acknowledging the respecting 
the immense accountability of organizational leaders (i.e. the shadow cast by leaders),
522
 
giving multiple stakeholders greater decisional and corporate control,
523
 and codes of 
ethics, policies, procedures, and statements that articulate reasonable constraints on 
autonomy (autonomy does not mean at will liberty).
524
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 Enron was neither the first nor the last in a long line of unethical organizational 
conduct: Some of the recent companies charged with fraudulent financial reporting 
include Sunbeam ($60 million, 1996-1997), Xerox ($1.5 billion, 1997-2000), Adelphia 
Communications ($3.1 billion, 2001), Waste Management ($1.7 billion, 2002), 
WorldCom / MCI ($3.8 billion & $400 million, 2002), Tyco ($600 million, 2002), and 
Healthsouth ($4.2 billion, 2003).
525
  Further charges of irregularities include Adelphia 
Communications for theft of assets (2001), Anderson for obstruction of justice (2002), 
Tyco for theft of assets and unauthorized loans to management (2002), Imclone Systems, 
Inc. for insider trading and perjury as well as obstruction of justice (2002), Parmalat for 
looting the company (2003), and Ahold NV for management fraud (2003).
526
 
 Someone may observe that the preceding statements have their bases in a claim, 
namely that these corporate scandals and federal charges indicate that the corporations 
were unethical.  Stated differently, the above statements misuse the is/ought distinction 
by inferring moral impropriety with scandal and judicial charges.  While such a remark 
has legitimacy, scholars react to these scandals by addressing the organizations‘ moral 
culpability rather than exonerating their morality, as if separate and additional evidence 
was required to demonstrate moral culpability.
527
 
 Various reasons accompany the response pertaining to the morality of these 
organizational agents, as illustrated by scholars.  First, regarding the is/ought distinction, 
organizational agents may have gotten themselves into trouble because they used the 
same assumption for different conclusions.  Assuming no overlap between the legal and 
moral, an organization that is operating with disregard for ethics ought not to have this 
affect their legal adherence.  Assuming total congruence between the legal and moral, 
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immorality is contextual (i.e. the law is casuistic or case-based and nuances differences 
between organizations) and ought to respond only in the most egregious cases.  That is, 
the knowledge that everyone bends the rules a bit and the watchdogs rarely call any 
organization to task is (or was) the situation.  To behave by bending the rules as much as 
possible because this is the practice infers what ought to be the norm.  While morality 
and legalism are not synonymous, it is reasonable to assume there is overlap between 
laws and moral behavior.
528
  People craft and pass laws that are reflective of national or 
state values, which change as persons‘ sense of morality changes over time.529  The law 
relates to morality because it supplies a path or course for reflective ethical decisions.  
For example, the law reflects the most serious issues and concerns for society.  Legal 
foundations, reasoning, precedence, and value of impartial judgment also evidence in 
morality; thus, legal analysis (process), judgment, and justification are similar to moral 
analysis, judgment, and justification.
530
  A reflective business approach recognizes the 
letter and the spirit of the law.
531
  It also may catalyze internal discussions about the 
extent of the overlap between legal and ethical behavior with organizations in every 
instance.  One cannot assume that acting within the bounds of the law is also ethical 
behavior in this situation.  In other words, deliberating about the legal and the ethical is a 
method to become more reflective about what moralists call the is/ought distinction. 
Second, in each case mentioned above, the infractions mentioned were not the 
result of only one behavior.  Consider that ―the types of fraud were pervasive, extended 
over years rather than single episodes, and involved very large sums of money.‖532  
Behaviors were repeated numerous times with various individual agents. 
 187 
Behaving morally, third, is akin to aircraft safety checks for quality reasons in the 
era before regulatory mandates, or beginning checklists in industries or processes that do 
not have or mandate them.  Prolific author and physician Atul Gawande relates a 
conversation with a business leader and investor about, generally, using checklists as a 
means to catalyze thoughtful reflection and, specifically, considering the utility of 
checklists with Enron.  This investor states, ―‗This is basic basic basic.  Just look!  You‘d 
be amazed by how many people don‘t do it [i.e. do not use checklists or a reflective 
decision-making process]. [In reference to Enron,] People could have figured out it was a 
disaster entirely from the financial statements.‘‖533  Thoughtful employment of a 
checklist exhibits concern for quality above and beyond the letter of the law as well as 
disciplined attention to mundane processes for the good of others.
534
  It is also an 
opportunity to ensure that an organization‘s mission and values infuse all levels of 
decision-making.  An organization demonstrates moral literacy when it identifies and 
attends to situations and prospective ethical issues before any legal ramifications; that is, 
good ethics precedes legal compliance.
535
  The justification is that responsible, 
accountable, ethical behavior will prevent the failures described above.
536
  Similar to an 
iceberg, it is the organization‘s public face that is the visible part of the iceberg above the 
water‘s surface.  This observable portion of an iceberg is only a fraction of its total 
volume.  The iceberg‘s majority, which is underwater, is comparable to the 
organization‘s culture and behaviors.  Insufficient attention to moral behaviors is 
comparable to the iceberg becoming bigger.  Damage may result from any piece of the 
iceberg, public or hidden.  In fact, the hidden portion may be even more dangerous 
because it remains unseen by the outside. 
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Continuing the metaphoric iceberg, one may ask what the issue is with an iceberg 
becoming bigger.  Maybe it runs an increased risk of bumping into other icebergs.  It is 
possible that the greater volume will distribute evenly.  Then again, it may not.  A 
company may be lucky if the extra volume is below the surface and remains largely 
unnoticed by society.  Unlucky companies may have the added size above the water, 
meaning that practices have been exposed to the public. 
All of the imagery so far ignores the proverbial elephant in the room – society, 
which passes by as numerous freighters just trying to reach their destinations.  Without 
fail, every organization serves four different groups of stakeholders, namely customers, 
employees, owners, and the community.
537
  In Catholic health care, we may term the 
groups as patients, associates, public juridic persons and founding religious communities, 
and community.  The U.S. Senate report examining the Enron failure spoke of 
organizations‘ fiduciary duty, which goes beyond narrow self-interest.  U.S. Courts 
acknowledge the fiduciary obligation categories of obedience, loyalty, and due care.
538
  
Fiduciary obligations to the company include all of the stakeholder groups above.  ―It is 
hard to believe that popular (and accepted) thinking has become individualized and jaded 
to the point of only ‗what‘s in it for me‘ is the thing that counts most.‖539  Arguably, 
employment itself is what links the individual to the fiduciary obligations of the 
organization. 
By extension, organizations have a greater responsibility than individuals for 
preventing irreparable harms.
540
  The reasoning and examples above serve to prove the 
point about the amount of harm that organizations may create, and their accountability to 
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avoid them.  President George W. Bush took measure of the harm created by corporate 
scandals and deceptions: 
[These] high-profile acts of deception have shaken people‘s trust.  
Too many corporations seem disconnected from the values of our 
country.  These scandals have hurt the reputations of many good 
and honest companies.  They have hurt the stock market.  And 
worst of all, they are hurting millions of people who depend on the 
integrity of businesses for their livelihood and their retirement, for 
their peace of mind and their financial well-being.
541
 
 
President Bush‘s statement is both prophetic and ironic given that he was addressing the 
corporate scandals early in decade that began in 2001.  It was made before the ‗bursting 
of the housing bubble‘ later in the decade that brought down mortgage and other lending 
companies, such as Freddie Mac and Fannie May, because of immoral lending practices 
tantamount to usury.  The subsequent financial recession has brought down many more 
organizations, including ones that operate ethically and justly.  Inattention to the 
prevention of irreparable harms is cataclysmic. 
IIG. Defining Who Is On the Team (Moral Agent) 
 With individuals, it is obvious who the moral agents are in most situations that 
apply cooperation.  For instance, it is the obstetrics (OB) physician who consults the 
patient who requests an elective sterilization stating, ―I am done having kids; my family 
is big enough.‖  The OB physician performs the surgical procedure and, throughout the 
procedure, a nurse hands instruments to the physician.  Obviously, the physician is a 
moral agent as well as nurse.  Using the cooperation terminology established before, the 
physician is the agent and the nurse is the cooperator. 
In organizations and communities, social dynamics, roles, and relationships make 
the accountability with organizational agency more complex.  Consider the Enron 
 190 
debacle for an initial example.  It was clear early in the scandal‘s fallout that Enron‘s 
leaders, including Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, were responsible for initiating and 
commissioning counter-cultural climate as well as approving specific decisions to ignore 
warnings, push boundaries, and foster an unrestrained, aggressive culture.
542
  The 
question that investigators are still trying to process is how much others, such as ―Lay‘s 
Lieutenants,‖543 had to do with each specific decision including cooking the books.  A 
lieutenant whom the media credits often with being the Enron whistleblower (Time 
Magazine chose her as person of the year in 2002) is Sherron Watkins, Vice President for 
Corporate Development.  Watkins submitted an anonymous comment about financial 
mismanagement to a comments and suggestions box after leadership prompted associates 
to do so.  She met with Kenneth Lay three times when her comment was not addressed 
(Lay did not have a response), and submitted an unsigned memo where she encouraged 
Enron to silently rectify concerns.  Watkins did not notify anyone about the distressing 
practices outside of Enron.
544
  Despite the press attention, her individual culpability for 
Enron‘s organizational agency is dubious. 
At least two expansive categories of responses about individuals and 
organizational moral agency generally, counting the Enron example specifically.  One 
approach is that the entire organization is responsible.  With respect to Enron, this means 
that Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Sherron Watkins, entry-level associates, as well as all 
other associates bear the same accountability and responsibility for Enron‘s misguided 
organizational agency.  The other approach is incongruent with the first approach.  If 
anything, Watkins exemplifies that not everyone has the same level of accountability for 
immoral organizational agency.  At least she made some attempts to bring awareness to 
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disturbing practices in the corporation.  She could have made more of an effort, but hers 
illustrated that almost all her colleagues made less of an effort.  With this perspective, 
Watkins should be less culpable than Lay or Skilling, less culpable than Enron associates 
who knew about the immoral practices and did nothing about it, but more culpable than 
associates who did not have the slightest clue about the practices. 
A similar issue garnered the world‘s attention in 2011 when the Murdoch 
publication News of the World shut its doors due to phone hacking allegations.  The 
allegation, with substantial evidence and indictments, is that wires of politicians and 
authorities were tapped.  Accusations of payments to Scotland Yard in attempts to bribe 
the justice system also subsist.  Rupert and James Murdoch appeared before the British 
Parliament‘s House of Commons to answer questions regarding the phone hacking and 
payments.
545
  Parliament is attempting to ascertain the level of involvement of others in 
the organization.  Questions of interest may include who approved, sanctioned, protected, 
covered-up, created, supervised, participated, or ignored the immoral actions as well as 
who knew about it and who did not.  In other words, people are interested in who the 
agents and cooperators were. 
To suggest that all individuals in the Murdoch empire or The World, which is less 
than 1% of the Murdoch empire, are equally accountable for the phone hacking and 
payments is preposterous.  It is probable that many individuals within organizations with 
suspect or dubious agency know about the organizations‘ immoralities and injustices.  
Certain individuals in organizations have less involvement in organizational agency at 
any given moment and situation.  Within organizational agents, there is a cascading 
culpability, or accountability, for every decision.  In this way, a visual representation of 
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accountability and responsibility within organizations looks more like a patchwork quilt 
or mosaic than a solid color.  Persons accept the work or piece in its entirety, which is 
comparable to the culpability of an organizational agent; still, in that piece, there are 
variances of color and patterns that render the whole as a montage or medley, making it 
anything but homogeneous and uniform. 
Patrick Miller, mentioned previously, speaks about the constitution of a moral 
community.  They center on relationships, lives lived together, and conduct between 
members.  Their moral character is intrinsic, a component of their being as communities.  
Individual membership in moral communities does not only depend on official 
acceptance in the group but the eagerness and capacity to be moral.  Other community 
attributes the incorporation of time and space (even though communities may continue 
over generations), voluntary associations, sanctioning and rationalities, commitment to 
ideals and ideologies, human ambitions and desires, orders and liberties (freedoms), 
memories and experiences, inclusive and exclusive behavior (communities have 
relationships, memberships, and reject ‗the other‘ or others).546  Sub-communities also 
enter the consideration of larger communities.   
All of these factors mean that organizations assessing past or future opportunities 
to cooperate require more energy in defining their own moral agency and cooperation 
than individuals.  Cooperation can be episodic, continuing, or contractual.
547
  
Organizational consideration of the culpability or accountability of particular, individual 
agents for the organizational agency necessitates intentional consideration about which 
sub-communities, committees, and teams were involved most with any particular moral 
behavior, decision, or repercussion.  Going back to the image of the community quilt or 
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mosaic, this is akin to finding out who is responsible for the patches or tiles of the 
dominant color in the art, assuming that various people contributed to begin with. 
This section summarized the differences in moral agency when individuals and 
organizations apply the principle of cooperation.  The differences include the greater 
possibility of scandal, broader affect of decisions (i.e. they impact more people, have 
greater scope, etc.), longer lasing decisions (i.e. duration of decisions is longer), greater 
responsibility to prevent irreparable harms, increased intentionally and effort defining 
who is on the team in any given situation, and less capability to create moral distance 
from injustices and evil with organizational agents when compared to individual agents.  
One other notable difference between individual and organizational agency has so many 
facets that it is the predominant focus of the next section. 
 
III. The Moral Agency of Health Care Organizations Applying the Principle of 
Cooperation 
 
IIIA. The Kinds of Issues Weighed are Dissimilar between Individuals and Organizations 
The other, extensive distinction in moral agency between individual and 
organizational agents applying the principle of cooperation is that the kinds of issues 
considered are dissimilar.  A few of the individual applications of cooperation covered in 
the last chapter consist of assisting in a morally illicit procedure (e.g. pregnancy 
termination, direct sterilization), genetic counseling, using stem cell lines from research 
involving aborted fetuses, prescribing and distributing contraceptives (e.g. birth control, 
condoms), prescribing and distributing erectile dysfunction substances, and voting for 
health care legislation that, especially, involves morally grave procedures such as 
pregnancy termination.  This final segment in the chapter details the exercise of 
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organizational agency with applications of cooperation typical for health care 
organizations and groups. 
At hand are some differences in the exploration process of individual and 
organizational applications of cooperation between the former chapter and this one.  
Chapter two attended to a thorough explanation of the topic, the relevance of cooperation, 
and the variety of different ways to apply cooperation.  This segment and chapter will not 
explain the topics in the same way as the last, precisely because this groundwork was 
covered before.  To be perfectly clear, the applications of cooperation between 
organizations and individuals are different even though some of the moral evils and 
injustices are same.  The moral evils and injustices were covered in the last chapter, so 
this segment about organizational applications of cooperation is significantly shorter than 
the last chapter section about individual applications of cooperation. 
To recap, health care organizations act as moral agents when they apply the 
principle of cooperation to the different types of issues mentioned above.  This is explicit 
in some literature and implicit in other literature.
548
  The following are some common 
examples of institutional uses of cooperation. 
IIIB. Sponsoring, Allowing, or Initiating Groups, Messages, and Initiatives with 
Controversial Content 
 
As the subtitle indicates, the sponsorship, permission, or initiation of groups, 
messages, or initiatives with content controversial to Catholic Church teaching is an 
expansive topic.  One such topic is about how a Catholic health care organization treats 
those patients who have tried to commit suicide.  The Catholic Church‘s stance on 
suicide was one of the few moral evils not discussed in the previous chapter.  It specifies 
the following the Catechism of the Catholic Church: 
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Everyone is response for his life before God who has given it to 
him.  It is God who remains the sovereign Master of life.  We are 
obligated to accept life gratefully and preserve it for his honor and 
the salvation of our souls.  We are stewards, not owners, of the life 
God has entrusted us.  It is not ours to dispose of.  Suicide 
contradicts the natural inclination of the human being to preserve 
and perpetuate his life.  It is gravely contrary to the just love of 
self.  It likewise offends love of neighbor because it unjustly 
breaks the ties of solidarity with family, nation, and other human 
societies to which we continue to have obligations.  Suicide is 
contrary to love for the living God.
549
 
 
Theologian David Kelly writes about suicide in at least two of his books.  Suicide is a 
pillar of consensus between law, secular society and its morality, and the Catholic 
Church.  This is the reason that state identifies an interest in preserving life – life has 
value even though a person may rebuff that value.
550
 
 Knowing this, it becomes easier to understand why Catholic health care 
organizations could use the principle of cooperation in instances of treating individuals 
whom unsuccessfully try to commit suicide.  The Ethics Department in Catholic Health 
East reviews a scenario where clinicians treat an 82-year-old patient with COPD after a 
failed suicide attempt.  According to cooperation, the organization needs to exercise its 
agency by making it clear that their intentions and actions are different from the 
patient‘s.551 
 Richard McCormick writes about a different situation he became involved in 
regarding a proposed student group at Georgetown University.  In this case, the issue 
involving cooperation pertained to a decision about not allowing a gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual group to be recognized as an official student organization of Georgetown 
University.  This situation exemplified the need to walk a fine line between respecting 
Church teachings about homosexual acts (i.e. sex between two men, sex between two 
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women) and avoiding unjust discrimination in all forms, which is also in Church 
teaching:
552
 
[Men and women with homosexual tendencies] must be accepted 
with respect, compassion, and sensitivity.  Every sign of unjust 
discrimination in their regard should be avoided.  These persons 
are called to fulfill God‘s will in their lives and, if they are 
Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the Lord‘s Cross the 
difficulties they may encounter from their condition.
553
 
 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, before becoming Pope Benedict XVI, was all too aware of 
this dichotomy and the tension, or moral distress, created by balancing these interests in 
his ―Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual 
Persons (1986).‖554   
Catholic health care organizations also must weigh factors including their 
response to homosexual associates and patients.  One tool available for Catholic 
organizations considering actions such as ‗plus one‘ insurance coverage or 
organizationally affiliated groups is cooperation.  The reference point is always the 
‗homosexual act‘ and how the cooperative act relates to it.  For instance, group agents 
may use the framework of cooperation questions to ascertain the cooperation level 
presented by CHA: Does the organization intend homosexual intercourse by providing 
‗plus one‘ coverage?  Does ‗plus one‘ insurance coverage somehow support or contribute 
to homosexual intercourse?  Is the act of ‗plus one‘ coverage closely related to gay 
sex?
555
 
Christianity and Catholicism have always been countercultural, and the issue of 
conscience clause protections is another that connects organizational support with a 
controversial message.  In Health Progress, law professor Lynn Wardle wrote that 
pressure on rights of conscience would increase in three different ways.  Medical schools 
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that do not offer ‗opportunities‘ to participate in certain procedures (i.e. ones contrary to 
Catholic teaching) are less attractive to competitive medical school candidates.  The 
demands of aging populations place increased pressures on health systems, which could 
truncate conscience protections in lieu of the system‘s ‗necessities.‘  Plans for health care 
reform threaten to change the few provisions for conscience protection in federal law, and 
state protections are lacking with challenging case law that diminishes the significance of 
legislated conscience protections.
556
  Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), women‘s groups, and abortion-right activist groups are progressively more 
challenging, citing ideological differences to conscience protections.
557
  
Ordinarily, rights to conscience seem like an issue for individuals and, indeed, 
opting out because of moral or religious beliefs is the decision of a natural person.  It is 
for this reason alone that Catholic health care organizations ‗have a horse in the race.‘  
Religious institutions have used their option to ―‗opt out‘ of public policy in conflict with 
their religious beliefs.‖558  Individuals know this and count on the organizational agency 
of their workplace to protect their consciences and advocate larger communities, such as 
the government, to follow suit.  Conscience clauses provide exemptions for in vitro 
fertilization and other assisted reproductive technologies, contraception, sterilization, and 
abortion.
559
   
Ultimately, all of these dynamics are indicative of the rift between the Church and 
secular society.
560
  On one side of the chasm are the Church and its longstanding support 
of conscience, even to the extent that conscience leads one to faithful dissent from 
noninfallible Church teaching.
561
  A conscience motivated by truth has priority over 
groups and their consensus, accommodations, demands and power as well as personal 
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preferences and tastes.
562
  On the other side of the rift are secularist groups and U.S. 
society-at-large that label conscience clauses as ―refusal clauses.‖563  To an extent, part of 
the secular perspective is the regard for religion as a routine or way of life and nothing 
more.  The predominant component of the secular view is the individual rights 
perspective, which they believe entitles U.S. citizens to positive liberties in addition to 
negative liberties – people have a right to reasonable services and goods whenever and 
wherever they request it.
564
  So the seemingly incommensurate sides with their own 
versions of the summa bonum reside with their tensions suspended across the rift. 
The application of cooperation to organizational conscience rights and conscience 
protection may not be evident.  In a manner of speaking, this is an issue about not using 
cooperation.  Following the trends of diminishing secular conscience protection means 
that, at some point, Catholic health care organizations may have to apply cooperation to 
their inability to opt out of procedures such as sterilizations and abortions for reasons of 
conscience.  To do so (i.e. opting out) would threaten the ministry itself and its 
continuing witness within the U.S.  Stated differently, exercising organizational 
conscience by opting out could be a catalyst for applying the principle of cooperation in 
the future. 
Consider a more immediate application of cooperation as a function of 
organizational agency with conscience protections.  Institutions need to consider their 
own internal messaging with respect to conscience protections.  Responding to other 
messages, preparing press releases, and talking points for frequently asked questions, for 
both internal and external stakeholders, all may be opportunities to employ cooperation.  
Cooperating with groups such as the ACLU, especially given its messaging, are also 
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occasions to apply the principle of cooperation.  Organizational cooperation with groups 
is the focal topic in two of the following subsections, including the next one. 
IIIC. Philanthropic Donations 
 Catholic institutions respond to Christ‘s commitment to charity as a part of their 
identity, as exemplified through generous and extensive efforts to eliminate social ills and 
injustices such as poverty and disease.  Acting charitably and for the love of one‘s 
neighbor necessitates partnerships or charitable recipients who do not share a 
commitment to Catholic identity, teaching, and values.  Occasionally, there are instances 
when donations and activities with associations and organizations conflict with Catholic 
teaching.
565
  For this reason, another burgeoning context that has received increased 
attention in the past ten years is philanthropic organizations‘ use of Catholic donations 
for purposes understood as sinful to the Catholic Church. 
It is not necessary to cover the breadth of moral evils and injustices that external 
organizations use with charitable donations.  A few examples should be adequate.  
Ethicist John Brehany writes about the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF): 
[O]ne of the most successful [health and medical charities – 
JDRF], not only publicly endorsed research involving human 
embryonic stem cells, but dedicated millions of donated dollars to 
fund it.  Moreover, JDRF engages in political advocacy to promote 
such research, donating over $1 million to a California initiative to 
provide state funds for human embryonic stem cell 
research…JDRF contributes approximately $10% of its research 
budget to stem cell research (over $10 million in FY 2005), with 
the vast majority of such grants funding human embryonic stem 
cell research.
566
 
 
March of Dimes (MoD), a medical or health charity, has addressed birth defects and 
infant health for over 50 years.  Starting in the 1970s, MoD promoted abortion after 
positive tests for birth defects, followed by legalized abortion and selective reduction 
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support in the 1990s, and public endorsement of human embryonic stem cell research 
even more recently.
567
  Other philanthropic organizations supporting or endorsing stem 
cell research include the American Diabetes Association and the American Cancer 
Society.
568
 
 Another philanthropic organization under scrutiny is Susan G. Komen for the 
Cure, which was established in 1982 and has dedicated itself to early detection of breast 
cancer, fund treatment and prevention, advocacy at all levels (i.e. local, state, and 
national), as well as encouragement and aid for women grappling with breast cancer.  The 
alleged immorality on the part of Susan G. Komen is an affiliation through grant awards 
to Planned Parenthood.  Specifically, Komen awarded 21 grants to Planned Parenthood 
chapters for a total of $475,000 (1.24 percent) out of $38.4 million donated in 2003.  
More recently, it conferred 19 grants for a total of $375,840 (0.54 percent) out of $69.6 
million given in one year.
569
  Planned Parenthood has ties to abortion clinics.
570
  The 
result is similar to giving money to a friend who used some of the money to buy gas to 
encourage another to get an abortion.  The general description above is not the full story 
regarding Komen and Planned Parenthood.  Komen awards two different kinds of grants, 
and one applies to the kind given to Planned Parenthood.  Yet, grants petitioned to 
Komen are restricted, meaning that the affiliate petitioning the grant uses the funding in 
accord with the terms of the grant.  ―All the Planned Parenthood grant proposals that are 
funded are concerned with breast health education and screening, or with the prevention 
and treatment of breast cancer.‖571  These grants often serve underserved and low-income 
women.
572
  To reiterate, none of the funding goes to moral evils; at most, it goes to a 
secondary source that, under different circumstances, advocates abortion to different 
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patients ‗under the same roof.‘  Suggesting the withdrawal of Catholic funding for these 
reasons is somewhat akin to boycotting your physician‘s office because a different 
physician in the practice referred your friend to an abortion clinic after disclosing she was 
pregnant from an affair.  This boycott makes sense to some, but seems an overreaction, 
and a bit drastic, for others. 
 The University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame) is an example of a Catholic 
institution that maintains a periodic review of charitable giving and philanthropic 
donations.  Notre Dame may require affiliates to provide written assurance of how they 
use the funds.  It has the right to withhold funds from future endeavors if it finds 
inappropriate uses of funds.  Notre Dame also provides a guideline of seven questions to 
guide those considering institutional donations.
573
 
 In a fashion similar to Notre Dame, ethicists Ron Hamel and Michael Panicola 
suggest answering eight sets of questions for Catholic health care organizations to assess 
wrongdoing: 
1. Does the philanthropic organization (PO) openly and publicly 
promote or advocate for the wrongdoing?  If so, does the PO‘s 
activity constitute a central part of its mission and does it 
dedicate a considerable amount of resources toward this end? 
2. Does the PO provide support to another engaged in 
wrongdoing? 
3. Does the PO‘s support contribute in essential ways to another‘s 
ability to carry out the wrongdoing? 
4. Does the PO‘s support contribute in non-essential ways to 
another‘s ability to carry out the wrongdoing? 
5. Does the Catholic health care organization‘s (CHCO‘s) support 
contribute in essential ways to a PO that promotes wrongdoing 
and/or supports the wrongdoing carried out by another? (Note: 
if the PO is not engaged in this type of activity or relationship, 
then the CHCO‘s support is not problematic.) 
6. Does the CHCO‘s support contribute in non-essential ways to a 
PO that promotes wrongdoing and/or supports the wrongdoing 
carried out by another? (Note: if the PO is not engaged in this 
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type of activity or relationship, then the CHCO‘s support is not 
problematic.) 
7. Does the CHCO‘s support of the PO lead to scandal? 
8. Is there a proportionate reason for the CHCO‘s support of the 
PO?
574
 
 
Note that the questions not only assess the level of cooperation with the Catholic health 
care organization but the philanthropic organization‘s involvement in wrongdoing. 
 Using their proposed scheme, Hamel and Panicola find that the intent of Komen 
in working with Planned Parenthood is to provide breast health screening for underserved 
women; Komen has not taken a public stance regarding abortions; and Komen does not 
provide anything essential to the procurement of abortions.  At most, Komen is in remote, 
mediate material cooperation with Planned Parenthood.  The Catholic organization‘s 
moral object is sponsoring a team to run in Komen‘s race for the cure, which is 
indifferent; there is no intent for wrongdoing on the part of the Catholic organization; the 
organization does not have any link to the wrongdoing; and there is little chance for 
scandal.
575
  Thus, a Catholic organization‘s funding to Susan G. Komen is permissible 
given the listed conditions. 
IIID. Research Participation (Stem Cell and Birth Control Protocols) 
 Organizational agents are accountable for the variety of issues that arise in 
research, as discussed in the previous chapter.  Rather than recounting detail, it is 
sufficient to give some examples, while referring to chapter two for the detail.  At least 
two general contexts exist pertaining to cooperation with research.   
First, involves the moral evil of partnering with research using stem cells or 
therapies derived from immoral procedures.  When drafting or revising research policies, 
a Catholic institution must take into account the involvement of the research sponsor as 
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well as the sponsor‘s request of participating institutions.  Clearly, a moral distinction 
exists between using adult stem cells that do not result in death, and the use of fetal or 
embryonic stem cells, which result in the destruction of the fetus or embryo.  A careful 
way of applying cooperation is to not allow any partnerships with research institutions 
sponsoring, suggesting, or participating in embryonic stem cell research.
576
  This is the 
view offered by the Pontifical Academy for Life about a Catholic organization obtaining 
embryonic stem cells offered by other researchers – it is not morally acceptable.577  The 
research issue, however, is not only about the research itself.  It is about the therapies that 
result from the research.   
The most accurate, albeit being nondirective, summary about Catholic 
organizations and stem cell research derived therapies is from Albert Moraczewski, 
―Arguments may be made on both sides of the question as to whether or not research and 
therapies that do not require any further destruction of human embryos constitute 
immoral cooperation of scandal.‖578  This is a thorny predicament for Catholic health 
care.
579
  On the one hand, some things seem clearly inappropriate as formal or immediate 
material cooperation.  For instance, several sources acknowledge the unsuitability of 
having another organization ‗do the dirty work‘ of extracting, or to encourage the 
harvesting of, stem cells from the embryos for use in Catholic organizations.
580
  This is 
formal cooperation as the cooperator shares the intent of the moral agent.  On the other 
hand, some other interactions with embryonic stem cell therapies are permissible as 
mediate material cooperation.  For instance, therapies that use immortalized cell lines or 
suspended fetal tissues do not have a connecting relationship between research and 
therapeutic uses and the original abortions.
581
  Cell lines derived from abortions are many 
 204 
generations removed from the aborted fetal tissue used to start them.
582
  A sufficient 
distance may exist for Catholic health care institutions to use therapies derived from the 
lines.  In addition, options that skirt the issue include harvesting stem cells from umbilical 
cord blood or placentas, which are both plentiful sources of stem cells and do not destroy 
embryos during gathering procedures.
583
  Catholic health care organizations also must 
reflect on social justice considerations.  For this reason, Michael Prieur and colleagues 
recommend that Catholic institutions adopt guidelines that include provisions about not 
using stem cells attached to a profit – that is, when organizations pay the donor.584 
 Second, Bishop Anthony Fisher states unequivocally that an agency dispensing or 
circulating contraceptives is in formal and illicit cooperation.
585
  His statement is accurate 
to the extent that allowing another agency to dispense contraceptives especially within a 
Catholic organization is explicit or implicit formal cooperation.  This is only one piece of 
the puzzle when it comes to cooperation, research, and organizations. 
 Catholic health care organizations also must consider policies and procedures as 
they relate to research investigations and protocols that recommend contraception or 
other forms of birth control.  Examples include cancer treatment protocols.  Cytotoxic 
substances and radiotherapy (i.e. chemo and radiation) generally result in abortion or 
significant, congenital fetal abnormalities when conception occurs in conjunction with 
these cancer treatments. Naturally, no one expects mature adults to abdicate their 
sexuality while being treated for cancer.
 586
  Another source adds: 
The literature advises that a pregnancy should not be attempted for 
2 years following a breast cancer diagnosis, due to recurrences 
occurring most often in that period (Isaacs, 1995; Petrek, 1994b).  
According to a review of the breast cancer and pregnancy 
literature, avoiding pregnancy in the short term brings forth a 
―quagmire of issues related to contraceptive methods‖ (Puckridge, 
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Saunders, Ives, & Semmens, 2003, p. 502).  Despite little concrete 
evidence, nonhormonal contraceptive methods are preferred 
(International Planned Parenthood Federation [IPPF], 1999).
587
 
 
Research protocols as well as standard disclosures for cancer treatment often involve and 
even stress the need for contraception during the treatment course. 
 With respect to cooperation, a former Director of Education at The National 
Catholic Bioethics Center, Germain Kopaczynski, addresses cancer treatment research 
protocols that encourage contraceptive practices for participants.  As an example, he uses 
a sixty-page protocol for LC3267 – an experimental substance in Phase II trials for 
patients with non-small-cell lung cancer – that counsels sexually active persons to take 
precautions to avoid conception given the presumed powerful effects of the substance on 
the fetuses.  Kopaczynski advises Catholic health care institutions that they may serve as 
sites for such research as long as they promulgate natural family planning (NFP) and 
abstinence, not artificial birth control methods (e.g. barriers such as condoms, hormones 
and substances such as ‗the pill‘).588  Seemingly, Kopaczynski likens the blanket 
advocacy of not conceiving within Catholic health care institutions with formal 
cooperation.  It is the sole promotion of NFP and abstinence that makes the participation 
of Catholic organizations mediate material cooperation. 
 His logic regarding the application of cooperation has flaws on two levels.  First, 
a general backing for not conceiving has the same intent as NFP and abstinence.  In fact, 
broad recommendations, such as not conceiving, do not endorse any particular method.  It 
is information absent description in its object with contraceptive intent for patients in dire 
circumstances, which describes both the overall, general recommendation as well as the 
encouragement of NFP and abstinence.  Second, a high burden-of-proof exists to 
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categorize mentioning specific barrier or chemical contraceptives with NFP and 
abstinence as formal cooperation.  Part of this burden includes the establishment of intent 
and essential causal links to the evil.  It is doubtful that mentioning barrier and hormonal 
contraceptives, information available on the internet, is a necessary link.  Furthermore, 
the intent of all methods is to warn in order to make sure a difficult situation does not 
become even more so.  Much of the proof should explore if the provision of information 
is equivalent to advocacy of that information.  (Keenan made a similar argument about 
artificial contraception information from health professionals for the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS transmission.)
589
  By extrapolation, reasonable arguments exist that general 
recommendations or NFP and abstinence as parts of a range of options are all permissible 
as mediate material cooperation. 
IIIE. Physicians’ Practices (Insurance, Residents’ Training, Unrestricted Funding for 
Procedures) 
 
Situations within the context of physicians‘ practices may relate to evils according 
to the Catholic Church, therefore making cooperation analysis essential.  It is not 
necessary to apply cooperation to each instance because cooperation has been applied and 
discussed in relation to the same moral evils previously.  A quick survey of issues 
relevant for applying cooperation within physician‘s practices suffices.  The provision of 
vaccinations derived from aborted fetuses (and distributed through physicians‘ clinics) 
was covered already.  Like acute care organizations, clinics administer therapies and 
conduct research that may, somehow, connect to a moral evil.
590
  Clinicians, and others 
such as therapists, who make home visits to evaluate patients (clients) occasionally find 
some who live in ―physically dangerous situations.‖591  Lease agreements with 
physicians‘ practices and other clinicians typically include provisions about abiding by 
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the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care (ERDs).  These 
agreements give the Catholic organization in ownership the right to revoke the lease if 
indiscretions come to light.
592
  Organizations that are also teaching institutions should 
consider policies, guidelines, or procedures dealing with issues such as employed 
physicians teaching students ‗required‘ but immoral professional procedures offsite, 
requesting participation of residents and students for these procedures, immoral demands 
of supervisors, and how to respond when asked for counsel or referrals about immoral 
treatments and procedures.
593
  All of the occasions mentioned above are ripe for applying 
cooperation. 
IIIF. Social Injustices and Inequities 
At least one infers that the use of cooperation is appropriate for gauging 
organizations‘ complicity with evil for the elimination of social injustices.  Keenan, as 
mentioned previously, seems to understand the paradoxical relationship between 
injustice, mercy, and cooperation.  In order to correct injustices, one must act with mercy 
without intending or being closely complicit in moral evils.
594
  An example is Keenan‘s 
argument in favor of the distribution of prophylactic information within Catholic 
organizations as a health measure to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS, which 
affects populations disproportionately (i.e. HIV/AIDS epitomizes and perpetuates 
existing social injustices).
595
 
One way to describe Catholic social teaching is a yardstick to measure the 
accomplishments and limitations of specific social justice characteristics.
596
  Similarly, 
cooperation is a compass to navigate a sailboat through the stormy seas of behaving with 
integrity.  Sailing is not as simple as setting a course and going the direction of the 
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course.  A sailor knows to tack, using the elements of wind and waves, which are never 
constant, to zigzag to the destination.  Overreacting to the elements can be destructive.  
On one hand, avoiding them entirely by staying close to the shore never takes the vessel 
away from familiar land.  On the other hand, ignoring the elements while at sea may 
cause the craft to be swept away by the very forces it could use to its advantage. 
IIIG. Mergers, Partnerships, and Affiliations with Other-than-Catholic Organizations 
One of the most popular applications of cooperation is for mergers, partnerships, 
and affiliations with other-than-Catholic systems that do procedures such as direct 
sterilizations.  Many moral theologians and ethicists comment about mergers, 
partnerships, and affiliations.
597
  Part Six of the ERDs is ―Forming New Partnerships with 
Health Care Organizations and Providers,‖ and description of cooperation has been 
tailored to the context of mergers, partnerships, and affiliations because they have 
become so prevalent.
598
 
Organizations flex their muscles of moral agency when they perform due 
diligence and integrate with other organizations.  The structure of ventures assumes 
various forms depending on the identity of the institutions: 
[Involvement may be between] two Catholic institutions; a 
Catholic and another denominational institution; a Catholic and a 
nondenominational (secular) institution.
599
 
 
(Readers may notice an incongruity with the quote immediately above and the 
subheading of this section.  Merging or affiliating Catholic organizations act as moral 
agents, Part Six of the ERDs is relevant, and cooperation applies.  In all probability, 
Catholic organizations have fewer issues to apply cooperation to in a merger or affiliation 
because it is unlikely that moral evils exist in those institutions than when contrasted with 
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their other-than-Catholic counterparts.)  Multiple aspects merit close consideration in a 
merger, acquisition, or joint venture.  Some are board structure, policies and procedures, 
assets, administrative structure, operations, revenue, and legal provisions.  The number 
and specificity of features for consideration is intricate.  Organizations frequently codify 
these considerations into binding legal documents for the new organization or between 
the new entities.
600
  The reference point(s) for cooperation, the behaviors of the moral 
agent (as opposed to the cooperator), could be any one or more issues, including the ones 
mentioned in this chapter and chapter two.  For example, the other organization could 
perform direct sterilizations, fit patients for contraceptive devices, do IVF or other 
artificial reproductive technologies, and/or contribute to social sins and social injustices 
such as inhumane treatment of its associates.  While possible, it is less likely that acute 
care organizations being considered in a venture, merger, or acquisition perform direct 
abortions.  An example of an organizational merger includes the hypothetical example of 
St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH) and St. Bernardine of Siena Wellness System 
(SBW) presented both in the previous chapter and the ―moral distance‖ segment of this 
chapter. 
IIIH. Resistance that Health Care Organizations Encounter when Applying Material 
Cooperation 
 
 Associates in health care organizations may be resistant to applying cooperation, 
for reasons that either may be intentional or inadvertent.  An unintentional reason is 
apathy or a lack of awareness about processes or available resources.  Beth Dixon, an 
associate professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, makes a 
distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance, with culpable ignorance 
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reflecting that the person proclaiming his or her ignorance should have known to do 
something correctly.  A person with non-culpable, or what Aquinas calls ―antecedent,‖ 
ignorance has circumstances that legitimize that person from not knowing what to do.
601
  
―The difference between these two types of ignorance rests not in the specific state of the 
agent nor in his personal description of what he was about.  It concerns instead the more 
public matter of what we reasonably expect people to know.‖602  Liguori adds that there 
must be full knowledge about the truth of an evil or offense for a sin to have 
significance.
603
  Examples of ignorance from apathy include an individual who does not 
know the moral act is wrong or unjust, organizational resources for dealing with issues, 
or about the incongruence with Mission and Core Values.  Another is an organization that 
does not know ordered cell-lines were originally derived from something illicit, such as 
an abortion.
604
 
 Intentional reasons for resistance when applying cooperation may originate from 
theological grounds, such as another principle being better suited or an individual being 
unconnected with the issue.  For instance, one may argue that the Church‘s stance on the 
use of condoms for HIV/AIDS reduction and prevention is either an application of the 
principle of cooperation or the principle of lesser evil.
605
  In addition, various individuals 
with the organization may disagree that something is a cooperation issue at all, or one 
that they are remotely connected to.  Such perspectives depend on some knowledge of the 
issues and Church teaching as well as weighing information in order to conclude that 
cooperation is not relevant. 
 Agents may have practical concerns.  Persons may have time constraints, work 
deadlines, or a lack of resources or support.  For instance, physician M. Scott Peck 
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detects that certain professions such as medicine seem inherently resistant to religious 
and morality talk and examinations.  The resistance may be societal in nature, resulting in 
professionals feeling that they do not have support in religious and moral matters, as they 
do not want to offend their coworkers.
606
  Agents may disclose issues with processes, 
including the model proposed in chapter five as well as with the principle of cooperation 
itself.  Furthermore, associates within the organization may not agree about the issue 
itself and its priority with other organizational concerns.  Individuals have experiences 
that, rightly or wrongly, attract them to or lead them away from issues and processes.
607
  
The last series of obstacles to the organizational application of cooperation is personal 
reasons that the organization‘s associates will not become involved in an issue.  Instances 
consist of disagreement that the issue is relevant or fear of ‗burning platforms.‘  Many of 
these issues translate to a lack of consensus within the organization and an inability to 
prioritize issues. 
 
 In conclusion, this chapter showed that organizations are moral agents, exercise 
their moral agency by applying the principle of cooperation, and confront different issues 
while applying cooperation when compared to individuals.  Organizational issues were 
explored, such as the sponsorship of groups, messages, and initiatives with controversial 
content; philanthropic donations; research participation; physicians‘ practice issues; 
social injustices and inequities; and mergers, partnerships, and affiliations with other-
than-Catholic systems.  Resistance to applying cooperation within organizations may 
occur and persist.  Some areas and examples of resistance were discussed.  Solutions to 
these categories of opposition exist.  For instance, critical analysis is necessary for 
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employees‘ experiences to become meaningful and educational.608  The next chapters 
consider methods for overcoming resistance, including a model that directly addresses 
these and other barriers. 
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Chapter Four – Interpreting the Implementation and Use of Material 
Cooperation as a Function of Moral Development 
 
 
This chapter diverges in its content from the previous two chapters.  Exploration of the 
use and application of cooperation is no longer under the backdrop of individual and 
organizational agency from a predominately theological context.  Instead, this chapter 
considers the use and application of the principle of cooperation as a function of moral 
development. 
 The introduction establishes that individuals exercise their moral agency and 
conscience in their decisions, the principle of cooperation is a method to gauge 
complicity with malfeasance, moral development theories are means to regard agents‘ 
perceptions and reactions to malfeasance, and moral development explains an agent‘s 
evaluation of his or her application of material cooperation.  Various developmental 
theories such as psychosocial, identity, typology, and cognitive-structural theories are the 
means situate the most appropriate developmental theories for the purpose of this 
dissertation.  The best theories, cognitive-structural theories, are most apposite and, 
therefore, garner the most attention – two theories in particular.  There is not only 
discussion about the stages of the two theories, but corresponding stage-related 
behaviors, both generally and in the context of business.  The emphasis of the chapter‘s 
reminder is the alignment of moral development with discernment and agency – that is 
not dependant on moral decision-making approaches such as deontology (duty-based), 
consequentialism (consequence-based), teleology (goal-based), and virtues-based – and 
understanding that the application of the principle of cooperation is a function of moral 
development. 
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I. Moral Development as a Foundation for the Moral Agency to Identify 
Wrongdoing 
 
IA. Introduction 
 Moral development is the backdrop or foundation for the moral agency to identify 
wrongdoing.  Individuals exercise their agency and conscience in their decisions, and 
material cooperation is a method to gauge complicity with perceived evil, injustice, and 
wrongdoing.
609
  There are means to look at agents‘ perceptions and reactions to perceived 
evil, injustice, and wrongdoing.
610
  These means are moral development theories, which 
are not new, but have existed in psychology and development literature for decades.  
These theories have empirical support, moral language, and general acceptance and 
respect, although there are significant comments and apprehensions about some of them, 
which this argument will address. 
A focal concept of this chapter is that moral development explains an agent‘s 
application of material cooperation.  The basis for this idea is that moral development is 
fundamental for moral agency, which includes the identification of wrongdoing.
611
  As 
stated before, moral agency applies to both individuals and organizations, as does 
development, as both are able to exercise agency and conscience in decisions, which is 
inherent in one of Richard McCormick‘s critiques about the Catholic Church in 
Corrective Vision.
612
  Therefore, applications of cooperation are functions of moral 
development.
613
 
The mechanism or process of demonstrating one‘s moral development while 
applying cooperation involves the moral agent‘s discernment.  In this case, the moral 
agent uses his or her discernment to identify the relevant evil, injustice, or wrongdoing.  
Then, and equally as important, the agent uses discernment while employing the 
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categories (i.e. lexical components) in the principle of cooperation.  Methods exist to 
measure and develop individuals‘ moral reasoning and, hopefully, corresponding 
behaviors. 
While the former context is individual, the former distinctions also apply to 
organizations.  Organizations express moral development while discerning issues in 
whatever decision-making process the organization employs, which may include the 
identification of wrongdoing and utilization of cooperation.  Organizational cooperation 
is a product of its associates‘ (i.e. employees‘) formation and development.  Development 
of an organization‘s conscience and response, as both evidence through its reasoning and 
behaviors, to evil and injustice is dependent upon assessing and fostering the 
development of its associates. 
IB. Appropriate Developmental Theories 
Various developmental and typology theories are available to gauge development.  
The rest of this segment concentrates on the available theories for categorizing moral 
development.  The goal of this endeavor is to select and focus on the most appropriate 
developmental and typology theories. 
First, one group of relevant theories is psychosocial and identity development.  
Psychosocial and identity development theories are examinations of the content of 
development and how individuals cope (respond) to changes in the environment.  
Theorists believe that development occurs throughout one‘s life and there is a 
foundational structure steering development.  Components of this foundational structure 
include in the influence of environmental demands, culture and gender-related influences, 
and cultural norms.
614
  Examples of psychosocial theories are Erik Erikson‘s eight stage 
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theory, Arthur Chickering‘s Theory of Identity Development (seven vectors of 
development), and Ruthellen Josselson‘s Theory of Identity Development in Women 
(four identity groups).  Identity development theories include Jean Phinney‘s Model of 
Ethnic Identity Development, sexuality identity development theories such as Vivienne 
Cass‘s Model of Homosexual Identity Formation, and change and transition theories such 
as Nancy Scholssberg‘s Transition Theory.615 
The next group, second, are systems called typology theories.  Typology theories 
identify characteristics that create particular ways of coping because people respond 
differently depending on type.  They are not developmental in the same way that 
psychosocial and cognitive-structural are because they do not consist of progressive 
stages.  The distinctiveness of individuals‘ learning, interests, and mental processing 
results in development in other areas, based upon the underlying presumption that variety 
(i.e. not seeing things in the same way) is positive and vigorous.
616
  Examples of typology 
theories are David Kolb‘s Theory of Experimental Learning, John Holland‘s Theory of 
Vocational Personalities and Environments, and the Myers-Briggs Adaptation of Jung‘s 
Theory of Personality Type.
617
  The Myers-Briggs theory and inventory, called the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
®
 is an excellent, popular example of a typology theory.  A 
person using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
® 
chooses options from a series of 
preferences, which places that person into any one of sixteen personality types.  That 
person who took the inventory being evaluated may exist in a world of introversion (I) 
and extraversion (E), assimilate information through the senses (S) or intuition (N), make 
decisions according to thoughts (T) or feelings (F), and create structure by judging (J) or 
perceiving (P).
618
  A person taking the inventory only ‗falls‘ into one of the two options 
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in each category.  Four categories with two options (e.g., I-E, S-N, T-F, J-P) results in 
sixteen different personality types, often referred to as ‗table types.‘ In a list, these 
categories are:  
▪ INFJ ▪ ENFP 
▪ INTJ ▪ ENTP 
▪ INFP ▪ ENFJ 
▪ INTP ▪ ENTJ 
▪ ISTJ ▪ ESTP 
▪ ISFJ ▪ ESFP 
▪ ISTP ▪ ESTJ 
▪ ISFP ▪ ESFJ619 
 
None of the sixteen types and their gradations, as each characteristic is not binary but on 
a gradient, represents a better or more morally developed form than another. 
 Another group, third, is the theories describing people‘s interaction with their 
surroundings, or person-environment theories.  Foundational to these frameworks is the 
idea that environmental conditions impact people‘s growth and development.  
Interventionists occasionally alter or manipulate the surrounding circumstances to 
facilitate development.  Examples of person-environment theorists are Nevitt Sanford, A. 
Astin, Nancy Schlossberg (also mentioned above under psychosocial theories), and L. 
Rendón.
620
 
 Fourth and finally, the last group of development theories is the cognitive-
structural theories.  Cognitive-structural theories focus on how people think, which 
developmental theorists categorize into stages.  Stages are set, universal, hierarchical, 
occur in the same order, and refer to general characteristics.  Changes happen as a result 
of assimilation and accommodation.
621
  Models include Jean Piaget‘s four periods of 
development, William Perry‘s Theory of Intellectual and Ethical Development (nine 
positions), Marcia Baxter Magolda‘s Model of Epistemological Reflection, King and 
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Kitchener‘s Reflective Judgment Model, James Rest‘s Theory, Lawrence Kohlberg‘s 
Theory of Moral Development (six stages and three levels), and Carol Gilligan‘s Theory 
of Moral Development (three levels and two transitions).
622
 
IC. Situating and Selecting the Appropriate Development Theory 
Situating the various developmental and typology theories was a precursor to 
selecting the theories that are the most helpful for advancing this thesis.  Examining the 
contents of development, things people think, or distinctive types and ways of coping to 
situations and others are not as helpful as studying how or why people think they way 
they do.  To a lesser degree, characteristics of coping with the environment are also not as 
helpful as knowing how persons‘ filters or lenses change for identification and 
assessment of situations.  The pertinent interest is about how people think and a universal 
hierarchy (i.e. not culturally specific), with the hope that relevant models can, at 
minimum, increase awareness and opportunities for development and, at maximum, 
catalyze the moral development of persons.
623
  For these reasons, cognitive-structural 
development theories are the most relevant, as they attend neither to coping, 
categorization, nor environmental adaptation.
624
 
A specification is in order.  The model of cooperation advanced in chapter five 
uses a form of situational (i.e. interpersonal interactions with others are a subset of the 
environment) adaptation by creating opportunities that would not otherwise exist.  This 
does not mean that the relevant development models are person-environment theories, 
which center on the precursors or optimal conditions for development.
625
  The existing 
environment of the organization, its culture, is set and does not change easily.  Using 
Sanford‘s postulate as an example, there is only so much one can do in order to avoid too 
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much or too little challenge, resulting in less adaptive modes of behavior, polarization 
and solidification of current behaviors, disregard in light of no escape, or be complacent 
in their current environment.  In other words, barriers to development (discussed at the 
end of the previous chapter) evidence themselves in one‘s reasoning to participate, or not, 
in development opportunities.  Environmental adaptations through interventions occur, 
but only in response to evidence of a person‘s level or stage of moral development.  
Stated differently, person-environment theories would be more relevant to this 
dissertation if they were the chief and germane concerns.  They are not the paramount 
concerns; they are partners (or cooperators) with cognitive-structural development 
theories, setting the stage for the main act, which does enhance development. 
There are cognitive-structural theories that expressly attend to moral 
development, and the philosophy of how to educate or catalyze moral development.
626
  
Kohlberg‘s Theory of Moral Development and Gilligan‘s Theory of Woman‘s Moral 
Development are time-tested and, arguably, the best of the specific cognitive-structural 
theories that concentrate on moral development.
627
  Both the Kohlberg and the Gilligan 
theory relate to each other.   
Lawrence Kohlberg is in the tradition of Dewey and Piaget.  His focus was on 
how people make moral judgments, and persons‘ views of justice are central to his 
theory.
628
  Kohlberg researched formulated, researched, and tested his theory over a 
period of thirty years at the University of Chicago and then Harvard.
629
   
Gilligan was a student of Kohlberg and felt that woman reasoned differently than 
men.
630
  A significant departure and difference between the Kohlberg theory and the 
Gilligan theory is that men reason using ―the justice voice‖ and women reason using the 
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―care voice.‖631  Gilligan also perceived Kohlberg to have an individual and hypothetical 
orientation to his theory (Kohlberg‘s formulated his theory from hypothetical examples), 
while her theory has its basis in relationships and actual situations.
632
 
Despite some critics, they are both appropriate as respected and empirically tested 
theories.
633
  The nature of the theories‘ critics, for example, has incorporated concerns 
about the assertion that stages are ‗universal and invariant,‘ which researchers have 
challenged.  For example, James Rest, another moral development theorist addressed in 
invariance of stages, ―[finding] that while people evolve in their moral development, they 
keep vestiges of their earlier stages with them, and thus the behavior and reasoning 
marking earlier stages sometimes reappear.‖634  In addition, others have challenged the 
ability to universalize the theories.  For instance, does Kohlberg‘s theory bind all people 
in all cultures, or is it simply a representative example of a heterogeneous, diverse, 
individualistic, Western culture, which is where Kohlberg studied and tested his 
theory?
635
  This matter has not been settled, much like the continuing discussions about 
whether a common morality connects all human persons or if morality is fractured into 
smaller moral communities (e.g. camps, academic disciplines).
636
  Another critique is that 
Kohlberg‘s theory, specifically, centers too much on cognitive process (e.g. the reasons 
supporting moral decisions), ignoring other crucial factors in moral decision-making (e.g. 
the motivations and emotions structuring moral behavior).  Arguably, emotions and 
motivations have central roles in decisions in addition to cognitive reasoning.
637
 
ID. Characteristics of Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s Theories of Moral Development 
Kohlberg‘s Theory of Moral Development has six distinct stages divided into 
three levels, with two stages per level.  The Kohlberg stages are synonymous with 
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another developmental theorist mentioned above, James Rest.  Because they are 
complimentary (with the caveat that an individual could regress in Rest‘s stages), Rest‘s 
stages will appear in parenthesis next to the explanation of Kohlberg‘s stages. 
The title of Kohlberg‘s first level of moral development is preconventional 
morality.  The description of the level is that morality derives from external sources.  In 
other words, the locus for morality is not set or derived from the individual; it is a product 
of authorities and their standards, which they impose on the individual.  This level of 
development typically involves children between one and ten-years-of-age.
638
 
In the preconventional morality level are two stages.  Stage one is heteronomous 
morality, where an agent bases his or her actions on punishment avoidance (Obedience – 
―Do what you‘re told‖).  Persons in stage one have absolute deference to authority 
figures, acting not for the good of others but out of fear of penalty and harm.  Authorities 
are those persons who can reward or punish others, thus its popular coining as the 
‗obedience and punishment stage.‘  All persons start in this stage per Kohlberg.  
Individualistic, instrumental morality is stage two.  In this stage, someone follows rules 
because it benefits a person to do so; interests may conflict so fairness is about equal 
exchange or agreement (Instrumental egoism and simple exchange – ―Let‘s make a 
deal‖).  The foundational value for this stage is pragmatism and achieving a balance 
between advancing personal needs and satisfying others‘ needs only to the extent that 
doing so avoids repercussion, retribution, or punishment.
639
  Stage two, or what others 
often call the ‗individualism and reciprocity stage,‘ persons practice a weighted or 
stacked mechanism of barters, connoting that he or she will always enter a trade thinking 
in his or her own self-interest.  One enters agreements to promote self-interest, or one 
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changes the conditions of the agreement to favor oneself.
640
  An example is a weighted 
consequentialism where benefits and burdens (i.e. positives and negatives, pleasure and 
pain, happiness and unhappiness) become more or less pronounced when it affects the 
stage two individual evaluating the agreement.  Thus, the stage two individual needs a 
greater proportionate benefit for the agreement to seem fair; a moderate burden may seem 
like a huge burden to someone in stage two. 
The next developmental level is conventional morality (i.e. conventional 
reasoning).  By this stage, individuals have partially internalized their morality.  Still, 
external sources still have a large influence on the person‘s sense of right and wrong.  
Social norms and expectations shape a person in this level, even though authority figures 
are less dominant in their ability to manipulate a response.  Persons ten to twenty-years-
of-age often are at the level of conventional morality.
641
 
The two stages in the conventional morality level are interpersonally normative 
reality and social system morality.  Interpersonally normative reality, stage three, is when 
doing right is being acceptable in relationship according to social roles and in the 
expectations of those who are close (Interpersonal – ―Be considerate, nice, kind, and 
you‘ll get along with people‖).  Being virtuous is being good, which one garners through 
the acceptance of others.  This is why a name for the stage is the ‗interpersonal 
conformity stage.‘  While this stage is not as egocentric as others, an overarching social 
fairness perspective – where interests of the self and others balance differently and 
appropriately according to the needs of the situation – does not yet exist.  A person just 
begins to understand a moral problem by putting himself or herself ‗in the shoes‘ of 
others.  One‘s scope is not comprehensive enough to gauge the needs of the common 
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good.  Community is local, typically tied to a social group or business organization.  
Persons with knowledge of organizational wrongdoing who do not become 
whistleblowers may typify this stage.  What matters is being a good Enron employee, for 
instance, with exceptional performance and not making waves.  Broader social welfare 
and responsibility is outside of these persons‘ scope.  Stage four is social system 
morality, which is doing right by obeying or upholding laws established by society 
because adequate social system functioning depends on people obeying coherent rules 
and procedures applying uniformly to everyone (Law and duty to social order – 
―everyone in society is obligated and protected by law‖).  Maintaining the system and its 
regulations and conventions is the ultimate good of someone in a social system morality 
stage.
642
  Because of the emphasis on the preservation of social functioning, some 
commonly call Kohlberg‘s stage four the ‗law-and-order stage.‘  Kohlberg believed that 
most adults in the U.S. culminate their moral development at this stage.
643
 
The highest level for Kohlberg is postconventional or principled reasoning.  
Those who reach this level have completely internalized their morality.  Others have little 
ability to influence moral standards.  It is rare to find an individual under twenty-years-
of-age who exhibits thoughts and behaviors from a postconventional or principled 
reasoning.
644
 
A stage in the postconventional level is stage five, human rights and social 
welfare morality, where social systems and codifications, such as laws, are open to 
interpretation.  The evaluation of social systems and codifications is according to how 
much they promote basic, or more fundamental, human rights (Societal consensus – ―You 
are obligated by whatever arrangements are agreed to by due process procedures‖).  
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Social systems are useful and ‗good‘ to the extent that they promote guard rights and 
promote values, and according to their helpfulness, individuals may enter and exit, 
validating or invalidating the social contract, according to needs.  Phrased differently, 
stage five persons have perspectives that begin to transcend particular cultures and 
societies, making the persons less dependent or attached to their own specific culture or 
society.  Agents illustrate their coherentism, contractarianism, or rational metaethical 
absolutism with their perspective that all rational persons would agree to basic 
determinations of right and wrong.  ―This hypothetical social contract is taken as the 
basis for moral decisions by persons at this stage.‖645  The characterization of the final 
stage, stage six, is what Kohlberg calls the morality of universalizable, reversible, and 
prescriptive general ethics principles.  The exceedingly few persons in this highest 
developmental stage believe that basic or fundamental ethics frameworks apply in all 
situations.  There is equal consideration for the points-of-view of all stakeholders in any 
particular situation.  Fair process and procedures are just as important as decisions 
(Nonarbitrary social cooperation – ―How rational and impartial people would organize 
cooperation is moral‖).  Some title this stage the ‗universal ethical principles stage‘ 
because of the common and collective application of norms to all people, based on their 
intrinsic rights and human dignity.
646
  The ‗principles‘ term of the title originates because 
―moral decisions are not based on simply what is best for everybody.  They are based 
instead on principles that are chosen freely by the agent, but that agent would be willing 
for everyone to live by as well.‖647  All contracts and agreements materialize within a 
milieu, which one must consider when evaluating obligations and the fairness of any 
situation.  Persons in this stage may endure passive suffering in order to show respect for 
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all, as well as ―transform the world in accordance with a divine and transcendent 
image.‖648 
The description of Kohlberg‘s highest stages illustrates what philosophers call 
reflective equilibrium.  Philosophers David DeGrazia and Tom Beauchamp summarize 
reflective equilibrium as the affiliation between general norms of morality and specific 
judgments of morality: 
[Rawls] argues it is appropriate to start with the broadest set of 
considered judgments [emphasis in the original] (i.e. a technical 
term referring to judgments in which moral beliefs and capacities 
are most likely to be presented without a distorting bias) about a 
subject and to erect a provisional set of principles [i.e. or values, 
goals, obligations, etc.] that reflects them.  Reflective equilibrium 
views investigation in ethics (and theory construction) as a 
reflexive testing of moral principles, theoretical postulates, and 
other relevant moral beliefs to render them as coherent as possible.  
Starting with paradigms of what is morally right or wrong, one 
searches for principles that are consistent with these paradigms as 
well as one another.  Such principles and considered judgments are 
taken, as Rawls puts it, ―provisionally as fixed points,‖ but also as 
―liable to revision.‖649 
 
John Rawls explains how he derived the name – equilibrium describes how theory, 
ideals, and ideologies (e.g principles, duties, goals, and values) correspond with acts (e.g. 
judgments and behaviors), and reflective depicts that we know to what theory, ideals, 
ideologies, and acts coincide and how they derive.
650
 
University of Michigan M.E. Tracy Distinguished Professor of Organizational 
Behavior and Human Resource Management Robert Quinn understands the concept even 
though he does not refer to reflective equilibrium by name: 
…[O]ur actions can be symbolic representations…[They] are like 
seeds.  They carry transformational potential.  Each time we act, 
we represent our beliefs and values.  We embody possibilities and 
illustrate constraints.
651
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In one of his books, philosophy professor Jacob Needleman refers to the need for 
congruity between understanding good principles, duties, goals, and virtues and acting in 
accord with them.
652
  Professors John Rich and Joseph DeVitis use the psychology and 
development terms ―‗self-actualized person‘ (Maslow)‖ and ―‗fully functioning human 
being‘ (Roger)‖ to describe Kohlberg‘s stage six, which is similar to reflective 
equilibrium.
653
 
 Adding all-the-more credence to Kohlberg‘s stage six as reflective equilibrium is 
the description from John Rawls that the various points on the reflective equilibrium line 
are not permanent and unchanging.  They are always in a state of flux where actions from 
situations and experiences refine postulates, theories, and ideologies.  Vice-versa is true 
as well – postulates, theories, and ideologies constantly influence actions.654  In his study 
of morally developed persons, Quinn notices that change agents, which Kohlberg stage 
six persons are typically, are constantly in a process of translating and responding to our 
and others‘ behaviors: 
We are thus ever-involved in a process of co-creation with the 
world around us.  We create the world that also creates us.  This 
process can then be correctly interpreted in two opposite ways: The 
world creates us or we create the world.  Both statements are true.  
Overemphasis on the first, however, can lead to resignation in 
which who we are increasingly becomes determined by external 
forces.  An overemphasis on the second leads to self-deception in 
which we claim that all constraints are illusions.  The focus here is 
on the reality of constraints and the reality of potential; both are 
true… [Actions carry our beliefs and values.]  With each action, 
we become a living symbol that others must interpret and to which 
they must respond.  That is, our actions are signaling devices in the 
process of co-creation.  What we represent matters deeply.
655
 
 
The theoretical claim is solid, albeit not empirically tested, that the few persons in 
Kohlberg‘s stage six of development exhibit the most congruence with reflective 
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equilibrium.  In a sliding scale to lower stages, persons in each lower developmental 
stages display less self-actualization, full function, all-encompassing ethical frameworks, 
and ability to adequately maintain a reflective equilibrium. 
Kohlberg and some others proposing revisions to his theory hypothesize that there 
is a seventh stage of development.  ―At one point, Kohlberg himself postulated a seventh 
stage, a religious one, beyond Stage Six.  This level was said to be the stage of moral 
development reached by such religious figures as Jesus or the Buddha.‖656  Kohlberg 
eventually revised this stage because he acknowledged that religious development was its 
own process with of development.  While there are points of interconnectivity, someone‘s 
religious development may follow its own independent path from moral development.   
An example of a religious development theory is James Fowler‘s Stages of Faith 
Development.  Similar to Kohlberg and Gilligan, an individual grows through several 
different stages or levels of faith, beginning with a pre-stage (ages three through seven) 
called intuitive-projective faith where a child adopts the symbols and rituals of his or her 
caregiver(s), intertwining fantasy (i.e. illusion) with reality.  Concrete operational 
thinking generally transitions a child to the next stage, which is mythic-literal faith (ages 
seven through early adolescence), typified by factual thinking of hyperbole, allegory, and 
parable.  The next stage is synthetic-conventional faith (adolescence; some never 
advance), catalyzed by the recognition of inherent contradictions in stories; and 
characterized by following the convention and expectations of others without any 
conscious thought (i.e. examination) about the adherence to a particular ideology.  The 
vehicle for another stage, individual-reflective faith (early to mid-twenties; some never 
advance), is often disagreements between authority figures or changes to rituals (i.e. 
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practice), symbols, and teaching (i.e. policy) formerly understood as unchangeable and 
sacrosanct.  Its categorization is through individuals who adopt an identity that is 
independent of authorities and their hopes, critical reflection about self and ideology, and 
the acceptance of rituals, symbols, and teaching as less literal and more conceptual.  A 
person is not ready for transitioning to the next stage until he or she abandons the rote, 
overdependence on logical, rational, conscious thought and accepts the influence of 
unconscious, multifaceted, and abstract concepts.  Upon recognition of the former 
disillusionment, a person evolves to the subsequent stage, called conjunctive faith (mid-
life; some never advance), distinguished by the individual‘s recognition of the 
unconscious mind, gratitude for the contradictions and paradoxes inherent in the truth 
(i.e. accepting conflicts with a both/and disposition rather than an either/or orientation), 
and the ability to create meaning through imagination and (theoretical) obligations to act.  
Exceedingly few persons make it to Fowler‘s last stage, universalizing faith, exhibited by 
rare exemplars – Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, and Mother Teresa.  Those who 
transition into this stage eliminate the disparity between a world in need and the 
transformative power of action and change.  Inaction perpetuates injustice and inequity, 
so self-actualization becomes more than thinking about good; it is doing good.   
Gilligan does not refer to her developmental categories as stages.  Nonetheless, 
they are phases or levels of sorts, which each has a corresponding transition.  The 
intricacy and understanding of self in relationship with others becomes more multifaceted 
with each level, culminating in a ―sophisticated understand between selfishness and 
responsibility.‖657 
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The categorization of the first phase or level is an orientation to individual 
survival.  A person can only have a framework for right and wrong if that particular 
decision emerged already in that person‘s own life.  Individuals are self-centered and 
preoccupied with survival.  Their goal is the preservation of self and they have no way to 
distinguish between what should occur and what would occur.  Often, relationships fall 
short of their potential for persons in this level.  The first transition is from selfishness to 
responsibility.  Individuals realize that there is potential for social acceptance, integrate 
responsibility and care into moral decision-making patterns, and transition from 
independence and selfishness into connection and responsibility.  In other words, 
―should‖ and ―would‖ become distinguishable.  The key to the first transition is the 
recognition and acceptance of relationships and associations with others.
658
 
In Gilligan‘s second level, agents define goodness as self-sacrifice.  Survival 
becomes linked with social acceptance, and judgments may favor social connection over 
individual judgment because choices that hurt others reflect disequilibrium.  Discontent 
and unease for the prioritization of others over self exists, but acknowledgment of this 
may occur in private rather than public because public acknowledgment may hurt others, 
making any disequilibrium worse.  The second transition is from goodness to truth.  An 
individual in this transition questions why pleasing others is favored to the detriment of 
the self, and decides that the needs of the individual need to have the same weight as 
others.  The struggle to balance care and harm between self and others maintains, but 
with the conclusion that the self is important as others.  The needs of the self are not 
frivolous or egoistic, and the fulfillment of needs is valid and sincere.
659
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The third and final phase (level) is the morality of nonviolence.  Here, the 
individual recognizes the moral equality between self and others, achieving an elevated 
understanding of relationships and morality through the principle of care.  Nonviolence, 
the imperative to avoid hurt or pain, trumps the needs of the self and to appease others, 
such that previous dichotomies disappear.
660
  The settlement of prior divergences ―opens 
the door for the individual to recognize her power to select among competing choices and 
to keep her needs within the mix of moral alternatives.‖661  A transition from this level 
does not exist because it is the most developed phase of reasoning.
662
 
 
II. Aligning Moral Development with Discernment and Organizational Agency 
IIA. The Lenses of Ethical Theories and Frameworks 
While applying cooperation, or when reasoning in general, persons may use 
reasoning that illustrates approaches in addition to developmental ones.  There are at least 
three main styles of moral reasoning and justification – consequentialism, teleology 
(virtues), and deontology.  Accepting moral development theory, the highest stage of 
moral development, perhaps the goal of human development, is the flourishing of all, 
with universally applied, equitable norms, fair processes, and just procedures.  The ends 
of human development as being perfectly just and fostering flourishing, and the 
corresponding characteristics to achieve this, are the hallmarks of goal-based theories, 
which include teleology and virtues.
663
  As Robert Quinn observes in Change the World, 
virtuous persons embody these ends, which are the characteristics of an advanced stage of 
moral development.
664
  In deference to moral development theory again, a deontologist‘s 
duty becomes to create a scheme with the correct principles such that every obligation 
has a lexical priority to others.  Crafting appropriate rules may assist.
665
  The ultimate 
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result is that each action or behavior is measured in accord with aspiration-oriented rules, 
presumably consistent with perfect flourishing and equity in process, procedure, and 
product (decision).  In the words of Immanuel Kant: 
Rules of ethics are measuring-rules of action and ought to set 
before us the standard of moral necessity.  They ought not to be 
trimmed in consideration of [humankind‘s] capacity.  Any system 
of ethics which accommodates itself to what [persons] can do 
corrupts the moral perfection of humanity.  The moral law must be 
pure.
666
 
 
Those making use of consequential reasoning consider the immediate repercussions of a 
decision – the consequences, effects, or products.667  The result of many of the lower 
developmental stages, using consequentialism, appears to be an increase in happiness, but 
this is a façade, as it may increase your (the agent‘s happiness) at the expense of making 
others unhappy; the amount of unhappiness greatly increases.  Persons in later stages or 
levels of development understand the difference between a more objective, balanced 
consequential reasoning and a subjective, imbalanced (i.e. weighted) consequential 
reasoning, and they adopt the more objective standard. 
Using any of the three frameworks and approaches does not invalidate 
applications of cooperation as indicative of moral development.
668
  Indeed, all of the 
above theories and frameworks – and others, many based on the above theories and 
frameworks – are significant when assessing and crafting an intervention to advance 
moral development.
669
  Using any of the above three frameworks or approaches, or 
others, does not invalidate applications of cooperation as indicative of moral 
development.
670
  They are the equivalent of different color lenses on a camera or tints on 
a photograph.  Ultimately, they do not change the ways of seeing, but not the components 
of the background or objects in the image itself. 
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Examples will facilitate a better perspective of the former point.  Someone could 
describe Kohlberg‘s stage six using any of the moral theories or frameworks mentioned 
above.  Using teleology and virtues, and accepting moral development theory, the highest 
stage of moral development, perhaps the goal of human development, is the flourishing 
of all, with universally applied, equitable norms, fair processes, and just procedures.  As 
noticed by Robert Quinn in Change the World, virtuous persons embody the 
characteristics of an advanced stage of moral development.  Accepting moral 
development theory again, this time using deontology, duty in stage six is to find and 
adhere to the correct principles such that every action is consistent with flourishing and 
equity in process, procedure, and product (decision).  Crafting appropriate rules may 
assist.  With consequentialism, the result of many of the lower developmental stages 
appears to be an increase in happiness, but this is a façade, as it may increase your (the 
agent‘s happiness) at the expense of making others unhappy.  The amount of unhappiness 
greatly increases.  Higher stages of development add less weight to the self, including a 
subordination of personal interests to that of others. 
IIB. Kohlberg Stage Behaviors 
Persons‘ behavior corresponds with their developmental stage.  As the context of 
this model is professional and organizational, rather than personal and clinical, it is useful 
that the authors of Practical Business Ethics, Warren French and John Granrose, spend 
most of their book outlining the Kohlberg stages, how they present in the business 
setting, and the corresponding managerial styles to the stages.  Their text serves as an 
exemplar for surveying the behaviors that accompany each stage while being precise to 
the business setting. 
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Exercise of power is nothing new to business.  Still, it is in the abusive 
implementation of power or obedience to authority through coercion that stage one 
businesspersons show their true colors: 
…[C]oercive power is most likely to be accepted by persons who 
are at Stage One of moral development since they consider 
themselves to be ethical when they obey a more powerful force.  
In effect, Stage One adherents narrowly interpret the third 
component of our definition of ethics – societal well-being – to 
mean only their own person well-being.
671
 
 
Coercion relies on one party giving into another because of fear generated through 
threats.  Presumably, the authors are referring not only to those who obey such authority 
without considering those others affected by and left out of the decision-making process, 
they are making an observations about those who inappropriately use coercive force.  
Behaviors of stage one persons are selfish and egoistic:
672
 
Many of the individuals who rely on Stage One reasoning can be 
identified by the defensive nature of their statements.  They are 
not so much interested in resolving conflicts as in presenting 
their perception of the facts and principles underlying their 
positions. 
 
Scholars such as Jürgen Habermas explain that this type of communicative behavior is 
self- or ego-centric, which focuses on the listener rather than the person speaking.
673
 
The key word for stage two of Kohlberg‘s moral development is exploitation, 
which is different than reciprocity and mutuality.  (Mutuality is a reciprocal relationship 
where both parties treat each other respectfully or as end-unto-themselves, meaning that 
there is appreciation for the other person‘s goals.  This is not true with reciprocity, where 
both or all parties use the other as means to their own ends; it is mutually self-serving.  
Exploitation is disproportionate because only one party takes advantage of another.)  
Those in stage two will not totally ignore others, but they are still ego-centric, only 
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seeking to frame their rationale and justifications in more socially appropriate ways.  
Rather than being defensive in communication, stage two persons go on the offensive, 
attempting to reframe others‘ positions to their own advantage using tactics such as 
paraphrasing negatively, observing incongruence, assailing interpretations, establishing 
incommensurate examples, and broadening analysis to an improbable end.  From this 
description, exploitation and coercion is not only written and physical (i.e. threatening 
posture, gestures, and body language), it is verbal.  Some persons, just as philosopher 
Johann Schmidt, advocate the ethical egoism involved with stage one and two persons.  
This approach, nevertheless, garners little support because of the strength of arguments 
that refute it.
674
 
Conformity epitomizes stage three reasoning, which French and Granrose title 
custom, convention, and courtesy.  Another way to describe business behaviors in this 
stage is that they are deferential to force-of-habit or etiquette.  The models for custom and 
convention are generally small or medium groups, such as teams or cliques or 
organizations, rather than large groups, including religions (in their entirety) or societies.  
A person in this stage will conform to the expectations and practices of an organization or 
business, but has no concept that these practices may be right or wrong when one 
expands the scope beyond these groups:
675
 
The classic stereotype associated with this stage is that of the 
―Organization Man.‖  Loyalty to the firm more than any other 
characteristic marks this person‘s behavior.  Stage Three people 
seek acceptance and respect from others and do not mind giving 
up person autonomy in the interest of mirroring the group‘s 
image.  Hence, the connections with custom and convention 
should be obvious [emphasis in the original].  The group-directed 
values of those in Stage Three, as contrasted with the self-
centered nature of people in the first two stages, stem from a 
different motivating force.  Shame, rather than punishment or 
 245 
deprivation of personal rewards, is the perceived penalty that 
results from behavior that does not live up to the ethics of this 
―Organization Man‖ mentality.676 
 
To oversimplify somewhat, the individual at Stage Three is 
likely to be (1) more motivated by group acceptance and 
complimented for team play than motivated by selfish gain; (2) 
more motivated by consequences benefiting the reference group 
from which self-worth is derived rather than by consequences for 
society as a whole; and (3) more motivated by only those 
deontological norms that are held as sacred by the chosen 
reference group rather than by universal principles.  Individuals 
may go far in the business world, at least as employees, by 
adopting a Stage Three profile of behavior.  Their thought pattern 
can be captured by the phrase, ―Be a team player.‖677 
 
Social appearance, looking good, fitting in, keeping one‘s ‗nose to the ground,‘ or ‗not 
making waves‘ all demonstrate loyalty and courtesy.  The pitfalls of this approach should 
be obvious and were demonstrated in the discussion of the recent ethical failures of big 
business in the previous chapter on organizational and business ethics.  Simply, it 
muddles the is/ought distinction, implying that industry and organizational standards 
must be ethical.  On one hand, organizational values and behaviors may not reflect 
society as a stakeholder.  Organizational values and statements, on the other hand, may 
reflect societal values, but behaviors may not match. 
Legal approaches are always components of business ethics.  A law-and-order 
perspective, with its concentration on the letter rather than the spirit of the law, is 
archetypal for Kohlberg‘s stage four persons.  The legal and the ethical are the same thing 
for those in stage four even though the law, like morality, is one way to appease 
conflicting or contradictory interests.
678
  French and Granrose describe the business 
behaviors of stage four individuals: 
The law provides an external reference point for resolving 
conflicts.  That reference point is usually more unbiased than the 
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individual and group perspectives that underlie the first three states 
of moral reasoning.  The law also draws a detailed boundary about 
what constitutes the society over whose well-being the business 
community must be concerned.  But laws are not perfect; in many 
cases they show both an obsolescence and a vagueness that bring 
consternation to business decision makers.
679
 
 
It seems likely that those who stress the importance of adhering to 
the letter of the law when conflicts involving business arise – 
rather than considering the spirit, intentions, or purpose behind the 
law – are comfortable with Stage Four reasoning (the so-called law 
and order stage).
680
 
 
Each approach has a downfall, as does those behaving in Kohlberg‘s stage four.  St. Paul 
succinctly summarizes the inadvertent drawback of stage four in Second Corinthians 3:6, 
namely that – according to one interpretation of the passage as ―our qualification comes 
from God, who has indeed qualified us as ministers of a new covenant, not of letter but of 
spirit,‖ – the spirit of the law matters.681 
The most obvious sign of a person‘s transition to Kohlberg‘s stage five reasoning 
is a scope that now accounts for the spirit of the law.  French and Granrose have a 
potentially disproportionate focus on decision-making they term as ‗cost/benefit 
analysis.‘  They base their observations off of a comment by Kohlberg that persons at 
stage five go beyond laws, duties, and obligations and begin to consider overall utility.
682
  
Perchance it would be best to honor the spirit of Kohlberg‘s statement rather than the 
letter of it.  It seems more likely that Kohlberg intended to express that the scope of the 
stage five person goes beyond the law to a basic understanding of the common good, not 
that individuals suddenly develop comprehensive, consequential reasoning in stage five.  
Laws may contribute to the common good, but they are not the totality of the common 
good.  Furthermore, stage five persons exhibit congruence between a cycle of thought-
behavior-justification not seen in other stages: 
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Stage Five behavior implies rights as well as correlative 
responsibilities.  If one goes beyond or against the traditional 
moral norm in the name of individual autonomous rights, it is his 
or her concurrent responsibility to reasonably justify his or her 
actions in terms of enhancing societal rather than person (Stage 
Two) well-being.  This is the obligation under the social contract 
of the justice that allows such behavior.
683
   
 
A business example of stage five reasoning ‗in action‘ provided in Practical Business 
Ethics is someone who is a whistleblower.  In the authors‘ estimation, the case‘s 
circumstances determine if the whistleblower‘s development stage is four, five, or six.684  
They do not go into detail, but whistleblowing in itself does reflect postconventional 
reasoning (stages five and six).  For instance, someone in stage four reasoning may work 
entirely within the legal framework for whistleblowing from identification to the process 
itself, which not only demonstrates rote adherence to the law (a hallmark of stage four 
reasoning), it depicts risk-averseness that high stages do not.  It is, for example, much 
more risky to be a whistleblower when a practice meets industry (i.e. regulatory, legal) 
standards, and the whistleblower argues that the practice does not meet good ethical 
standards, or that the industry standard is unethical.  Besides, strict adherence to the legal 
process of whistleblowing does not present the personal risk of bypassing the legal to do 
moral good in the interest of others and at the expense of self. 
Stage six behaviors, generally and in the business setting, epitomize our ideals of 
equity, justice, and fairness.  Moral judgment and reasoning have little to do with the 
expectations of others and more to do with internal guides, whether they are values, 
goals, consequences, obligations, principles, analogous cases (i.e. comparative, 
contrasting, casuist), relationships, or other ethics frameworks:
685
 
[Stage six persons are] (1) more motivated by autonomously 
arrived-at personal goals with a societal orientation than by 
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imposed social rules or totally self-focused concerns, (2) more 
motivated by long-term consequences than by short-term 
consequences, and (3) more motivated by universal principles than 
by calculations of utility.
686
 
 
They are not lofty ideals, but congruent with actions.  The scope of stage six persons is 
immense; their moral compass is even more expansive than stage five persons, with the 
flourishing of society always in mind as well as noted appreciation for the decision‘s 
impact on people.  Decisions do not have the same impact on people (e.g. primary 
stakeholders, secondary stakeholders), and stage six persons consider this in their 
judgments and reasoning.
687
  The ensuing passage describes the methods of 
communication with stage six persons: 
The individual at Stage Six is likely to engage in what Habermas 
labels Discursive Communication [emphasis in the original] to 
resolve conflict.  This form may be contrasted to Ordinary or self-
serving Strategic Communication.  Kurtines has isolated separate 
types of Discursive Communicative action that flesh out 
Habermas‘s concept: (1) Reflective action by which we make 
explicit to the other party our understanding of the facts underlying 
that person‘s position.  (2) Reflective action by which we state in 
explicit terms to the other party where we understand are the 
principles underlying that person‘s position. (3) Integrative action 
by which we attempt to establish a new shared mutual 
understanding with the other person, based on facts and 
principles.
688
 
 
Although not specified in the passage, those in stage six know how to master the 
communication process such that these steps adapt to every situation with deference to 
timing, style (e.g. assertive, ‗laid back‘), and setting. 
IIC. Gilligan Level Behaviors 
Behavior may look different when considering it from Gilligan‘s framework, 
which emphasizes relations.  Level one persons think there is not an answer that is more 
correct than another because they do not know how to respond to situations outside of 
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their experience.
689
  Gilligan‘s first level is similar to Alasdair MacIntyre‘s argument in 
After Virtue that humankind has fractured into various moral camps or traditions that 
need reconstruction.  The loss of an ultimate human telos reduces normative ethics to an 
exercise in subjectivism or emotivism.
690
  In essence, people have lost a shared, common 
moral structure, which is analogous because people in Gilligan‘s first level lack a mutual, 
joint appreciation for issues outside of their experience.  An example of a level one 
woman in Gilligan‘s studies was an eighteen-year-old who was asked about her views 
and normative position on abortion.  She responded, ―‗there was no right decision‘‖ about 
the issue because she had not been and did not want to be pregnant.
691
 
Persons in Gilligan‘s second level will go along with others in a group situation, 
even if the majority of others disagree with those persons‘ opinion. The tyranny of the 
majority rules in this stage as the preservation of relationships through socially 
conformist behavior outweighs ‗sticking out of a crowd,‘ dissent, and even recognized 
(but unsupported or unpopular) injustice.  The authors of Student Development in College 
provide an example of two young women who believe that the intramural volleyball team 
has become too competitive (intramural sports are for fun and recreation only).  
Additionally, one of the two young women believes that her lifelong friend, Vanessa, 
should be able to join the team.  Both women, however, initially have trouble speaking up 
to the team about their views, knowing that other members of the intramural volleyball 
team feel differently about both issues.
692
  On one hand and of relevance to cooperation 
discussions, does agreement about perspectives and courses-of-action truly reflect a 
genuine and sympathetic agreement between the will and intent of an individual?  On the 
other hand, is the connection between the will and intent of an individual weak because 
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the disposition of the will is not absolute equity, but the egoistic approval of a group?  
The disciplines of philosophy and theology have attempted to discern the will and intent 
for thousands of years; much remains unknown despite the effort.  The prospect exists 
that altering the size and constituency of the group – by breaking it up into smaller groups 
for instance – may change the dynamic for Gilligan‘s level two individuals. 
Just as Kohlberg‘s higher stages, those in Gilligan‘s third level demonstrate 
reflective equilibrium, meaning that relationships fit into a congruent structure between 
higher-order beliefs and practical judgments and behaviors.  Level three persons 
understand the duty to care, as this relates to cooperation, in the broadest way possible, 
including the role of self.  This may require subverting personal interests for the group, or 
standing up for what is correct, despite personal risk.  Either way, the greatest violation 
for someone in this level is being disingenuous to one‘s beliefs, even if this immediately 
strains some relationships.
693
 Using the above example, the Student Development in 
College authors point out that both women involved with the intramural volleyball league 
initially have trouble speaking out and ‗going against the grain.‘  However, one 
eventually does:
694
 
[She moves] beyond her individual desire.  She chooses to speak 
out in favor of accepting Vanessa onto the volleyball team at the 
risk of other members‘ rejection.  [She] rejects the unstated criteria 
for membership on the volleyball team, which [other members] 
adhere to, and makes a strong appeal to disregard them and include 
Vanessa on the team.
695
 
 
The selfish egocentrism of before has been replaced with overarching moral ideologies, 
methodologies, decisions, and behaviors.   
 
III. Understanding the Application of Cooperation as a Function of Moral 
Development 
 251 
IIIA. Moral Agency Discerns Wrongdoing and Applying Cooperation Distinctions 
(Lexical Matrix Components) Requires Discernment 
 
 It is central to understand how cooperation is a function of moral development.  
Moral agency discerns wrongdoing in different ways.  As illustrated above, moral agents 
discern or perceive evil, injustice, or wrongdoing differently.  Furthermore, agents justify 
thoughts and reasoning in disparate ways.  An organization‘s moral agency is a 
composite of its associates‘ development and exercise of agency.  Therefore, fostering 
moral development assists organizational agency and discernment.
696
 
Applying cooperation requires discernment on the part of moral agents.
697
    It 
reflects an agent‘s moral development.  One may exhibit that person‘s framing of 
cooperation by using the statements about moral stages given above.  Relating this back 
to organizations, interpreting the application organizational material cooperation is 
reflective of its individual associates‘ development. 
IIIB. Discernment Functions to Identify Evil, Injustice, and Wrongdoing as well as Apply 
Categories of Cooperation 
 
Both theoretical and real examples exist of agents reflecting their moral 
development while discerning cooperation.  Exploring the theory first, someone asked to 
use cooperation in Kohlberg‘s stage one may question the benefit of using the 
cooperation.  He or she may ask, ―What‘s in it for me?‖  Someone in Kohlberg‘s first 
stage may display unease around changes to defined standards, including how 
cooperation fits into or deviates from those standards, as well as wish to defer to the norm 
or what has been done in the past that this may deviate from.  A corresponding question 
is, ―Why would we do this if we didn‘t get into trouble before?‖  Angst or concern for 
getting into trouble while applying cooperation may surface.  It is possible that some 
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persons in Kohlberg‘s stage one need to be told what is right or wrong.  Trying to discern 
such matters for one‘s self becomes a daunting and intimidating matter.698  
Those using cooperation in Kohlberg‘s second stage will exhibit concern for 
associating with something that may or may not be bad, look for rewards such as money 
and prestige in exchange for participating in assessments using cooperation, and seek 
relatively equal benefit for time and money burdens, either in process or as a result using 
cooperation.  Persons in Kohlberg‘s second stage will not like the idea that a form of 
cooperation could be formal cooperation or immediate material cooperation, which are 
impermissible.  The obvious method for minimizing negative consequences is to avoid 
participation or the use of cooperation altogether for persons in this stage.  Egoistic 
pragmatism also expresses persons in the second stage.  One may question, ―What‘s in it 
for me if I participate in this discussion of cooperation?  Do I receive remuneration or 
comp time?‖699 
Moral agents using cooperation in stage three will craft compromises to appease 
stakeholders.  Doing good is appeasement, making themselves and respected stakeholders 
happy, not taking action with the recognition that pleasing everyone is not always an 
option.  Stage three persons want to know the opinions and expectations of persons that 
the agent respects with respect to the cooperation issue.  After all, one must know how to 
appease someone, meaning what the boundaries and parameters are for making a person 
happy, before doing so.  Persons in this stage often exhibit personal unease with 
nonconformists, disagreements resulting from cooperation discernments themselves, or 
lacks of definitional uniformity.
700
  Nonconformists represent precisely the items stage 
three persons seek to avoid – dissent or disagreement is uncomfortable.  The wish to 
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evade uncomfortable situations extends to instances when people do not agree, but they 
also do not disagree, often referred to as ‗agreeing to disagree.‘  For instance, one person 
agrees that an issue is unjust while another dismisses it as a justice issue, labeling it as an 
unfortunate circumstance that nobody can control.  After a discussion, the two persons 
involved in the definitional disparity simply agree to disagree.  The tension resulting from 
this leaves others uncomfortable.  
Those in stage four, social system morality, can be fiercely systematic.  They 
could insist on a uniform process for triggering cooperation discernment and procedure 
for using cooperation.  The idea that cooperation discernments only have rough 
frameworks and may proceed in any number of different directions is unnerving.  
Because they are intensely methodical, stage four persons would appreciate, for example 
Hamel and Panicola‘s structured cooperation questions in Health Progress.  Skipping 
questions, even irrelevant ones, and revising questions generates anxiety.  They believe 
that doing what is right, potentially resulting from cooperation discernment, should not 
break a laws, codes, policies, and procedures (strict principlism, rule utilitarianism).  For 
instance, it is better to have a member of the legal counsel check into relevant laws 
surrounding the donation of food and emergency supplies after a local, natural disaster 
than going to the immediate aid of persons in need.  With cooperation, stage four persons 
will create scales, systems, and procedures for assessing the gravity of evil, levels of 
injustice, or use of cooperation.  They will not deal with nonconformists – meaning those 
who will violate laws and rules to do the right thing (e.g. those in higher stages of 
development) – well.701  
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The few persons who advance to Kohlberg‘s stage five will realize that different 
people discern cooperation issues dissimilarly and discernment depends upon the 
evaluator‘s values.  Disagreement is not failure, despite its discomfort.  She or he will not 
let regulations or rules, such as organization and system policies, get in the way of doing 
what is right.  Stage five persons notice the existence of other injustices and associations 
with evil along the way, meaning while in process.  To provide an example, a cooperation 
issue examines the injustice of closing a halfway house in the inner city – a noble 
purpose.  Meanwhile, stakeholders attend the discernment, but they are cut off and 
drowned out by a highly focal majority in the meeting.  Stakeholders have not been able 
to get a word in edgewise, much less adequately represent a difficult and contrary opinion 
– a flawed process.  People in stage five will perceive the complexity of some scenarios, 
but not necessarily let the difficulty dissuade one from doing what is right, while insisting 
that some values outweigh others, even to the point of standing out against the crowd.
702
  
Stage six persons will be fair and equitable to all parties during the cooperation 
discernment process, which includes making sure the appropriate stakeholders are ‗at the 
table.‘  In other words, fair process has a wide scope encompassing stakeholders who 
others may not recognize as such.  This is because he or she understands that interpreting 
concepts, such as the common good, needs to be in the broadest sense possible.  The use 
of cooperation in this way is an opportunity to correct other injustices and associations 
with evil noticed along the way, meaning those things noticed while in process.  Being 
fair and equitable to everyone at every stage means being fluid and adaptable to changes 
during processes and the reevaluation of results.  The few persons who reach Kohlberg‘s 
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stage six understand that following one‘s conscience can come at extreme personal risk 
and act despite the threat of harm.
703
 
Predictable responses in the application of cooperation also accompany Gilligan‘s 
theory and levels.  Those persons, as her theory applies to women and men, in her first 
level will not know how to respond to a cooperation dilemma that they do not connect 
with themselves for any number of reasons.  Participants in the first level may experience 
disconnect because Catholic teaching does not resonate, the evil or injustice does not 
have import, or the affected stakeholders experience is not commensurate.  They may not 
understand the complexity of a particular cooperation issue, especially with situations the 
agent has not encountered.  Their ontological discomfort with others applies to the 
discernment of issues outside their experience, meaning that they could be aloof or 
disquieted by many of the alien cooperation topics.  For example, in a cooperation 
discernment (or many other settings), a woman born into privilege – consisting of wealth, 
education, and limitless resources – in Gilligan‘s first level will not connect with the 
underprivileged person whose misfortune was exacerbated by poor organizational 
decision-making. 
It is Gilligan‘s second level that applies to those persons who submit to a certain 
group-think or peer pressure, which causes them to relegate their own interests in favor of 
the majority.  Behaviors such of these have implications for group settings such as the 
model for applying cooperation advanced by this dissertation.  Not taking views during 
cooperation discernment that seem contrary to the group (because they may sever 
relationships) means that the setting for the scope of harm is still, largely, the individual 
and his or her ‗inner circle‘ of relationships.  Using consequentialism, the scope of 
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pleasure/pain, happiness/unhappiness, and benefits/burdens is not comprehensive enough 
for a neutral balancing.  Level two persons already have weighted the scale.  Women and 
men in this level will assume a position contrary to that person‘s actual view or 
perspective (incongruent thought and action) to keep the peace or ‗save face‘ in a 
cooperation discernment.  These situations present a challenge for cooperation 
discernment facilitators, as these women and men may need isolation from others in order 
to educe their authentic opinion and reasoning. 
Persons in the third level who participate in this model of cooperation will be 
attentive to the group‘s interpersonal dynamics, potentially even challenging those who 
seem disingenuous or detached.  They will understand the duty to care, as this relates to 
cooperation, in the broadest way possible, including the role of self.  A more objective, 
broad-scope utilitarianism for determining the best action replaces the narrow-scope or 
weighted-to-self utilitarianism of the second level.  They may resolve disputes and 
differences in ways that do not exclude self or the group.  These third level persons are 
useful in many ways, which consist of helpfulness in shaping or revising the model itself 
so it is even more inclusive and just.  
Advanced stages or levels per Kohlberg and Gilligan may be challenging for 
those organizing and facilitating the proposed model for non-traditional reasons.  They 
may not fully appreciate the process for reasons of fairness, inclusiveness, objectivity, 
sensitivity, and relationship building.  Suggestions for improvement may accompany 
their interpretation.  For instance, it may be insincere and uncaring to bring in the poor 
and underserved persons who were disadvantaged by the initiative in question while not 
making appropriate accommodations for them.   Food, transportation, and methods of 
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remuneration are reasonable to avoid inadvertent nonmaleficence, or the obligation not to 
harm,
704
 even while attempting to serve justice.  Higher stage and level persons will 
notice incongruities throughout the process, which others may not observe or address. 
Organizations are replete with examples of moral agents who exhibit their levels 
of moral development in group situations.  For instance, the director of spirituality in an 
organization begins weekly worship services.  She offers an orientation session for 
colleagues who would like to lead the services.  At the end of the leader training session, 
a young man discloses that he has trouble with the idea of inclusive language in worship 
and liturgy.  His reasoning is that ―it alters the Word of God.‖  The director of spirituality 
points out that, historically, the Bible was not transcribed immediately after the life of 
Jesus, nor was it written as an entire work.  Furthermore, there are many different 
versions of the Bible (i.e. King James Bible, New American Bible), which were 
translated into English.  He seemed to acknowledge this, but later articulates five 
passages in his version of the Bible, including Deuteronomy 4:2 and Galatians 1:9-10, 
which address altering the word of God or the Lord.  The director responds that she will 
print the words with revised inclusive language on the bulletin, so he does not participate 
in the alteration of Biblical passages.  He seems to accept this compromise.  Still, when 
she asks him to read a passage during the worship service, he takes out his different 
version of the Bible and reads directly from it to the confusion of the worship 
participants. 
Arguably, these behaviors all may demonstrate this young man‘s level of 
development.  His discomfort with breaking rules, unease with nonconformity (probably 
because this is different from his faith tradition), and systematic approach reveal a 
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Kohlberg level two – stage three or stage four – reasoning.  From Gilligan‘s theory, he 
does not seem to appreciate the feelings of others, those who may prefer inclusive 
language for instance, or the confusion of the participants.  This may reveal that he is in 
Gilligan‘s first level of relationships because he seems to disassociate with the things that 
he does not have experience in or comfort with. 
Another example, as told by The Catholic Health Association, involves a diocese 
that associated charitable gifts and fundraisers for a philanthropic group as being immoral 
because of purported, but not verified, associations with evil.  The diocese prohibited any 
association.  It did so without any investigation as to the specifics of the situation.  The 
prohibition seemed to be a reaction to others‘ fears without investigation into the 
particulars.
705
  No discernment, in fact, seemed to take place. 
This event, rote reaction without discernment and reflection, appears to exemplify 
Kohlberg‘s first level of preconventional morality because they promote following the 
rules as it is in the interest of the diocese to do so.
706
  Rome (i.e. the authority conferred 
by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church) will not question the reasoning and justifications 
of the diocese if it avoids the appearance of impropriety through a categorical ban.  This 
is a textbook example of Kohlberg‘s stage two, instrumental morality. 
Some considerations about exhibiting moral development while applying 
cooperation relate to organizational uses of cooperation as opposed to individual uses of 
cooperation.  A definitive threshold does not exist for officially categorizing something 
as a certain kind of cooperation.  Examining an issue is not a utilitarian calculus, nor is it 
simply acting in accord with duty or principles: 
There are more than practical reasons, however, as to why all of 
the actions of a corporation can not be reducible to individual 
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actions.  There are philosophical reasons as well, having to do with 
the nature of a corporation as a collective entity.  There is 
something called collective corporate action even though the actors 
are individuals who make individual contributions to the collective 
action.  But one individual action in itself is not sufficient to 
produce a collective action.  In a collective action is mixed with 
others and transformed into an action or policy of the organization.  
Because of this process of transformation the collective action of 
the corporation is quite different from the primary inputs of any of 
the individual contributors.  In principle, at least, it is possible for 
an immoral collective action to be the result of a mixture of moral 
primary actions, this making the moral evaluation of corporate 
actions different from the moral evaluation of individuals within 
the corporation who played a role in the action.
707
 
 
Policies themselves demonstrate the convolution of the organizational machine.  They are 
not the result of one person, but demonstrate another form of collective action.  All these 
factors along with the size and intricacy of organizations make it difficult to assign the 
apposite responsibility to the appropriate individuals within the organization.
708
 
Other difficulties subsist, but there cause for hope.  Barriers in group situations 
include fear, wish for privacy, inability to confess and change failures, and failure to 
acknowledge vulnerabilities, proving once again that organizational agency is more than 
the sum of individual agencies.  Individuals can affect organizational change through the 
cultivation of improvement.  Change is the facilitation of others‘ learning, which is 
dependent on our own consciousness and willingness to make our own actions open to 
inquiry.  Improvement means that we learn that we have roles in evils and injustices 
associated with our organization, the ability to make a difference (agency), recognize our 
own role in the development of others, and respond accordingly, which means that 
actions correspond with preferences. 
An illustration of the difficulty of the barriers mentioned above is a series of 
events that unfolded with a health system of a program called Higher Ground.  
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Facilitators asked participants in Higher Ground, a series designed to enhance their 
spirituality and formation, to disclose something personal that no other work associates 
knew about them.  This made participants nervous, as the instructions were interpreted as 
a mandate to expose private information.  One uncomfortable associate disclosed she had 
an abortion.  Her discomfort later manifested as paranoia, feeling that her coworkers 
judged her and treated her differently based on her disclosure. 
IIIC. Conclusion 
Some specifications about the developmental theories deserve attention.  A 
common reaction to the two theories is that they are antagonistic or contrast one another.  
This is not so.  Gilligan was, indeed, a reaction to Kohlberg, but even according to 
Gilligan, her theory does not invalidate Kohlberg‘s.  They are complimentary.  Men and 
women use both care and justice in their reasoning and justifications, proving that both 
theories are relevant.
709
 
Researchers continue to examine relationships and discernment with various 
different methods and instruments, some described below.  One particular area of interest 
is the worldwide, cross-cultural character of the theories.  Do they apply to everyone in 
every society?  For instance, Gilligan has expanded her studies beyond the original 
sample of predominantly white women of privilege in order to examine the cultural 
differences inherent in relationships and development.  Some findings related to the DIT 
have been validated in other countries besides the United States, perhaps giving a certain 
amount of the credibility of Kohlberg‘s stages as universal and invariant. 
Both Kohlberg and Gilligan had assessment instruments for their theories.  
Generally, psychological or developmental assessment instruments gauge or measure a 
 261 
person‘s stage or level, type, or approach.710  Assessments in developmental research 
have challenges and limitations.  As many go beyond linear answers (e.g. true/false, 
multiple choice, etc.), scoring and understanding responses requires dedicated training 
and experience.  The amount or number of reliable and valid instruments is small, 
especially when assessing particular aspects of development.  It would be rare to have a 
choice of three to five instruments to measure an aspect of development; for instance, 
there are only three main measures of gay, lesbian, and bisexual identity development – 
the Cass‘s Stage Allocation Measure, Cass‘s Homosexual Identity Questionnaire (HIQ), 
and Brady‘s Gay Identity Questionnaire (GIQ).711  The authors of Student Development 
in College specify some other difficulties with developmental assessment instruments: 
Often, [assessment instruments] must be individually administered 
and hand-scored.  These are costly and time-intensive procedures 
that limit the number of participants in studies.  For many theories, 
no standanrdized instruments exist to test related propositions and 
hypotheses.  For other theories, such as that of Chickering, existing 
instruments relate to only certain components of the theory.  To 
compound the problem further, some existing instruments are 
becoming dated.  For example, the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 
1986a) includes a dilemma that references the Students for a 
Democratic Society, an organization active in the 1960s that many 
individuals today would not recognize.  Obviously, the lack of 
appropriate instrumentation limits how research is conducted and 
what can be studied.
712
 
 
Kohlberg and Gilligan‘s assessment instruments are not immune from the inherent 
difficulties just described. 
Two instruments are available for determining a person‘s level or stage of moral 
reasoning per Kohlberg and the corresponding theory from Rest.  Incidentally, the same 
theorists, Kohlberg and Rest, constructed corresponding assessment instruments, namely 
Rest‘s Defining Issues Test (DIT) and Kohlberg‘s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). 
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Rest completed design of the DIT in 1986.  It is a written estimation of moral 
reasoning using six hypothetical dilemmas that respondents read and rank.  Each situation 
has twelve statements that accompany them, with each statement exhibiting an 
interpretation and way of reasoning in response to the predicament.  The instrument 
instructs participants to appraise and hierarchically position statements in order of 
importance or most to least appropriate reasoning.  Every statement connects to Rest‘s 
stage descriptions.  Weighted ranks are the bases for determining a percentage of 
reasoning at each level and a p score, which has the highest reliability and validity, in the 
.70s and .80s range, among all test-scoring mechanisms.  By no means are test-retest 
reliabilities in the .70s and .80s exemplary.  Accordingly, Rest was cautious about 
overemphasizing minor changes in repeat tests of the DIT.
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The year after Rest (1987), Kohlberg issued the final version of the MJI, an 
instrument that has three analogous versions and scoring systems that underwent three 
revisions.  The arrangement is a structured written or verbal interview with respondents 
where each format (i.e. three version) has three hypothetical quandaries.  Each problem 
demonstrates a conflict between moral issues where some challenge participants to 
decide between two seemingly bad options.  The converse is true, as well, meaning that 
the instrument forces participants to pick one of two equivalently good options.
714
  An 
example follows: 
[The Heinz dilemma places] the value of preserving life and the 
value of upholding the law [into] conflict…, in which a husband 
must decide whether to steal a drug to save his wife‘s life when the 
druggist is charging more for the drug than the husband can pay.  
Other conflicts [in the MJI] include conscience versus punishment 
and authority versus contract.
715
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Between nine and twelve standardized questions are together with each dilemma in order 
to elicit participants‘ explanations, rationalizations, and elucidations.  For this reason, 
theorists and researchers prefer the verbal interview, as it allows investigators (i.e. the 
person or persons conducting the interview) to clarify a subject‘s responses if any 
ambiguity exists.  As stated above, there have been three revisions to the MJI scoring 
system, with the final version labeled Standard Issue Scoring, which does not have 
guidelines for stage six thinking since none of the subjects in Kohlberg‘s research 
reached this level of reasoning.  Not only did the scoring undergo three revisions, there 
are three different procedures for arriving at a final score.  For instance, one of the 
versions provides a mixed or cusp stage score, where persons can be in two stages at the 
same time (e.g. stages one/two, stages three/four).  The subsequent passage relates to the 
reliability and validity of the MJI: 
Colby and Kohlberg (1987) reported very good to excellent test-
retest reliability (high .90s), alternate form reliability (.95), and 
interrater reliability (.98) for the MJI.  Walker (1988) and Colby 
and Kohlberg (1987) have demonstrated construct validity, in the 
form of invariant stage sequence and consistency of stage usage 
across moral issues.
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Before attending to Gilligan‘s assessment instruments, some stipulations are in 
order with respect to the DIT and MJI, both individually and as they relate together.  
Concentrating on the latter first, a modest association exists between the DIT and MJI, at 
.70s for varied (i.e. heterogeneous) samples and less for the same, identical (i.e. 
homogeneous) samples.  Rest felt that it is easier for participants to understand and 
concur with statements than to create an unguided response.  At least one research team 
provides data that corroborates Rest‘s reflection.  This team found that DIT scores are, 
time and again, more diverse and susceptible to change when compared with MJI, which 
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reflects sluggish stage movement with a typical peak of stage four before midlife.  With 
respect to each test individually, other measures – ones assessing moral concept 
understandings, legalism and ordered society attitudes, and political open-mindedness – 
have a moderate correlation with the DIT.  A pertinent different between the DIT and 
MJI is that the DIT, on one hand, relies on recognition, where participants read moral 
dilemmas and then select a written response that aligns best with their reasoning.  The 
MJI, on the other hand, depends upon recognition, or the participant reacting instinctively 
to questions about the verbal or written moral dilemmas.
717
   
A number of formal assessments, including verbal interviews with intricate 
scoring and written tests, existed in order to recognize and determine various care 
approaches.  One of Gilligan‘s students, Nona Lyons, was the initial person to create a 
systematic, empirical test specifically for Gilligan‘s theory in the early 1980s.  She 
developed dependable, assessable conditions to correlate self-perception and moral 
reasoning.  An improvement in the early 1990s was the Ethic of Care Interview (ECI), 
which was conceived and expanded to refine the assessment of moral reasoning such that 
it coincided with the levels and transitions in Gilligan‘s Theory of Moral Development.  
The inventory‘s format was an interview where facilitators ask participants to express 
their reactions to four dilemmas.  One is a genuine, real dilemma and the other three are 
theoretical, hypothetical dilemmas.  Scoring of the responses corresponds to Gilligan‘s 
three levels and two transitions, such that answers fall into one of five categories (i.e. 
one, one-and-a-half, two, two-and-a-half, and three).  Studies testing the validity of the 
ECI generated an interrater reliability range from .78 to .96 with one untrained and two 
trained female raters with, in the original study, eighty-six female, undergraduate student 
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volunteers.  A correlate was found between Gilligan‘s level of development, as 
established through the ECI, and an theory of identity development, called Marcia‘s four 
levels of identity development (diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achievement).
718
 
Modifications to testing instruments and methods allowed for the investigation of 
identity, moral relationships, and moral reasoning derived from Kohlberg‘s and 
Gilligan‘s theories with both men and women.  For instance, Skoe and Diessner 
administered the MJI, ECI, and Marcia‘s Measure of Ego Identity Status to 134 (76 
female and 58 male) predominantly white high school and university (ages 17 to 30) 
students within the Boston area in 1994.  When researchers examined the test results, 
they found that Marcia‘s identity status was a better correlate of ECI and MJI scores than 
chronological age for men and women.  A few researchers developed and improved the 
Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO) during the early and mid-1990s.
719
  It was targeted 
for ―traditional-aged college students, … was designed to be easy to administer and 
score, [and] … is the only paper-and-pencil instrument designed to measure justice and 
care.‖720  It was revised in the mid- to late 1990s, which included enhancing the scoring 
through, for example, the removal of a moral problem. The following section addresses 
the structure of the MMO itself: 
The instrument measures preference for care or justice responses to 
moral problems through a series of nine moral dilemmas.  Each 
dilemma includes an option to choose a care or justice orientation.  
Participants choose from a four-point Likert scale (strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree) in 
response to each option.  The instrument also measures [the] 
―respondent‘s perception of himself or herself as caring or just‖ 
(Liddell et al., 1992, p. 327) through a twelve-item self-description 
questionnaire.
721
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A stipulation is that the MMO does not measure Kohlberg‘s and Gilligan‘s moral 
development stages; it does, however, heighten the awareness of students aged in their 
late teens and early twenties to the idea that morality involves both justice and care.  The 
MMO is a reliable measure of an individual‘s interpretation of a state of affairs (i.e. a 
measure of moral sensitivity).
722
 
Arguably, measurements of development are imperative; still they are not the 
preferred or desired end of moral behavior.  Doing more good (doing better) nor moral 
development are for the purpose of ‗teaching to the test‘ or getting better scores on an 
inventory.  Morality is inherently a social enterprise.  Moral development is for the 
betterment of others and self – benefiting society, which also betters the person.  Ideally, 
people demonstrate moral behavior in their actions and behaviors, not just their thoughts.  
Moral reasoning and moral behavior were correlated at higher developmental stages for 
Kohlberg.  Others, with some exceptions discussed in the next chapter, validate 
associations between moral reasoning and moral behavior.
723
 
In conclusion, this chapter began by establishing moral development as a 
foundation for the moral agency to identify wrongdoing through, among other things, 
establishing and examining the appropriate development theories.  The next the task was 
the alignment of moral development with discernment and organizational agency, which 
required a more detailed exploration of individuals‘ behaviors, many of them in an 
organizational setting, with the corresponding Kohlberg stages and Gilligan levels.  
Finally, going from theory to application, the chapter concludes by ‗drilling down‘ 
specific behaviors within the context of applying cooperation within a group, 
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organizational setting in order to understand the application of material cooperation as a 
function of moral development.   
Both literally and metaphorically, this represents a ‗new chapter‘ of this 
dissertation.  The literal meaning of new chapter is obvious.  A brief review about the 
progression of the dissertation provides context for the metaphoric meaning.  This 
dissertation began with the cultural milieu of health care, generally, and Catholic health 
care, specifically.  Chapter one framed the historical and contemporary problems facing 
Catholic health care, which include the need for formation within relevant traditions and 
moral engagement and development in order to make values and principles congruent 
with behaviors.  The principle of cooperation was introduced and nuanced as a 
mechanism to analyze collective behaviors and relationships in chapter two.  The chapter 
concluded with individual applications of cooperation.  Chapter three was a smooth segue 
from chapter two because it discussed the nature of organizational agency, namely that 
groups and institutions act as organizational agents, as well as organizational applications 
of cooperation.  This chapter shifted gears in the ways mentioned above to address moral 
development and moral interventions.  It is now feasible and appropriate to recommend a 
model using cooperation for addressing and assisting the moral formation of stakeholders 
after having resolved that the use of and implementation of material cooperation is a 
function of moral development. 
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Chapter Five –The Contribution of Material Cooperation as a Function 
of Moral Development for Ministry Formation 
 
 
Whereas chapter three served as a bookend to chapter two, this chapter, chapter five, is 
particularly complimentary to the previous chapter, chapter four.  Differently stated, this 
chapter discusses interventions generally and a model for cooperation as a function of 
moral development for ministry formation in specific.  This chapter was based on 
foundations established in the previous chapters and especially the groundwork of moral 
development and the application of the cooperation as a form of moral development in 
the last chapter.  Knowing commonly how, what, where, why, and to whom interventions 
apply must precede the establishment and description of this exact intervention. 
This chapter divides into the segments mentioned above.  First, the chapter 
situates the model for ministry formation and ministry discernment, which includes 
further specifications about ministry formation and ministry discernment, qualifying the 
likely effects and character implications of this and similar interventions, and stipulating 
the benefits of using cooperation for moral formation and discernment.  Second, the 
chapter proposes a specific model using cooperation for ministry formation and ministry 
discernment, which necessitates attention to the model‘s structure, roles of those involved 
with the model, and process. 
 
I. Situating the Model for Ministry Formation and Ministry Discernment 
The latter part of this chapter builds upon the former portion, similar to the 
foundations from former chapters serving this chapter.  For this reason, this section is 
more empirical and oriented to interventions generally, as opposed to the next section that 
uses the observations in the literature to construct a particular intervention.  To this end, 
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this section begins by defining and describing the similarities and differences between 
formation, ministry formation, discernment, and ministry discernment.  The next task is 
to position Kohlberg and Gilligan‘s theories amidst the complexity of reasoning, 
behaviors, and measurements.  Subsequently, moral interventions are ‗thrown into the 
mix,‘ or roux, of moral thoughts and actions.  Folding in the face of such complexity and 
challenges is to abdicate our duty as moral teachers and ignore the utility of cooperation 
for formation and discernment.  Cooperation‘s characteristics as a postmodern concept in 
a modern principle‘s ‗clothing‘ are portions of what enables its utility. 
IA. Introduction 
Beginning with definitions for ministry formation and ministry discernment is 
appropriate groundwork for a chapter about material cooperation as a model for 
advancing formation and discernment if not moral development.  Formation is an 
indoctrination or inculcation into a particular system or way of thinking.  At least one 
theorist argues that formation involves the recognition and acceptance of moral agency, 
the development and improvement of ethical deliberation skills, as well as shaping and 
configuration of conscience.  Formation is a constant process, meaning that the 
conscience is both the product of past formation and will be the effect of current and 
future formation.
724
  As it relates to morality, formation is ―laying down a path which 
leads to coherence in understanding and interpreting the world, living in the story, 
allowing it to become the framework of one‘s own worldview and shaping life within its 
horizon.‖725  Just as every act has a moral component, all actions and exchanges form 
moral conscience, character, and decision-making.
726
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Thus, ministry formation is about becoming steeped in the beliefs, traditions, 
rituals, history, ethos and morality, and behaviors, called charisms, of a hospital system‘s 
founding congregations.  This involves a responsible negotiation between respecting 
Church teaching and development of one‘s own conscience and exercising it according to 
sponsors‘ charisms.727  Material from the Sisters of Mercy Health System‘s Advanced 
Formation Program also describes the ministry formation process: 
(Organization name) has defined formation as a continuous process 
for leaders to assess and deepen their understanding of and 
commitment to the healing ministry of Jesus in the spirit and 
charism of (Organization name).  As part of (Organization name) 
formation, this developmental initiative is intentionally and 
specifically focused on formation of participants, that is, it will 
assist leaders in modeling the (Organization name) mission and 
values and integrating our Catholic / Christian identity into 
decisions, behaviors, and organizational activities.   
 
Formation shapes and orients an individual‘s life, identity, and 
heart for ministry.  The format of sessions, therefore, will be 
different from other leadership meetings. Leaders will meet 
consistently with a small group of peers. Sessions are designed to 
enable leaders to reflect on their experience, expand their 
knowledge and understanding in the context of their abiding 
convictions and commitments, pray together, engage their 
heart/emotions, and identify ways in which the content will effects 
their behavior and decisions as a Mercy leader. 
 
Since this program is meant to be formative in nature, it will focus 
on increasing knowledge, and deepening abiding convictions and 
aligning one‘s behavior with (Organization name) values.  
Sessions will include educational content, experiential learning, 
integration of knowledge and application in daily work, discussion 
and faith development.
728
   
 
The intended audience for the above material is ministry leadership.  One does not need 
to occupy a leadership role, though, to be the recipient of ministry formation (i.e. to be 
formed).  It applies to anyone who is a stakeholder in the organization, its mission, or its 
values.  Formation is a more expansive category than mere education because it involves 
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shaping character in addition to providing information.  In formation, information (the 
pun notwithstanding), events, and experiences combine to, ideally, change character such 
that information and behavior processes reflect the content of information, events, and 
experiences. 
Transcendent formation is when the indoctrination or inculcation alters the 
participant.  This kind of formation concentrates on symbols and encourages transcendent 
acts.  Such acts may encourage corresponding character dispositions.  Character 
formation inherently involves the definition of exploration of roles between a person, and 
his or her uniqueness, and community.  Transformation inherently implies congruence 
between dispositions and behaviors, meaning that people show integration of the 
transformation in the internal and external realms.  Finally, there is harmony between 
character dispositions as a result of transformation.
729
 
Discernment positions towards decision-making that best reflects morals, values, 
and relationships.  It is a process that helps users interpret right or moral behavior 
according to Christian understandings of persons and society.
730
  At least one author 
suggests that the Bible reflects the contemporary understanding of discernment in at least 
two different passages.  First, Solomon prays for discernment in 1 Kings 3:9 when he 
states, ―Give your servant, therefore, an understanding heart to judge your people and to 
distinguish right from wrong.‖731  (At least one translation uses ‗discern‘ instead of 
‗distinguish.‘)732  Next Paul mentions it throughout Romans 8 with the passage that ―‗the 
renewing of our minds‘ will help us ‗discern what is the will of God.‘‖733  In an article 
about discernment, musical liturgist Kathleen Harmon provides additional definitions of 
discernment: 
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According to Augustine, discernment is ―love distinguishing with 
sagacity between what finders it and what helps it … prudence is 
love making a right distinction between what helps it towards God 
and what might hinder it.‖  For Joseph Pieper, discernment is ―a 
studied seriousness … a filter of deliberation‖ and ―the perfect 
ability to make decisions in accordance with reality … the 
quintessence of ethical maturity.‖ Finally, Lewis Smedes defines 
discernment more colloquially as ―having a nose for what‘s going 
on under the surface.‖734 
 
Peter Browning believes that discernments function as a channel or method: 
 Recognize and acknowledge what God is doing and what God 
desires; 
 See a situation from God‘s perspective; 
 Uncover, rather than make, a decision; and 
 Listen to the Holy Spirit, who prays within and among us.735 
 
Harmon continues her explanation of discernments by quoting John Witvliet with the six 
qualities or characteristics needed for good discernment: 
First is the willingness to give an alternative viewpoint, movement, 
or style…a fair hearing [meaning that]…we need to be open to 
examine viewpoints different from our own. … Second, 
discernment involves making choices [and] becoming self-
conscious [emphasis in the original] about the choices we make, 
realizing to what we are saying ―yes‖ or ―no,‖ why we are saying 
this, and what the implications are. … Third, discernment requires 
knowledge [as it provides]…the tools necessary to pass judgment 
on the options before us. … Fourth, discernment requires love [i.e., 
Christian agapaic love] that prompts us to both listen 
empathetically to another and to challenge the other when fidelity 
to the gospel calls for such a challenge. … Fifth, discernment 
comes out best when done in community…in ongoing 
conversation with one another. … Sixth, [accept and acknowledge] 
the presence of the Holy Spirit [because]…discernment is only and 
always a gift of the Spirit.
736
 
 
Discernments require both an internal disposition, such as openness to other viewpoints 
and becoming self-conscious, as well as alignment of external factors, such as the 
inclusion of appropriate stakeholders and provision of the relevant information.   
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Mission discernment and ministry discernment are similar concepts.  They are 
deliberative reflections about right and wrong courses-of-action, using the filter of the 
organization‘s mission or ministry‘s identity.  The difference between discernment and 
mission discernment as well as discernment and ministry discernment is the end or goal 
of the discernments when comparing mission discernments and ministry discernments. 
Paul‘s, Aristotle‘s, and Browning‘s definitions (above) all refer to the discriminate either 
the service, will, desires, or perspectives of God.  God is the end or orientation of the 
discernment.  With mission discernments, the goal or aim of the discernment is the 
organization‘s or system‘s mission, whether it is the mission‘s preservation, flourishing, 
fulfillment, propagation, protection, or actuation.  The purpose or aspiration of ministry 
discernment is acting in accord with the principles, values, obligations, or goals of the 
ministry.  Although specifics may change specific situations, mission discernments focus 
more on the mission and core values of the organization than ministry discernments, 
which center on the identity and charisms of the organization.  The ultimate object or 
orientation of a mission discernment or ministry discernment may still be God, but 
mediated through the ministry or its mission as intermediate ends.  Ministries still serve 
God through their mission, values, identity, and functioning, even with these as ends-
unto-themselves.  An ecclesiastical positivist view would understand the function of the 
health ministries to follow or be in sync with the Church Magisterium, or the teaching 
authority of the Church, as promulgated by the Church hierarchy (i.e. the pope and 
bishops).
737
  Patrick Hays, former and then-chairperson of Trinity Health, Novi, MI 
described mission discernments as prerequisites to significant decisions by the board.  
―The board wants to know, for instance, how a given decision ‗meets our Core Values 
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and who might be adversely affected.‘‖738  Inclusion of mission discernment in decisions 
such as the ones described here is not exclusive to the Trinity Health board.  Others share 
the responsibility for intentional decision-making in all areas of the organization or 
system.  The specific model using applications of the principle of cooperation may also 
function is discernment, ministry discernment, or mission discernment. 
These are different concepts, as formation has more to do with instruction and 
conscience advancement than discernment, while discernment has to do with considerate 
decision-making according to our values and beliefs.
739
  Formation relates to the 
amendment of character, as demonstrated through reasoning, behaviors, and actions.  
Discernment pertains to the exercise of conscience by congruence between a relevant 
decision and identity, values, and beliefs.  At least one source states that formation and 
discernment interrelate, mainly that formation supports discernment.  ―Formation in the 
skill of discerning the ‗voice of God‘ should become the key educative and formative 
goal of all moral education in the parish, particularly for adults.‖740  Even though this is 
about parish formation, the same holds true for formation within other settings – one 
could use formation as indoctrination into an organization‘s particular discernment 
process. 
IB. The Reality of Using Cooperation for Formation – Advancing Formation But Not 
Necessarily Development 
 
Kohlberg‘s and Gilligan‘s theories were cognitive, meaning that they explore the 
connection between the capacity to reason from conflicting values with living in accord 
with those chosen values.  The theories are also about reasoning, disposition, and 
possibly judgment.  In addition, some think awareness of self and others, or what some 
call moral sensitivity, is important.  There is a disconnect with evidencing that moral 
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behavior is a result of reason, disposition, and judgment because of the complexity 
between reasoning and behavior.  The divide has empirical evidence.  For instance, Krebs 
and colleagues demonstrated that there is a connection between moral judgment and 
moral performance (i.e. behavior) which seems to vary between dilemma types (nuanced 
below), proving that stage-theory is like a tiered cake (i.e. people will exhibit a lower 
stage of development depending on the dilemma) even though individuals rarely 
demonstrate higher stage reasoning outside of a western academic context.
741
 
The mere assertion of intricacy is not enough.  This argument must nuance the 
issue‘s complexity.  Specifying the distinctions must precede the discussions of 
interventions, as this intervention must respond to difficulties and barriers in order to 
have the greatest effect with participants in this model. 
First and foremost with respect to reasoning itself, persons must realize that 
multiple right and wrong answers to any situation may exist simultaneously – using the 
same form of moral reasoning or different forms.  One moral theory or framework for a 
state of affairs does not necessarily outrank another.  Two examples about charitable 
giving may assist this point: In some occasions, decision-makers may agree to use a 
utilitarian, consequentialism theory to allocate charitable donations; however, they 
disagree about the level of need of certain individuals and, consequently (pardoning the 
pun) how much to allocate relative to need.  In other occasions, some decision-makers 
agree to apply utilitarian reasoning to resource allocation, whereas others wish to donate 
a little extra to whomever ‗walks through the door‘ of the charity for reasons of sentiment 
and compassion because it is the holiday time.  Either party in both cases is not more or 
less correct that the others.  In other words, reasoning using moral theories and 
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frameworks is only one feature of behaving morally.
742
  A certain amount of ambiguity 
exists.
743
 
Certain variables influence moral reasoning.  Gender is one of them.  Gilligan‘s 
belief that women reason differently than men influenced her development theory, which 
was initially tested with women.  When Gilligan widened her investigations, by studying 
reasoning and development in both genders, she concluded that most people use both 
justice (e.g. Kohlberg‘s development theory) and care (e.g. Gilligan‘s development 
theory) moral orientations.  Roughly three-quarters of all men favor a justice approach, 
and over three-quarters of all women defer to a care approach according to Gilligan, who 
also theorized that over one-third of men do not use a care approach at all and one-third 
of all women do not use a justice approach at all.  Others investigators, wishing to know 
more, developed studies to explore gender differences in moral reasoning with more 
specificity.  Another study categorized undergraduate students into four gender-related 
categories – masculine, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated.  The researchers 
used participant responses to real-life and hypothetical dilemmas; all dilemmas had 
justice and care components.  They found that the difference between females and males 
in moral judgments was not statistically significant.  Some difference existed between 
gender roles.  In general, participants tended to use more of a care-based orientation with 
real-life dilemmas, and more of a justice-based orientation with hypothetical, non-
personal dilemmas.  Given the results, the investigators assumed that there was not a 
predominant approach, signifying that participants used both approaches in dilemmas.  
Sometimes researchers noticed incongruities when participants stated the significance of 
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one approach (i.e. a certain kind of justice, caring about power relationships and 
struggles) and then used another (or multiple approaches as justification).
744
 
An observation, noticed by Gilligan and others, is that Kohlberg‘s dilemmas to 
gauge moral development stage were hypothetical.  It begs the question, pondered by a 
few theorists, if reasoning in hypothetical dilemmas differs from the moral reasoning 
employed in real dilemmas.  A number of studies have replicated the results of a study 
reported by Cheryl Armon – using the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) and others, such 
as the Good Life Interview, studies have found that responses to real and hypothetical 
dilemmas are similar.  Also consistent between all the studies, any differences in 
dilemma responses manifested as higher moral development exhibited in hypothetical 
dilemmas when compared to real-life dilemmas:
745
 
This supports the commonsense notion that the requirements of 
hypothetical moral dilemmas, usually lacking the subject‘s actual 
interests, motives, and skills are easier to generate than those of 
real-life moral events, each of which contains its own unique 
constellation of values, desires, and nuances of interpretation, as 
well as its variable fit with the specific competencies of the moral 
actor.
746
 
 
The investigation also concluded that women‘s everyday moral reasoning appears to be 
significantly lower than men‘s, even though abstract, hypothetical moral reasoning is 
equivalent.  A reason for this is that women in the study reported more real-life dilemmas 
of a personal or impersonal nature than men.  The study has limitations; most notably, 
descriptions of reasoning for past moral dilemmas may not be predictive of behaviors at 
the time of the real-life dilemmas.
747
  Only studies gauging moral reasoning and behavior 
in the moment would be the most predictive of future correlates between thought and 
 283 
action in the future.  Still, it is possible that the other variables described below are 
reasons why moral reasoning does not always transcribe to corresponding moral actions. 
The previous chapter established the association of age with moral reasoning, 
which is worth reiterating.  Previous theories hypothesized that people‘s moral reasoning 
abilities tapered off with age, as represented graphically by Robert Keegan and Lisa 
Laskow Lahey in Immunity to Change: How to Overcome It and Unlock the Potential in 
Yourself and Your Organization (Leadership for the Common Good) by a plateau effect 
in the beginning of a person‘s third decade of life after rapid growth of moral reasoning 
complexity.  (Mental complexity means that the individual is less ego-driven, more 
accountable, and has a more comprehensive view of the realities of human nature and 
relationships.)  This was the standard perspective thirty years ago.
748
  The perception of 
people‘s ability to grasp abstract moral reasoning with age has changed, which is now 
more indicative of another graph by Robert Keegan and Lisa Laskow Lahey in Immunity 
to Change. This time the graph shows a continuous incline of mental complexity 
reasoning over time, such that people are able to grasp more difficult moral concepts 
throughout their lives, without a plateau.  The graph illustrates that people can 
comprehend increasingly more difficult concepts into their 60s and 70s.
749
  Perspectives 
about the ability of adults to learn morally complex concepts have changed.  The obvious 
implication is that moral education and interventions have the ability to be effective with 
adults. 
Moral agency has pre-conditions, similar to elements of informed consent.  
Choice, vision, and end-in-view are constituent components of moral agency.  Choice 
involves a few interrelated concepts.  Actions must be free or voluntary (i.e. absent undue 
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influence), more than one competing or conflicting course-of-action must exist, and the 
decision-maker must be in control, have capacity, and understand the situation.  Even 
though vision may seem vague, it refers to the ability to understand any given situation 
from a variety of perspectives, taking into account our own biases and preferences.  
Vision is an awareness of different worldviews and is analogous to the moral sensitivity 
concept explained below.  End-in-view is the ordering of choice and vision towards a 
goal or objective.  Goals are not self-serving but ordered to the common good or social 
benefit.  An assumption regarding end-in-view is that increased consciousness about the 
import of involvement in social goods leads to a more profound understanding of moral 
agency.  The end-in-view is malleable and can change.  Reasoning, moral or otherwise, 
and reassessment may produce a fresh end-in-view.
750
 
Emotions are considerations in moral reasoning and action.  Philosophers have 
argued for a long time that emotions are adverse to moral decision-making involving 
choice and judgment.  However, those with backgrounds in anthropology, sociology, and 
feminist theories have not only challenged the previous dialectic, they have risen above it 
to illustrate and test the following points of almost uniform agreement: ―Emotions are a 
way of knowing.  They are socially and culturally constructed.  Emotions are ineluctably 
tied to power relationships.  Emotions are fundamental ingredients of the moral life.‖751  
The authors of Emotional Intelligence 2.0 believe that people need to concentrate more 
on their awareness and processing of emotions in their theory of EQ (i.e., Emotional 
Quotient, which combines with other personality traits and IQ during decision-
making).
752
  Aristotle differentiated between three different types of emotional virtues, 
which also describe ways that our emotions ‗interact‘ with moral sensitivity, motivation, 
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reasoning, and behavior.  Emotion-virtues are emotions, in themselves, are morally fitting 
feelings (e.g. compassion).  Emotion-regulating virtues are methods of controlling or 
normalizing emotions, but are dispositions and not emotions themselves (e.g. courage 
counteracting fear).  Emotion-combining virtues help lexically prioritize emotions into a 
timely and acceptable hierarchy and, similar to emotion-regulating virtues, are 
dispositions and not emotions themselves (e.g. justice).
753
 
Layers of nuance exist about the ways that emotions relate to moral decision-
making.  One layer is that many conflicts characterized as conflicts of principles, values, 
goals, duties, or consequences are actually disagreements about apposite emotions in 
situations.  For example, parents should bond with their babies, even those with terrible 
prognoses, and failure to do so is a signal to health care professionals, such as nurses, that 
the parents are neglecting their roles (i.e. derelict or abusive parents).  Conversely, health 
care professionals and others often react with equal concern if the parents bond with an 
infant with an incurable, fatal prognosis.  Emotional attachment, to some, then impedes 
or impinges more ‗neutral‘ decision-making in these cases.  Another layer is emotional or 
emotive dissonance, which is when one‘s actual experience disagrees with perceived 
apposite emotions.  For instance, professionals in NICUs and special care nurseries must 
deal with the reality that mortality and morbidity in such settings are better today than 
previously, and they may care for infants who grow up to have profound disabilities.  
Professionals develop strategies, such as situational emotional engagement and 
detachment, to cope with the emotional dissonance of caring amidst thorny circumstances 
and prognoses.  Yet another layer exists.  Power relationships convey emotions, and some 
may use emotions strategically and politically to disparage, criticize, or disavow others.  
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A case-in-point is a physician who discredits nurses‘ legitimate concerns by stating that 
nurses, in general, are too emotional.
754
 
Mustakova-Possardt, Hartshorne and May, and Morton and colleagues believed 
that more processes mediate or connect moral reasoning with moral behavior.  Stated 
differently, moral behavior is not the sole byproduct of moral reasoning.  In fact, moral 
reasoning only accounts for 10-20% of the variance in moral behavior according to 
Morton and colleagues.
755
  Hartshorne and May observed only a slightly higher correlate 
between moral reasoning (as measured through a moral knowledge test) and moral 
behavior at 30%.  Although Kohlberg made the same distinction (between moral 
judgment and moral behavior), he believed that cognitive moral development is the 
―‗only distinctively moral factor in moral behavior,‘‖ ―the single most important or 
influential factor in moral behavior,‖ and ―the ‗will‘ becomes normal only when 
informed by moral judgment.‖756  At first, this may appear contradictory to the findings 
of Mustakova-Possardt, Morton, and colleagues.  For Kohlberg, some other factors, such 
as emotions and the will, play parts in moral reasoning and development:
757
 
He [Kohlberg] would argue that the exemplars of Stage 6 morality 
– Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Jesus – are proof that ‗the 
cognitively developed‘ person is also a person of great moral 
passion and feeling.  Will and emotion are certainly not irrelevant 
factors in moral development; but rather that existing as 
independent factors of morality, they are part of and flow from 
general cognitive-moral development.  The Stage 6 person who has 
reached the heights of cognitive moral development is also a 
person of great moral passion.
758
 
 
Jonathan Friday also challenges the determinants of moral behavior as well as the basic 
ethical assumption that optimal moral reasoning is unbiased application of reasoning to 
specific situations.  Stating his second conclusion differently, knowing more about moral 
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theory (e.g. educated and trained ethicists and moral theologians) does not make one a 
better person.
759
   
The other considerations in addition to emotions and moral reasoning are moral 
sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral character.  Moral sensitivity involves the 
determination of values, duties, consequences, or goals at-stake.  It is the awareness of 
problems or dilemmas, including their stakeholders and impact.  In their proposed model, 
emotions and their regulation are skills that apply moral sensitivity.  For instance, the 
ability to be empathetic exemplifies moral sensitivity.  Moral motivation is the filtration 
or negotiation between values, duties, consequences, or goals, meaning the prioritization 
of these qualities amongst themselves, others, and self-interest.
760
  For instance, one 
researcher studied the moral ―motivational process by studying the role of empathy in 
motivating an orientation to justice.‖761  Mustakova-Possardt seems to encompass moral 
sensitivity and moral motivation in what she calls moral identity, which is rooted in 
values and mediates social conventions, becoming the determiner of what is understood 
as the right thing to do.
762
  Higher religious and spiritual development may aid a person‘s 
ability to prioritize.  Moral character is the capacity or capability to persevere in the face 
of obstacles.
763
  Having a well-formed or cultivated character is the substance of the 
virtuous person.
764
  Morton and colleagues‘ statement about perseverance amidst 
difficulties implies that resilience is a desirable quality.  (It would be interesting for 
Morton and colleagues to address how resilience differs from less desirable attributes 
such as stubbornness.)  Although moral reasoning has been described, it is making the 
determination about how to act, given the available considerations.
765
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Experimenters tried to test the interrelatedness between moral sensitivity, moral 
motivation, and moral reasoning.  The hypothesis is that moral sensitivity mediates the 
relationship between motivation and reasoning.  Moral motivation measures, moral 
reasoning measures, and some with moral sensitivity measures correlated.  Moral 
sensitivity positively correlated with moral motivation and one moral reasoning 
measure.
766
  Critical consciousness is a comprehensive theory that incorporates moral 
identity (including moral sensitivity and moral motivation), moral reasoning, emotions, 
moral development, and faith development.  It is the glue that binds all elements with its 
developmental themes of moral interest, moral authority, moral responsibility, expanded 
moral and social responsibility, sociopolitical consciousness, principled vision, 
philosophical expansion, and historical and global vision.  These occur across 
consciousness levels of pre-critical consciousness (CC), transitional CC, CC, and lifespan 
development, with critical consciousness as the tipping point for sufficient moral 
engagement.
767
  Critical consciousness is another way to categorize moral development 
(taking into account moral identity, moral reasoning, emotions, moral development, and 
faith development), where pre-CC, transitional CC, CC, and lifespan development are the 
levels; moral interest, moral authority, moral responsibility, expanded moral and social 
responsibility, sociopolitical consciousness, principled vision, philosophical expansion, 
and historical and global vision are the corresponding descriptors or stages.  Another way 
to conceptualize CC is by progressive concentric circles similar to the ‗rings‘ of a tree, 
starting with the awareness of self representing Kohlberg‘s stage one as the ―bulls eye‖ 
center, at least one other in stage two as the next circle, ―one‘s peer group or equivalent‖ 
in stage three as another larger circle, ―one‘s nation‖ in stage four (continuing as larger 
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concentric circles), ―the broader group as described by a bill of rights or constitution‖ in 
stage five, ―and mankind as a whole‖ in stage six.768 
The influence of experience and knowledge to moral sensitivity, motivation, and 
reasoning varies.  A tendency exists to assume that more experience in anything, 
including ethical decision-making, makes one better positioned to properly respond to 
other situations.  This is not the case.  There is not a correlation between age and better 
learning from and application of moral experiences.  Older persons do not necessarily 
have more enriching experiences.  Adults can live and exist in a minute moral universe; 
and for this reason, romanticizing experience is not educational or helpful.
769
 
Conceptualizing all of these factors is difficult, but not impossible.  One way to 
do so uses visual representation.  Figure 5 is a visual depiction provided by one of the 
Catholic Health Association ethicists, Tom Nairn, of the elements involved in moral 
reasoning and behaviors: 
Figure 5: The Process of Inputs, Judgments, Behaviors, and Outcomes
770
 
 
Figure 5 requires minimal explanation; it depicts the input-decision-behavior-result 
process.  The core considerations are moral reasoning, with the influences of ―person‖ 
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and ―action.‖  The other factors, such as ―emotions‖ and ―motivation,‖ support the 
person-judgment-action-consequences progression.  Moral sensitivity (i.e. awareness) is 
the notable absence, which one could easily add to the ―person‖ influences. 
Amidst the complication, our goal is simple.  It is to create a more moral 
organization by providing opportunities using the principle of cooperation, as described 
below, for associates to act morally, further associates‘ formation, and possibly advance 
associates‘ moral development.  Ideally, fully formed and more morally developed 
associates think differently about moral issues, and of even more importance, they behave 
differently.  Behaving better individually (i.e. more in-line with or representative of 
Kohlberg‘s and Gilligan‘s highest levels) – as typified through more deliberative 
decision-making and thoughtful decisions (i.e. considerate, justifiable, and in sync with 
normative morality and Catholic teaching) – means the greater possibility of behaving 
better organizationally.  Because of organizations‘ characteristics (refer to chapter three 
descriptions), the chances of effecting meaningful, societal change increases greatly with 
moral organizational agents.  The result is that there is considerable complexity in 
reaching the simple goal. 
After making an argument about misguided perceptions about moral judgment, 
one author concludes that ―the study of moral theory and its application to particular 
moral problems is unlikely to make one a better moral thinker.‖771  This comment 
pertains to the nature of moral education and interventions.  A way to describe moral 
education and interventions is the process of taking the goals, import, and values of a 
morally-developed, mature adult and interacting with an immature, under-developed 
person with the goal of changing that person.
772
  By the end of this segment, the reader 
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will have an appreciation about why the mere knowledge of moral theory and its 
application is not enough for moral education and interventions. 
Using Kohlberg‘s commentary, Robert Carter reflects Kohlberg‘s stance on moral 
interventions, which should have the goals of helping someone transition through moral 
stages.  According to Carter, Kohlberg avoids two extremes with moral education and 
interventions, which fall into accord with two camps of critics and their critiques.  On the 
one hand, moral reasoning and interventions must be more than values clarification, 
which is non-normative and relativist in nature.  Any justified answer is acceptable.  On 
the other hand, the deliberate inculcation of normative moral values, often referred to as 
character education – without critical inquiry or exploration of how values they work – is 
equally as avoidable as mere values clarification.  Character education interventions 
usually are methods that promote the tyranny of the majority without inquiry.  
Furthermore, children will especially confuse traditional educational methods, such as 
discipline and by-the-book management, as morality rather than pragmatism.  Teaching 
morality as doctrinal, when it is not, ―violates one‘s moral freedom‖ according to 
Kohlberg.
773
  Education, principally education involving religion, has not always 
acknowledged the element of free choice in its learners.
774
  Indeed, religious education 
has attempted to balance the two extremes outlives above.
775
  In a moderate approach, 
which may be preferable to Kohlberg, moral interventions include the illustration set by 
the educator, the organizational or school identity including its mission and values, and 
specific instruction methods.
776
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Interventions must be more than the transmission of knowledge.  Consider the 
example about virtue inculcation or formation provided by Dennis Moberg from Santa 
Clara University: 
Each virtue may be thought of as an integrated psychological 
system comprised of four independent components: knowledge, 
motivation, emotion, and cognition (cf., Staudinger, Lopez, & 
Baltes, 1997).  If individuals possess the virtue of courage, they 
have expert-level knowledge about when and how to be 
courageous.  Additionally, the individual would have the emotional 
discernment about when and how to be courageous.  Additionally, 
the individuals would have the emotional discernment to receive, 
process, and express emotions within a courageous act.  A person 
with a courageous character would be motivated by a desire to be 
morally excellent, and they would approach decisions wisely.
777
 
 
Adding more specificity to the above components, knowledge in this context has at least 
two dimensions – knowing the parameters of the profession and organization as well as 
the occupational content and information needed to do the job.  Motivation describes an 
optimistic, genuine regard; in other words, authentic willingness to help others animates 
legitimate virtue, not using others for the means of one‘s own self-enrichment.  In 
addition to the attributes mentioned above, being virtuous with emotions means not only 
appropriately integrating emotions with reasoning and behavior, it implies the ability to 
recognize (i.e. identify) others‘ emotions and suitably address (i.e. process) them.  
Cognition or reasoning entails the balancing of knowing and doubting, confidence and 
cautiousness, and sensitivity and resolve.
778
 
The ―Classroom Mentor Project‖ is perhaps the most convincing evidence that 
using emotions are a bridge linking moral thinking to meaningful moral behavior.  This 
was a university program that brought moral concepts ‗to life‘ by paring predominantly 
white, middle- and upper-class, adult graduate students with troubled, inner-city youths in 
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a mentorship program along with a traditional ethics and social justice curriculum.  Of 
the mentors, 66 percent strongly agreed that their initial beliefs about the population 
changed as a result of the experience, 79 percent thought that they directly addressed 
social justice issues during the mentorship, 82 percent believed the experiences helped 
them understand racial tensions, 71 percent agreed that theory was put into practice 
during the experience, and 92 percent listed the experience as personally helpful in an 
immediate follow-up.  After a two-and-a-half years, 91 percent of the mentors answered, 
yes, that things have come up in their subsequent thoughts, attitudes, or behaviors related 
to the internship experience, and 95 percent reported that the internship affected their 
motivation to participate more actively in the community.  Researchers concluded that 
the program had significant impact on the mentors.  The program enabled persons to see 
impacts and problems; as one must see that a problem exists before moral reasoning and 
action occur.  Long-term follow-up results were similar to those of the initial study, 
meaning that results were long-lasting for many, and seem to influence major life and 
career changes.  Another major supposition of the researchers is that mentors must have a 
personal and emotional connection with the participants for experience to be meaningful.  
Students not only need to understand the social problem academically or conceptually, 
they need to emotionally connect and care for the people affected.  The impacts of this 
assumption are far-reaching, especially given the individualism present in the U.S.  They 
surmise that moral education and interventions should take place in the workplace, home, 
and the street, while it is only typically in schools. Furthermore, they need to go beyond 
abstract reasoning, so that they are applied to experienced and relevant social 
problems.
779
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In a study titled and about ―Changing Moral Judgment in Divinity Students,‖ 
researchers divided students (mostly Protestant, ranging from 22-57 years old) at a local, 
conservative, Bible-based divinity school into three groups.  First, one group had 32 
hours of lecture on ethics concepts, topics, and applications.  Some lively discussions 
about specific topics and applications ensued.  Second, another group had less lecture 
time, only 25 hours, with more dedicated and structured discussion time.  There were 
seven hours dedicated to small-group discussions of moral dilemma cases.  Third, the 
final group did not have lecture at all, just reading assignments for each day along with 
corresponding ethical dilemmas, dedicated and structured group discussions, and required 
written reflections.  The number of hours dedicated to cases increased to 28.  The content 
or topics remained exactly the same during the comparable time periods for the sake of 
eliminating variability.  The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was administered as a pre- and 
post-test to the class.  The pre-tests scored the same (i.e. little variation) between all three 
groups.  The difference in moral reasoning between the pre- and post-test increased the 
most dramatically for the third group, which was nearly twice the increase of the second 
group.  The first group exhibited hardly any difference between the pre- and post-test.  
The primary investigator, who is also the author, concludes that small-group discussion 
of moral dilemmas improves moral reasoning more than lectures and other variables such 
as setting or location.
780
  Locations, nonetheless, matter, but seldom are classrooms for 
adults.  They may include libraries, workplaces, museums, multimedia presentations, and 
self-directed study for adults.
781
 
A way of considering the above study is that constructed experiences to process 
and apply knowledge are perhaps more important than the knowledge itself.  
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Observations and conclusions such as these would not have surprised John Dewey, who 
theorized about education in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  Dewey and his colleague, 
Emile Durkheim, believed that education itself served a social function.  Standard 
education and its delivery (i.e. techniques, processes) also transmit understandings, 
worldviews, and values.  Values and morality always involve relationships with others; 
thus, the institutions such as schools serve as instruments for providing the experience to 
exercise morality in social settings.
782
  ―It is an environment where moral forces are 
created and sustained within a social context.‖783  Durkheim, therefore, believed that a 
teacher is a secular priest because she or he is an interpreter of moral ideas, just as priests 
interpret the divine.
 784
  Ideally, educators need to allow for the assimilation, processing, 
and application of information in a group setting: 
Because society is composed of many diverse groups, children 
need assistance in understanding individuals from other groups.  
The genuinely democratic society as an integrated and balanced 
community rests on mutually shared understanding.  Although 
problem solving is individualized and personalized, it is also a 
social process.  Group experience is a cooperative enterprise in 
which all the participants share their experiences.  The more 
sharing occurs, the greater are the possibilities for growth.
785
 
 
Moral education has optimal impact when it arises from ―‗real events,‘ not simply 
‗abstract lessons.‘‖786  In fact, one contemporary scholar explicitly links experiential 
learning with Gilligan‘s care approach for at least a couple reasons.  First, experiential 
learning exposes a person to opportunities to interact by tending to others with care, 
which is demonstrated interest in the welfare of others.  Second, persons may experience 
the reality that justice and care at higher developmental stages involves working with 
others where they are, meaning that persons conform to individuals‘ needs (e.g., needs 
for interaction and education).
787
  With respect to Dewey, he tested his educational 
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theories at the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago from 1896 to 1904.  
Although Dewey‘s pilot studies were with children, his validated conclusions extrapolate 
to adults, as adult moral learning and development is possible and addressed in the 
literature.  Even Aristotle and Plato made observations about philosophy and moral 
teaching in adults because moral formation and education requires maturity.
788
 
Per Dewey‘s concept, imbedded learning is the ―hidden curriculum:‖   
Mention the phrase, and people with a sociological background 
will think of Bowles and Gintis‘ (1976) study of ―Schooling in 
Capitalist America,‖ in which they argued from a Marxist 
perspective that the organization of public schooling in the States 
was designed to prepare pupils to be wage-slaves … For our 
purposes in higher education, let us … start with Snyder (1971). 
Snyder's observations pre-figured all the later research on ―Deep‖ 
and ―Surface‖ learning; he noted that at MIT in the ‗fifties and 
‗sixties, the curriculum was getting more and more crowded as 
technological knowledge grew, and so undergraduates were taking 
―short cuts‖ in their learning. They could not absorb everything, so 
they strategically tried to guess what would be assessed, for 
example, and revised only that. Snyder's additional insight, 
however, was to realize that unintentionally the Institute was 
teaching them to act strategically, hence the term ―hidden 
curriculum.‖789 
 
In other words, the hidden curriculum refers to the messages, modeling, education, or 
other content that is part of pedagogy or process apart from the stated or formal 
curriculum (which contains its own pedagogy or process with messages, modeling, 
education, and other content).  The hidden curriculum is also a method that transmits 
culture.  Kohlberg offers that it serves the role of acclimating students to social 
systems.
790
  Elizabeth Vallance makes a chronological curriculum argument, which 
advances that articulated concepts, many of them in a formal curriculum from a previous 
age, become components of the hidden curriculum later.
791
  In this way, Dewey stands 
with other educators, educational theorists, and educational researchers who attend to 
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pedagogy, culture, organizational identity, and ideologies transmitted within hidden 
curricula.  A scholar in Christian ethics and theology, Werner Schwartz, illuminates two 
different camps of religious and moral formation, and both exemplify hidden curricula.  
In a volkskirchlich model, persons experience morality and religion, told through stories, 
as individual, out-of-touch, passé, and largely irrelevant to everyday life.  Whereas in a 
free-church model, stories live and are organic, are personally meaningful, and integrate 
into social life.  The free-church model exemplifies the natural law, as persons are more 
inclined to notice their role in the continuous unfolding of the Christian people‘s story.  
They are also more likely to view moral actions, and their rightness or wrongness, in 
community, as opposed to individually.
792
 
The ―shadow curriculum‖ is a similar concept explained in an article bearing the 
same title (i.e., ―The Shadow Curriculum‖).  This describes a particular kind of hidden 
curriculum which is more than competing with a formal curriculum; it is in direct 
contradiction or opposition to the public, stated mission, vision, values, statements, 
policies, and curriculum.  Shadow curricula are questionable subsets of hidden curricula.  
For instance, a 2003 study noticed that universities with public ‗environmentally friendly‘ 
statements had practices that illustrated disregard or absolute neglect for the environment.  
Phrased differently, universities stating their positions as environmental stewards did not 
all conserve natural resources.  Another example is organizations taking public positions 
against direct-to-consumer marketing within industries while allowing such marketing 
within their own organization.
793
  The shadow curriculum has an apt title because it is 
opposite of what appears in the light. 
 298 
One may have the tendency to think that hidden and shadow curricula are 
unintentional.  While shadow curricula are more likely to be unintentional than hidden, 
the terms are not synonymous with being unintentional, just as a formal curriculum is 
likely, but does not have, to be intentional.  ‗Unintentional‘ curricula (i.e. teaching 
methods) describe when people learn despite the absence of purposeful learning 
outcomes.  ‗Intentional‘ curricula is the inverse or opposite, describing learning from 
sources that are in accord with purposeful learning outcomes.
794
   
In an article about professionalism and medical education as moral formation, 
Warren Kinghorn of the Duke University Divinity School notes that medical 
professionalism, which is descriptive and evaluative, ―cannot be considered in abstraction 
from the whole of medical practice.‖795  Stated differently, moral formation should 
integrate into other professional education in order to enhance effectiveness.
796
  Kinghorn 
proposes a utility model for educational (formation) endeavors of this kind that is 
strikingly close to Griffin Trotter‘s futility definition and characteristics (the notable 
difference is the third step, which is a negative criterion in Trotter‘s model and a positive 
one in Kinghorn‘s):797 
(1) the end or goal is specified in advance of the application of 
―method,‖ (2) the focus is on the best method…by which to attain 
the pre-specified end, and (3) …any sufficiently skilled person, 
adequately trained in the correct educational method, can 
successfully implement the end…the successful application of the 
method…does not depend on the moral character of the agent.798 
 
A specification is in order for Kinghorn‘s method.  Kinghorn addresses mainly 
professionalism, such that professional moral formation amalgamates with, not 
surprisingly, other professional training and education.  The context of the model 
proposed here is not specific to certain professions.  It is one generated through the 
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workplace, binding all who embody Catholic teachings and identity.  This becomes the 
glue or foundation for addressing formation, not exclusively disciplines and 
professionalism. 
 Others have entertained similar debates about the ability to educate morality 
independently from religion and religious beliefs.  Compelling arguments exist on both 
sides.  On one hand, situations attempting to establish sufficient separation between 
religion and morality have failed to do so, as interviewees exhibit standard answers that 
have religious connotations.  On the other hand, the knowledge of the good may precede 
the knowledge of God as good, meaning that the concept of God depends on the right and 
the good, and religion and morality can exist independently.
799
  Taking a side in this 
distinction may be irrelevant because of the context of moral interventions within 
Catholic health care systems or other organizations with religiously-derived values.  The 
context automatically fuses religious and secular morality using mission and value 
statements, core values, visions, and more. 
Nel Noddings expanded many of Gilligan‘s theories about development in greater 
depth.  She also created a particular feminist position to moral education, based upon the 
tenets that ―to be cared for is a human universal (i.e. not gender-dependent and the 
language of the mother is the original condition), caring is engrossment and motivational 
displacement, and asymmetrical reciprocity [is] moral independence.‖800  Moral 
motivations and duties, as characterized by Gilligan‘s higher levels, arise when there is 
recognition of and reciprocity within community.  All of these conditions give rise to 
Nodding‘s framework for education, as all education should be moral education, such 
that it includes modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation (i.e. not making others 
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conform to one particular ideal).  Some of Nodding‘s particular critiques about morality 
and education were the perpetuation of a western, male-dominant pattern of thinking (e.g. 
leading to a devaluation of things that are earth, body, and woman), the historical 
categorization and connotation of ‗evil,‘ and the lack of caring to the ―traditional 
concerns of women‖ as well as modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation.801 
For moral education and interventions to be successful, one scholar hypothesizes 
that they must address four domains.  The four domains and their descriptions are as 
follows: 
The direct, external domain characterizes didactic instruction 
conveying clear behavioral objectives for the moral-ethical 
domain, helping students understand the moral expectations for life 
in the classroom, school and society. 
The indirect, external domain represents classroom strategies 
for shaping moral climates: with specific regard for activities 
aimed at applying moral principles in the classroom and school; 
also the active examination of the application of these principles. 
The direct, internal domain depicts self-regulatory practices 
which promote a state of harmony between the mind and body – 
thereby reducing errant internal responses and fostering the 
capacity to find moral conduct intrinsically rewarding. 
The indirect, internal domain embodies the examination of 
emotions: in oneself and in others – with special reference to their 
influence on our perceptions of others and ourselves, and our 
conduct with others.  [There is] consideration of strategies for 
controlling  impulse and regulating mood.
802
 
 
Goals of moral education can and should address all domains, providing ―structure and 
dimension‖ for each one.803  Stephen Brookfield from the University of St. Thomas 
considers that adult moral learning encompasses five, interrelated processes.  First, moral 
reasoning is unavoidably related to context and situations; situations can matter without 
ascribing to situationalism, and context can have import without being relativism.  
Second, morality is inherently communal or social in its purpose, diffusion, and 
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implementation.  Third, persons can become aware of incongruence and ambiguities in 
their own and others‘ moral reasoning and behavior; individuals can be conscious of 
reflective equilibria.  Fourth, education can and should make people aware of their own 
moral shortcomings, which involves the acknowledgment of ambiguity in many 
situations, including recognition on the part of facilitators and educators.
804
  Fifth and 
finally, persons can become self-aware and thoughtful about their own moral reasoning 
and assertions.  The precondition for all five is that teachers must acknowledge and 
respect that moral learners are adults.
805
  Another theorist comments on educational 
processes as they relate to justice, restorative or relationship justice in particular, and 
leveraging moral development for the common good.  The conclusion is that fractured 
relationships repair when there is a problem-solving process (an intervention) between 
the victims and the offenders, enabled by their models of four kinds of victim-offender 
conferencing – victim-offender reconciliation that includes resolution between the two 
parties and a mediator, family group conferencing that depends on the inclusion of the 
victim‘s support persons for social pressure on the offender, community conferencing that 
places the locus of victimization on the community itself and involves key community 
members and public officials, and circle sentencing, which is a popular form of Native 
American justice and includes ―victims, offenders, their support groups, justice officials, 
community members and elders…totaling 15-30 people, but up to 100 people.‖806  Such a 
theory is relevant because evils, injustices, and malfeasances of the health care system 
contribute to victim-oppressor cycle. 
 The same creator of the critical consciousness theory – described above as a 
comprehensive theory accounting for moral identity, moral reasoning, emotions, moral 
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development, and faith development – surmises that formational or educational 
interventions must maintain equilibrium between head (mind) and heart, so that behavior 
is expressive of integrated harmony.  Methods of doing this include ―cultivating a moral 
and spiritual sense of identity, relatedness on all levels including relationships with nature 
as well as individuals and groups, conversations on the meaning of life, and a sense of 
authentic personal authority, responsibility, and agency.‖807  Others who summarize 
various approaches to moral education make similar conclusions – approaches must 
exhibit balance.  In a meta-analysis, a team observes that both direct (i.e. classroom 
instruction, discussions, reflections, thinking, and reflection) and indirect (i.e. modeling 
moral behavior, using narrative and stories, and giving opportunities to apply learning in 
‗real‘ settings) approaches have demonstrated utility and effectiveness; hence, arbitrary 
distinctions, such as direct and indirect, are not helpful.
808
 
Educators, researchers, and theorists recommend a number of approaches or 
frameworks for moral education or formation.  In its most simple form, any educational 
or instructional process has four variables: an instructor, learners, method or subject 
matter (i.e. curriculum), and setting (i.e. environment).
809
  One such framework, listed 
below in the outline format provided by the authors, encourages consideration of 
instructional methods, materials, goals (ends), and content: 
A. Psychological assumptions 
 Regarding what the salient features of our moral psychology 
are;  
 Regarding the nature of those features; and 
 Regarding how those features develop and/or how they are 
likely to respond to various environmental variables. 
B. Moral assumptions 
 Regarding the nature and scope of morality (metaethical 
assumptions); and 
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 Regarding what is good/right/virtuous/caring (normative 
assumptions 
C. Educational assumptions 
 Regarding nature and scope of teaching and education in 
society; and 
 Regarding the aims of education. 
D. Contingent factors 
 Personal 
 Historical 
 Social 
 Political 
 Institutional810 
 
A later form included the following elements: 
I. Thinking 
 Thinking on various levels 
 Critical thinking 
 Moral reasoning on the higher levels 
 Divergent or creative thinking 
II. Feeling 
 Prize, cherish 
 Feel good about oneself 
 Aware of one‘s feeling 
III. Choosing 
 From alternatives 
 Considering consequences 
 Freely 
 Achievement planning 
IV. Communicating 
– The ability to send clear messages 
– Empathy – listening, taking in another‘s frame of reference 
– Conflict resolution 
V. Acting 
 Repeatedly 
 Consistently 
 Acting skillfully in the areas in which we act (competence)811 
 
The values clarification approach, originated by Durkheim, is another general framework 
for moral education.  In its earliest form, it consisted of education where persons were 
exposed to choosing ―freely from alternatives after thoughtful‖ deliberation of each 
alternative, ―prizing (i.e. cherishing, being happy with) the choice enough to be willing to 
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affirm it with others, and acting (i.e. doing something with the choice),‖ which includes 
repeated behaviors.
812
  Kohlberg recommended that education account for a number of 
different moral perspectives (i.e. pluralism), indoctrination of particular moral thoughts 
and behaviors, and the stimulation of cognitive moral development through challenge and 
choice.
813
  The role of the instructor in this model is to instill accountability in students, 
be influential but not unrelenting, set limits or parameters on discussion, elucidate the 
perspectives of individuals, occasionally clarify responses, not respond to every 
individual, and to stay away from preaching, judging, and disapproving.
814
 
 A few authors comment on the idea of identity formation.  The attributes needed 
for this are:  
(1) frequent, long term contact; (2) warm, loving relationships; (3) 
exposure to the inner states of others; (4) models who can be 
observed in a variety of life settings and situations; (5) consistency 
and clarity in others‘ behaviors, values, etc.; (6) correspondence 
between behavior and beliefs espoused; and (7) explanation of the 
lifestyle conceptually, with instruction accompanying shared 
experiences.
815
 
 
In this model, the teacher or instructor is a community facilitator, who must guide the 
education and experience in order to live out God‘s revealed reality.816 
Others‘ frameworks concentrate less on moral education and development and 
more on methodologies for faith formation.  Scholars have debated the role of human 
behaviors, some of them categorizing faith as only an internal (i.e. interior, e.g. 
emotional, spiritual) relationship with God while religion is about external relationships 
(i.e. interactions, e.g. conduct, behaviors).  Such claims are weak and do not have an 
adequate historical support.
817
  Otherwise stated, some believe that faith is about the 
greatest commandment, as articulated by Jesus (Matthew 22:37), ―You shall love the 
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Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind,‖ which 
speaks to internal dispositions.
818
  In this case, religion is more like the next 
commandment articulated by Jesus (Matthew 22:39), ―You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself.‖819  In the next verse (Matthew 22:40), Jesus posits that both commandments 
are important.
820
  They are, and both are the work of faith and religion.
821
  Therefore, 
there is not a stark contrast between faith formation, religious education, and religious 
instruction. 
A simple framework for faith formation is quite similar to the moral education 
and development frameworks: be open, say yes, trust, give one‘s heart, listen, and 
respond.
822
  The basis for religious instruction should always be the instruction itself, 
from its use and rigorous, empirical verification; however sufficient, robust theory is also 
critical for religious instruction.
823
  Religious instruction always contains the following 
eight components: ―(1) product content; (2) process content; (3) cognitive content; (4) 
affective content; (5) verbal content; (6) nonverbal content; (7) unconscious content; (8) 
lifestyle content.‖824  Harold Burgess identifies six components in religious instruction: 
―aim, subject matter, teacher, learner, environment, and evaluation.‖825  Efforts geared for 
transcendent formation have the following qualities: They help participants become 
conscious of their own congruent and contradictory character temperaments.  Efforts aid 
the awareness and approval of the ideal dispositions, which may be consistent with other 
traditions (e.g. faith).  They should assist the advancement and attainment of character 
and personality traits that are harmonious with the ideal dispositions.  Interventions 
should focus on three types of ideas – the importance of character trait congruence, reveal 
and stress the magnitude of supportive and subordinate ideals to the overarching and 
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transcendent ideals, and endeavor for the effective realization of both the subordinate and 
overarching ideals.  Interim goals and objectives may help the process, as long as they are 
realistic.
826
  Finally, the setting is important.   
The principles of character formation should come alive in well-
guided interformation groups.  The participants should charitably 
and wisely interform by reflecting together on the tradition-
inspired character dispositions they may have in common.  The 
principles underlying this character formation can be clarified in 
interformational discussion groups.
827
   
 
People being formed have a right to ―moral self-constitution,‖ which depends on a three 
stage model of moral education.  First, moral education must promote three dimensions 
of the good life – living well, living well with others, and working with just institutions –
characterized by self-esteem, solicitude, and justice.  Second, a critical testing process 
judges and calls others to action, using the three-dimensional criteria of discarding action 
that harms the individual (and his or her autonomy), refraining from those things that are 
unfavorable to the respect of others, and desisting from impediments to justice.  Third, is 
phronesis, which is the ability to be dialectic between theory (i.e. premises) and concrete 
problems (e.g. both top-down and bottom-up reasoning), the recognition that individual 
and group processes can be as good as product, and the attestation of processing a 
conviction.
828
  Catechesis, which is a dialectical and long-term process, ―implies (1) 
intentional, mindful, responsible, faithful activities; (2) lifelong sustained efforts; (3) 
open, mutually helpful interpersonal relationships and interactions of persons within 
community; (4) a concern for every aspect of life; and (5) involvement of the entire 
person in all of that person‘s relationships with God, self, neighbor, and the world.‖829 
The ways chosen to teach and form others each have their own methods of 
assessing success.  For instance, it is one thing to train or teach someone a habit using 
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sanctions and rewards, which is measurable though behavior patterns.  It is another thing 
to teach a rule and the reasons for it, assessed by communications about the appropriate 
or undesirable norms.  Yet another method is to teach beliefs in morality with user-
provided reasoning and justifications, evaluated by the provision of appropriate reasons 
for the belief.  Finally, a totally different way is to teach culturally accepted beliefs 
(moral norms) and to act according to conscience and convictions, which demands an 
explanation and proof of behaving in accord with the behavior and explanations.
830
  The 
presence, absence, or degrees of behaviors are assessment measures themselves.  
University of St. Thomas professor Neil Hamilton lists some behaviors relevant within 
health care as empirical evidence of the central link between professional development 
and formation with practice and action. 
Higher moral judgment scores are related to  
– clinical performance ratings by supervisors of medical 
residents 
– internship performances in nursing (better predictor than 
grade point average, standardized entrance scores, or 
age)  
– resisting use of insider knowledge in a trading simulation 
– detecting fraud in financial statements & whistle blowing in 
organizations 
– maintaining independence of judgment  
– decreased malpractice claims for physicians  
– effectiveness of verbal responses in a case role play831  
 
Any one of these or other behaviors may serve as assessment measures of moral 
education or interventions within health care. 
Some have more specific recommendations for interventions.  Based on his 
Choice-Vision-End-in-View theory, Robert Boostrom challenges some typical 
preconceptions about environment and learning characteristics, based on observing the 
moral teachings of Socrates, Aristotle, John Dewey, and Nel Noddings.  Rather than 
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honoring only the teacher‘s (facilitator‘s) goals, facilitators and teachers must honor the 
goals and motives of students.  Classrooms (meetings) that are a ‗safe space‘ rarely 
challenge people to develop and grow; students (participants) must prepare to have their 
beliefs and preconceptions challenged, engage in meaningful dialogue with others about 
their deliberation, and to have their vision validated by others.  Learning and developing 
must be reflective, and everyone involved must be able to see the fruits of their labors or 
‗test their vision.‘832  Commenting the use of moral education as restorative justice, 
Schweigert identifies three principles for moral education and development.  First and in 
reference to sources of moral authority, persons need to emphasize ―the complementarity 
of communal and universal norms.‖833  (Essentially, this is teaching communitarianism, 
which could be a significant detriment for those who approach morality and justice from 
libertarian, egalitarian, contractarian, utilitarian, or meritarian perspectives.)  Pertaining 
to the operating space for moral authority, second, moral education occurs best in the 
space between different parties (e.g. offenders and victims, responsible and less 
responsible, etc.).  Finally, moral education and development done in this manner should 
strengthen community, which is about the process of moral authority.
834
 
David Candee, from Harvard University‘s Center for Moral Education, uses 
Rest‘s components from moral thought (i.e. reasoning) to moral action as the basis for 
assistance or interventions during the process from reasoning to action.  Each of Candee‘s 
steps has corresponding measures.  First, one must recognize something as a moral 
dilemma by identifying a statement that best frames a situation as an ethical dilemma.  
Second and third, a person groups, extracts, and establishes the bases for the moral claim.  
This is about the framing of the problem, or identifying the persons involved in the 
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situation, as well as the behaviors, moral claims, and the basis for the moral claims of 
each.  Fourth and fifth, a person ascertains the legitimacy of each person‘s moral claims 
and the precedence of each claim.  This involves exposing individuals to other modes of 
reasoning and justification (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue).  The assessment or 
measure is about acclimating the person to the end or result of a certain line-of-reasoning.  
Sixth and seventh, the person communicates and settles the decision with others.  Either 
the moral agent or others implements a behavior or action.
835
  The author does not 
disclose measures or means of gauging the last three steps. 
Studies by Turiel (1966), Rest (1969), and Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) all 
validated another important specification about moral reasoning and interventions.  
Persons understand moral reasoning below and at their own stage of reasoning.  Beyond 
this, persons are likely to understand statements and justifications one stage above their 
own stage, but incrementally less likely to understand each stage beyond.
836
  With this in 
mind, Kohlberg advocated the use of ―environmental influence by passive exposure to 
external examples of higher thought with environmental influence by the induction of 
conflict leading to internal reorganization.‖837 
Arguments against moral education are present.  Some have to do with the 
appropriateness of some locations (e.g. schools) for this kind of education.  A second has 
to do with the intrusion of certain moral norms (i.e. the norms of the majority or 
community) on individuals.  Another reflects concern about the use of moral education as 
a subjugation device to carry on social structure.  There is not adequate specification for 
the framework of character education both within society (some arguing it is too shallow 
to do so, as well), and the framework and underlying assumptions for specific content.  
 310 
Some claim it does not have a useful, grounded, and methodical pedagogy.  Rarely are 
the students‘ autonomous needs for independence, reasoning, and judgment recognized.  
Yet another is a claim that there has not been a significant measure of the empirical 
effectiveness of moral education within schools.
838
  Finally, a last claim is that schools 
―have been proved to be institutions of manipulation and imposition.‖839   
The first and last objections are not relevant to this model, which takes place in 
organizations and not schools.  The second and third objections – the intrusion of moral 
norms and moral education as a suppression mechanism – seem less relevant, especially 
in Catholic health care.  It is reasonable to assume that an organization would expect 
individuals who work in the organization to uphold its mission and values.  One would 
expect the organization to perpetuate its identity.  Alasdair MacIntyre does not 
specifically advocate moral education and interventions within organizations.  Though, 
he infers that organizations are better suited to advocate a specific morality than general, 
public education advocating multiple or shared, public morality.
840
   
Kohlberg also seems to downplay the concerns of ‗cultural indoctrination‘ 
because moral development requires ―something more universal in development, 
something that would occur in any culture,‖ as revealed by the results of his cross cultural 
studies.
841  
Kohlberg, and his colleague Kramer, published graphs based on his studies of 
middle-class, urban boys from ten to sixteen years-of-age in the U.S., Taiwan, and 
Mexico as well as boys from isolated villages in Turkey and the Yucatan, also from then 
to sixteen years-of-age.  All the graphs (each graph represents an average per nation) 
show a decline in stage one reasoning over these six years. Stage two reasoning either 
peaks at thirteen years-of-age and then decreases, or it steadily decreases over the six 
 311 
years.  In general, stage three, stage four, stage five, and stage six reasoning increase over 
the six years, with more pronounced progression in stage three and stage four 
reasoning.
842
  (Remember that people displaying stage five and stage six reasoning tend 
to be rare in general, and even more uncommon for people so young.) 
Cultural differences coincide with the developmental status of youths within the 
universal stage hierarchy.
843
  With respect to framework and pedagogy, this model, 
arguably, advances both in a grounded, specific, and useful manner.  According to 
Kohlberg, scholarship and methods within the moral philosophy and, even more 
specifically, the Catholic moral tradition are uniquely suited to advance education with 
frameworks and pedagogy.
844
  This sentiment was echoed by others with other addenda: 
(Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.) Children and youth cannot 
take over a ready-made body of truth from other people.  They 
must wrestle with each aspect of truth in the light of their 
experience until they make it their own and until it becomes a part 
of their lives. 
 
(Randolph Crump Miller) The clue to Christian education is the 
rediscovery of a relevant theology which will bridge the gap 
between content and method, providing the background and 
perspective of Christian truth by which the best methods and 
content will be used as tools to bring the learners into the right 
relationship with the living God…The task of Christian education 
is to provide opportunities for the right kind of relationships and to 
interpret all relationship within the framework of the revelation of 
God in Christ.
845
 
 
[The grace-faith relationship with God and others] is an experience 
that we cannot create, but which we are empowered to offer to 
others when we have known it for ourselves…This grace is 
persuasive rather than irresistible.  It is the product of love rather 
than coercion.  It is a gracious personal relationship which we are 
free to reject…Education at this point [i.e. when it offers choices 
such as theses] is evangelical… When the right theology, which 
again must be open-ended, and not dogmatic, stands in the 
background and when grace and faith are in the foreground, the 
learner‘s sense of worth will be underscored and the teacher-pupil 
 312 
relationship will operate on an I-thou level within the broader 
community of the church, and the transforming power of the 
gospel will work to bring about a decision of faith in Jesus 
Christ.
846
 
 
The method is also respectful of students‘ autonomous independence, reasoning, and 
judgment.  As to empirical proof of effectiveness, studies discussed later in the chapter 
demonstrate effectiveness of moral teachings and interventions in settings other than 
schools. 
 Another caution is the avoidance of theological imperialism in method or process.  
In other words, theological methodology is not sufficient proof for or ability to judge the 
worth of teaching processes (i.e. techniques).  Theology can only justify the connection 
of a specific method or practice to theology.
847
  ―By attempting to be all explanations to 
all reality, theological imperialism becomes no explanation to all reality, and loses its 
own reality in the process.‖848  The most obvious way to avoid imperialism is to remain 
neutral and objective about the application of cooperation using this model.  It is one 
method, albeit an historically useful one, from a religious tradition for describing 
relationships where a partner is doing evil.  It may not be the answer to every such 
situation for everyone.  The function of cooperation in this model is not theological 
imperialism, but using a religious concept as mediation to a new reality as a bridge 
between theology and religious instruction, in which both method and content intertwines 
to create a different ontic reality.
849
  Instruction becomes a mode for unveiling and 
experiencing reality together, which is also Catechesis, as an intentional, methodical 
process of creating and maintaining valuable relationships within a community of faith 
that lives, listens, learns, worships, and witnesses together.
850
  In this manner (the one 
proposed here), any education becomes less focused on the cognitive dimension and 
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more on the interpersonal and experiential dimensions, which has been a traditional 
difficulty of religious education.
851
 
This intricacy, and the difficulty, of addressing issues only intensifies when 
considering moral education, formation, and interventions.  Effectively using moral 
interventions becomes tedious and daunting, but not impossible.  Trends are present in 
the above literature about moral education, from which one may extrapolate helpful 
generalities.  People can learn to be moral (i.e. good character) in a manner similar to a 
skill, which requires a skilled facilitator (teacher).  For moral interventions to be 
effective, they must engage the person so he or she has the chance to practice moral 
behavior, and have his or her views challenged.  Fostering an environment that confronts 
persons‘ most fundamental beliefs also defies the typical notion of the classroom as safe 
space.  Furthermore, the end result is the organization and its associates acting morally.  
To accomplish this, moral interventions need to address the convolution of moral 
motivation (intent), sensitivity, reasoning, judgment, and behavior (actions) such that 
none of the elements impede the goal of associates acting morally.  Arguably, the success 
of interventions may have something to do with how many components of moral 
reasoning and action the researchers address.  In effect, the assertion is interventions that 
successfully address more components linking education to moral behavior including 
moral motivation (intent), sensitivity, reasoning, judgment, and behavior (actions) will do 
better than interventions that do not.  Objections to the claims of success in moral 
education and skill building do not result in the unconditional claim that educating morals 
does not work, merely that the evidence is inconclusive, which could be due to survey 
instrument design and methods.  Due to the inconclusive evidence, it is a much safer 
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claim to state that interventions, such as the ones proposed here, advance participants‘ 
moral formation, but not necessarily their moral development.
852
 
Discussing cooperation in this context is critical.  The proposed use of 
cooperation maintains the context of Catholic, substantive moral principle and adds the 
milieu of vehicle for moral education.  One may also describe the use of cooperation here 
as a moral intervention.  For these reasons, it is necessary to discuss opportunities and 
challenges of moral education and interventions, generally, and using cooperation as 
moral education and intervention in a health care organization. 
Moral teachers would abdicate their duties if they surrendered to the difficulty of 
the educating morality effectively.
853
  Those acknowledged as moral exemplars and 
teachers, even though they may not recognize themselves as such, are ideal examples.  
One may regard Jesus Christ, for instance, as having either having God‘s perfect 
knowledge and phroenesis (practical wisdom), or he did not, but had special gifts and 
talents.  In the latter case, we concede that Jesus is a respected teacher with an 
exceptional method for showing others how to be moral.  In the former, the Gospels tell 
us about God, who knows the perfect way to educate.  Either case exemplifies the unique 
character of selfless, moral teaching.  Others acknowledged as moral exemplars, such as 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, were called to action, not stagnation in the face of 
complexity and challenge, even at their own personal expense.
854
 
The result of moral interventions and models, both generally and in this proposed 
use of cooperation, is not necessarily moral development.  Stated differently, it is possible 
for someone to ‗move,‘ for instance, from a Kohlberg stage four to a Kohlberg stage five.  
Likewise, it is equally as possible to expose someone in Gilligan‘s first level to a new 
 315 
situation and way of relating, such that the person advances to the second level.  The 
reality of the model of cooperation proposed in this dissertation is that it advances 
participants‘ formation and, hopefully, their moral development.  No guarantees 
accompany claims to progress moral development. 
A demonstration of the above claim within the proposed cooperation discernment 
process should provide clarity.  Assume that Brianna is in the process of defining evil.  
Her annoyance rises as Darius, a coworker, insists that the ―appropriate people are not at 
the table‖ for the discussion.  In other words, Darius makes a compelling argument the 
group omitted relevant stakeholders in this particular issue.  The facilitator explains how 
justice is a Core Value of the organization, and the concern of Darius is a procedural 
justice issue.  Andrew, the facilitator, asks Darius and Brianna if they will discuss their 
concerns with each other.  They consent and continue their discussion.  The discussion 
escalates with periodic reframing from Andrew, they eventually ‗agree to disagree,‘ and 
both Brianna and Darius leave with feelings of disquiet and incompletion. 
We can assume that Darius, Brianna, and the other participants learn something 
more about acting justly in accord with the Mission and Core Values of the organization.  
Studies and theory suggest that Brianna could progress her moral development, as 
measured by the MJI or DIT posttest when compared with the pretest.  Brianna may not 
progress at all, albeit the intent of the facilitator to pair the two with each other to create 
respectful challenge to foster moral development. 
IC. The Reality of Using Cooperation for Discernment 
 
The use of cooperation in this model is not only a good chance for moral 
development, but also qualifies as organizational and moral discernment.  Some 
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explicitly comment on using this principle or other methods for discerning organizational 
issues, albeit not with the model proposed here.
855
  The reference of cooperation is 
always an action that is evil, or actions that are evil (and in our case unjust or 
inappropriate).  By the means proposed here, this structure is conducive to some clarity 
about issues.  Attempting to define the evil (injustice, inappropriate activity, etc.), 
discussing the organization‘s connection or proposed link to it, interpreting and applying 
Catholic and/or organizational identity to the issue, and suggesting options or 
alternatives, described below, all are means of discerning present or future organizational 
issues.  In other words, the proposed model is discernment. 
Various methods or modes accompany the variety of ways associates may use 
discernments.  For instance, many organizations already have mission discernment or 
assessment processes, performance improvement (evaluation) tools for leaders, and 
organizational or social ethics committees that exemplify the organization‘s 
stewardship.
856
  Cooperation discernments can integrate well into any of these 
mechanisms, such as acknowledging a leader‘s participation in discernments during that 
person‘s performance review.  Values based decision-making, discernment, and process 
excellence tools foster retrospective review of decisions, and cooperation discernment 
could serve a useful function for ‗after-action‘ analysis.857  Organizations may or may not 
have a tool called an identity matrix (the most notable is the Catholic Identity Matrix by 
St. Thomas University) to assess the knowledge (awareness), infusion (permeation), and 
displays (demonstration) of Catholic identity throughout Catholic health care 
organizations.
858
  Again, the proposed use of cooperation may illustrate the knowledge, 
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infusion, and displays of Catholic identity within the organization.  This cooperation 
model also could be part of the matrix itself. 
ID. The Benefits of Using Cooperation for Moral Formation and Discernment 
 
The once-prevalent culture or structure for moral and value inculcation (i.e. 
education, indoctrination, formation) was a modern one, which had the following 
features: Rules and regulations are useful for shaping behavior.  Conscience is the inner 
voice telling persons that they are guilty when wrong.  Examples, inspirational stories, 
and role models have an absolute, untarnished quality of perfection.  Persuasion and 
arguments rarely allow for persistent ambiguity (i.e. agree to disagree), but concentrate 
on rhetoric and debate, which depend on the weaknesses and fallacies of others‘ 
reasoning.  Persons should not question religious teaching and dogma.
859
  The 
teleological direction of modern ethics is to the legislation or regulation of human 
behavior.  The application of reason for rational analysis needs structure and bounds.  
Modern education is egocentric, individualistic, and has the additional following 
qualities:
860
   
1. Claims are universal or universalizable. 
2. It has principles and is rule-governed. 
3. Ideals involve reasoning and deliberation. 
4. Its nature is closed. 
5. It is confident in wisdom and certain in judgment. 
6. Moral presumptions are subjective. 
7. Generation and justifications are instrumental and prudential. 
8. Morality is timeless, holding for successive generations. 
9. It attempts to be as coherent as possible. 
10. Morality, ideally, is non-contradictory. 
11. Unity is a value unto itself, which grounds morality in a single, 
unitary, and universal ethical code.
861
 
 
The pitfalls of this method involve a typical lack of explanation about why (i.e. the 
reasons) to act a certain way, and it does not allow persons to practice decision-making 
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and acting morally.  In addition, persons do not experience conflict, opportunities to 
discard or revise previously held beliefs (possibly a sign of transitioning to another to 
another Kohlberg stage or Gilligan level), nor chances to operate autonomously.
862
  
Ultimately, it may even diminish the autonomy of individuals who exhibit good decision-
making in other life decisions, while synonymously expecting the same individuals to 
unquestionably submit to ideologies (some that are hypocritical in their expectations).
863
 
Using the Bagnall criteria of modernism listed above, the Catholic Church and 
natural law reasoning (NLR) is an example of modern reasoning, education, and setting: 
1. NLR is universal in scope and sensitivity. 
2. Laypersons and clergy inform NLR through discourse, but 
NLR does not operate this way; it operates as principled with 
rules and an increasingly narrow mode of application. 
3. Only a few reason NLR, offering less of a feeling of sensus 
fidelium or experiences of the faithful informing NLR through 
deliberation. 
4. The Church hierarchy increasingly regulates and comments on 
pastoral application as dogma, which virtually closes it to 
expression and empathy. 
5. While moral theology has some latitude for determining the 
appropriateness of moral acts, the Church specifies, with 
increasing frequency, the suitability of specific acts assuming 
confidence in its ability to determine the object, intent, and 
circumstances of the act. 
6. Due to the perceived loss of sensus fidelium, human experience 
seems less intersubjective and more subjective, with clergy 
positing norms for laypersons to follow (e.g. the Vatican 
overriding the committees‘ reports during Vatican II is an 
example). 
7. NLR is both instrumental and prudential. 
8. The Church is timeless; NLR is ahistorical. 
9. The Church and NLR are coherent, meaning that it is a system 
unto itself. 
10. In some matters, the Church claims itself to be inerrant, 
validated by the process itself, which often does not 
acknowledge wisdom about doubts or contradictions noticed 
by others. 
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11. We acknowledge one universal, Catholic Church, which only 
recently has outwardly acknowledged the wisdom of other 
faiths, but not to the extent of full extent of full inclusion.
864
 
 
Those who are familiar with the Catholic Church and NLR are aware, whether outwardly 
or unconsciously, of its typical method of operation and education.  Although empirical 
data to back this claim does not exist, people perceiving its enculturation, operation, 
education, and formation as outdated and modern (versus relevant and postmodern) could 
be part of its problem – the Church does not seem to appreciate or acknowledge the 
observations about education, formation, and development presented here.  There seems 
to be a divide between what the Church proclaims and how it does so with the perception 
of the faithful.  Per Robert Quinn in Change the World, the Church fits the description of 
not recognizing its hypocritical self.
865
 
A postmodern structure or context, as it relates to moral formation and education, 
is one that will: 
1. Encourage [persons] to make choices, and to make them freely. 
2. Help them discover and examine available alternatives when 
faced with choices. 
3. Help [persons] weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting on 
the consequences of each. 
4. Encourage [persons] to consider what it is that they prize and 
cherish. 
5. Give them opportunities to make public affirmations of their 
choices. 
6. Encourage them to act, behave, and live in accordance with 
their choices. 
7. Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in their 
life.
866
 
 
It allows those being formed to practice morality, which is more than learning morality.  
―Aristotle said, ‗we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, 
brave by doing brave ones.‘‖867  This postmodern model concentrates on the internal 
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motivations rather than only external sanctions, has the goal of to exposing the person to 
difficult situations taking account of ones with competing or conflicting morals, and 
centers on the acquisition of ―second order dispositions (e.g. integrity, self-
control)…rather than solely first order dispositions (e.g. honesty).‖868  The setting of 
interventions becomes a location for significant investigation of competing and 
conflicting perspectives, not the obligation to inculcate (i.e. submit to) praiseworthy traits 
and morality.
869
 
The cooperation model proposed here is a postmodern concept in a modern 
principle‘s ‗clothing.‘   Employing cooperation in this manner is counter-cultural to the 
Church, much as the teachings of Jesus to the culture of the time.  Discernment with this 
cooperation model is postmodern and counter-cultural because it is a theological 
principle that does not operate like a traditional principle or rule.  Again, using the 
Bagnall modernism criteria, cooperation in this model is: 
1. Tailored to be in response to specific situations and events. 
2. Grounded in and informed by intersecting discourse. 
3. Dependent on situations as a discernment and, therefore, spontaneous and 
enlightened by the experience and lenses of the participants. 
4. Open to self-expression, empathy, and challenges to our development and 
formation through interactions between participants. 
5. A framework used for categorizing participation in evil, injustice, or 
malfeasance, meaning that right answers may not exist; also, moral 
expertise or mediation skills do not translate to having correct answers in a 
cooperation discernment. 
6. A discernment process involving a group of stakeholders and interested 
associates using the principle of cooperation, and the decision, if any, is 
not the product of an individual moral agent. 
7. Purposeful in addressing the concerns of associates about specific issues 
(relevant for cooperation discernment); presumably, the impetus is not a 
tangible reward, but concern for others. 
8. Always a link to a particular issue and, as such, has time constraints; a 
discernment cannot go on indefinitely and any results work for those 
stakeholders, at that time, and in that particular setting. 
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9. A discernment process that will generate differences in opinion and 
justification; nothing in particular may trigger a cooperation discernment 
other than concerns. 
10. Not a consensus-generating mechanism, as the discernment may not yield 
a unified perception or solution (this is the reason for using it to assess and 
challenge moral development); several solutions may result from a single 
discernment 
11. Already complex, but due to its non-universal nature, but becomes even 
more so, and stronger, when used in a group rather than only an individual 
moral agent‘s sole employ of the principle.870 
 
Whatever elements are not postmodern to begin with could integrate into the cooperation 
discernment to make it even more postmodern.  Cooperation discernment, used as group 
formation, challenges the typical means of using cooperation, which involves an 
individual moral agent, a moral theologian or ethicist, assessing participation and 
justifying that assessment. 
 
II. Cooperation as the Model for Ministry Discernment and Ministry Formation 
An explanation of the proposed use of cooperation for ministry development and 
formation takes place below.  Structure, roles, and processes are ways of dividing the 
nuance of the model into distinct categories.  One limitation of these divisions is the 
perceptual difficulty of seeing the model in its entirety (i.e. ‗the big picture,‘ ‗30,000-foot 
view‘).  The intent of Table A (top of the next page) of the CD4DF Model is to alleviate 
this difficulty: 
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Table A: Cooperation Discernment for Development and Formation (CD4DF) Model 
Meeting Number & Title Members Cooperation Pedagogy Purpose 
Pre-Discernment 
Meeting: Organization 
and Planning 
Facilitator, planner, 
and cooperation 
specialist 
Minimal; initially to process 
in order to frame the issue 
to facilitator and advocates 
Process request or 
issue; agree on utility of 
other meetings 
1st Discernment 
Meeting(s): Establishing 
Relevance 
Advocates, facilitator, 
planner and 
cooperation specialist 
(both optional)  
Provide facts about the evil, 
injustice, or malfeasance; 
discuss needs for more info 
Introductions, determine 
issue’s relevance, 
confirm process and 
stakeholders 
2nd Discernment 
Meeting(s): Defining 
Relevance 
Advocates, facilitator, 
cooperation 
specialist, and issue 
specialist(s) 
Defining, discussing the evil 
act (malfeasance, injustice) 
and the act of cooperation 
Participants define the 
issue; facilitator creates 
development 
opportunities 
3rd Discernment 
Meeting(s): Introducing 
Info, Ethics or Justice, 
and Cooperation 
Advocates, facilitator, 
and cooperation 
specialists 
Explain cooperation’s utility, 
history; detail and discuss 
cooperation categories 
Informational; knowledge 
about applying justice and 
ethics theories, 
cooperation 
4th Discernment 
Meeting(s): Discussing 
Cooperation 
Advocates, facilitator, 
planner, and 
cooperation 
specialists 
Discussion of application of 
cooperation to situation; 
finalize group categorization 
Participants discuss their 
cooperation 
categorization; 
development opportunities 
Follow-Up Meeting 
Advocates, facilitator, 
and cooperation 
specialists 
Possible; depends on 
participants’ requests 
Review possible 
changes in issue’s 
status; discuss 
 
The use of cooperation in the pre-discernment meeting and the follow-up meeting is 
minimal.  Aside from these, all steps either frame the cooperation issue or use 
cooperation in significant ways.  In addition, most meetings allow for the possible moral 
development of participants (advocates).  Examples are the first and second discernment 
meetings.   Both are relevant for establishing the issue and its associated facts and 
stakeholders.  A cooperation issue always pertains to two separate yet specific acts.  
Information and discussion about these acts is necessary before discussing the taxonomic 
level of cooperation.  These first meetings are more than perfunctory; they are 
opportunities for development of the participants.  Participants may illustrate their stage 
of development at any point, including their questions and explanations.  For instance, a 
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participant stating, ―Lying is always evil,‖ may indicate one level of development, with 
another depicted by the question, ―What is in this for me if I do this?‖ 
IIA. Structure 
In addition to moral education models, the proposed structure of cooperation as 
model for ministry formation and ministry discernment employs several suggestions for 
structuring productive organizational discernments and decision-making opportunities.  
For instance, Ben Davis outlines five distinctive types of ethical processes.  To an extent, 
this model embodies all five.  That is learning about morality (i.e., moral norms and 
principles, e.g., the principle of cooperation in the Roman Catholic tradition), learning 
moral theory (i.e. people approach problems differently, e.g., consequentialism, 
deontology, teleology), discussing  social ethics (i.e., how persons react to perceived 
injustice and immorality), practicing ethics applied to an issue (i.e. discussing a difficult 
issue), and applying ethics to specific individual and professional situations (i.e., how this 
affects each person and his or her profession).
871
  It incorporates Mark Repenshek‘s and 
Dave Belde‘s model for respecting experience in moral discourse through case studies 
and examination, elucidating diverse moral viewpoints through experience sharing, and 
studying lived meanings through the lens of the Catholic tradition.
872
  In addition to 
embodying moral education and intervention suggestions, the CD4DF Model also uses 
other theological concepts and principles.  An example is that using the model could be 
an application of the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that the persons involved with the 
model are the most appropriate level.
873
  (Perhaps the original decision-makers were not 
the most suitable for the decision.)  Much of this model is dynamic, so that it fits the 
needs, identity, and culture of any organization.  For instance, an organization will need 
 324 
to determine how to use this model for ministry discernment (e.g., retrospective review of 
decisions, for divisive issues, etc.). 
To start, a focus group may want to ask the following questions: What role does 
this cooperation discernment serve in the system?  How does it fit operationally in the 
organization?  To whom do discernment discussions go?  If there are any, what authority 
do determinations have?  Stakeholders in the formation of this cooperation model should 
vet the proposed structure and operations with a wide group of associates in the 
organization.  Formation and discernment participants should also have a voice in the 
model.
874
 
A few points are always helpful before seeking appropriate buy-in for a new 
model.  First, processes and structures should be as transparent as possible.
875
  Second, 
stakeholders need engagement; therefore, organizers should invite feedback for 
strengthening process and structure.
876
    Third, it is easy for stakeholders to become 
disenchanted if no evidence exists of feedback being integrated.  An option to integrate 
feedback is by organizing a group to do this.
877
   Finally, all of these specifications 
depend on associate awareness.  Organizers need to promote or advertise this option to 
associates so that they are aware of the ways to become involved in co-creation or as 
participants. 
IIB. Roles for the Cooperation Issue 
Before summarizing the process itself, a description of the suggested discernment 
participants will enhance clarity.  The facilitator is the person who mediates the 
cooperation discernment.  The function of mediator is similar to how Dubler and 
Liebman describe clinical ethics mediation when they contrast consultation with 
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mediation in their text.  For instance, mediators are optimists who assist other parties to 
move from their positions to focus on solutions based on interests.  The principles of 
party autonomy, informed decision-making, and confidentiality are at the core of 
mediation.
878
  The facilitator should have skill in mediation and counseling, generally, 
and this method specifically.  The facilitator can benefit from some other basic 
techniques.  Equal to other mediation roles, this is a difficult role because the person must 
be a role model for acceptable behavior.  He or she does this through being a respectful 
challenger while being nonjudgmental, which is a delicate balance between extremes.  On 
one hand, a facilitator does not confront issues from a position of moral superiority.  On 
the other hand, he or she does not challenge people directly.
879
  A meta-analysis of the 
most effective pedagogies for facilitating moral reasoning by Pascarella and Terenzini 
reported that the best facilitators truly facilitate and mediate discussions rather than only 
provide information, meaning that these persons promote self-assessment, analysis (i.e., 
discernment), and reflection.  Their feedback is multi- or cross-disciplinary, cultivates 
development and formation, and if necessary, attends to injustice, bias, discrimination, 
and intolerance.
880
  Facilitators should tailor techniques with perceived moral stages.
881
  
For instance, imitation, suggestion, and identification may be effective tools for those at 
lower stages of development, but not for those at higher stages of development.  Finally, 
the facilitator also needs to be familiar with both the principle of cooperation and the 
particular issue catalyzing the discernment. 
Advocates are those who participate in the discernment.  Presumably, most will 
be associates of the organization.  They do not need any background in cooperation.  
Nonetheless, they should be passionate and engaged about the issue (not implying 
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agreement with cooperating in the situation) and the organization.  It is prudent for 
members of such groups have interest in their own formation and development, and 
represent different areas or various departments of the organization from leadership to 
clinicians, specialists, and technicians.
882
 
Specialists describe two different categories of persons.  Category A is the 
persons, or those, who know the principle of cooperation well, which is fundamental to 
the proposed process that involves an explanation of cooperation to the advocates.  Those 
in Category B are specialists who know the germane issue.  For instance, consider a 
situation where within the past three months, all senior executives made their bonuses 
while a rather large, inner-city clinic shut its doors.  The clinic was the only vestige of the 
system that had three inner-city hospitals at one time.  These decisions, the closure and 
rewarding bonuses, were related and many associates are outraged or disappointed.  It 
would help make arrangements to involve some of the previously underserved, now un-
served, to be specialists in the cooperation discussion.  Including stakeholders most 
affected by decisions, as specialists in this case, not only exemplifies the principle of 
subsidiarity, it brings the most relevant voices to the table and provides a first-hand 
account for advocates who may dialogue with the issue specialists.
883
  Irrespective of the 
specialists‘ category, role of the specialist is that of an expert witness who presents his or 
her informed perspective to the group. 
The final role is the planner.  A planner coordinates and helps determine the 
sequence, timing, and participants, as all need specificity and are central details to groups 
such as this.
884
  In addition, the planner organizes the events‘ details, informs discernment 
advocates about specifics and asks for assent, manages schedules, and distributes helpful 
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information.  The facilitator, cooperation specialist, and even the planner may be the 
same person, or different persons could take these roles. 
IIC. Process – Mostly Accomplished Through a Series of Meetings 
A series of group meetings is the suggested process for cultivating discernment, 
formation, and possibly development.  All of the meetings center on an explicit topic and 
may take place over several months.  In total, there should be at least four meetings with 
the specialists, advocates, and facilitator.  Most of the time in meetings is in a group 
setting, although there are advantages to allowing time for individual processing of the 
group time.  Each of these specifications has reasonable justifications for enhancing 
discernment, formation, or development.
885
 
An organizing and planning meeting is always constructive for laying the 
groundwork for other meetings.
886
  The meeting would involve the associate who 
catalyzed the request as well as a standing cooperation discernment planner, facilitator, 
and specialist.  Goals of this meeting should be to process the request to try and agree on 
the utility of other meetings, and to arrange the aforementioned meetings.  Some of the 
preparation work includes researching the relevant issue and contacting the issue 
specialists to present the issue at the first meeting. 
Each subsequent discernment meeting has its own focus and characteristics, 
which draws support from the literature.  The focus of the first discernment meeting is for 
establishing the relevance of the issue.  Participants will introduce themselves to each 
other as well as familiarize themselves with the cooperation issue, process structure, and 
the discernment purpose and goals.  Partaking in the discussions assumes the 
participants‘ consent.  Still, similar to any informed consent process, the facilitator should 
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dialogue with participants about options, risks and benefits, and alternatives.  In this case, 
participants need to know everything is confidential within the group, they can opt out at 
any time, there is no data collection, and processes may challenge comfort levels, as they 
confront underlying assumptions and preconceptions.  Moral formation and development 
are not easy, but participants need to know this and judge if the end result, moral 
formation and development, is worthwhile.
887
  A facilitator must introduce the concept of 
respectful space, meaning that participants will face challenge, which may not always 
feel ‗safe,‘ but this can occur in a respectful, collegial manner.888 
Achieving the purpose of the second discernment meeting would be through each 
participant defining the relevance of the issue.  This involves the participants describing 
how each individual group member views the alleged impropriety, whether some 
perceive it as evil, others recognize it as injustice, and more may not identify an issue at 
all.  An ‗expected‘ way of reasoning does not exist.  Nevertheless, there will be 
differences that are indications of a person‘s moral development.  The role of the 
facilitator is not to judge.  He or she catalyzes discussion between the participants about 
why they categorize an issue in a particular way by calling attention to the differences in 
the issue‘s characterization, for instance, by asking why one advocate calls it ―evil‖ and 
another ―malfeasance.‖  The facilitator listens for indications of participants‘ moral 
development.  Rather than commenting perceived moral development category or stage, 
he or she uses mediation techniques to catalyze discussion between participants in 
adjacent stages.
889
 
Specialists and facilitator(s) initiate advocates to concepts such as cooperation, 
ethics theories, and justice theories to catalyze additional discussions in the third 
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discernment meeting.  Transparency about cooperation, including that no ‗right‘ answer 
exists, assists participants, as well as using relevant case-based examples or casuist 
reasoning (always helpful education models for health care professionals, specifically, 
and adults, generally).
890
  Not only is it valuable to acquaint advocates to cooperation‘s 
history and contemporary uses, it is equally as significant to remind participants of three 
things: 
1. Cooperation does not ‗tell‘ a person what to do.  People can disagree, depending 
on their perspectives, about the categories of cooperation. 
2. Therefore, we all have wisdom as a group for discerning cooperation issues. 
3. Nobody holds special knowledge about cooperation that makes an answer more 
‗correct‘ than another. 
Additionally, using the principle of cooperation in this manner is only one way of 
addressing our complicity with evil, malfeasance, or injustice. 
Encouraging each participant to discuss his or her perception of the organization‘s 
level of cooperation (i.e. implicit formal, immediate material, proximate mediate 
material) is the focal point of at least one other discernment meeting.  Discussion should 
have the goals of attempting to categorize the level of cooperation and for participants to 
have some awareness of their and others‘ emotions and views.891  Total agreement or 
consensus among participants is not necessary.  Written summaries of the meetings may, 
and should, reflect differences of opinion.  The facilitator will initiate a wrap-up of the 
meetings, encourage advocates to discuss lessons learned from the meetings, and suggest 
a follow-up meeting.  Additional or follow-up meetings are at the discretion of the 
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participants and may be constructive for reviewing any changes in the status of the 
discussed issue. 
IID. Conclusion 
As stated in the chapter‘s beginning, this chapter serves as a natural resolution to 
the previous chapter – the purpose of the former chapter to introduce moral development 
and this chapter to build upon those foundations by exploring other developmental 
considerations and interventions.  The nature and framework of the precise intervention 
entails the principle of cooperation.  Chapter two detailed common individual 
applications of cooperation, and chapter three stipulated conventional organizational 
applications of cooperation. 
This chapter built upon the general foundations of moral development by 
distinguishing the other factors in moral development and behavior besides moral 
reasoning.  Emotions, moral sensitivity, moral motivation, character, and experience are 
examples of aspects explored in the literature.  Tom Nairn‘s diagram served as a visual 
representation of the relation of these features in moral reasoning and behavior.  Moral 
interventions are methods for shaping moral reasoning, influencing moral sensitivity, and 
bringing awareness about possible moral motivations, character traits, and the influence 
of experience.  Studies of moral influences and interventions (e.g., education) support the 
complexity of successfully changing behavior.  Whilst complex, it is not impossible.  
Arguably, persons abdicate their role or duty as teachers when they surrender to the 
complexity, or when they choose not to address as many of the above dynamics as 
possible, which would give moral interventions, such as the one proposed here, the best 
chance of success.  The chapter concluded with an explanation of the specific proposed 
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employment of the principle of cooperation.  The conclusion and final chapter gives more 
detail about the model through its strengths and weaknesses.  It also explains why this 
model is useful for other-than-Catholic organizations. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusion 
 
This chapter‘s conclusion recaps and summarizes the entire dissertation, including this 
chapter.  Therefore, these opening, summary comments in this introduction will be brief.  
Chapter five, which explained both general and specific interventions, built on the former 
chapters, which described the principle of cooperation and moral development in detail.  
There are three main topics for this chapter – the advantages and disadvantages of this 
model of cooperation, the relevance of this model to other-than-Catholic (whether secular 
or religious in identity) organizations, and finally, a review of the progression of this 
dissertation. 
 
I. Strengths and Weaknesses of the CD4DF Model 
No model is perfect, including this one.  A number of strengths and weaknesses 
exist that are likely to arise in the implementation and use of the Cooperation 
Discernment for Development and Formation (CD4DF) Model.  This model is adjustable 
and highly malleable to the extent that it may be possible to alleviate or resolve some of 
the drawbacks, as discussed in this section. 
IA. Weaknesses of This Model 
Beginning with weaknesses, there are a few that merit discussion.  Planners, 
facilitators, and specials can mitigate the drawbacks anywhere in the development, 
implementation, and debrief and feedback of the model.  Some are more theoretical, and 
others are practical.  This segment starts with theoretical concerns. 
A popular quote in organizational culture often attributed to Peter Drucker is, 
―Culture eats strategy for breakfast every time.‖892  To explain this quote, it is imperative 
to review the definition of culture, defined in the first chapter of this dissertation.  Culture 
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is the ―collective personality of an organization, including its assumptions, attitudes, 
values, behaviors, beliefs, and collective memories.‖893  One may further characterize the 
components of organizational collective personality by what Edgar Schein calls ―culture 
levers,‖ which appears as a pyramid structure with ―underlying assumptions‖ (i.e., why 
people do something both individually and collectively) as the base, ―behaviors‖ (i.e., 
how individuals do something) in the next tier up, ―systems‖ (i.e., how people work as a 
system) in the following upper tier, and ―technical‖ (i.e., what people do using 
―processes, tools, and structures‖) at the top of the pyramid.894  It becomes progressively 
more difficult to change the culture levers going from the top of the pyramid to the base 
because culture elements are ―observable and manageable‖ (e.g. ―structures, processes, 
leadership values, strategic histories, metrics‖) nearer to the top, but ―hidden and hard to 
influence‖ (e.g. ―collective memory, unwritten rules‖) nearer to the base.895   
Explanations of culture, culture levers, and complexity in changing culture levers 
are by way of explaining the first theoretical weakness – many organizational nuances 
and relics exist that could make meaningful change using this model difficult, as 
evidenced by organizational responses.  A number of subsets and examples of this 
weakness exist.  For instance, consider the use of the CD4DF model in an organization 
where a senior vice president is a participant.  The group is exceptionally quiet; no one 
seems to disagree.  Participants are aware of the organization‘s history (i.e., collective 
memory) of slowly ushering those who disagree with senior leaders, even respectfully, 
out of the organization.  This leads to the underlying assumption that you cannot 
challenge organizational leadership – ‗what a leader says…goes.‘  The organizational 
climate and culture of ‗yes men‘ [sic] is not hidden; however, it is hard to change.  The 
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above example is one where the culture may hinder the use of the CD4DF model, which 
is a strategy for formation and development. 
It is entirely different, for instance, to have a situation where the planner forgets to 
communicate with direct supervisors of the participants.  In particular, the planner does 
not mention that any time used for the discernment meetings are typical work hours and 
do not need special codes or management in the digital, computerized, timekeeping and 
workforce management system.  All of managers have given their permission, but lacking 
coding information, some tell their direct reports that they cannot attend the meetings 
until they have the timekeeping codes.  This example is one about a technical cultural 
lever, as it involves how people use processes, structures, and tools.  It is a manageable 
and easily correctable portion of organizational culture, and does not present the 
challenge to the optimal purposes (e.g., issue discernment, formation and, hopefully, 
development) of the CD4DF model that the former example does. 
Similar to persons, organizations must be minimally open to change and 
feedback, making the model optimal for organizations that truly value feedback and 
accountability.  As established before, persons may have more or less reflective 
equilibrium, which is the affiliation between general norms of morality and specific 
judgments of morality.
896
  Matching individual moral agents‘ (i.e., natural persons) 
actions or behaviors with specific judgments and general norms is in the same vein.  
Organizations (i.e., juridic persons) are also moral agents, as discussed in chapter three.  
They decide, make goals, act to achieve goals, are accountable for harm and praised for 
good, and are responsible for the evaluation and assessment of the suitability of those 
goals and behaviors.
897
  Organizations also possess culture or collective personality.  
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Arguably, organizational reflective equilibrium is just as conceivable as individual 
reflective equilibrium.  With respect to culture, assumptions, attitudes, values, beliefs, 
and collective memories, all part of basic underlying assumptions and values, which are 
difficult to change, while behaviors are part of behavioral and technical cultural levers, 
which are less difficult to modify.  Ideally, cultural congruence (i.e., organizational 
reflective equilibrium) should exist.  In other words, saying that there is value to 
accountability within the organization is not enough.  Actions and behaviors, as cultural 
characteristics, must match statements and claims in order for the model to have optimal 
chances for success. 
The absence of definitive ends or goals for participants in the model could be 
problematic, if not a teleologist‘s nightmare.  It is more about process (i.e., means) than 
product (i.e., ends).  On one hand, this theory does not ensure or guarantee moral 
development.  While it seems more certain, despite being perfunctory, that one could 
contend that the definitive ends are formation and issue discernment.  On the other hand, 
one could employ a more distant end and contend that this model is part of the unfolding 
of reasoning and moral order (e.g., serving the common good) through the natural law or 
the work of the Holy Spirit, which is redemptive in itself.
898
  An answer such as this may 
be unsatisfactory for some as well: 
The theological approach really does not comes to grips with 
environmental variables by issuing vague and amorphous 
statements about the Holy Spirit or the faith community providing 
the environment for effective religious pedagogy…To be practical 
and useful for…instruction, advocates of the theological approach 
must not simply state that the Holy Spirit and/or the faith 
community act as powerful environmental factors, but how these 
environmental forces specifically affect religion teaching and 
learning…[A]ssertions about the Holy Spirit as the basic 
environmental factor mean nothing beyond what is known 
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empirically about the specific effects which various environmental 
factors have on teaching and learning.
899
 
 
Theologians from Martin Luther to Karl Barth question humans‘ capability to know the 
natural law, or that everything possesses a natural end.
900
  Therefore, there is no way of 
knowing or proving the claim that this model is part of unfolding natural law.
901
  A 
compromise, perhaps, between the more immediate and distant goals is the establishment 
of a process-oriented purpose.  It is what Lawrence Richards calls mutual experience and 
participation in the unfolding reality established though Jesus Christ, which is similar to 
Kuczewski‘s concept of mutual self-discovery discussed below.902 
One could claim a theoretical weakness because the model embodies Catholic 
teaching, including common good and subsidiarity, and is communitarian in its 
foundations, subsequently.  Such a claim has merit.  The CD4DF model is a textbook 
example of how bioethics scholar Marck Kuczewski describes Ezekiel Emanuel‘s 
approach and liberal communitarianism, ―Communal deliberation is intrinsic to 
communitarianism.  So it is natural that some communitarians should propose that 
community members gather and deliberate to develop consensus.‖903  Furthermore, the 
possible impact of the model on the individual is similar to what Kuczewski calls mutual 
self-discovery (within the communitarian model), which is an intentional, dialectic 
process where a person interprets behaviors, goals, and values through the community 
where others engage their own self-discovery, and adjusts his or her own response.
904
  To 
concede that the model has communitarian groundwork demands concurrent justification 
from someone contending that this is a weakness.  Namely, the objection must 
demonstrate how this model impedes or undercuts those who use different foundations 
(e.g., consequentialism, libertarianism).  For instance, how does this communitarian 
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model act as a positive liberty, which forces the libertarianism believer to use it?  
Providing such proof is difficult, as the model does not force anyone to do something that 
she or he does not want.  Absent justification, the ultimate result is a stalemate – the age-
old attempt to prove that one philosophy and way-of-seeing the world is better than 
another. 
Somewhat similar to the last objection and weakness, one could also contend that 
applying the model to situations is an exercise in theological or moral imperialism.  
Differently stated, imperialistic claims are overtly or intrinsically oppressive attempts to 
assert that one system of morality is superior to another.
905
  (The theoretical struggle 
between relativism and universal, normative understandings, often interpreted as 
imperialism, has not resolved.)
906
  Practically, however, to assert this is to maintain that 
this theology and model are fundamentally normal for all persons, which is not the 
case.
907
  Illinois Institute of Technology professor Michael Davis discusses five types of 
ethics across the curriculum.  One type is what he titles ―morality across the curriculum,‖ 
which describes when a school or university indoctrinates students to a specific moral 
code, often written, and stresses the significance of adhering to the code or specific moral 
norms.
908
  According to Davis, this type of specific moral codes and norms were common 
in U.S. liberal arts colleges in the 1800s and in Christian liberal arts colleges today.  
Another type of common ethics education is instruction about moral and justice theories 
themselves, often in a separate class in universities.
909
  The implicit worry is that 
educating about moral and justice theories without practice and experience, or 
perpetuating rigid adherence to particular moral norms is myopic, sheltered (i.e., 
confined), and narrow.  The situation does not exist because facilitators and specialists do 
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not purport Catholicism and the model to be ‗all things to all people‘ (i.e., ‗everything to 
everyone‘).  The model‘s function and utility must be realistic and not overinflated.  It is 
a useful tool and a description of one perspective, which is coherent with the reality and 
nature of Catholic teaching and moral theology.
910
  Using the model is simply ―one 
possible way to understand our lives and history, [make] possible particular experiences, 
and [impart] particular ways of living.‖911  Facilitators and specialists should describe the 
model this way. 
Unfortunately, religious education in general and Roman Catholic education in 
particular does not enjoy a forward-thinking and respected status and history.  In fact, 
religious education has struggled to come unto its own throughout the 1900s.  This is, in 
part, because theology has driven and guarded content, structure, and form.  Additionally, 
perspectives and languages are binary, implying that a person is either in or out of the 
religion, including its educational pedagogy.  Because each religion views itself as the 
way, education will naturally reflect wholehearted commitment to the faith, demanding 
total devotion of students to that way.
912
  This observation encapsulates some other 
difficulties people may have with the model, some discussed previously – it represents 
Roman Catholic imperialism, is mechanism for conversion, reflects a traditional binary 
view of the faithful, and has a sheltered, non-progressive, and self-perpetuating form.  
Some concerns – namely the imperialism and sheltered, non-progressive format – have 
been attended to previously.  (Chapter five discussed the progressive format of this model 
as a post-modern teaching method in a modern principle‘s ‗clothing.‘  This model is not 
sheltered nor is it archaic.)  The other points of unease – binary outlook regarding the 
faithful and others as well as conversion method – merit a reciprocal remark that Catholic 
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health care has come to terms with the idea that many associates, perhaps the majority, 
working in Catholic health care are not Catholic themselves.  Little or no empirical 
support exists that bolsters claims that Catholic organizations are trying to subtly or 
overtly convert their associates.  The same holds true for binary views about the faithful.  
Again, if the distinction exists at all, Catholics working in Catholic health care regard 
associates of different faiths, or agnostics, who perpetuate the Catholic Mission, Core 
Values, identity, and traditions as being ‗in the family‘ or ‗a family member.‘ 
Claiming and boldly proclaiming the model‘s Roman Catholic foundations also 
eliminates another contentious issue and possible objection.  University of Illinois at 
Chicago‘s professor Larry Nucci and Indiana University‘s professor Robert Kunzman 
debate about if religious content and norms are inherent to morality, or if moral and 
religious norms are independent, in the Journal of Moral Education.  In other words, the 
following question could summarize their debate: Is there a ‗public‘ morality that is free 
or unaffected by religious norms?
913
  While both make compelling, empirically-based 
arguments, they are not relevant for our purposes, as their debate pertains to education in 
secular education and public schools.  Barry Chazan summarizes the caution as, ―Moral 
education is not a legitimate activity of schools and that it should, in fact, have no place 
therein.‖914  In all probability, Nucci, Kunzman and others such as Godwin, Rosseau, 
Tolstoy, and Illich would concede that there is a suitable setting and method for religious 
education and interventions, namely in religious organizations with the requisite 
knowledge.  This describes many of the settings that could use this model.  The next main 
section will make a compelling argument about why this model is useful to secular 
organizations.  If nothing else, organizers could predicate the use of the model in a 
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secular organization as a framework with some historical success for catalyzing good 
discussions and debate within the Catholic Church and organizations. 
Problems may arise related to the use of a modern principle in a postmodern way.  
The two approaches do not mesh – a modern approach denies or abolishes an individual‘s 
decision-making and action based upon experience, and a postmodern approach is critical 
of modernism‘s attempt to replace self-determinism with rule-following behavior.915  In 
practice, this presents as a participant disagreeing with the structure of the principle of 
cooperation or offering to revise (i.e. ‗improve‘) the lexical matrix.  Nothing is wrong 
with doing so.  It is a legitimate, postmodern critique made even more understandable 
with appropriate justification.  Still, it does bring participants, facilitators, and specialists 
into uncharted territory concerning responses and the utilization of a new model that 
lacks testing and history. 
The CD4DF model is theoretical and difficult to measure.  Some standard tests, 
such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT), gauge moral reasoning and may help determine 
moral development.  One could administer a pre- and post-test (i.e., before and after the 
CD4DF model) using a standard reasoning test such as the DIT to detect changes in 
participants‘ moral reasoning before and after the CD4DF model.  Doing this, however, 
would only capture changes in reasoning, not moral behavior.  It would be more 
successful to assimilate a test such as the DIT with another method to estimate changes in 
the moral behavior of individuals and the organization.  Professor Neil Hamilton and 
Verna Monson offer empirical evidence about the role of formation and moral 
interventions on practice.  Higher moral judgment scores, calculated using instruments 
such as the DIT, correspond with changes in health care practice such as ―clinical 
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performance ratings by supervisors of medical residents, internship performances in 
nursing (better predictor than [other standard measures]), maintaining independence of 
judgment, and decreased malpractice claims for physicians.‖916  Process improvement 
and performance change professionals are appropriate associates to connect with for the 
establishment of optimal performance measures, which may include the quantifications 
above or others, such as increased associate satisfaction, congruence between values and 
behaviors, and highly engaged senior leadership in an organization‘s associate surveys.  
With respect to practical concerns, moral development researchers James Rest 
and Darcia Narvaez believe that even well-constructed interventions may have difficulty 
affecting the moral reasoning for the lowest-scoring (i.e., less developed, e.g., Kohlberg 
stages one and two, Gilligan level one) individuals.  For example, reframing this using 
Mustakova-Possardt‘s ―critical moral consciousness‖ model begs the question if it is 
more difficult to elevate persons from a pre-critical consciousness to a transitional critical 
consciousness level than from transitional critical consciousness to ‗pure‘ critical 
consciousness.  These persons, meaning those at a lower stage or level, cannot anticipate 
the concepts discussed in group.  Topics may seem vague or imperatives to these persons.  
The conclusion that interventions are ineffective with lowest-scoring is not consistent 
with the experience, research, and recommendations of others.
917
 
Participants (facilitators and specialists, for that matter) develop many coping 
(i.e., self-regulatory mechanisms) skills over a lifetime, which evidence at various times.  
Such occasions may include the use of the model.  The use of coping skills includes 
moral disengagement whilst behaving as a moral agent.  Famous psychologist Albert 
Bandura describes moral disengagement as reorganization of immoral, inhumane, or 
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unjust conduct into something more harmless, or even praiseworthy, through displacing 
and diffusing mechanisms such as euphemistic or sanitizing language, displacement of 
responsibility, diminishing or overlooking consequences, or attributing blame to someone 
or something else.
918
  This is similar to Alesdair MacIntryre‘s notion that people can 
seem virtuous without actually being so.  Virtue is a façade or visage.
919
  Kohlberg, 
similarly, discusses genotypic and phenotypic educational objectives and behavioral 
changes, where genotypic changes involve ―underlying processes and structural 
organization which determine moral behavior,‖ and phenotypic changes are more 
―immediate, observable changes in moral behavior.‖920  Stating MacIntyre‘s concept as 
Kohlberg, one needs to get beyond the phenotype, which is the observable characteristic, 
to detect the genotype. 
Similarly, persons are often resolute, passionate, and compelling about their 
convictions.  Someone clearly in the wrong from another perspective can justify his or 
her actions, knowing that it was the right, substantiated, and acceptable thing to do.  
Phrased another way, some persons do not experience any cognitive dissonance nor do 
they have any awareness about a fractured reflective equilibrium.  This situation puzzles 
philosopher Beth Dixon, who poses the question, ―Under what circumstances do we hold 
a person blameworthy for the beliefs she acquires about the moral correctness or 
incorrectness of the acts she performs?‖921  Some of her reflections indicate that 
diminished cognitive or deliberative capacities are reasons to suspend blame and 
accountability; whereas self-induced vices, bad decisions, or failure to self-reflect then 
self-correct are reasons to hold someone accountable for poor choices.  Difficult 
upbringing and socialization are considerations, but they are not ones that exonerate 
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persons from blame and accountability.  Other important information includes knowing 
―the extent of a person‘s social isolation, the degree of cultural homogeneity she 
experiences, and the amount and kinds of educational opportunities available to her.‖922  
In response to Dixon, facilitators of this model are not trying to attribute blame.  They 
may challenge presumptions of participants, but their role is not one of judge. 
The challenge is recognizing such behavior when it happens and responding 
accordingly, which requires skill on the part of the facilitator.  For these reasons, it would 
help facilitators to be familiar with common coping, displacement, diffusion, and other 
self-disruptive behaviors.  These behaviors are not insurmountable challenges, just ripe 
for reframing, perhaps using the example of Edmund Burke, ―‗The only thing necessary 
for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing…[and] a lot of people, doing a bit of 
it, in a morally disengaged way, with indifference to the human suffering they 
collectively cause.‘‖923 
Attending to matters involving ethics and spirituality are not tidy; in fact, they are 
quite contrary – they are messy.  Theologian Jack Shea ‗connects the dots‘ when he 
observes that people should pay attention to spiritual wisdom.  Spirituality and its insight 
are matters of the heart that reveal internal conflict, manifesting conflicted results in 
matters of the head and hands.
924
  The CD4DF model proposed here impacts people both 
internally and externally.  Effects may range from disappointment and malaise with self, 
groups, and the organization to frustration and even rejection of person(s) and groups.  
For example, an organization may witness a certain amount of attrition when those 
experiencing a high degree of conflict decide that they are not called to be a member of 
their particular profession or work for the organization.  At face value, this seems to be a 
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weakness inbuilt to any formation, spirituality, or other inner-directed process.  Further 
thought and reflection capitulates different insights.  Organizations and their personnel 
should be congruent; a mutual best-fit enhances both the organization and its associates.  
An individual noticing contrast or rifts between personal and organizational goals, values, 
and obligations is saving the person and the organization time, effort, and money.  What 
seemed to be weakness is actually strength. 
Participants may not understand each other, making productive, respectful 
challenges more difficult to achieve.  Using Brian O‘Toole‘s four different ethics 
approaches (and there may be even more than four), a participant using a moral sentiment 
(i.e., feelings, emotions) approach may not understand the participant using a duty-based 
approach (i.e., obligations, e.g., framing duty according to principles).  People not only 
reflect their spiritual-theological insights with these approaches, they also articulate 
themselves using any of the approaches.
925
  This is an innate weakness to any moral 
decision-making model or process.  Facilitators can mitigate these difficulties by 
reframing the different perspective to the participant using that participant‘s moral 
approach.  For instance, stating, ―I think what Eve is trying to say is that she 
acknowledges your feeling about the issue, but her ‗gut reaction‘ is to follow our own, 
internal protocol on this matter – imagine how others would feel if we started to break 
our own procedures‖ to the moral sentiment person.  The statement above reframes a 
principle- or duty-based statement as a moral sentiment.  Likewise, one could frame a 
moral sentiment as a principle- or duty-based statement – ―While Peyton is appreciative 
of the role of protocol, he also acknowledges an obligation, perhaps an even stronger 
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duty, to follow his intuition and instinct, which is just as valid even though he may not be 
able to justify his perspective in the same way that you explain yours.‖ 
By at least one account, participants do not only want to critically reflect.  They 
wish to also ―act out of the joy of living in moral ways.‖926  At face value, this may seem 
to be a weakness of the CD4DF model because of the critical reflection involved with 
applying the principle of cooperation.  Conversely, this is one of the reasons why the 
model promotes participation of community members affected by the decision among 
other ‗tangible‘ efforts.  Using the model is not an academic exercise; it is an opportunity 
for meaningful change.  It brings social justice issues to the learner.
927
 
This model requires substantive time commitments from participants, facilitators, 
specialists, and planners.  Sr. Pat Talone from the Catholic Health Association makes a 
corresponding and compelling argument, regarding starting and maintaining 
organizational ethics committees, about why time allocation and participation is critical.  
For one, successful implementation is dependent upon time allocation and associate 
availability.  Most of all, ―Members [who] do not do their homework or fail to attend 
meetings…[do not serve the organization well.]‖928  Ensuring attendance often 
incorporates other factors.  Associates will need to ask their supervisors about their 
comfort level with participating in the model for a few days total throughout a several 
month period.  Any letters or communiqués sent to supervisors on behalf of organizers 
should frame this as associates channeling their productivity in a different way, but also 
for the benefit of the organization, for a few days total.  It is not ‗lost‘ productivity.  It is 
alternatively directed efficiency.  In fact, at least one study about volunteerism, one 
supporting workplace-endorsed volunteerism during work time, suggests that work time 
 352 
spent volunteering is not ‗lost‘ productivity, as associates become more engaged and self-
fulfilled overall.  The corollary should be evident.  The CD4DF model is another method 
for associates to gain a greater sense of organizational and community engagement.  
Catholic health care organizations with substantive, independent ministry formation 
programs may have their own data and assessment tools for illustrating the impact of 
similar programs on associates.  (Ministry formation is one of many interrelated variables 
affecting job satisfaction, engagement, and other scores on general surveys.  Some 
ministry formation programs may have their own ways of trying to isolate the impact of 
ministry formation, to the extent possible, with program pre- and post-assessments.) 
Finding the correct person for the role of facilitator is a significant challenge.  
This person, as explained in the last chapter, must be a Jack-of-all-trades or Jill-of-all-
trades, requiring, at minimum, experience and skill, and at maximum, mastery of 
numerous different subjects – counseling, moral development, mediation, education 
pedagogies, health care organization and operations generally, specific organizational 
Mission and Core Values, this model of cooperation, as well as ethical and justice 
theories and frameworks.  The facilitator must tailor his or her style, as well as edit the 
responses of others, to the developmental needs of each participant.
929
  He or she must 
―demonstrate genuine concern for the issues and others‘ moral development…[and] not 
‗force‘ ethics down [others‘] throats, but neither should [he or she] be afraid to engage 
[others‘] concerns and their own.‖930  Furthermore, there are understandable hesitations 
about trying to assess a person‘s stage of moral development because of perceived ties to 
sin, damnation, culpable versus non-culpable upbringing, and intrusion into private 
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domains.
931
  The role of facilitator is a difficult one to assume and attract talent to 
because of these factors. 
There are other practical considerations endemic to this and other similar models 
and committees.  Sufficient funds must exist.
932
  It is unlikely that the CD4DF model will 
be costly, but transportation costs and other reimbursement for specialists, meals for 
participants and others, and other associated material are matters requiring awareness and 
deliberation.  Needed organizational resources include administrative services (provided 
primarily through the planner), the use of public relations personal and mechanisms to 
inform associates about the model (generally and then related to specific initiatives), and 
the enlistment of support and cooperation from key executives and department leads.
933
 
This subsection entertained counterarguments to the weaknesses.  For this reason, 
this subsection is longer than the next, which is about the strengths of the CD4DF model.  
Also for the same reason, there are few references from the next segment on strengths 
back to this segment on weaknesses. 
IB. Strengths of This Model 
The attractiveness of the CD4DF model involves its strengths, which are 
impressive both in number and significance.  Similar to the weaknesses, some strengths 
are more theoretical, and others are practical.  This segment begins with theoretical 
strengths and gradually transition into more practical or applied strengths. 
One of the most obvious strengths relates to the observation above.  To the delight 
of utilitarians, the CD4DF model has many more strengths than weaknesses.  The 
implication is that the theory is solid and well-supported, which could translate to strong 
chances for producing tangible and helpful results. 
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Especially if the cooperation issue involves organization-society relationships, 
this is a good first step to furthering the organization‘s mission within itself and society.  
It is a good way to witness the organization‘s role and influence in wider society.  In 
itself, it may not be the mechanism of social reform.  All social reform, though, has 
catalysts, which are often ―small group discussion, reflection…and charitable service,‖ 
leading to social change.
934
  This model qualifies as such a catalyst, meaning that it is an 
embodiment of ―the Catholic vision of the human person…grounded in our relatedness to 
one another and God.‖935  For Dewey and Durkheim, morality is essentially social in 
nature, and its practice should involve others for the good of groups and society.
936
  The 
CD4DF model fits the Dewey and Durkheim vision. 
The method and pedagogy of this model nicely fits into some of the larger trends 
within education and development, which includes suggested educational pedagogies and 
structure as well as new insights from developmental research.  For instance, it is now 
known that the development of moral reasoning does not plateau after young adulthood.  
These studies inaugurated a new era of education – ―lifelong moral education‖ and ―adult 
education.‖937  With the progression of moral education, another approached amidst two 
endpoints developed – on one side, there is the values clarification approach that simply 
elucidates the morality involved in any given situation or decision and, on the other side, 
there is teaching reasoning, moral theory, and preferred behaviors as academic topics.  
According to Kohlberg, the latter approach tends towards indoctrination, while the 
former lends itself to moral relativity.  In either case, students do not learn about the 
validity of moral norms for themselves.  Amidst this, another approach emphasized 
students as moral actors, based upon the need to practice behavior and moral agency as 
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well as attend to social justice issues.
938
  ―Practice may not make perfect, but ‗practice 
makes morals.‘‖939  The teacher must avoid the appearance of only values clarification or 
indoctrination with the third approach.  For instance, it would not help to promote a 
number of rules for using, nor principles assisting, the model without explanation.
940
  The 
best teaching (facilitation) and learning environments are ones tailored to the 
developmental needs of individual participants.
941
  Appropriate use of this model is one 
that honors moderation in the interest of moral development – the facilitators and 
specialists, on the one hand, do not want inflexible, regimented, and doctrinal adherence 
and, on the other hand, also do not seek to clarify without direction.  They can also 
explain the relevance of moral concerns within all professions, both related to the 
organization and independent from the organization.
942
  It also honors the developmental 
needs of individual participants through the pairing of persons in adjacent stages or levels 
for conversation and respectful disagreement.  It also avoids the flaws inherent to only 
presenting moral theory without meaningful application.
943
 
Further research and reflection reveals that adults wish to be part of ―a more 
skilled and education workforce, and the desire…for wider-participation.‖944  Adults wish 
to be part of progressive workforces that encourage active citizenship.  They also 
acknowledge the imperative for education to extend beyond classroom walls, including 
self-directed learning, group situations, libraries, museums, and more.
945
  This model 
does exactly that.  Chapter five recommends putting those made more vulnerable by a 
particular decision at the ‗front and center‘ of the issue by involving them in the process.  
Doing this embodies the Gospel ethic of putting the sick and poor at the center of the 
organization.
946
  The danger of Machiavellian, self-righteous, single-minded individual 
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who does not want to change, or wishes to deflect accountability, is evident, and it is 
something that the facilitator can respectfully challenge.
947
  Participants must be open to 
seeing their own shadow after having their thoughts, behaviors, and contradictions 
exposed to others.
948
  The use of the model is also malleable, so that exercises such as 
‗field trips‘ to visit with affected persons and to see impacted settings are also possible 
because of their value and proven helpfulness.
949
 
Method and pedagogy also exemplify some of the trends in religious education.  
For instance, theology and educational theory in a model should operate as dialectic, 
where method and pedagogy encourage students to think and act in the face of real 
problems.  Likewise, acting or doing illustrates the relevance of theological concepts and 
may even inform these theological theories, models, and principles.
950
  The correct model 
will act as a mediator, ―in which two or more realities become united in a new reality,‖ 
and the new reality will include the following characteristics concurrently:
951
 
(1) Incorporates and retains the essential features of its original 
components, and (2) puts the essential features of the original 
components in to a new fused relationship with each other so 
that they are no longer separate but become inextricable 
combined in the new reality – so inextricably combined, in 
fact, that in this new reality the components are no longer 
separate and distinct ontic entities but exist in the new reality 
only in their united state.
952
 
 
One component does not dominate another in this new reality.  ―A dynamic equilibrium 
reigns.‖953  This mediation balances theology and instruction (i.e., substantive content 
and structural content), where external criteria do not determine the place of theology, but 
how internal criteria, namely how instruction and its function, fit the needs of specific 
communities and times.
954
  Because it is social in nature, the structure of a social setting 
model, such as this, should have the characteristics of prolonged contact, supportive and 
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agapaic relationships, contact with others‘ inner states, models to observe in a variety of 
settings, steadiness and clearness with others‘ behaviors and values, congruence between 
others‘ behaviors and their beliefs and ideals, and the persistence of clarity in concept 
with corresponding group experiences.
955
  Much of this, of course, originates from the 
commandment to love one‘s neighbor and perpetuate culture or a way of life, which is in 
community.
956
 
Alasdair MacIntyre may identify the CD4DF model as being strong and resilient 
as well as vulnerable at the same time.  His position is consistent and well-documented 
that morality has fractured into different moral camps, ones that do not ‗speak the same 
moral language,‘ which need mending by reconstructing moral traditions in themselves 
before engaging each other.
957
  Surely the CD4DF model is a first-rate method for 
reconstructing the moral tradition of a Roman Catholic organization or components of the 
Catholic tradition within the U.S.  (The former is a presumptive statement because the 
Catholic tradition in the U.S., or even one Catholic organization, is a conglomerate of 
many other cultures, as introduced in the first chapter.)  It may appear, at first blush, that 
this model is not the relevant instrument for other traditions.  A response to this is that the 
CD4DF model has the flexibility to adapt to the needs of other organizations and moral 
traditions.  It is not a one-size-fits-all product.  It is a tool for adjusting and adapting to 
the needs of distinct groups and moral camps. 
Opportunities are present to expand the model to integrate other important facets.  
There is, for instance, occasion to connect experiences within a group to scripture, which 
is appropriate especially for Christian organizations.  Moreover, the experience of 
discerning in community is occasion to correlate other communities doing the same in 
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scripture.  Examples are Deuteronomy 6:6-8, Hebrews 10:24-25, 1 Corinthians 14:26, 
Acts 2:42-47, and Acts 4:32-35.
958
  In the interest of meaning, though, the group should 
complete the circle by reflecting on the import and association between the Biblical 
passages and the contemporary issue and process.
959
  Scripture, case studies, and stories 
are means to obtain fuller or analogous narratives.  Without delving into the dense 
amounts of narrative literature, comparable case studies, experiences (without idolizing 
them), and telling narratives, in written or verbal form, are ways to create value and add 
moral coherence to any situation.
960
  Creating a comprehensive narrative and providing 
case studies for casuistic comparisons are methods to get all the facts necessary to make a 
good group decision.  Although the model already integrates many components, another 
opportunity is to integrate Zigler‘s version of the Jakari window, the four domains of 
moral education.  This means that the pedagogy should include direct external (e.g., 
sharing objectives of the experiences as well as expected behaviors), indirect external 
(i.e., strategies for achieving the objectives, e.g., exposing participants of various moral 
stages and levels to different moral stages and levels through structured discussion of 
real-life dilemmas), direct internal (i.e., reflective and self-regulatory practices, e.g., 
structured periods of silence, reflection, and journaling for participants), and indirect 
internal (i.e., examining how emotions factor into discussions, e.g., taking time within a 
group to acknowledge emotional affect).
961
 
The debate between Nucci and Kunzman about the existence of a secular morality 
apart from religious values was discussed above.  Nucci argues that religion and religious 
values are independent of a secular morality and not important for moral decision-
making.  Kunzman disagrees.  While religion is not the sole catalyst for ‗secular 
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morality,‘ it is an influence, has relevance, and cannot extricate or separate itself from 
morality generally (i.e., religion and morality cannot be wholly independent).
962
  As 
mentioned above, the debate may be irrelevant to the use of this model within religious-
based organizations.  The context of Nucci and Kunzman‘s debate was public schools.  
One expects the foundations and derivations of morality in religious-based organizations 
to be religious, even if in part.  This debate becomes more relevant when considering the 
application of a theological principle and model within a secular organization.  A method 
for justifying its relevance and use is by mentioning its helpfulness and historical use in 
the Catholic setting for framing certain problems.  A later section addresses the role of 
mission and values within secular organizations.  It is worth mentioning that the debate 
between Kunzman and Nucci did not resolve; subsequently, one could assume that 
organizations may already have mission and values with religious foundations and 
derivations.  Attempting to strip anything with a remote religious message from secular 
organizations and society sends its own message, and it is not necessarily a positive 
one.
963
 
The segment about weakness of the model remarked that it is presumptuous to 
label it as part of unfolding revelation and natural law, because of the difficulties inherent 
to proving (or disproving) this claim; and while it is equally as presumptuous to call 
embodying the model ‗a slice of the City of God,‘ applying the model in the way 
described here serves as a role model not only for a Catholic witness in the world, it 
exemplifies deliberate and relational decision-making as well as a form of justice.  It is an 
example of religious education materializing from a theological position in an 
imaginative and skilled manner, and in this way, it works in a ―temporal sequence of 
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creativity‖ with God.964  As stated many times before, this model proposes uses and 
applications of the principle of cooperation in a new and innovative way, as it is 
communal, formative, and, hopefully, transformative.  It also embodies the restorative 
justice characteristics of Schweigert‘s four kinds of community-based victim-offender 
conferencing.  Namely, the model is a framework for a mediated discussion and conflict 
resolution per victim-offender reconciliation programs, community participation in 
societal-community injustices and malfeasance per community conferencing programs, 
and brainstorming and enacting restorative justice plans that address underlying causes 
per circle sentencing, which is common in Native American communities.
965
 
The end of the first section of chapter five explored the relationship of this model 
using a modern principle in a postmodern way.  Rather than going through modern and 
postmodern qualities, it merits noting that postmodern methods are new to some cultures 
and subcultures, especially considering that professional societies and organizations tend 
to address complaints and concern through regulations and rule-adherence, which is 
modernist in structure.
966
  It is the fusion of modern and postmodern in this model that, 
optimally, creates the following situation: 
When the right theology, which again, must be open-ended, and 
not dogmatic, stands in the background and when grace and faith 
are in the foreground, the learner‘s sense of worth will be 
underscored and the teacher-pupil relationship will operate on an I-
thou level within the broader community of the church, and the 
transforming power of the gospel will work to bring about a 
decision of faith in Jesus Christ.
967
 
 
The model utilizes the technique of not telling persons what to do; it lets participants 
discuss and find out for themselves, which has not been the traditional approach.
968
  It 
exemplifies what Davis calls attention to social ethics situations as well as ―ethics from 
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across the curriculum,‖ symbolizing when a group attends to an issue that it considers 
important.
969
 
Integrating the conclusions from empirical studies strengthens the CD4DF model, 
including its utility, relevance, and persuasiveness (i.e., academic support).  Some data 
suggest that incrementally less traditional lecturing and more small-group case 
discussions improves persons‘ moral judgment.970  Other studies demonstrate the value of 
interpersonal interactions, especially with those affected by injustice and intolerance, in 
order for people to form meaningful connections and develop.
971
  Another study 
recognizes the need to address other vectors besides moral reasoning – including identity, 
authority, responsibility, agency, relationships, and the meaning of life as they relate to 
categories such as moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and emotions (i.e. feelings, e.g. 
caring) – in moral development, which another has adapted into educational theory and 
pedagogy.
972
 
Without even knowing it, participants in the model are cast into the roles of 
students as moral agents.  That is, they entertain significant moral agency about the 
distinct cooperation issue.  Participants are unawares because education typically has not 
permitted students to exercise their moral agency.  Applying this model allows such 
decision-making.  The CD4DF model achieves Boostrom‘s conditions for moral agency, 
which were based on Plato‘s Meno, of honoring choice, vision, and end-in-view; and, 
moreover, it also promotes the characteristics of a modern classroom or learning 
environment, also discussed by Boostrom, which he derived from his conditions for 
moral agency.  Namely, the classroom honors the students‘ own motives, redefines the 
notion of ‗safe space,‘ promotes dialogue between students and teachers about genuine 
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issues, acknowledgment and encouragement of students‘ visions on the part of teachers, 
and allows students and teachers to test their vision.
973
 
The model utilizes a number of respected principles and approaches.  This will 
not go into detail about them because explanations are in previous chapters.  Some of the 
Catholic principles and approaches are the principle of cooperation, of course, the 
principle of subsidiarity (i.e., ideally, it is inclusive of the people who should be part of 
the decision-making), mission and ministry discernment, ministry formation, and 
Catholic social teaching.  Other methods and approaches include mediation techniques, 
adult learning techniques and methods, change leadership methods, and if needed, 
casuistry, principlism, and justice theories. 
 
II. Relevance of the CD4DF Model Outside of Catholic Organizations 
IIA. Relevance of Accountability in Other-than-Catholic Settings 
The introduction in the first chapter of the dissertation compared the variety of 
challenges and struggles in Catholic health care to the heat surrounding a pressure 
cooker.  The pressure cooker itself is the organization; the fare inside the cooker is the 
organization‘s associates.  This suggested mechanism does not only work on one pressure 
cooker, corresponding to not only working with Catholic organizations.  It can work for 
others.   
Although cooperation is a Catholic moral principle, its use applies to other-than-
Catholic organizations.  In fact, it is particularly relevant in contemporary situations with 
complex relationships and accountabilities.  Individuals act within groups in a variety of 
situations, and ―because participating individuals orient themselves in acting with respect 
to collective outcomes, they may be warrantably accountable for acts done by other group 
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members in pursuit of the collective object.  Among structured groups, therefore, 
accountability can be simultaneously collective and individual.‖974  This does, of course, 
relate with more basic concepts of individuals, society, and baseline assumptions about 
the function of morality.  Discussed in the segment about weaknesses above, 
communitarians may more readily accept the description above and agree to the concept 
of societal moral norms than libertarians.
975
  Methods exist for introducing the notion of 
causality to those who are skeptical or not accepting, for instance, by showing how 
denying collective relationships and causality may force others into unfortunate 
situations.  Some tools and methods occur after the examples below. 
Two examples may suffice.  The first relates to individual accountability in 
actions with collective influence.  It is a good example, albeit its position outside of an 
organizational setting.  Mia wants to buy a hybrid car and has looked at several different 
models.  Her justification is that the car is more environmentally ‗friendly‘ (less 
deleterious to the environment) than other vehicles.  She is has not ‗done her homework‘ 
regarding the assembly and production of various vehicles.  Cameron, Mia‘s friend, 
knows much more than Mia about the assembly and production of hybrid vehicles.  He 
suggests that Mia expand her search to other vehicles because of the carbon footprint left 
by other vehicles and processes associated with making the hybrid vehicles.  In other 
words, there is a larger carbon footprint (a.k.a. more environmental degradation) 
associated with producing hybrids than other cars.  A person interested in the 
environment should be aware that buying a hybrid is more deleterious to the environment 
before purchase than other cars. 
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Christopher Kutz uses the bombing of Dresden in 1945 by the Allied forces as an 
example.  Its purpose was mostly retaliatory, as payback for civilian bombings in Allied 
countries, and ideological, as disapproval of Nazi methods (that included indiscriminate 
killing).  To achieve this purpose, Allied forces waited until the meteorological 
conditions were precise, to inflict the most damage by generating a firestorm for more 
civilian causalities.
976
  It was a massive undertaking with thousands of persons 
contributing and participating: 
The city was bombed in three raids, and at least 1,000 plances and 
8,000 crewmen were directly involved in the raids, in various roles 
as pilots, navigators, bombers, and gunners.  The firestorm was 
already raging before many crews dropped their bombs…Many 
thousands further were involved in planning and support at 
Bomber Command – what Freeman Dyson, the physicist and peace 
activist, would later call ―a huge organization dedicated to the 
purpose of burning cities and killing people, and doing the job 
badly.‖  (A consequence of this mass participation is the wealth of 
personal accounts about Dresden as well as Hamburg and Tokyo, 
in which participants reflect on the nature of their responsibility for 
the events…)977 
 
By the end of the destruction, nearly 35,000 civilians lost their lives.  Admittedly, not 
everyone who participated in the process knew what was going on.  Some did.
978
  For 
those who did, the defense of ―I was just following orders,‖ is just as repugnant for the 
Allies as a defense from high-ranking Nazi officers justifying the Holocaust. 
A few different tools and methods are available to analyze the examples above – 
some traditional and some different ways of framing individual actions.  Two ways of 
viewing contributions to collective action are individual in orientation and framework.  
As such, they are traditional to U.S. culture.  Kutz labels them the ―Individual Difference 
Principle‖ and the ―Control Principle:‖ 
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Individual Difference Principle: [Emphasis in the original.] 
(Basis) I am accountable for a harm only if what I have done made 
a difference to that harm‘s occurrence. (Object) I am accountable 
only for the difference any action alone makes to the resulting state 
of affairs. 
 
Control Principle: [Emphasis in the original.] (Basis) I am 
accountable for a harm‘s occurrence only if I could control its 
occurrence, by producing or preventing it. (Object) I am 
accountable only for those harms over whose occurrence I had 
control.
979
 
 
Kutz is unsatisfied by the two approaches above because of the ability of an individual to 
absolve his or her accountability in group actions due to diminished (i.e., minimal) 
control or the lack of an individual difference (i.e., action, behavior) profoundly affecting 
the group‘s results.980   
Two main reasons present for Kutz‘s discontent with the approaches.  First, 
traditional ethics theories and frameworks are not equipped to handle collective 
wrongdoing including malfeasance, sin, and injustice.  In the case of utilitarianism, for 
instance, this deficit partly results from individual variances in the use and application of 
objective versus subjective, hypothetical versus actual, rule versus act utilitarianism to 
groups.  Likewise, deontology, including Kant‘s categorical imperatives, is not equipped 
to deal with individual participation in collective wrongdoing, similar to 
consequentialism.  The problem is that firebombing cities does not lend itself to 
becoming a universal maxim; therefore, a lesser statement about marginal participation 
(e.g., ―I will drop my…bombs…in order to avoid the criticisms of my commander and 
follow crew, but only because I know these few bombs won‘t make a difference to 
whether a firestorm arises.‖) is equally as skeptical as a universal:981 
…[T]he problem posed by collective action is that it introduces a 
gap between act and harm.  In the standard case, where individual 
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agency is sufficient to produce the harm, universalizing the act 
universalizes the harm.  In the case of marginal participation, 
universalizing the act is no longer the same as universalizing the 
harm, in light of the fact that the act requires universal (or at least 
very wide-spread) participation for there to be any harm.  Since 
universalization is already built into the collective act, a 
universalized harm does not simply follow logically from 
universalizing the individual act…[The following is a description 
of the moral link:] An agent who wills even a remote connection to 
a nonuniversalizable harm wills a world incompatible with 
relations of cooperation and reciprocity.  [This kind of situation 
breaks more fundamental, a priori duties.]
982
 
 
Variations exist between the import of intention, results, probabilities, and marginality 
that marginalize the effectiveness of traditional ethics theories and frameworks.  Second, 
defining a different connection between individuals and groups makes accountability less 
complicated.  An example is Kutz‘s definition of collective intention, which a group 
achieves upon meeting the subsequent three conditions: 
(1) Members of the group are intentionally members of that group.  
That is, they are disposed to participate as members of the 
group in deciding upon a shared plan and then in acting in 
conformity with that plan. 
(2) There is an explicit or implicit collective-decision rule by 
which a collective intention may be assigned to the group in 
virtue of individuals‘ intentions to participate in forming and 
abiding by that collective intention. 
(3) The participatory intentions of the individuals overlap 
sufficiently to meet the constraints of the collective-decision 
rule.
983
 
 
Another way of stating the above conditions is that collective intention describes when 
groups have structure such that persons are intentional in membership and plans of 
action, method where individuals share their intentions and pledge (explicitly or 
implicitly) to abide by group decisions, and occasion where individuals evidence similar 
intentions.   
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This explanation of collective intention creates compelling individual links to 
group malfeasance and injustice.  Consider the example of various professionals who 
reviewed the documents for the example in chapters one and three of the regional, 
Catholic system, St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH), which signed a letter of intent 
(LOI) to form a partnership with a small, accountable health care network, St. Bernardine 
of Siena Wellness System (SBW), formerly owned by a Protestant denomination and 
now owned and operated by a secular company.  As discussed previously, presume the 
observation of many distressing practices – including multiple infractions of 
confidentiality and ignoring and dismissing legitimate patient and associate complaints – 
after SFH and SBW integrate.  Unlike the former scenarios, assume that professionals 
performing due diligence found distressing issues during document reviews and visits; 
though they did not mention anything because ‗too much was riding on the merger.‘  
Their justification may have been that their individual ‗red flags‘ may not have made a 
difference in the overall merger.  Likewise, the professionals reviewing documents and 
visiting were not the persons conducting the questionable practices, nor were they in a 
position of authority such that they could slow down or stop the process until the suspect 
customs were addressed.  Still, the professionals performing the due diligence were 
nominated and subsequently accepted departmental responsibility for reviewing 
documents and visiting sites.  They attended group meetings with other departmental 
leaders about due diligence.  In these meetings, a process for addressing questions or 
suspect practices was addressed.  Additionally, discussion in the due diligence planning 
meetings also articulated a few different intents – perpetuate the mission and guiding 
values throughout the proposed transaction by checking for congruent and compatible 
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values, the articulation of such values in policies and other guiding documents, and 
evidence of behavior and practice that corresponds the complementary values of the other 
organization(s).   
With these parameters in place, the department head could claim could claim 
absolution under the Individual Difference Principle and the Control Principle.  On one 
hand, claims such as these, indeed, would fit the definitions of both principles.  Yet, both 
principles, by definition, are insufficient for linking individuals to collective action for 
the two main reasons discussed above.  On the other hand, the situation meets the three 
criteria for strict interpretation of collective intention.  Namely, an intentional, methodical 
process for the selection of group member occurred.  Leaders from the Department of 
Mergers, Developments, and Acquisitions in each organization formed a plan, openly 
shared the intent of due diligence within their own organization, and the other group 
members within their own organization demonstrated that they shared the intent by 
agreeing to participate as leads for their own departmental review.  (In fact, for the 
purposes of this situation, group leaders meet the standard elements of disclosure for 
informed consent by detailing the recommended course-of-action, benefits and 
drawbacks, and the alternative of electing someone else to participate.  Participants had 
the chance to clarify their understanding, ask questions, decide, and authorize freely, 
without undue influence.)
984
  Then the group members actuated the plan by leading the 
due diligence within their own departments.  This was a strict interpretation of collective 
intention because it applies to those involved with this specific initiative, denoting the 
associates charged with due diligence.  One could make the weak case that employment 
in an organization is an intentional membership, which includes commitment to the 
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Mission and Core Values as a shared plan, spanning all departments, which all associates 
act in accord.  In their initial orientation, associates become aware of the centrality of 
Mission and Core Values as well as the need to uphold these ideals throughout the 
organization.  All associates demonstrate a sufficiently overlapping collective intention 
by an implicit rule where all, presumably, agree to uphold that intention in the form of 
ensuring that actions are in accord with Mission and Core Values.  It is possible to 
construct a weak obligation to hold oneself accountable for any situations that seem to 
impinge or violate the organization‘s ideals. 
The Individual Difference Principle and Control Principle are categorically 
different from the ―Complicity Principle,‖ also described by Kutz: 
Complicity Principle: [Emphasis in the original.] (Basis) I am 
accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate in 
the wrong they do or harm they cause. (Object) I am accountable 
for the harm or wrong we do together, independently of the actual 
difference I make.
985
 
 
On one side, the Individual Difference Principle and Control Principle are attractive from 
a first-person and third-person perspective, meaning that the principles are more 
convincing for moral agents complicit with evil, injustice, or malfeasance as well as from 
a typical, Western bystander perspective.  The two principles are less pleasant from a 
second-person perspective, signifying those who were harmed.  On the other side, the 
Complicity Principle is uncomfortable for cooperators, who are morally complicit with an 
evil, injustice, or malfeasance.  It is much more palatable from the second-person vantage 
of those who were harmed.
986
  Kutz explains the interrelation between all three 
principles: 
The Complicity Principle conflicts with well-rooted convictions 
about the necessity of a link between individual accountability and 
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individual causal contribution.  Its ground, however, lies not in a 
consequentialist conception of accountability, but in a conception 
that relates agents to wrongs and harms in virtue of the content of 
their wills.  Given a proper analytical understanding of collective 
intentional action and of the nature of intentional participation in a 
shared project, the Complicity Principle stands secure.  When we 
act together, we are each accountable for what we all do.
987
 
 
Clearly, it is the Complicity Principle that bears the most import when compared with the 
Individual Difference Principle and Control Principle for Kutz. 
Kutz does not reference the principle of cooperation, but his distinctions are 
similar to cooperation distinctions.  Three notable differences exist when contrasting the 
Complicity Principle to cooperation.  First, the Complicity Principle is about complicity 
generally, whether the reference point is the moral agent (i.e., the person causing the evil, 
injustice, or malfeasance) acting as an individual or as part of a group, or a cooperator 
with various levels of connection (e.g., proximate association, remote association).  
Cooperation is only a principle of association, where the focal point is the cooperator and 
not the moral agent.  Second, the Complicity Principle presupposes intention by 
definition with, ―I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate in 
the wrong they do or harm they cause.‖988  Cooperation distinguishes different affiliations 
of intention and justification.  These gradations do not share universal agreement, as 
discussed in chapter two.  In principle, though, formal cooperation describes direct 
participation of cooperation independent of the agent‘s or cooperator‘s attitude or motive 
(i.e., motives or justifications of intent are irrelevant), the cooperator‘s approval of evil, 
or the cooperator‘s consent or concurrence to the evil.989  Material cooperation is when 
the cooperator does not intend the evil, injustice, or malfeasance; it is the absence of evil 
intent on the part of the cooperator, or cooperation without the knowing and willing 
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assent, or approval, of the agent‘s act on the part of the cooperator.990  Third, Kutz goes 
on to explain the difference between a cooperator‘s different levels of association or 
relationship (e.g., proximate, remote) with the moral agent even though it is not explicit 
in his Complicity Principle.  These differences are inbuilt to cooperation.  For example, 
immediate material cooperation is the willful, intentional contribution to the essential 
circumstances of the agent‘s immoral act while not intending the agent‘s evil, injustice, 
or malfeasance.
991
  Mediate material cooperation is when the cooperator assists the evil 
act by contributing in a non-essential and secondary way, but the cooperator‘s act is 
lesser when compared with the primacy of immediate cooperation.
992
  The cooperator‘s 
help intimately connects with the evil of another in proximate mediate material 
cooperation, and the cooperator‘s help does not closely connect with the agent‘s evil in 
remote mediate material cooperation.
993
 
The differences between the Complicity Principle and cooperation evidence 
themselves during the application of both.  The Dresden fire bombings is a tragic but 
valuable example if and only if one eliminates the theory, influence, and justification of 
―just war‖ reasoning, which would mitigate all persons‘ accountability.  With this caveat 
in place, it is easier to contrast the Complicity Principle with cooperation.  Kutz recounts 
the role of the firebombing crews, ―Each crewman‘s causal contribution to the 
conflagration, indeed each plane‘s, was marginal to the point of insignificance.‖994  A 
bomber, for instance, could try to justify his actions with the Individual Difference 
Principle and the Control Principle by explaining that he is only accountable for the result 
of his own actions, if noticeable harm occurs at all, and that he is accountable for the 
harms that he could control.  Implied is that his actions were minor or insignificant in the 
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overall result, and he could not minimize or prevent the harm.  Justification according to 
these two principles alone is unsatisfactory.  Using the Complicity Principle, the bomber 
is accountable because he intentionally participated in a collective wrong and harm, 
which was not dependent on the actual difference he made.
995
  This links the bomber to 
the collective evil.  According to Catholic moral theology, the Catholic bomber is not in 
collaboration, as collaboration is a deliberate joint action but not in relation to a moral 
evil.  Bombing innocent civilians is unjust, ill-advised, or evil, (depending on 
perspective) so collaboration is not valid.
996
  The principle of cooperation also may not 
apply to the bomber.  Remember that cooperation is association, affiliation, or other 
partnership with evil, when another chooses to assist an immoral act of by an individual 
or institutional moral agent.
997
  The bomber is one of the agents directly committing the 
evil, so the principle of cooperation is not relevant. 
Applying the principles to different agents yields dissimilar results.  Consider the 
commander who strategically plans the mission, the specialist who attaches the bombs to 
the planes, and the pilots who fly the planes in the execution of the mission.  Assume that 
all of the described persons know the mission generally, as well as the specific, tactical 
plan.  Just like the last situation, the Individual Difference Principle and the Control 
Principle are insufficient explanations.  Again, the commander, specialist, and pilot are 
accountable because they intentionally participated in a collective wrong and harm, 
which was not dependent on the actual difference they made.
998
  The Complicity 
Principle is relevant and applicable.  So is the principle of cooperation according to the 
brief definition above and the extensive definition in chapter two because all the 
cooperators, presumably, intend the moral evil and have a connection to the moral agents, 
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such as the bombardier, who directly cause the evil.  Pilots, commanders, and specialists 
may not have the same level of connection – pilots seem to be much more instrumental to 
the commission of sin than commanders.  Still, proximity or remoteness does not make a 
difference with applying cooperation this case because all parties intend the evil.  It is 
explicit formal cooperation when the cooperators directly will, which is approval of, the 
immorality of the agents.
999
  It is implicit formal cooperation when the cooperators claim 
no intent or approval because the act is not sinful in itself (e.g., commander giving orders, 
specialist ensuring the plane is safe and ready to fly, pilot flying a plane) but the nature 
(object) of the act cannot have any other meaning (ex fine operis).
1000
 
At least two main reasons exist for the nuance provided about Kutz‘s theories as 
well as the extended application comparison with the principle of cooperation.  First, 
Kutz convincingly argues for the relevance of individual accountability when another or a 
group causes injustice or malfeasance.  He does so solely from a secular perspective.  The 
significance is demonstration of secular significance and importance for the principle of 
cooperation.  Second and furthermore, Kutz‘s Complicity Principle bears some 
similarities to the principle of cooperation.  It is helpful for establishing individual 
connection and accountability to group injustice or immorality.  The Complicity Principle 
links the causal connection between evil, primary agency, and cooperation (i.e., 
secondary or antecedent agency).  The principle of cooperation picks up where the 
Complicity Principle stops.  Therefore, the lexical matrix of cooperation may prove 
useful in secular society for differentiating different affiliations of intention and 
justification and different levels of association or relationship between the cooperator and 
the moral agent. 
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The various sources in this dissertation illustrate that many accept the premise that 
knowing the barbarism, unfairness, or unacceptability of certain acts and, nevertheless, 
participating in them does not release a person from accountability.  All of us are 
accountable, and we are all part of something that is cooking – the unfolding of the 
Natural Law and the improvement of the common good.  Methods correctly identify that, 
when it comes to cooking, we are all chefs, belong in the kitchen, and bear responsibility 
for not burning the stew.   
IIB. Ideals and Norms in Other-than-Catholic Settings 
Applications of the principle of cooperation are analogous to ships anchored in 
the open sea.  The vessel, representing the cooperator, has various positions or locations 
in comparison to the anchor, which depends on the length of chain to the anchor, cardinal 
direction of the bow, weather and water currents, and internal momentum.  The heavy 
line connecting the ship to its anchor is symbolic of the relationship between the 
cooperator and the agent causing the moral evil, injustice, or malfeasance.  The relevance 
of this relationship, including the accountability of others to sin (i.e., evil, injustice, 
malfeasance), in all settings was established in the last subsection.  This subsection 
attends to the anchor, which is the person(s) causing the sin as well as the sin itself.  It 
demonstrates how the anchor is still germane for secular and other-than-Catholic settings.  
In other words, incongruence can survive between ideals, norms, and behaviors despite 
any claims about the irrelevance of Catholic teaching about sin in other-than-Catholic 
contexts according to other-than-Catholic theories, frameworks, explanations, and 
justifications. 
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In short, secular and other-than-Catholic organizations have anchors in the form 
of mission, philosophy, and value statements.  For instance, Macy‘s, Inc. corporate 
philosophy statement specifies that it: 
[I]s committed to open and honest communications with 
employees, shareholders, vendors, customers, financial analysts 
and the news media.  The company seeks to be proactive in sharing 
information and in keeping these key stakeholder groups up-to-
date on important and material developments.
1001
 
 
Without implying any past, current, or future malfeasance, it is hypothetically 
conceivable that a partner of Macy‘s could cover-up an error, an accounting error for 
instance, which other associates within the corporation ‗turn a blind eye to‘ even though 
it will affect shareholders and other key stakeholders.  This situation may be a good place 
to use cooperation because, at face value, it seems to violate the corporate philosophy 
statement. 
The premium ice cream company, Ben & Jerry‘s, is also known as a company 
‗with a heart‘ because of their social activism.  Their mission statement and ‗progressive 
values‘ codify this in the following way: 
[The social mission] is to operate the Company in a way that 
actively recognizes the central role that business plays in society 
by initiating innovative ways to improve the quality of life locally, 
nationally and internationally.  [The product mission] is to make, 
distribute and sell the finest quality all natural ice cream and 
euphoric concoctions with a continued commitment to 
incorporating wholesome, natural ingredients and promoting 
business practices that respect the Earth and the Environment.  
[The economic mission] is to operate the Company on a 
sustainable financial basis of profitable growth, increasing value 
for our stakeholders and expanding opportunities for development 
and career growth for our employees.  [Progressive values include 
seeking and supporting] nonviolent ways to achieve peace and 
justice.  We believe government resources are more productively 
used in meeting human needs than in building and maintaining 
weapons systems.
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Hypothetically, it is possible that one of Ben & Jerry‘s charitable causes could, in turn, 
support causes that use aggressive methods to ‗advance‘ peace and justice.  (Again, this is 
hypothetical and does not imply any past, present, or future malfeasance.)  This is another 
opportunity to use the principle of cooperation and the CD4DF model. 
Johnson Controls has a 34-page guide, called Ethics Policy: Integrity Every Day.  
It articulates the Johnson Controls International (JCI) vision and values: 
Our Vision –  
 [Is] a more comfortable, safe, and sustainable world. 
Our Values – 
Integrity: We act with honesty, fairness, respect and safety, 
furthering a culture of unquestioned integrity.  This strengthens 
relationships across businesses and functions. 
Customer Satisfaction: Out future depends on us serving as 
customer advocates and customers‘ success.  We are proactive, 
hard-driving and easy to work with.  We offer expert 
knowledge and practical solutions.  We deliver on possibilities. 
Employee Engagement: As we grow, so will our people.  We 
foster a culture that promotes excellent performance, 
teamwork, inclusion, leadership and growth.  Our employee 
and leader diversity will mirror our global markets and 
population. 
Innovation: We believe there is always a better way.  We 
encourage change and seek the opportunities it brings.  We will 
commercialize innovations globally at an accelerating pace. 
Sustainability: Through our products, services, operations and 
community involvement, we promote the efficient use of 
resources to benefit all people and our planet.  The 
environment and sustainability are key elements of our 
business proposition.
1003
 
 
The introduction of the JCI ethics policy acknowledges that only clear-cut choices are 
easy, but most ethics dilemmas are not between good or bad, right or wrong, yes or 
no.
1004
  The hypothetical situation facing JCI (which is not intentionally in reference to 
past, present, or future real-life persons or situations) is that a ‗third-party,‘ engineering 
firm has been in trouble with the Better Business Bureau for alleged improper practices, 
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including claiming others‘ intellectual property as their own.  The firm is being audited.  
This firm has been an intermediary between a key client and JCI‘s business as the 
designer and tester of the client‘s climate control systems.  During design and testing, JCI 
associates work with the engineering firm, not the client directly.  JCI is not working with 
the firm at present and the alleged inappropriate activities happened in association with a 
different client, meaning that neither JCI nor the clients were involved.  This may be the 
perfect occasion for JCI to use the CD4DF model, as the engineering firm‘s conduct is 
not cohesive with JCI values. 
Portions of the Starbucks mission statement about partners, customers, stores and 
neighborhoods as well as a corporate ethics statement are as follows: 
Mission –  
Our Partners: We‘re called partners… Together, we embrace 
diversity to create a place where each of us can be ourselves.  
We always treat each other with respect and dignity.  And we 
hold each other to that standard. 
Our Customers: …[Our work] is really about a human connection. 
Our Stores: …[O]ur stores become a haven… [They are] always 
full of humanity. 
Our Neighborhood: Every store is part of a community, and 
we take our responsibility to be good neighbors seriously.  We 
want to be invited in wherever we do business.  We can be a 
force for positive action – bringing together our partners, 
customers, and the community to contribute every day.  Now 
we see that our responsibility – and our potential for good – is 
even larger.  The world is looking to Starbucks to set the new 
standard, yet again. We will lead.
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Ethics –  
Starbucks believes that conducting business ethically and striving 
to do the right thing are vital to the success of the 
company…We share our customers‘ commitment to the 
environment.  And we believe in the importance of caring for 
our planet and encouraging others to do the same.
1006
 
 
Starbucks commits to the wellness of its own partners (i.e., associates), including various 
programs and the provision of health insurance for part-time and full-time partners since 
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1988.
1007
  Hypothetically, a situation that could call for cooperation (not implying any 
actual past, present, or future wrongdoing) is if Starbucks was to partner with a 
community development firm, which advances community initiatives but does not 
provide basic services, such as health insurance, to its employees. 
There is always use for this model of cooperation because of our accountability to 
each other.  It is a multi-agency principle for improving the way we handle our dynamic, 
multi-faceted, complex organizations, relationships, and lives.  Cooperation always has 
an anchor to someone or a group doing something we do not agree with, where the heavy 
chain tying the vessel (i.e., the cooperator) to the anchor (i.e., the moral agent) is a 
relationship or association.  The compass (i.e., values, mission, standards) does not have 
to be religiously-based to be relevant. 
 
III. Summary and Conclusion 
Cooperation has been called one of the most difficult concepts in moral 
theology.
1008
  It is not only a difficult concept because of the nuance of its taxonomy; 
people rarely interpret and apply it in the same way.  ―Cooperation is so difficult because 
it reflects the complexity of life.‖1009  For these reasons, one could easily regard it as a 
recipe for frustration, if not disaster. 
The thesis did not begin with the complexity of the principle or the suggestion of 
a different and novel use.  Three topics preceded this in chapter one.  It started with 
foundational assumptions as context, historical challenges for Catholic health care, and 
the complexity of challenges in contemporary life and Catholic health care.  It 
transitioned by introducing cooperation as an essentially social principle. 
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Specifying the complexity of cooperation was the latter task of chapter two.  This 
included defining material cooperation and its taxonomy from within the tradition, 
relating (e.g., comparing, contrasting) it with other principles within the tradition, 
locating it (i.e., describing its development) within the history of theological ethics, 
applying it to individual issues within Catholic health care, and identifying fundamental.  
Establishing the Roman Catholic theological foundations of cooperation was the former 
task of chapter two. 
Cooperation has organizational uses, which was the topic of chapter three.  It 
began with the assertion that, indeed, organizations have moral agency, although their 
form of agency differs from individual agency.  Organizations‘ agency is a function of 
organizational ethics and acknowledged within the Catholic theological tradition.  The 
chapter completed by comparing and contrasting individual and organizations during the 
application of cooperation as well as conversing about the organizational applications of 
cooperation, which are different from the individual applications. 
A strategic shift in emphasis occurred in chapter four that set aside cooperation 
and switched to the implementation and use of cooperation as a function of moral 
development.  The chapter began with moral development as a foundation for moral 
agency to identify wrongdoing.  Next, it aligned moral development with discernment 
and organizational agency, and it ended with an understanding that the application and 
justification of material cooperation is a function of moral development. In other word, 
an agent who employs cooperation may reveal cues as to his or her moral development 
while explaining why he or she categorized an issue in a particular way (e.g., explicit 
formal, immediate material, proximate mediate material).  
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Chapter five had two major divisions, both pertaining to the contribution of 
cooperation as a function of moral development for ministry formation.  The first division 
was about situating the model for ministry formation and ministry discernment, which 
consisted of defining formation and discernment, discussing the complex connections 
between moral reasoning and moral behavior than moral interventions, the reality of 
using cooperation for discernment, and the nature of this postmodern use in a ‗modern 
principle‘s clothing.‘  The second division discussed the CD4DF model itself – its 
structure, roles, and process. 
This chapter, the sixth and final, covered the benefits and burdens, advantages and 
disadvantages of this CD4DF model.  It also extrapolated the relevance of the CD4DF 
model outside of Catholic organizations – secular and other-than-Catholic organizations.  
Making this argument necessitated substantiation that secular and other-than-Catholic 
organizations have missions, values, and thus, reason to establish malfeasance, 
incongruence, and injustice, if not moral evil in the sense of the Catholic tradition.  
Similarly, people in secular and other-than-Catholic organizations have relationships and 
moral proximity (or distance) to those causing the malfeasance, incongruence, or 
injustice.  Cooperation, therefore, has relevance in these settings.  
With reference to cooperation‘s intricacy, it is precisely this nuance – this mixture of 
ingredients – that makes cooperation the perfect principle for gauging persons‘ moral 
development when applying cooperation to an issue.  Utilizing the above model, the 
complexity of cooperation in its application is one mechanism for addressing multiple 
dynamics including organizational ministry discernment, individual ministry formation, 
and possibly individual moral development.  The relationship and interconnectivity, if 
 381 
any, between moral motivation (intent), sensitivity, reasoning, judgment, and behavior 
(actions) is complex and unclear, presenting a significant challenge for many moral 
interventions.  Still, by addressing what we know about this relationship as well as moral 
and adult education, we create an optimal environment for advancing participants‘ moral 
development by addressing as many of the mentioned factors as possible.  The CD4DF 
model becomes an optimal release valve for ensuring that the fare inside the pressure 
cooker, the people in an organization, reaches its full potential, which is their formation 
and development. 
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